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A REVIEW 

OF THE 

ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS 

OF THE 

GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA 



iQi^^^^t^ 



BY DIRECTION 

OF 
THE MAJOR GENERAL COMMANDANT 

OF 
THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS 






Ijlljy 



I 



A REVIEW OF THE ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS 

OF THE GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA 

Prepared By 



MAJOR JULIAN C. SMITH, U.S.M.C. 
MAJOR LLOYD L. LEECH, U.S.M.C. 
MAJOR THOMAS P. CHEATHAM, U.S.M.C. 
CAPTAIN EDWARD L. BUR WELL, Jr., U.S.M.C. 
CAPTAIN H. M. H. FLEMING, U.S.M.C. 
FIRST LIEUTENANT OREGON A. WILLIAMS, U.S.M.C. 
SERGEANT MAJOR CHARLES DAVIS, U.S.M.C. 
CORPORAL EMIL H. KRIEGER, U.S.M.C. 



BY DIRECTION OF THE MAJOR GENERAL COMMANDANT 
OF THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS 



TO THE OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE UNITED STATES 
MARINE CORPS AND NAVY WHO LOST THEIR LIVES WHILE 
SERVING WITH THE GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA 
STRIVING TO RESTORE PEACE TO THE INHABITANTS OF 
A TROUBLED NATION. 



THE ROLL OF HONOR 

LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HUGO F. A. BASKE, (MC), U.S.N. 

CAPTAIN HARLAN PEFLEY, U.S.M.C. 

FIRST LIEUTENANT EDWARD SELBY, U.S.M.C. 

FIRST LIEUTENANT VERYL H. DARTT, U.S.M.C. 

FIRST LIEUTENANT LEO HEALEY, U.S.M.C. 

FIRST LIEUTENANT LESTER E. POWER, U.S.M.C. 

FIRST LIEUTENANT ALBERT R. BOURNE, U.S.M.C. 

SECOND LIEUTENANT LAURENCE C. BRUNTON, U.S.M.C. 

CHIEF Q.M. CLERK JAMES F. DICKEY, U.S.M.C. 

FIRST SERGEANT JOHNNY F. HEMPHILL, U.S.M.C. 

FIRST SERGEANT THOMAS G. BRUCE, U.S.M.C. 

GUNNERY SERGEANT EDWARD H SCHMIERER, U.S.M.C. 

PHM. FIRST CLASS FINIS H. WHITEHEAD, (MC), U.S.N. 

SERGEANT ROBERT W. LEAKE, U.S.M.C. 

SERGEANT JAMES O. YOUNG, U.S.M.C. 

SERGEANT NORMAN G. FREEMAN, U.S.M.C. 

SERGEANT RUSSELL WHITE, U.S.M.C. 

SERGEANT WILLIAM H. PIGG, U.S.M.C. 

SERGEANT WILLIAM E. McGHEE, U.S.M.C. 

SERGEANT LUIS A. RAMIREZ, U.S.M.C. 

SERGEANT CHARLES J. LEVONSKI, U.S.M.C. 

CORPORAL LEWIS E. TROGLER, U.S.M.C. 

CORPORAL LAURIN T. COVINGTON, U.S.M.C. 



lU 



PREFACE 

The story of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua is one of moving 
interest not only to the officers and men of the Marine Corps, but also 
to the general reader. It is full of important lessons to the naval and 
military services, and to the statesman as well. It furnishes a perfect 
illustration of the fact that the officers of the naval and military services 
do not make, but only carry out the policies of their Government ; and of 
the effect of economics on military operations. 

When the Guardia was organized the Republic of Nicaragua was 
prosperous and there was a surplus of revenue over expenditures in the 
National Treasury; while the Government of the United States was 
apparently committed to the policy of maintaining a military force in 
Nicaragua until the country was completely pacified, and until a corps 
of officers had grown up and been trained to take over the responsibili- 
ties of the administration of the Guardia, and the maintenance of law 
and order throughout the Republic. 

Within two years the worldwide depression had descended upon 
Nicaragua, leaving the country with insufficient income to meet its 
ordinary expenditures, precluding the maintenance of a military or- 
ganization of sufficient size and strength to restore and maintain peace 
and security to the inhabitants; while at the same time, due to a change 
in the administration in the United States, the American policy changed 
from one of lending military assistance, to the withdrawal at the earliest 
possible moment of all armed forces, leaving Nicaragua to cope unaided 
with its internal disorders and revolts. 

Neither these policies nor the economic depression were the making 
of the officers assigned to duty with the Guardia, and their methods of 
executing the policies were subject to the constant supervision of the 
State Department of the United States. 

Since the President of Nicaragua was the Commander in Chief of 
the Guardia, except during the electoral periods when the Chairman 
of the Electoral Commission assumed full control, the Jefe Director often 
found it necessary to regulate his actions to meet the wishes of the Presi- 
dent without running counter to the policies of his own Government. 

It was necessary for the Guardia to conduct a continuous savage 
guerilla war against forces, which if they were not greater than the total 
strength of the Guardia, were so situated that they were superior in the 
areas where they operated, and whose ranks were filled with seasoned 
troops and capable leaders, veterans of revolutionary wars from the 
Rio Grande to the Isthmus of Panamia. At the same time it was re- 
quired to build from the beginning, an organization that would stand 
alone, officered by men of mature judgement, capable of administering 
its affairs, and maintaining it as an efficient military organization, all 
of this in the short space of a little more than five years. 

Only the general outline of its accomplishments under command 
of officers and men of the United States Marine Corps and Navy has 
been attempted. It would be impossible within the scope of this work 
to recount the many incidents of heroism, hardship, and self-sacrifice 
of those who fearlessly led their men through the almost trackless, but 
always bandit infested wildernesses of northern and central Nicaragua ; 
or to more than mention the wholehearted support and cooperation re- 
ceived from the Major General Commandant of the Marine Corps, the 
Special Service Squadron, the Second Brigade of Marines, and particu- 



larly, the members of the Aircraft Squadrons, always so willing to come 
tc the assistance of their brothers-at-arms, and ever ready to risk a life 
to save the life of a Guardia. 

The work has been divided into two parts, Volume I, the text, and 
Volume II, the appendices. In this manner it is the hope of the Board 
that the interests of both the military student and the general reader 
will be served. Where it was believed necessary to quote documents to 
sustain statements made in the text, the quotations have been included 
in the appendices. The student of small wars will be fully repaid for 
the time he may spend in a perusal of the contents of Volume 1 1, as they 
contain first hand accounts of a number of typical contacts between the 
guardia and bandit forces as well as copies of the original orders and 
correspondence concerning matters pertinent to the situation confront- 
ing the Guardia. 

Every effort has been made to verify all the statements appearing 
in the text, and all matter has been presented without comment. 

The members of the Board submit this work with the hope that it 
will not only preserve a record of the splendid self-sacrificing perfor- 
mance of duty of the officers of the Marine Corps and Navy, attached 
to the National Guard of Nicaragua, but will also be of assistance to 
those who may be required to organize and command similar organiza- 
tions in the future. 

The contributions of Captain E. L. Burwell, Jr., and Sergeant 
Major Charles Davis, consisting in the preparation of chapters, search- 
ing records for data and in the general compilation of the work, have 
been invaluable. Lieutenant Edward J. Trumble, though not a member 
of the Board kindly contributed the chapter on the Military Academy. 

The appreciation of the Board is due to Brigadier General J. C. 
Breckinridge, Commandant of the Marine Corps Schools; and the 
members of his staff, who cooperated in every way possible, furnishing 
office space, clerical assistance, and their sympathetic support to the 
members of the Board; and to the Reproduction Department for re- 
producing maps and sketches. 

Lieutenant Colonel C. B. Matthews merits the thanks of the Board 
for his helpful comments when reading the chapters in draft form. 

JULIAN C. SMITH, 
Major, U.S.M.C, 
Senior Member. 



VI 



CONTENTS 

VOLUME I 

CHAPTERS PAGES. 

I HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 1—6 

II THE ORGANIZATION OF THE GUARDIA 7—20 

Guardia Municipal 16 — 17 

Civicos 17 

Auxiliares 18 — 19 

III MILITARY OPERATIONS 21—42 

Bandit objectives 2 1 — 23 

Terrain 23 — 24 

Bandit intelligence 24 

Bandit organization and operations 25 — 27 

Guardia strength and organization 27 — 28 

Guardia missions 28 — 29 

Closing the border 29 — 30 

Concentration of all Guardia forces for an offensive 30 — 34 

Combining an active defense with offensive operations 35 — 38 

Guardia operations 38 — 39 

Guardia morale . 39 

Guardia intelligence 40 — 41 

Aviation support of the Guardia 41 — 42 

Summary of objectives attained by the Guardia 42 

IV PUBLIC RELATIONS 43—60 

The Civil Government of Nicaragua 43 — 48 

Judiciary proper 45 

Government accounting 45 

Settlement of claims 45 

Civil officials exercising judicial functions 45 

Military Tribunals 45 

Courts of Appeals 45 — 46 

The District Courts 46 

The Local Courts 46 

The Tribunal of Accounts 46 — 47 

The Claims Commission 47 

Directores de Policia 47 

The Jefes Politico 47 

Administrador de Rentas 47 

Alcaldes 48 

Jueces de la Mesta 48 

Jefes de Canton 48 

Capitanes de Canada 48 

Extra-ordinary military tribunals 48 

The Police Mission 49 — 53 

Factors entering into and effecting the Police Mission 50 — 53 

Cooperation with the Civil Officials of the Republic 53 — 54 

The System of Administration of Justice and 

Criminal Procedure 54 — 60 

vii 



CONTENTS 

VOLUME I 
CHAPTERS PAGES 

IV(con't.). Criminal Procedure 55 — 57 

Contraband 58 

Traffic in Arms, Ammunition and Explosives 58 

Importation of Arms, Explosives, Munitions 58 

Martial Law in Nicaragua 58 — 60 

V BANDIT CHIEFS 61—70 

Section 1 — Augusto Calderon Sandino 61 — 68 

Section 2 — Other Leaders 68 — 70 

Juan Gregorio Colindres 68 

Carlos Salgado 68 — 69 

Jose Leon Diaz 69 

Juan Pablo Umanzor 69 

Miguel Angel Ortez y Guillen 69 

Pedro (Pedron) Altamirano 69 — 70 

Pedro Blandon 70 

Pedro Irias 70 

VI THE QUARTERMASTER'S DEPARTMENT 71—80 

Section 1 — Organization and Personnel 71 — 73 

Disbursing Division 71 — 72 

Voucher Section 71 

Purchase Section 71 

Subsistence Section 71 

Canteen Section 72 

Transportation Section 72 

Public Works Section 72 

Property Accounting Division 72 

Property Section 72 

Clothing Section 72 

Receiving and Forwarding Section. 72 

Animal Section 72 

Purchasing 73 

Auditing 73 

Section 2-Accountability, Clothing &z Property 73 — 74 

Section 3-Initial Supply 74 — 75 

Section 4-Uniforms and Clothing 75 — 76 

Section 5-Arms and Equipment 76 

Section 6-Remounts and Forage 76 — 77 

Section 7-Motor Vehicles 77 

Section 8-Transportation, troops and supplies 78 — 79 

Section 9-Rent, repairs and construction of barracks 79 

Section 10-Rations 79—80 

Section 1 1 -Turnover to Nicaraguan Officers 80 

VI I THE PAYMASTER'S DEPARTMENT 81—86 

Section 1 -Organization and Personnel 81 

Section 2-Funds, sources of 81 — 82 

Section 3 -Funds, by whom di sbursed 82 

Section 4-Funds, methods of supplying 82 — 83 

viii 



CONTENTS 

VOLUME I 

CHAPTERS PAGES 

Section 5-Payrolls 83 

Section 6-Pay, rates of (tables) 83 — 8$ 

Section /-Maintenance funds 85 

Section 8-Miscellaneous activities 85 — 86 

Section 9-Inspection of Paymaster's Accounts 86 

Section 10-Summary 86 

VIII THE LAW DEPARTMENT 87 

IX THE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT 88—90 

Section 1 -Organization and Personnel 88 — 89 

Section 2-Collateral Activities 89 

Section 3-Turnover to Nicaraguan Control 90 

.X SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS 91—94 

Section l-General 91 

Section 2-Telegraph 91 

Section 3-Telephone 91 — 92 

Section 4-Radio 92 — 93 

Section 5-Communications Office 93 — 94 

XI THE GUARDI A POLICE COMPANY, MANAGUA 95—99 

XII THE DEPARTMENT OF CONSTRUCTION OF ROADS. . . . 100—101 

XIII THE NICARAGUAN NATIONAL MILITARY ACADEMY. . 102—106 

XIV THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD 107—108 

XV MUTINIES 109—122 

Section l-General 1 09 — 

Section 2-Somotillo 110 — 1 1 1 

Section 3-Telpaneca (first) Ill — 112 

Section 4-Telpaneca (second) 11 3 — 1 1 5 

Section 5-Paso Real 11 5 — 1 16 

Section 6-Jicaro 1 16 — 1 17 

Section 7-Somoto 11 7 — 1 1 8 

Section 8--Presidential Guard, Managua 1 18 — 1 19 

Section 9-Kisalaya 1 19—120 

Section 10-Quilali 120—121 

Section 11-San Isidro 121 — 122 

XVI ACTIVITIES OF THE GUARDIA NACIONAL 

DURING THE EARTHQUAKE IN MANAGUA 123—134 

XVII DECORATIONS, CITATIONS 135—137 

XVIII THE ELECTION OF 1932 138—146 

XIX THE TURNOVER 147—161 

XX THE EVACUATION 162—163 

XXI THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION SUBMITTED BY 

THE GUARDIA NACIONAL 164—202 

APPENDICES (In separate volume). 

ix 



MAPS 
Bound in volume 

1. NICARAGUA, by Areas and Departments following page 19 

2. NICARAGUA, showing unoccupied, disputed, and 

pacified zones, and bandit routes 

of supply and communication. .. . " " 44 



SKETCHES 

VOLUME II 

1. Captain Anderson's ambush following page 750 

2. Lieutenant Clark's ambush " " 54 

3. Attack on Captain Power's patrol " " 57 

(two plates) 

4. Attack on Limay " " 60 

5. Guardia attack at Biltigni River " "65 



APPENDICES 

CHAPTER II 

1. Letter Stimson to Moncada concerning terms of disarmament. 

2. Letter Stimson to Moncada stating terms of amnesty. 

3. Executive Order designating ranks and pay of American officers 

in Guardia. 

4. Executive Order authorizing Guardia increase. 

5. Executive Order authorizing appointm.ent of 60 officers. 

6. Executive Order directing police service in Department of Chi- 

nandega be taken over by the Guardia. 

7. Presidential Decree No. 54, directing the Guardia to take over 

police functions of the Republic. 

8. The Guardia Agreement. 

9. Navy Department instructions for forces in Nicaragua. 

10. Modification of Appendix numiber 9. 

11. Executive Order directing Guardia to take over police service of 

the capital. 

12. Executive Order authorizing increase ot the Guardia. 

13. Strength and distribution table. 

14. Copy of contract with municipalities for maintenance of Muni- 

cipal Police. 

15. Civico contract. 

16. Civico en Finca contract. 

17. Order creating Auxiliares. 

18. Auxiliar contract. 

19. List of Jefe Directors, Staff, Area and Department Commanders, 

and Executives. 

CHAPTER III 

1. Letter Sandino assuming authority over towns in Segovias. 

2. Proclamation Sandino declaring certain villages out of Diaz' 

control. 

3. Regulations for civil and military authorities of the territory 

claimed by Sandino. 

4. Letter Sandino to Altamirano defying American authorities, and 

other subjects. 

5. Newspaper articles quoting Sandino propaganda and intentions. 

6. Sandino bulletin listing combats and proclaiming fraternity with 

people of Honduras. 

7. Entry of Sandino into Honduras. 

8. Letter Jefe Director advising American Minister that Sandino is 

reported in Honduras. 

9. Decree of Sandino directing contributions to bandit organizations. 

10. Order of Altamirano to Lieutenant Herera to collect contribu- 

tions and ordering the death of all enemies. 

1 1 . Letter Altamirano decreeing a contribution to bandit organiza- 

tions. 

12. Outline of bandit activities and plans in Central Area. 

13. Account of ambush of Captain Anderson near San Juan de Tel- 

paneca. 

14. Account of ambush of Lieutenant Clark at Los Pinos. 

xi 



APPENDICES 

CHAPTER Ill(Cont). 

15. Attack on Captain Power's patrol at Embocaderos. 

16. Attack on Limay. 

17. Attack on Somoto. 

18. Guardia attack at Biltigni River. 

19. Engagements of Company "M" at RIO AUYUBAL, LINDO 

LUGARE, SAN ANTONIO and LA CEIBA. 

20. Operations in Eastern Area, (death of Blandon). 

21. Operations near Neptune Mines by Guardia and airplanes. 

22. Pursuit of Altamirano by Captain Bourne's patrol. 

23. Pursuit of bandits by Captain Williams. 

24. The Convention of Peace with Sandino. 

25. Organization of Nueva Segovia. 

26. Organization of Central Area. 

27. Weekly summary of Guardia intelligence. 

28. Message of President Moncada to National Congress, and address 

to President Elect Sacasa outlining peaceful accomplishments 
during his administration, expressing appreciation for the 
assistance of the United States to the Nicaraguan people, and 
voicing the necessity for the continuance of the Guardia 
Nacional. 

29. Official List of Contacts with Official List of Marine Corps and 

Navy casualties. 

CHAPTER IV 
1 . Outline of Police and Military missions of the Guardia in North- 
ern and Central Areas under Martial Law. 

CHAPTER XVIII 

1. Letter of Instructions, National Board of Elections, 1932. 

2. Instructions of Jefe Director regarding Plebiscite of Liberal 

Party. 

3. Instructions concerning control by the Guardia of all distilleries 

during electoral period. 

4. Confidential letter Jefe Director to all Area and Department 

Commanders regarding Plebiscites. 

5. Instructions regarding Electoral Mission of the Guardia. 

6. Amendment to Appendix number 5. 

7. Instructions regarding Electoral Mission of the Guardia. 

8. Sale of beer during electoral period. 

9. Letter of appreciation by Chairman Electoral Mission for services 

rendered by Guardia prior to Election Day. 
10. Presidential Decree forbidding use of fireworks during certain 
part of Electoral Period. 

CHAPTER XIX 
L Agreement of Presidential candidates pledging preservation of 
non-partisan character of Guardia. 



Xll 



CHAPTER XX 

1. Order Chief Naval Operations directing evacuation from Nicara- 

gua. 

2. Memorandum Commander, 2nd Marine Brigade to Jefe Director 

concerning details of evacuation. 

3. Plan for concentration of Guardia personnel submitted to Com- 

mander, 2nd Marine Brigade. 

4. Plan of concentration for evacuation. 

5. Order for concentration of Marine Corps and Navy personnel in 

Guardia for evacuation. 



xiu 



CHAPTER I 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 

At the time of the formation of the Guardia Nacional under com- 
mand of officers of the United States Marine Corps, Nicaragua had 
completed a little more than a century of national independence, hav- 
ing, together with the other four Central American Republics, thrown 
off the yoke of Spain in 1821. Prior to that date the history of the coun- 
try consisted of three centuries of despotism, during which the people 
had been kept isolated from the rest of the world, allowed to trade 
only with Spain, and held in ignorance and poverty. 

The separation of the Central American colonies from Spain was 
practically unopposed, as the mother country was too much occupied 
in trying to save the far more valuable colonies of South America to 
spare troops to hold these less important possessions. The revolt was 
easily accomplished, but the task of organizing a government composed 
of the five Central American colonies proved beyond the capabilities 
of a people untrained in administering their affairs, and lacking in the 
traditions and experience of self government. 

Nicaragua, like the rest of the Latin American Republics, adopted 
a constitution and system of government modeled after that of the 
United States. The government consists of a President, a Congress of 
two houses, and a Supreme Court. While completely democratic in 
theory, the government in fact has consisted of a series of dictator- 
ships, in which the President has exercised arbitrary power, bending 
both the Congress and the Courts to his will. National elections have 
been a farce, and the party in power has never failed to turn in a ma- 
jority of the votes counted for its candidate, and with the exception of 
the supervised elections of 1928 and 1932, a complete change of govern- 
ment has never come about except through revolution. 

Geographically, Nicaragua is the largest of the Central American 
Republics. It contains Lakes Nicaragua and Managua, which occupy 
substantially 3000 square miles of its territory and have had a great 
influence upon the history of the country. The depression containing the 
basins of these lakes and of the San Juan River, their outlet to the At- 
lantic, extends across the Isthmus. Lake Nicaragua, which is only 110 
feet above sea level, is separated from the Pacific by a range of low 
hills, and is distant from, it only 1 3 miles at the narrowest point of the se- 
parating land. Lake Managua lies to the north and is distant from the 
Pacific only about 30 miles across the low plain of Leon. In colonial times, 
the route across the isthmus through Leon to Granada on Lake Nicara- 
gua and thence by water, was commonly used for the transportation 
of products from all pans of Central America to Spain ; and much more 
recently was one of the most popular lanes of travel between California 
and the east coast of the United States. It was considered by many 
the most practicable route for an interoceanic water-way. Diplomatic 
controversies for the possession of the canal route, and the machina- 
tions of corporations endeavoring to gain control of its existing facilities 
for transisthmian transportation have played a large part in the inter- 
national relations of the Republic, and at times have disturbed her 
internal political conditions. The construction of the Panama Canal 
and the ratification of the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty, whereby the United 



States purchased the sole right to a canal by the Nicaraguan route put 
an end to the difficulties from this source. 

Since obtaining her independence the history of Nicaragua has 
been a record of almost uninterrupted internal discord, revolt and revo- 
lution, and the condition of her people with regard to ignorance and 
poverty has but little improved; some seventy percent of her inhabi- 
tants are illiterate, and many live in isolated regions with only the most 
primitive means of communication with each other or with the outside 
world. With an area of 49,200 square miles, greater than that of the 
State of New York, there are only 171 miles of railroad. Highways, in 
our sense of the word, are unknown except between some of the larger 
cities of the Pacific coastal plain. The roads consist only of beaten 
paths over mountain and through jungle, some passable for the two- 
wheeled bull-carts of the country during the dry season, and in the rainy 
season impassable to anything more modern than a pack train. Com- 
munication between the east and west coasts is by mule pack and small 
boat, difficult and slow in the dry season, and im.possible, or at least 
extremely dangerous, during the rains. 

When the Spaniards conquered the country they enslaved the in- 
habitants, and intermarried with their women, and the present popula- 
tion is the result of that mingling. According to the census of 1920, the 
population was 638, 119. Of this number, 17 per cent is classed as white, 
3 per cent as pure Indian, 9 per cent as Negro, and 71 per cent as mixed 
— mainly Spanish and Indian. About 72 per cent of this population is 
illiterate. The negroes are mainly confined to the Atlantic coast, having 
migrated from the West Indies. Spanish laws, customs and language 
prevail through the country. 

The people of Nicaragua more than the people of the other coun- 
tries of Central America, are dwellers in cities. About one-fourth of all 
her inhabitants live in six important towns in the lake plains. The con- 
centration of the population in a few cities has intensified the conditions 
that have worked against peace and made Nicaragua the most turbulent 
of the Central American Republics. The Mestizo artisans, especially 
those of the larger cities, are always ready to drop their work and take 
up arms in the interests of their faction or of their patron, and even the 
ordinary laborers are Liberals or Conservatives and followers of this 
or that chief. The common people are little interested in principles, but 
follow their leaders partly from devotion and partly because they are 
united to them by the old local hatreds that have kept the parties alive. 
Granada and Leon, the respective centers of Conservatism and Liberal- 
ism, have been bitter rivals since their foundation, and this rivalry and 
the inherited hatred between these two most important cities, has been 
the cause of many revolts and uprisings. The other cities are divided in 
their sympathies. Those dependent geographically upon one of the 
rivals have naturally followed it in politics. Others are split within 
themselves by fueds between their leading citizens and between different 
elements in their population. 

The country has been dominated politically by the Conservative 
and Liberal parties, the leaders of which are intelligent and usually well 
educated men. Unfortunately in the past, they have been more inter- 
ested in exploiting the people and maintaining themselves or their 
friends in power than in advancing the interests of their country and 
its inhabitants. 



The events leading up to the interventions by the United States 
which culminated in the supervision of the elections of 1928 and 1932, 
and the formation of the Guardia began with the regime of Zelaya, who 
obtained the Presidency as a result of the Liberal revolution of 1893. 

Jose Santos Zelaya was the absolute ruler of Nicaragua for sixteen 
years. During his administration, the railway system and the steamer 
service on the lakes was extended and improved, the development of 
the coffee districts was stimulated by generous subsidies, and the capital, 
Zelaya's birthplace, was transformed from a rather primitive small town 
to the most progressive city of the Republic. Marked progress was 
made in the matter of public instruction, schools were opened in all 
parts of the country, and many young men of special ability were sent 
abroad to study. 

Despite his progressive policy, however, Zelaya was a brutal and 
unscrupulous tyrant, who exploited the country for his own personal 
profit on a scale unprecedented in the history of the isthmus. He vio- 
lated personal and private property rights, inflicting the most brutal 
treatment on his enemies. He fomented revolutions in all the other 
Central American Republics and kept the whole isthmus in a state of 
turmoil. His warlike activities, his systematic opposition to American 
influence and his propensity for entering into entanglements with foreign 
governments finally brought about an open rupture with the United 
States, and did much to cause his downfall. 

In October, 1909, a revolt broke out in Bluefields against Zelaya. 
General Juan Estrada was named provisional president and Adolfo 
Diaz, a local official of an American mining company, financed the re- 
volt. As the conflict grew intense, the United States unmistakably 
showed that its sympathies were with the revolutionists. Early in 
November, two Americans, Cannon and Groce, holding commissions 
in the revolutionary army, were captured. Zelaya had these two men 
tried by court-martial and they were sentenced to be shot, which sen- 
tence was duly executed November 17, 1909, in spite of protests by the 
American Minister in Managua. 

When it became known in Washington that Cannon and Groce had 
been shot. Secretary of State Knox broke off relations with Nicaragua 
and handed the Charge d'Affaires his passports. 

Zelaya resigned on December 15, 1909, and left the country. The 
Nicaraguan Congress elected Dr. Jose Madriz to succeed Zelaya. With 
the mora] support of the United States the revolutionists defeated 
Madriz and he resigned August 20, 1910. 

The United States appointed Thomas C. Dawson, the American 
Minister in Panama, as special agent to Nicaragua, to arrange for free 
elections and liberal constitution, a loan to restore Nicaraguan finances, 
the liquidation of all m.ixed claims, and an indemnity for Cannon and 
Groce. The arrangements made cam.e to be called the Dawson agree- 
ment, which lost most of its effect when the Senate of the United States 
refused co ratify the Knox-Castrillo convention to carry out the loan 
provision. However, Estrada was elected President and Diaz Vice 
President on Decemiber 31, 1910. Estrada's rule lasted only a short 
time, terminating on May 9, 1911. He caused General Mena, Minister 
of War, to be arrested for "contemplated treason." The commotion 
caused by this incident forced him to resign and Diaz succeeded to the 
Presidency, releasing Mena at once. 

3 



Although the convention was not ratified, yet a loan was made by 
the bankers, Brown Bros, and J. and W. Seligman, at the instance of 
Secretary Knox, for ,? 1,500, 000, and an American, Clifford D. Ham, 
was appointed Collector of Customs on the nomination of the bankers 
and Secretary Knox. A mixed Claims Commission was appointed, con- 
sisting of two Americans and one Nicaraguan. A total of ^13,808,161 
came before the Commission, and awards were made amounting to 
^1,840,432.31. The greatest number of claimants were Nicaraguans, 
but the 66 American claimants asked for ^7,576,564.13. They received 
only ^538,749.71, as their claims were based mostly on illegal conces- 
sions and on estimated future profits. 

On July 29, 1912, the Liberals proclaimed a revolution, seized con- 
siderable stores of war material, most of the custom houses, and part 
of the railroad. President Diaz then asked that the "United States 
guarantee with its forces security for the property of its citizens in 
Nicaragua and that it extend its protection to all the inhabitants of 
the Republic." 

The United States was not slow to act. On August 5, Secretary 
Knox asked President Taft for authority to use the marines then in 
Panama to protect American life and property in Nicaragua. Authority 
was immicdiately granted and on August 15th, the advance force under 
Major Butler landed in Nicaragua. The situation assumed greater pro- 
portions than was expected and more troops were sent. Altogether 125 
officers and 2600 sailors and marines were landed. 1 hey participated 
in the bombardment of Managua, a night ambuscade in Masaya, the 
surrender of General Mena and his rebel army at Granada, the surrender 
of the rebel gunboats Victoria and Ninety-three, the assault and capture 
of Coyotepe, the defense of Paso Caballos Bridge, and performed garri- 
son and other duty at Corinto, Chinandega and elsewhere. Under such 
circumstances the rebellion was soon ended, an election was held, 
guarded by the marines, and on November 12, 1912, Diaz v/as re- 
elected President. The leader of the revolt, General Mena, was sent to 
Panama as a quasi-prisoner of war. 

Upon the withdrawal of the marines, a legation guard was left in 
Managua. Nicaragua finances were in a sad plight by the end of 1912. 
This difficulty was met by the sale to the United States of the sole 
right to construct a canal through Nicaraguan territory, for the sum of 
^3,000,000. A treaty to this effect was drawn up, and finally ratified 
February 16, 1916. It is known as the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty. 

The Conservative party remained in power until 1924, when the 
moderate Conservatives and the Liberals united upon a coalition ticket 
composed of Carlos Solorzano, a Conservative, as candidate for Presi- 
dent, and Dr. Juan B. Sacasa, Liberal, as candidate for Vice-President. 
The extreme Conservative faction presented a ticket headed by Emili- 
ano Chamorro. The coalition ticket was declared elected by a large 
majority. Though the election had been comparatively free from vio- 
lence, it was not without charges of wholesale fraud. 

Prior to the 1924 election the United States had given notice that 
the Legation Guard would be withdrawn on January 1, 1925, immedi- 
ately after the inauguration of the new President. On the urgent re- 
quest of President Solorzano the withdrawal was postponed until 
August 4, 1925, when the new administration was supposed to have 
become steady in the saddle. 



Order lasted just three weeks thereafter. On August 25, the 
friends of General Emiliano Channorro, the defeated Conservative can- 
didate, seized the Liberal cabinet officers while they were attending a 
banquet, and locked them up. On October 25, Chamorro seized the 
Loma, the fortress that overlooked Managua, and dominated the capi- 
tal. Vice-President Sacasa, and subsequently President Solorzano, left 
the country in fear of their lives. The membership of Congress was 
reconstituted by expelling eighteen Liberal and moderate Conserva- 
tive members and filling their places by adherents of Chamorro. He 
was then elected by Congress as First Designate, who, in accordance 
with the Nicaraguan Constitution assumes the Office of President in 
the absence of the President and Vice-President. Chamorro assumed 
the functions of the Presidency on January 16, 1926. 

All this was done over the protest of the United States which 
claimed it was in violation of the Treaties of 1907 and 1923, whereby 
the Central American Republics had agreed not to recognize anyone as 
President who came into power by revolution or by coup d'etat. The 
first Liberal revolution against Cham.orro broke out in May. By Octo- 
ber, having spent all the money in the Treasury, and unable to borrow 
abroad, Chamorro yielded to the pressure against him and turned the 
reins of government over to Senator Uriza, who had been appointed 
Second Designate by Congress. The United States refused to recognize 
Uriza as President on the grounds that he had been elected by the same 
illegal Congress that had elected Chamorro. Thereupon a new extra- 
ordinary session of Congress was called. The eighteen Senators and 
Deputies who had been expelled by Chamorro from the previous Con- 
gress were invited to return and resume their seats. Of these, three 
returned to their seats and six others were represented by duly qualified 
alternates who had been legally elected in 1924. This Congress, on 
November 10, elected Adolfo Diaz as First Designate. 

At the tim^e of this election President Solorzano was in California 
and Vice-President Sacasa in Guatemala. Thereupon the United States 
Government extended recognition to President Diaz. 

The Liberals did not accept the election of Diaz to the Presidency 
but made plans to set up a rival government. On December 1, 1926, 
Doctor Sacasa, accompanied by 45 followers, landed at Puerto Cabezas, 
where he proclaimed himself "Constitutional President of Nicaragua." 
He named a cabinet, which included General Moncada as Minister of 
War and Navy. On December 2, 1926, he formally asked recognition 
of the United States, on which request the Department of State took 
no action. Doctor Sacasa also solicited recognition from the other Latin 
American countries; Mexico alone accorded it. 

Even before Chamiorro had left office, on notice not only from our 
own citizens, but from many foreign governments that American and 
foreign lives and property were in danger, the United States had sent 
naval forces to Nicaragua to protect them. 

President Diaz, soon after he came into office, formally notified 
our government that owing to the assistance given the revolutionists by 
Mexico, it would be impossible for the Nicaraguan Government to pro- 
tect the lives and interests of American citizens and other foreigners 
residing in Nicaragua. Shortly afterward the British, Belgian and 
Italian governments sent the United States formal notice to the same 
etlect and requested us to extend protection to their citizens in Nicara- 



gua. In February, 1927, the British Ambassador in Washington noti- 
fied our Secretary of State that the safety of British lives and property 
was threatened in Corinto, Leon, Managua, Granada, and Matagalpa. 
He further stated that while the British Government looked to us for 
the protection of their subjects, they had decided to send a man-of-war 
to the west coast of Nicaragua, for its moral effect and to serve as a base 
of refuge for British subjects. 

As a result of these requests, marines were again landed in Nicara- 
gua. Admiral Latimer, the senior naval officer present, proceeded to 
place a legation guard in Managua, and garrisons in the railroad and 
seaport towns in which neutral zones were established where there 
should be no fighting and where foreign lives and property might be safe. 

On March 31, 1927, Mr. Henry L. Stimson was requested by Presi- 
dent Coolidge to go to Nicaragua as his personal representative to in- 
vestigate and report conditions, and see if he could find a way to 
straighten out the situation. 

At that time Diaz, the Conservative President, was in complete 
possession of the populous western portion of Nicaragua, including the 
capital, Managua, and the principal cities of Granada, Leon, Chinan- 
dega and Corinto. The revolutionists, partly because of the skill of 
their commander, Moncada, and partly by reason of the arms, muni- 
tions and money furnished from Mexico, had captured many of the 
smaller towns on the Atlantic seaboard and had made their way through 
the mountainous interior until they were in contact with Diaz' main 
forces, not far from the town of Matagalpa. Fighting had been stub- 
born and losses extremely heavy. 

The long continued disorder and violence had produced a general 
disintegration of the social fabric of the country; semi-independent 
bands of marauders were taking advantage of the situation to plunder 
even in the settled districts. Our Minister reported to Washington 
that a general condition of anarchy was probably approaching. 

Mr. Stimson arrived at Corinto on the U.S.S. TRENTON. From 
Corinto he proceeded by rail to Managua. He describes his first im- 
pressions of Nicaragua as follows: "That the country was in the grip 
of war was apparent even from the car windows. The portion of the 
land through which we passed was evidently of great fertility. There 
were long stretches of open farming country interspersed with park- 
like vistas of beautiful trees, but the fields were uncultivated and little 
farming was going on. A large portion of the city of Chinandega was 
in ashes. Almost every man or boy whom one met either in the country 
or cities was armed. It was a common sight to see a farmer driving his 
cattle or leading his pack horse with a military rifle strapped on his 
back, while the butt ends of revolvers and automatics produced tell- 
tale creases in the garments of such male Nicaraguans as one met or 
did business with in town." 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Bales, William L., First Lieut., USMC — "The Nicaraguan Canal. ** 

McClellan, E. N., Major, USMC — "Supervising Nicaraguan Elections."* 

Cramer, Floyd — "Our Neighbor Nicaragua." 

Stimson, Henry L. — "American Policy in Nicaragua." 

Munro, Dana G. — "The Five Republics of Central America." 

State Department Document — "Latin American Series, No. 6 — The 

United States and Nicaragua." 
Cumberland, W. W. — "Nicaragua, an Econom.ic and Financial Survey." 



CHAPTER II 
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE GUARDIA 

Colonel Henry L. Stimson arrived in Managua on April 17, 1927, 
where, after conferring with the American officials, he held conferences 
with President Adolfo Diaz and other members of the Nicaraguan 
government as well as with various leaders of the Liberal party with 
a view to terminating the civil war. Colonel Stimson reported, that 
without exception, everyone with whom he conferred stressed the neces- 
sity for supervision of the elections of 1928 by the United States, as in 
view of past experiences, it was felt that whichever party controlled 
the electoral machinery in 1928 would determine the result of the elec- 
tion at that time in its own favor, unless a free election could be assured 
through American supervision. 

President Diaz proposed the creation by Nicaraguan law of an 
electoral commission to be controlled by Americans, nominated by the 
President of the United States, and offered to turn over to this board 
the entire police power of the state. The organization of a non-partisan 
constabulary under the instruction and command of American officers 
was further suggested by President Diaz, who, in this connection, asked 
for the continuance in Nicaragua of a sufficient portion of the American 
Naval Forces to insure order pending the organization of the con- 
stabulary. 

On April 22nd, President Diaz proposed the following peace terms 
to the revolutionists: 

a. Immediate general peace and delivery of arms simultaneously 
by both parties into American custody. 

b. General amnesty and return of exiles, and return of confiscated 
property. 

c. Participation in the Diaz cabinet by representative Liberals. 

d. The organization of a Nicaraguan constabulary on a non-parti- 
san basis, to be commanded by American officers. 

e. Supervision of 1928 and subsequent elections by Americans who 
would have police power to make effective such supervision. 

f. A temporary continuance of a sufficient force of American 
Marines to secure the enforcement of peace terms. 

The Liberal leaders in Managua transmitted the above proposal 
to Doctor Juan B. Sacasa at Puerto Cabezas, who, while declining to 
proceed to Managua himself, appointed representatives to confer with 
Colonel Stimson. These representatives, after conferring with Colonel 
Stimson, announced their acquiescence to all the propositions discussed 
except that for the continuance of President Diaz in office during the 
remainder of his term. Colonel Stimson, though appreciating the desire 
of the Liberal representatives for a new President acceptable to both 
parties, was unable to agree to their proposal. As a practicable matter, 
it was not considered possible under the circumstances then existing to 
find any government which would be supported by both sides, and on 
this subject Colonel Stim.son reported to the State Department. 

" I am quite clear that in the present crisis no neutral 

or impartial Nicaraguan exists .Moreover, any attempt by the 

Nicaraguan Congress to elect a substitute for Diaz under the forms of 
Nicaraguan law would almost certainly in the present situation become 
the occasion for further bitter factional strife " 



The Liberal representatives reserved making any commitments 
until after they had communicated with Doctor Sacasa and General 
Jose Maria Moncada, the leader of the Liberal Army. A truce was 
thereupon arranged, and on May 4th Colonel Stimson conferred with 
Liberal representatives and General Moncada at Tipitapa. General 
Moncada, while stating that he believed he could eventually defeat the 
Government forces, admitted that neither he nor any Nicaraguan 
could, without American help, pacify the country, which was becoming 
rapidly filled with groups of armed men responsible neither to himself 
nor to the Diaz Government; and that while in accord with the plan 
of supervision of the 1928 elections as the best method to save the coun- 
try, he urged the immediate substitution for Diaz of some other man as 
President, chiefly as a point of honor to pacify his Army; but also 
stated that he would not oppose the United States troops if the United 
States had determined to insist on the Diaz issue. General Moncada 
was informed by Colonel Stimson that the United States government 
intended to accept the request of the Nicaraguan government to super- 
vise the elections of 1928; that the retention of President Diaz during 
the remainder of his term was regarded as essential to that plan and 
would be insisted upon; that a general disarmament was also necessary 
for the proper conduct of such an election; and that American forces 
would be authorized to accept the custody of the arms of the govern- 
ment and those others willing to lay them down, and to disarm the 
rest. (1). The Liberal representatives then announced that they would 
recommend to Doctor Sacasa that no resistance be offered to the Ameri- 
can forces. 

The advent of the rainy season, which made communication with 
Doctor Sacasa and other Liberal generals slow and difficult, delayed 
the acceptance of the disarmament for eight days. During that time a 
truce was declared between the Government and Liberal forces, and 
upon withdrawal of the Government Army from the Tipitapa River, 
American Marines were stationed between the opposing troops and in 
a position where the arms of both sides would be received if an agree- 
ment were reached. 

On May 5th, President Diaz issued a proclamation of general am- 
nesty to political exiles and prisoners. He also announced that the free- 
dom of the press would be restored as soon as actual disarmament 
occurred. On May 6th, President Diaz took steps towards the restora- 
tion of the legal Constitution of the Supreme Court as it stood prior 
to the illegal changes which had been made by Chamorro. He further 
agreed to appoint Liberal Politicos in six Liberal provinces. 

At the second conference in Tipitapa on May 11th, General Mon- 
cada informed Colonel Stimson that his army had voted confidence in 
the propositions advanced at the various conferences; and on that date 
the terms of the amnesty were agreed upon. (2). At the same time 
General Moncada issued the following statement: 

"The Liberals cannot believe that the United States Government, 
through the personal representatives of President Coolidge, will give a 
promise which it will not fulfill. Once again the Liberals place their con- 
fidence in the United States. The leaders of the army will try to con- 

1. Appendix 1 — Chapter 2. 

2. Appendix 2 — Chapter 2. 



vince their men that this promise of fair elections will be fulfilled. The 
central point which the army wished to be assured of is that the United 
States will do its best to give Nicaragua a fair election in 1928." 

The following day, May 12th, Colonel Stimson received the follow- 
ing telegram signed by General Moncada and eleven of his generals 
including all his prominent leaders except Sandino: 

"The military chiefs of the Constitutionalist Army assembled in 
session today have agreed to accept the terms of the declaration made 
by General Henry L. Stimson, personal representative of President 
Coolidge of the United States, and consequently have resolved to lay 
down their arms. They hope that there will be immediately sent to 
receive these arms sufficient forces to guarantee order, liberty and 
property." 

The Diaz Government having agreed to pay the soldiers of both 
sides ten dollars for each rifle or machine gun turned in, a general dis- 
armament of both the Government and Liberal Armies began, resulting 
by May 26th, in the delivery to the American forces of 11,600 rifles, 
303 machine guns, and 5,500,000 cartridges. 

While the Tipitapa agreement was never reduced to one single 
document and signed by both parties, it is the fundamental agreement 
on which the Guardia Nacional was organized, and provided, among 
other things, for the disbanding of the Nicaraguan National Army, its 
functions to be assumed by the Guardia Nacional to be organized under 
the direction of American officers. In his letter to General Moncada, 
written at Tipitapa on 11 May, 1927, which letter forms part of the 
Tipitapa agreement. Colonel Stimson stated in part: 

"He (President Coolidge) has also consented to assign American 
officers to train and command a non-partisan National Constabulary 
for Nicaragua which will have the duty of securing such a fair election, 
and of preventing any fraud or intimidation of voters. He is willing 
also to leave in Nicaragua until after the election a sufficient force of 
Marines to support the work of the Constabulary and insure peace and 
freedom at the election. (1)." 

During the latter part of 1925 an attempt had been made to or- 
ganize a so-called Guardia Nacional under a Major Carter (American), 
consisting of some three hundred men. This attempt met with little or 
no success, and the remnant of this organization then existing (1927), 
was practically without any power and of negligible value to the govern- 
ment as a military organization. President Diaz on May 8, 1927, re- 
quested the appointment of an American officer to instruct and com- 
mand the Guardia Nacional, and on May 12, 1927, the reorganization 
of the Guardia was started under the direction of Lieutenant Colonel 
R. Y. Rhea, U. S. Marine Corps. (2). The first man was enlisted in the 
reorganized Guardia on 24 May, 1927, and between the dates of 18 to 
25 June, 1927, the First Company, Recruit Company, and Headquarters 
Company were organized at Cam.po de Marte, Managua. 

The First Comipany, consisting of three officers and fifty enlisted, 
cleared Managua on July 1, 1927 for Ocotal, Nueva Segovia, and on 

1. Appendix 2 — Chapter 2. 

2. Appendix 3 — Chapter 2. 



16 July, 1927, in conjunction with Marine forces, participated in the 
defense of Ocotal against a bandit attack directed by Sandino. 

On 11 July, 1927, Lieutenant Colonel E. R. Beadle, U. S. Marine 
Corps, was appointed Jefe Director and assumed command of the 
Guardia Nacional vice Lieutenant Colonel R. Y. Rhea, U. S. Marine 
Corps. 

President Diaz, on 13 July, 1927, authorized the strength of the 
Guardia to be increased to six hundred enlisted and the appointment 
of Marine Corps and Naval personnel as officers of the Guardia up to 
six and one half per cent of the authorized enlisted strength. (1). On 
8 September, 1927, the complement for officers was raised by President 
Diaz to ten per cent of the authorized enlisted strength. (2). 

On 29 July, 1927, President Diaz directed the Jefe Director to take 
over the police service of the Republic as soon as the enlisted strength 
of the Guardia would permit, and that this service be started in the 
Department of Chinandega, then one of the most disturbed and lawless 
departments of the Republic. (3). 

The early organization of the Guardia was divided into a General 
Headquarters, Areas, Divisions and Sub-Divisions. The Division or- 
dinarily included one political department, garrisoned by one company 
under the Division Commander usually of the rank of Captain. The 
Division was divided into Sub-Divisions which included one or more 
towns of importance, commanded by the Sub-Division Commander, 
usually of the rank of Lieutenant. The Sub-Divisions were further 
divided into sub-Stations known as Posts and usually commanded by a 
non commissioned officer. An Area included two or more Divisions 
commanded by a Colonel known as the Area Commander. This organi- 
zation continued in effect until 1 May, 1929, when the designations 
Division and Sub-Division were changed to Department and District. 

The Second Company on 4 August, 1927, established the Division 
of Chinandega with headquarters in Chinandega, and between the dates 
of 7 August, 1927 and 15 Novemebr, 1927, various sub-stations were 
established throughout the department. 

The Division of Nueva Segovia, with headquarters in Ocotal, was 
established between the dates of 31 July, 1927 and 7 August, 1927, to 
which was assigned the First Company then on duty in Ocotal. 

On 22 August, 1927, the Third Company, consisting of four officers 
and eighty-seven enlisted, cleared Managua and established headquar- 
ters at Pueblo Nuevo, Esteli, with sub-stations at Pataste and Tel- 
paneca, Nueva Segovia. 

Enlistments in the Guardia Nacional during the first few months 
of reorganization were necessarily slow due to the fact that few Nicara- 
guans belived the Government would actually pay good wages to sol- 
diers, and that if the money should be supplied by the Government 
that it would not be stolen by the officers as had been the custom in the 
past ; the coffee picking season intervened when good wages in the coffee 
areas made men reluctant to enlist; and the approaching elections 
caused political leaders to discourage volunteers, who on enlistment 

1. Appendix 4 — Chapter 2. 

2. Appendix 5 — Chapter 2. 

3. Appendices 6 & 7 — Chapter 2. 

10 



were sworn not to engage in political activities. On 1 October, 1927, 
approximately four and one half months after reorganization was 
started, the Guardia numbered forty-six officers and four hundred 
thirty-eight enlisted distributed in the Departments of Nueva Segovia, 
Chinandega, Esteli and Managua. 

The Fourth Company, three officers and fifty enlisted, took over 
control of the National Penitentiary at Managua on 1 November, 1927,, 
and established the Division of the National Penitentiary. 

The Division of Leon was established on 21 November, 1927, by 
the Fifth Company, six officers and sixty-two enlisted, with headquar- 
ters at Leon. 

The terms of an agreement for the establishment and maintenance 
of the Guardia Nacional were drawn up and the agreement was signed 
in Managua on 22 December, 1927, by the American Charge d' Affaires 
at Managua and the Nicaraguan Minister of Foreign Affairs. This 
agreement provided for: 

(1) The creation of a Guardia Nacional of 93 officers and 1136 
enlisted men, or a total of 1229 officers and men, at a cost of ^689,132 
per annum, with provisions that both personnel and expenses could be 
increased as finances permitted, upon recommendation of the Jefe 
Director and approval by the President of Nicaragua. 

(2) The Guardia to be considered the sole military and police 
force of the Republic, and to have control of all arms, ammunition, and 
military supplies, forts, prisons, etc., throughout the Republic subject 
only to the direction of the President. (1). 

The Guardia agreement was approved by the Nicaraguan Senate 
on 10 January, 1928, but the Chamber of Deputies delayed approval 
of the bill for more than a year. The agreement was amended and 
finally passed by both houses of the Nicaraguan Congress on 19 Febru- 
ary, 1929, and was signed by President Moncada. The original agreement, 
however, was changed by the Nicaraguan Congress to such an extent 
as to render it unacceptable to the United States, and the Guardia con- 
tinued to function and expand under Presidential Decrees. 

Under dates of 9 December, 1927, and 28 January, 1928, instruc- 
tions were received from the Secretary of the Navy of the United States 
and the Commander, Special Service Squadron, U. S. Navy, setting 
forth the principles governing the relations between the Second Marine 
Brigade and the Guardia Nacional, (2), and stated as the basic principles: 

"The Second Brigade constitutes the force of the United States 
responsible to the President of the United States. The Guardia Nacion- 
al constitutes the force of Nicaragua responsible to the President of 
Nicaragua. These two forces should operate independently of each 
other except in an emergency requiring joint action." 

The Guardia Nacional on 31 December, 1927, or approximately 
six and one-half months after reorganization was started, consisted of 
eighty-two officers and five hundred and seventy-four enlisted assigned 
to the following organizations: 

1. Appendix 8 — Chapter 2. 

2. Appendices 9 & 10 — Chapter 2. 

11 



12 


124 


136 


3 


20 


23 


10 


114 


124 


6 


82 


88 


51 


234 


285 



General Headquarters, 
Division of General Headquarters, 
Division of National Penitentiary, 
Division of Chinandega, 
Division of Leon, 

Division of Nueva Segovia (including Third Company in 
Department of Esteli) 
and distributed in five political departments as shown below: 

OFFICERS: ENLISTED: TOTAL: 

Department of Nueva Segovia 

Department of Esteli (Pueblo Nuevo) 

Department of Chinandega 

Department of Leon 

Department of Managua 

82 574 65c 

Seven officers arrived in Bluefields from Managua on 27 February, 
1928, and established the Area of the East, with headquarters in Blue- 
fields. Men were recruited and trained on the Atlantic Coast and acti- 
vities were extended as soon as men were available. 

The Third Company, on duty in Pueblo Nuevo, (Esteli), Pataste, 
and Telpaneca (Nueva Segovia), was consolidated with the First Com- 
pany, Division of Nueva Segovia, on 31 December, 1927, and a new 
organization known as the Third Company took over the police duties 
of the city of Managua on 16 March, 1928, in accordance with instruc- 
tions of the President of Nicaragua dated 21 February, 1928. (1). 

The Sixth Company, consisting of three officers and twenty-three 
enlisted, cleared Managua on 13 April, 1928, and established the Divi- 
sion of Jinotega with headquarters in Jinotega. 

The Division of Carazo, with headquarters in Jinotepe, was es- 
tablished on 17 April, 1928, by the Seventh Company. 

On 4 May, 1928, the Guardia Nacional band of 35 pieces was or- 
ganized at Headquarters, Managua. 

The Eighth Company, four officers and forty enlisted, established 
the Division of Matagalpa on 18 May, 1928, with headquarters at 
Matagalpa. 

On June 6, 1928, the Ninth Company, consisting of four officers 
and twenty-one enlisted, established the Division of Masaya with 
headquarters at Masaya. 

The strength of the Guardia Nacional, as determined upon in the 
Guardia agreement of 22 December, 1927, was based upon the belief 
that after the termination of the civil war, peace would follow in Nicara- 
gua. However, with the continued activity of Sandino and other armed 
bandit groups in the remote sections of the country it soon became 
apparent that an increased strength over the original number of 1229 
officers and enlisted men was necessary to cope with the situation, and 
on 10 June, 1928, President Diaz authorized the strength of the Guardia 
to be increased to 246 officers and 2000 enlisted men. (2). 

On 12 July, 1928, the Tenth Company, four officers and forty en- 
listed, cleared Managua and established the Division of Esteli with 
headquarters at Esteli, on 18 July, 1928. 

1. Appendix 11 — Chapter 2. 

2. Appendix 12 — Chapter 2. 

12 



The Division of Chontales, with headquarters at Juigalpa, was 
established on 27 July, 1928, by the Eleventh Company. 

The Division of Granada was opened by the Twelfth Company on 
20 August, 1928 with headquarters in Granada. 

The Thirteenth Company, three officers and ten enlisted, estab- 
lished the Division of Rivas with headquarters at Rivas on 21 August, 
1928. 

The Guardia Nacional on 1 October, 1928, numbered 145 officers 
and 1 597 enlisted line, and 28 officers and 40 enlisted medical corps, or 
a total of 1810 officers and enlisted men, the majority of whom were 
stationed in the southern and western departments. 

On October, 1928, the Division of the Guardia Nacional Hospital 
was established at Managua. 

The Divisions of Granada and Masaya were combined into one 
Division on 8 January, 1929, known as the Division of Granada and 
Masaya with headquarters in Granada. 

On 11 March, 1929, Colonel Douglas C. McDougal, U. S. Marine 
Corps, was appointed Jefe Director and assumed command of the 
Guardia vice Lieutenant Colonel E. R. Beadle, U. S. Marine Corps. 

The Division of the Presidential Guard was established on 15 
March, 1929, to which was assigned the Sixteenth Company consisting 
of three officers and seventy-five enlisted men. 

The Divisions of Managua and Carazo were combined into one 
Division on 20 March, 1929, known as the Division of Managua and 
Carazo with headquarters in Managua. 

During the latter part of May, 1929, a complete reorganization of 
the Guardia was decided upon to better permit the conducting of opera- 
tions in the field and to decentralize the organization in Managua. Five 
Areas, the Northern with headquarters in Ocotal, the Southern with 
headquarters at Granada, the Eastern with headquarters at Bluefields, 
the Western with headquarters at Leon and the Central with headquar- 
ters at Jinotega, were provided for in the plan of reorganization. 

Following this plan of reorganization, the Central Area was organ- 
ized on 1 June, 1929, the Northern Area on 11 June, 1929, and the 
Western Area on 1 August, 1929, in accordance with the general plan 
of organization as set forth in the following extracts from Guardia 
General Order Number 150—1929: 

" The Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua is commanded 

by the Chief of the Guardia who has general control and supervision 
of the organization. He is charged with its instruction, discipline, 
interior economy and administration. 

The following are members of the Staff of the Chief of the Guardia 
Nacional: Chief of Staff ; GN-1 ; GN-2; GN-3; and GN-4 (Quarter- 
master); Medical Director; Paymaster, and Law Officer. 

For purposes of administration, discipline, training, supply and 
disbursement of funds, the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua is divided 
into a General Headquarters, which is located in the city of Managua; 
Areas, Departments, Districts, and Posts. 

The Areas, and Departments embraced in each Area, are as follows: 

a. NORTHERN AREA: Comprises the Departments of Nueva 
Segovia and Esteli, with headquarters in the town of Ocotal. 

b. SOUTHERN AREA: Comprises the Departments of Coraza, 
Chontales, Granada, Masaya, and Rivas and the Comarca of San Juan 
del Norte, with headquarters in the city of Granada. 

13 



c. EASTERN AREA: Comprises the Departments of Bluefields 
and the Comarcas of Cabo Gracias a Dios, Princapolca, Rio Grande 
and Siquia, with headquarters in the city of Bluefields. 

d. WESTERN AREA: Comprises the Departments of Chinan- 
dega and Leon, with headquarters in the city of Leon. 

e. CENTRAL AREA: Comprises the Departments of Mata- 
galpa and Jinotega, with headquarters of the area located in the city of 
Jinotega. 

A Department corresponds with the geographical departments of 
the Republic of Nicaragua. 

a. For purposes of administration, the Department of Bluefields 
is divided into two sections known as follows: 

Department of Southern Bluefields with headquarters in the city 
of Bluefields. 

The Department of Northern Bluefields with headquarters in the 
town of Puerto Cabezas. 

b. The Department of Managua is not included in an Area, but 
is under the jurisdiction of General Headquarters. 

The following separate companies serving in the city of Managua 
are not included in any Area or Department, but are directly under the 
jurisdiction of General Headquarters: 

1st Company (Police Company in the city of Managua). 
4th Company (National Penitentiary Guard). 

16th Company (Presidential Guard). 

Guardia Headquarters was finally established with a modified 
General Staff organization. Due to the ever existing shortage of ex- 
perienced officer personnel, the majority of the officers on the staff of 
the Jefe Director were required to act in a dual capacity and the re- 
sulting organization consisted of: 

JEFE DIRECTOR with rank of Major General 

CHIEF OF STAFF " " "... .Brigadier General 

GN-1 and ADJUTANT " " "... .Captain 

GN-2 and GN-3 " " "... .Colonel 

GN-4 and QUARTERMASTER " " " ....Major 

PAYMASTER, FINANCE 6z 

BUDGET OFFICER " " " ....Major 

PUBLIC RELATIONS AND LAW 

OFFICER " " " ....Colonel 

MEDICAL DIRECTOR : " " " .... Colonel (MC) 

The organization of the Central and Northern Areas materially 
reduced the Guardia strength in the Southern Departments, as over 
four hundred officers and enlisted men were placed in the Departments 
of Jinotega and Matagalpa and over five hundred officers and enlisted 
men in the Departments of Nueva Segovia and Esteli. This organiza- 
tion, with minor changes, continued in effect during the remainder of 
the time the American officers controlled the Guardia ; with the excep- 
tion that the Southern Area was never organized due to lack of personnel, 
and on May 3, 1930, the Western Area ceased to function as an Area, 
the Departments included in the Southern and Western Areas operating 
as separate commands. 

14 



On 31 December, 1929, the strength of the Guardia totalled 2219 
officers and men distributed as indicated in the following table : 

OFFICERS: ENLISTED: 

Line Medical Radio | Line Medical Radio Total 



NORTHERN AREA 


40 


5 


2 


478 


12 


6 


543 


CENTRAL AREA 


31 


4 


3 


398 


7 


4 


447 


WESTERN AREA 


18 


2 




209 


6 




235 


SOUTHERN AREA 


25 


4 




299 


9 




337 


EASTERN AREA 


13 


3 




191 


7 




214 


DEPARTMENT OF 
















MANAGUA 


4 






78 






82 


FIRST COMPANY 


4 






60 


1 




65 


16TH COMPANY 


3 






49 


1 




53 


FOURTH COMPANY 


5 


1 




65 


1 




72 


HEADQUARTERS 
















COMPANY 


32 


7 




90 


13 




142 


CASUALS 


16 






12 


1 




29 


TOTALS 


. 191 


26 


5 


1929 


58 


10 


2219 



On April 1, 1930, the Military Academy was established at Mana- 
gua for the purpose of training Nicaraguan officers. 

During September, 1930, all Jueces de la Mesta and Jefes de Canton 
were placed jointly under the control of the Guardia and Jefes Politicos 
in accordance with a Presidential Decree. These men served without 
pay, except for a percentage of certain fines which they were authorized 
to impose by Nicaraguan law, and their services were utilized by the 
Guardia for minor police functions in the districts they represented. 

Lieutenant Colonel Calvin B. Matthews, U. S. Marine Corps, was 
appointed Jefe Director and assumed command of the Guardia on 6 
February, 1931, relieving Colonel D. C. McDougal, U. S. Marine Corps, 
detached to the United States upon completion of his tour of foreign 
duty. 

During the years 1931 and 1932, the officer and enlisted strength 
of the Guardia varied considerably due to the financial difficulties of 
the country, and the number of towns garrisoned and troops assigned 
to the different areas and departments, likewise varied with the chang- 
ing bandit situations. 

The authorized distribution of the Guardia on 1 July, 1932, was as 
indicated below, which general distribution continued in effect until 3 1 
December, 1932: (1). 

1. Appendix 13 — Chapter 2. 



16 



LINE MEDICAL TOTAL 

Officers Enl. Officers Enl. Offixers Enl. 



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS 

DEPT. MANAGUA— CARAZO 

POLICE COMPANY 

PRESIDENTIAL GUARD 

BAND 

MILITARY ACADEMY 

DEPT. CHONTALES 

DEPT. GRANADA— MASAYA 

DEPT. LEON 

DEPT. CHINANDEGA 

DEPT. RIVAS 

NORTHERN AREA 

CENTRAL AREA 

EASTERN AREA 



32 


31 


7 


9 


39 


40 


6 


68 


- 


- 


6 


68 


5 


59 


- 


1 


5 


60 


3 


59 


- 


1 


3 


60 


1 


30 


- 


- 


1 


30 


10 


4 


- 


- 


10 


4 


9 


115 


1 


3 


10 


118 


7 


48 


1 


2 


8 


50 


18 


152 


2 


4 


20 


156 


7 


58 


- 


1 


7 


59 


5 


32 


- 


1 


5 


33 


58 


616 


6 


19 


64 


635 


53 


615 


6 


12 


59 


627 


17 


291 


3 


9 


30 


300 



TOTALS. 



241 2178 



26 62 267 2240 



As previously stated, the continued activity of Sandino and other 
bandit leaders necessitated an increase in the Guardia over the original 
strength specified in the agreement, which same conditions later led 
to the creation of the Guardia Municipal, in order to relieve the regular 
Guardia from purely local police duties in the larger cities, and the en- 
rollment of civicos and auxiliares from time to time to reinforce the 
regular Guardia in the field and in holding defensive positions in the 
bandit areas. 

GUARDIA MUNICIPAL 

The enlistment of Guardia Municipal or municipal policemen, un- 
der control of the Guardia, and supported by their respective munici- 
palities, was authorized for the purpose of releasing regular enlisted 
Guardia from purely municipal police duties within towns and thereby 
making additional men available for patrol duty and the garrisoning of 
outlying posts. This arrangement, while making the support of the 
municipal police dependent upon the municipalities, incorporated them 
as an integral part of the Guardia Nacional, and subject to the control 
of that organization. The members of the municipal police, or Guardia 
Municipal, were recruited, trained and controlled by the Guardia. 
They were enlisted for a period of one year for duty in the town in which 
they were enlisted, and were subject to punishment under the Articles 
for the Government of the Guardia Nacional. They wore the Guardia 
uniform which was purchased for them by the respective municipalities 
from the Guardia Nacional. Although the municipalities met the ex- 
penses of the Guardia Municipal, they paid the necessary funds directly 
to a designated officer of the Guardia, who in turn made the required 
payments to the police. (1) A Presidential Decree authorized a tax 
of ten percent per liter on all aguardiente sold within the municipalities 
supporting municipal police, the proceeds from which were used to 
defray the expense of the police. This arrangement for the enlistment 

1. Appendix 14 — Chapter 2. 



16 



and maintenance of the municipal police had the dual advantage of 
making the municipalities financially responsible for their own police 
protection and at the same time making the Guardia Municipal an 
integral part of the Guardia Nacional, thereby keeping it removed from 
partisan control. 

CIVICOS 

Two classes of armed civilians, or civicos, enlisted as such and 
under the control of the Guardia, developed through force of circum- 
stances and as the result of experience. 

The first class consisted of volunteer groups of citizens who became 
civicos for the purpose of forming local defense units to be called to 
defend their respective localities or stand guard duty therein in case of 
emergency when the Guardia took the field or remained in insufficient 
numbers to guarantee the safety of the respective localities. Arms for 
this class of civico were kept in the Guardia storerooms and issued only 
when the civicos were actually called into service. The services of this 
class of civico were utilized to advantage at numerous stations in the 
bandit areas to reinforce the regular Guardia garrisons during emer- 
gencies, and on many occasions they accompanied Guardia combat 
patrols in the field. 

The second class of civico, called civicos en fincas, consisted of 
individuals employed by private parties such as hacienda owners, 
mining companies, etc., as guards for their property. This class of 
civico amounted to private watchmen, but were enlisted as civicos to 
bring them under the control of the Guardia, and in case of emergency 
they were subject to call for duty with the Guardia in the same manner 
as the first class of civico. Civicos en fincas were issued rifles which 
they were allowed to keep in their possession during the existence of 
their contracts of enlistments, for the purpose of guarding the particular 
property concerned. This class of civico, or watchman, was not, how- 
ever, employed by many large property owners due to the agreement 
made by certain Government officials that on withdrawal of Marines 
stationed on private haciendas they would be replaced by an equal 
number of Guardia Nacional, which agreement necessitated, at a time 
when the Guardia was handicapped by lack of sufficient personnel, the 
establishment and continuance of Guardia stations at points where the 
services of the personnel involved were of little value other than the 
safeguarding of the private property on which they were stationed. 

All civicos served without pay, except those employed as civicos 
en fincas, which expense was borne by the owner of the property con- 
cerned. All personnel enrolled as civicos were regularly enlisted as such 
and required to sign a contract form. (1). This contract placed the 
first class of civicos under the jurisdiction of the Guardia rules and regu- 
lations when actually called into service in conjunction with and serving 
under the immediate control of the Guardia, while the civicos en fincas 
were likewise placed under the Guardia rules and regulations when 
actually serving with the Guardia, but a special provision placed them 
under the jurisdiction of civil tribunals in cases of legal proceedings 
resulting from their official acts when performed solely in their capacity 
as private guards. 

1. Appendices 15 & 16 — Chapter 2. 

17 



AUXILIARES 

A force of auxiliares was created late in November, 1931, when a 
strong bandit movement towards the railroad in the Departments of 
Chinandega and Leon was in progress, and additional fighting men 
were required to reinforce the Guardia troops in that section. 

The President of the Republic authorized the enlistment of three 
hundred auxiliares on a basis of three months service, subject to dis- 
charge at any time during that period at the convenience of the Govern- 
ment. (1). The assistence of the Jefe Politicos, and other civil govern- 
ment officials was obtained in securing auxiliares and character recom- 
mendations of one government official or two reputable citizens were 
required. After enlistment they were wholly under the control of the 
Guardia and in the same status as regular Guardia in regard to freedom 
from interference by the civil authorities. The men were recruited 
mostly from the rural districts and contracts were effected, without 
formal medical examination, with about one hundred fifty men of the 
following authorized complement: 

From the Department of Leon 100 men 

" " " " Chinandega 100 " 

" " " " Masaya 50 " 

" " " " Carazo 50 " 

Total complement 300 " 

A copy of the contract is appended. (2). 

These auxiliares were paid twelve dollars monthly, had a ration 
allowance of ^0.20 daily and a clothing allowance of ^0.20 a day during 
the first month and ^0.07 daily thereafter. Each man was issued one 
regulation Guardia shirt, trousers, and a pair of shoes; hats were not 
provided, and the men usually wore straw hats of the native high-crown, 
broad-brimmed type. They were entitled to medical treatment while in 
active service only. 

They were subject to the Articles for the Government of the Guard- 
ia Nacional, and to all orders and regulations of the Guardia, and were 
available for such patrol duty, including combat patrols, as they might 
be assigned by the Guardia Commanding Officer. 

Much hard and arduous service was experienced by the auxiliares 
during December, 1931, and the greater part of the year, 1932, during 
which some two hundred fifty additional auxiliares were enlisted, and 
their services were of considerable value in the combat operations 
conducted by the Guardia, not only early in 1932 when the second 
bandit threat against the railroad departments was in progress, but 
later during the registration and election period. They usually operated 
as part of a Guardia patrol, or in close conjunction with such patrol, 
but at times operated independently with success. They were officered 
by regular Guardia officers and were furnished arms, ammunition and 
equipment by the Guardia. To all intents and purposes they were con- 
sidered and employed as a part of the Guardia complement of the section 
of the country in which they served. 

A number of American companies doing business in Nicaragua, and 
the Pacific Railroad Company of Nicaragua, desired the establishment 
of Guardia posts on certain of their properties, and as there were no 

1. Appendix 17 — Chapter 2. 

2. Appendix 18 — Chapter 2. 

18 



regular Guardia available for the purpose they met the situation by 
furnishing the money necessary to support the number of Guardia re- 
quired. Each company concerned was required to make a written con- 
tract covering the following points: 

"1. The detachments of Guardia will be composed of men regularly 
enlisted in the Guardia Nacional under the terms of the contract of the 
Guardia Nacional, and thereby come under complete control of the 
Guardia and subject to all the rules and regulations for the government 
and discipline of the Guardia. 

2. The money for the maintenance of the detachments must be 
deposited with or to the order of the Guardia by the 25th of each and 
every month preceding the month for which its use is designated. 

3. The ...Company will be required to give one month's 

advance notice in case it is desired to discontinue the Guardia on any 
property, in order that the Guardia Nacional may have time to make 
the necessary adjustments in its enlisted strength. 

4. The Guardia on its part will agree to maintain the detachments 
and furnish them with arms and ammunition, and to utilize their ser- 
vices for the sole protection of the properties of the Company 

and to employ them only on such limited offensive operations as may 
be required for the protection of the properties. 

5 In addition, the company will be expected to furnish 

satisfactory quarters for any officer who may be assigned to command 
the detachments, and suitable barracks for the enlisted personnel." 

The Standard Fruit Company, on the East Coast, furnished 50 
Guardia under such a contract, and the San Antonio Sugar Estates and 
the Pacific Railroad Company of Nicaragua, 20 men each in the Depart- 
ments of Leon and Chinandega. 



19 



NORTHERN AREA I I I I 1 1 
CENTRAL AREA i^^^^ 

EASTERN AREA E3 



/>. s 




A4/V JUAA/ 
P£L NORTE 



•TSlICi^RA.G?-UA 



Qc9^i 



I I I I I 
O to so JO AO niLCs 



ni; 3./^ARINE CORPS 

piviSiOM OF 
OPERATIONS & TR/MMlMflr 
HOiQTRa. 
aAMy^RCM iq33 



CHAPTER III 
MILITARY OPERATIONS 

At the signing of the Tipatapa agreement, with a background of 
a century of internal struggles and armed revolts, Nicaragua offered 
the most favorable possible situation for the conduct of a guerrilla war. 
The country was filled with disorganized, but armed bands who had 
found it easier to live on the country than to work, while the possession 
of weapons and the disorganization of authority gave them abundant 
opportunity to do so. Among these bands were many typical Central 
American professional revolutionists, experienced soldiers, and adept 
in the ways of guerrilla warfare, who travel from country to country, 
wherever fighting is going on, and, undisturbed by principles, join the 
side that offers the greatest opportunity for profit or loot. 

In accordance with the Tipitapa agreement, the forces under the 
control of the leaders on both sides laid down their arms; at the begin- 
ning of the intervention it was contrary to American policy for the Mar- 
ines to take up aggressive operations against these armed bands of 
marauders; the Guardia had not been formed; hence there were no 
forces of law and order capable of coping with the situation. Sandino, 
who with his followers, had refused to lay down his arms, furnished 
both the leadership and the nucleus about which these groups eventually 
rallied to carry on a revolt against the constituted authorities of the 
government. 

Among the leaders who joined Sandino were Pedro Altamirano, 
a notorious cattle chief, outlaw and smuggler; Colindres, Salgado and 
Ortez, all Nicaraguans, the latter of whom became one of the most 
energetic and aggressive of the bandit leaders; Plata, a Mexican; Giron, 
a Guatamalan; Montyoa, Umanzor and Jose Leon Diaz, Honduranians, 
as well as many others of the professional revolutionist type. 

BANDIT OBJECTIVES 

While there is much conjecture as to Sandino's motives, his stated 
military objectives were at first to set up a separate government in the 
Segovias with himself at its head. (1). Failing in this he stated that he 
would remain in revolt until all American assistance, financial and 
military, had been withdrawn from the country. (2). After all the Mar- 
ines were concentrated in Managua and the American Government had 
announced that its military forces would be withdrawn on January 2, 
1933, he published statements to the eft^ect that he would not recognize 
any government that came into power with American assistance. (3). 

His agreement with the Sacasa government in February, 1933, a 
government that had come into power as the result of an election super- 
vised by representatives of the United States, proves the insincerety 
of this statement. (4). 

In view of the fact that, after the Tipitapa agreement, he repeatedly 
refused to confer with the representatives of either Moncada or of the 
United States, or to state his aims, and the further fact that, but for the 

1. Appendices l,2&z3 Chapter 3. 

2. Appendix 4 Chapter 3. 

3. Appendix 5 Chapter 3. 

4. Ap)pendix 24 Chapter 3. 

21 



insurrection led by himself, the American Marines would have been 
withdrawn, or at least concentrated in Managua soon after the election 
of 1928, the sincerity of Sandino's patriotism and the unselfishness of 
his motives may well be questioned. 

It is entirely possible, that in the beginning, Sandino believed him- 
self able to set up some form of government in the fastnesses of the 
Segovias, and that he could maintain himself there against all the troops 
that could be brought against him. He had just seen Sacasa and Mon- 
cada (with Mexican assistence) successfully maintain themselves on the 
East Coast, and he was in touch with certain elements in Mexico and 
Central America, antagonistic to the United States, and with other 
elements in Europe and America, antagonistic to law and order, capi- 
talism and the democratic form of government. Without doubt these 
elements encouraged him and not only promised him support, but es- 
pecially in the beginning rendered him most substantial aid in equipping 
and outfitting his forces, and many individuals from the countries south 
of the Rio Grande joined his colors. Honduras was at all times friendly 
to Sandino. (1). 

The belief that he felt competent to maintain himself in the Sego- 
vias is borne out by his assumption of the offensive with attacks on the 
small Marine and Guardia garrisons at Ocotal, and later on Livingston's 
and Richal's columns near Quilali, and concentration of Marines in the 
Segovia's and the rapid, demoralizing defeats of his forces, it soon be- 
came clear that Sandino could not maintain even the semblance of a gov- 
ernment in that area. In fact, he soon found himself deserted by his fol- 
lowers and driven from the country. He knew, however, that his forces 
had not been destroyed, but merely dispei-sed, that the American govern- 
ment was anxious to withdraw its troops, and at the first sign of such 
withdrawal, his followers would again spring to arms at his call. 

It was then that his objective changed, and, as later events show, 
it not to be in accord with his published statements and proclamations, 
it can only be deduced from his actions. 

For the period beginning with the summer of 1930, when the Mar- 
ines as such ceased active operations against the armed forces of bandit- 
ry, and the Guardia assumed them, the objective of his sub-chiefs and 
their followers was unquestionably pillage and loot; while to Sandino 
himself, the most logical objective than can be assigned, is that of posing 
as the heroic deliverer of his country from foreign control, and main- 
taining himself in command of an armed force of sufficient strength to 
overthrow, or at least to compel concessions from, the government in 
power after American Military support was withdrawn. 

In order to maintain this position, he had to justify himself in the 
eyes of a large number of his countrymen, and in the eyes of his sup- 
porters outside of the country, as well as retain a considerable body of 
followers loyal to his standard. This first he attempted to accomplish 
by raising the false standard of patriotism, issuing deceiving and bom- 
bastic proclamations, and by establishing agents in Tegucigalpa, Mexico 
City and other capitals none too friendly to the United States, who spread 
propaganda and collected funds for his support. The second he accom- 
plished by permitting and encouraging his followers (under the guise of 

1. Appendices 4, 6, 7 & 8 — Chapter 3. 

22 



levying contributions for the support of his cause), to systematically 
blackmail, pillage, and loot the peaceful inhabitants of the country. 

The ambition on the part of Sandino to set himself up as a hero 
and patriot, as well as to make himself an object of fear by the govern- 
ment and people of Nicaragua made his operations different from those 
of the ordinary bandit encountered in the West Indies and Central 
America, who avoids contact with the forces of law and order and fights 
only when combat is unavoidable; and who can usually be persuaded 
to cease operations with an offer of amnesty accompanied with 
som.e sort of financial inducement. The Nicaraguan bandits did 
not value the amnesty offered by their government, and no financial 
inducement was possible because of the impoverished condition- of the 
treasury. They were well organized and well armed and were perfectly 
willing to fight either the Marines or the Guardia if the odds were long 
enough in their favor. While they avoided combat on anything like 
even terms, the bandit groups of Nicaragua, when the odds were suffi- 
ciently great and other conditions to their liking, would fight in defense 
of their camps, would ambush Guardia patrols and would attack Guardia 
detachments. They did not hesitate to attack garrisoned towns when 
the prospects for loot were commensurate with the risks involved. 

Hence the military objectives of the bandits were all points that 
afforded opportunity to loot, namely: towns, haciendas, stores, com- 
missaries, plantations, mines, railroad stations and labor camps, and 
Guardia detachments when the opportunity was favorable. 

TERRAIN 
The Northern and Central sections of Nicaragua furnish ideal 
terrain for guerilla warfare. Vast in extent, they consist of almost un- 
broken chains of mountains, whose rugged peaks afford ideal lookouts 
and whose densely forested slopes and secluded valleys furnish numerous 
hiding places secure from observation and attack by airplanes, and 
inaccessible to all but the most lightly equipped of ground troops. These 
sections are covered in the main with dense tropical jungle, impene- 
trable except by the few narrow trails, crossed by numerous rivers, pas- 
sable only at certain seasons; interspersed here and there with small 
towns, portreros where cattle, often wild, graze at will; and patches of 
corn, beans, rice or sugarcane, cultivated by the widely scattered rural 
inhabitants, friendly or at least neutral toward the insurrectos. This 
country affords ample food for roving bands of outlaws, but will not 
support troops in sufficient numbers to overrun the country and stamp 
out banditry. It borders on the one side the settled sections which are 
close enough, if unprotected, to be raided with impunity; and on the 
other, a country to which the forces in revolt could safely repair when 
hard pressed, which furnished an outlet for their loot and a source of 
supply for arms and ammunition, and at the same time denied the use 
of its territory to the government forces, and refused them the informa- 
tion and cooperation that could normally be expected from a friendly 
neutral state. 



The central section not only possesses the above charateristics, but 
lies between the settled portions of the East and West coasts rendering 
communication and the transfer of troops and supplies impossible to 
the government, while giving the bandits the advantage of a centrally- 
located rendezvous in a vast inaccessible area, from which they could 
deliver sudden blows in any direction and retire to its fastnesses before 
a force could be concentrated to cut them off. 

Although isolated and sparsely settled the interior and northern 
border sections on Nicaragua are of great econom.ic importance to the 
Republic. In addition to the food raised for consumption within the 
country, they are the source of the bulk of coffee, bananas, lumber, and 
gold, the export products upon v/hich Nicaragua depends for the main- 
tenance of her foreign trade and credit, as well as for a considerable 
portion of the revenue necessary to support the central government. 

Nueva Segovia, Esteli, Jinotega and Matagalpa produce coffee and 
cattle and before the beginning of the bandit depredations, produced 
considerable quantities of mahogany and gold. In northern Chinandega, 
sugar is raised. Chontales produces gold, coffee, and cattle; while on 
the rivers flowing into the Carribean are many banana plantations as 
well as lumber camps with their commissaries. Farther inland are a 
number of producing gold mines with their labor camps and stores that 
have grown up to supply the needs of the miners. 

In the Department of Leon, the construction of a road and an ex- 
tension of the railroad were being undertaken with the double purpose 
of opening up the country and giving employment to a portion of the 
population to save them from being driven by poverty into banditry. 

BANDIT INTELLIGENCE 

The bandits had a most effective intelligence and security system. 
Every town was filled with their adherents, whose identity was usually 
unknown to the officers of the Guardia, and in many cases not even 
suspected. The rural sections were filled with bandit sympathizers who 
were only too glad to report the movements of Guardia patrols. Their 
camps were usually covered by pickets, and the trails to the larger 
camps were watched by scouts or spies, who reported any movements 
along them to the bandit leaders. It was seldom indeed that a group 
of any size was surprised, and the Guardia, when seeking combat, usually 
had to comb the country from several directions, or send out patrols 
which proceeded rapidly along the trails in the formation best suited 
to the terrain and which invited ambush, depending upon their superior 
fighting qualities, better training and discipline to compensate for the 
disadvantages of position and loss of initiative inherent to this method 
of seeking combat. 

The efficiency of the bandit intelligence system is pretty accurately 
described in the following quotation: 

"There seems to be but little doubt that Sandino and the chiefs 
operating with him are reliably informed of our every movement. Their 
knowledge is pretty complete and enables them to avoid us. Sandino's 
information is obtained from spies mostly, and not from any well 
regulated reconnaissance or intelligence service. (GN-2 REPORT, 
JUNE 1931)" 



24 



BANDIT ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS 

The bandits were organized in 1929 and 1930 into two main groups, 
one in Nueva Segovia, under Ortez, the other in the Central section of 
Nicaragua under Pedro Altamirano, who raided the Jinotega, Mata- 
galpa and Bluefields areas. After the death of Ortez, his group was 
divided, one part continuing to operate in Nueva Segovia under Colin- 
dres, the other in the departments of Leon and Chinandega under 
Umanzor. These groups varied in strength from 150 to 300 men each, 
and each had from three to five automatic weapons. They secured 
their ammunition in Honduras in exchange for goods and livestock 
stolen in Nicaragua, and their food from the country through which 
they moved. 

In addition to these main groups whose operations were more or 
less intermittent, but always a potential threat, there were small bands 
of marauders which infested the countryside, making constant forays 
and carrying on a continuous campaign of murder, rapine and robbery. 
There was also another type of troublesome citizen, to be reckoned with, 
who came to be known as a "part time bandit." He was a "good citizen" 
most of the time, but a bandit when it suited his purpose. He was al- 
ways ready to furnish food and information or to join the regulars for 
an opportunity to loot, or for an especially important raid. It was the 
bandit of this type that made the information system of the bandits 
so reliable, as they were able to come and go at will, and to keep track 
of the dispositions and movements of the Guardia. 

All of these various types acknowledged at least a nominal allegiance 
to Sandino and operated under color of his authority. 

The objective of loot and pillage and the maintenance of an armed 
force of suf^cient strength to enable Sandino and his marauders to be a 
real menace to the peace of the land and a threat to the government in 
power after the withdrawal of American military support, caused bandit 
operations to be conducted with a view to spreading terror throughout 
the land, looting towns, compelling property owners to purchase protec- 
tion, with money in the case of the m.ore wealthy, and by contributions 
of food, clothing and medicines, in the case of the smaller land holders; 
and raiding, burning and destroying the properties and even taking the 
lives of those who failed to contribute. (1). 

While carrying on their operations the bandits carefully conserved 
their forces, especially their arms and the lives of their leaders. In their 
fights with the Guardia, the bandit leaders, with possibly the single 
exception of Ortez, kept well to the rear and were always the first to 
leave the scene of action. In their camps and on the march their security 
measures were based on the principle of protecting the J efes. Sandino 
himself was never known to have been in a contact after being wounded 
by an airplane bomb, in his camp at Saraguasca in June, 1930. Similar 
precautions were taken to protect their automatic weapons. As a result 
during all their operations the bandits lost only three of their important 
leaders (Giron, Ortez, and Blandon), and not a single automatic weapon 
was captured by the Marines or Guardia. 

(1) Appendix 12 — Chapter 3. 



These methods while serving to conserve their arms and forces 
intact, at the same time were absolutely fatal to the prospects of obtain- 
ing decisive victories. The bandits never rushed even the smallest 
Guardia patrols, and seldom stood their ground against a determined 
Guardia rush The moment their automatic weapons or their leaders 
were in danger the withdrawal began. These tactics saved many Guard- 
ia patrols from destruction at the hands of superior forces of bandits, 
but they also prevented the destruction of the bandit organizations 
whose operations were always conducted in territory that afforded a 
safe line of retreat, where their ability to scatter and reassemble at a 
prearranged rendezvous rendered pursuit fruitless. Even their selected 
and prepared ambushes were placed with a view, not to accomplish the 
destruction of their enemies, but rather for the purpose of inflicting as 
much damage as possible without risking a decisive engagement, and the 
line of withdrawal was always the most important feature of any position 
deliberately occupied by a bandit group. (1). 

To understand how they could maintain an organization that 
would survive so many tactical defeats and indecisive actions requires 
a knowledge of the economic and social conditions of the country and 
their racial psychology. After the prosperous period that reached its 
climax in 1928, Nicaragua suffered a great loss of wealth in the world 
depression that followed. Her main export crop, coffee, was a drug on 
the markets of the world and hardly brought a price that made it worth 
harvesting. The lumber export business dropped to almost nothing; a 
disease got into the banana groves on the east coast which in addition 
to the falling off of the world market for bananas, threw thousands out 
of employment. Then came the serious drought of 1930, when corn 
and beans were burned up in the fields for lack of water, leaving a large 
portion of the population without food. These unsatisfactory economic 
conditions threw large numbers of people into a state of enforced idle- 
ness, poverty and want. 

This state of affairs bore niost heavily upon the poorer classes of 
Nicaraguans who have been oppressed and down-trodden for more than 
four centuries, are poverty stricken in the best of times and densly ig- 
norant, but have learned to look up to their leaders with a loyalty and 
confidence that to an American is beyond understanding. Naturally 
brave and inured to hardships, of phlegmatic temperment, though 
capable of being aroused to acts of extreme violence, they have fought 
for one party or the other without considering causes since time im- 
memorial; and until a state of war is to them a normal condition. Then 
the unusual poverty of their country, the low wages for which they are 
accustomed to work, the primitive conditions under which they live, 
made their lot as bandits certainly no worse, and probably easier than 
that of the ordinary mozo, living on the verge of starvation in a grass 
covered hut in the hills. 

In all of their revolutionary battles the fire fight decides the issue. 
Both sides form a line and shoot it out until one side or the other begins 
to run short of ammunition or from some other cause loses heart and 
withdraws. The charge and hand to hand fight have never been a part 
of their military doctrine. The Nicaraguan bandits expected nothing 
more than a surprise attack, with a short fight and a clean getaway. 
Decisive success was not necessary to give them the moral uplift of 

(1) Appendices 13, 14, 15, 16 & 17— Chapter 3. 

26 



victory. That they were demoralized by decisive defeats is true. Vigor- 
ous pursuits when the bandit groups were caught out, so to speak, and 
unable to shake off the Guardia patrols were also demoralizing and were 
most effective in breaking up their organizations. But so long as they 
escaped with their lives and were able to rejoin their companions, their 
morale was not permanently impaired nor their confidence in their 
leaders shaken. 

GUARDIA STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION 

The Tipitapa Agreement provided for the disbanding of the Nicara- 
guan National Army, its functions to be assumed by a Guardia Nacional 
to be organized under the direction of American officers. On May 8, 
1927, President Diaz requested the appointment of an American officer 
to command and instruct the Guardia. On May 12, 1927, a Colonel of 
the Marine Corps was appointed as Jefe Director of the Guardia. The 
work of organization and training immediately began. In July, the 
first newly trained detachment of the Guardia entered upon active 
duties outside of Managua. 

An agreement for the establishment and maintenance of the Guard- 
ia Nacional de Nicaragua was signed at Managua on December 22, 
1927, by the American Charge d' Affaires at Managua and the Nicara- 
guan Minister of Foreign Affairs. It provided for: 

"The creation of a Guardia Nacional of 93 officers and 1136 en- 
listed men, or a total of 1229 officers and men at a cost of ,^689,132 per 
annum." 

This agreement was modified by the Nicaraguan Congress, but the 
modifications were not accepted by the American Department of State, 
and the Guardia functioned under the agreement as at first written . 
This proved to be quite a handicap to the offiicers in command, as the 
legal status of the organization was always in doubt. 

The strength of the Guardia, as determined upon in the agreement 
of December 22, 1927, was based upon the belief that after the termina- 
tion of the civil war, peace would follow in Nicaragua. When Sandino 
began his career of banditry a new and unforseen situation arose. In 
order to meet the situation created by his depredations, and assist in the 
supervision of the congressional elections of 1930, the Guardia was in- 
creased until on October 1, 1930, its total personnel numbered 2256, 
an increase of about 85% over the number provided for in the original 
agreement. Furthermore, the annual cost had grown to a total of 5 1 , 1 1 6, 
000. 

The economic depression and the resulting decrease in revenue 
forced a reduction in November, 1930 to 160 officers and 1,650 enlisted. 
At the same time, provision was made for establishment of local police 
to relieve a part of the Guardia performing police duties in the various 
municipalities. These Municipal Police while paid by the municipali- 
ties were under the complete control of the Guardia, but their numbers 
were never sufficient to wholly relieve the regular Guardia from Muni- 
cipal duties. In January, 1931, funds were made available to the Gov- 
ernment as the result of a revolving credit from the reserves of the 
National Bank on deposit in New York, and the strength of the Guardia 
was increased to an average of 200 officers and 2, 1 50 men. 

27 



As the Guardia increased in strength the active operations of the 
Marines of the 2d Brigade were curtailed so that by the summer of 1930, 
all offensive operations had been turned over to the Guardia and the 
Marines were concentrated either in the towns or as guards on the 
properties of American or foreign residents. In May, 1931, the number 
of Marines was greatly reduced and those remaining were concentrated 
in Managua. Marine Corps aviation continued to cooperate with the 
Guardia, rendering the same transportation, information and combat 
service that it had rendered to the Marine Brigade. 

In the summer of 1930, there were two main groups of bandits 
carrying on active operations, Ortez in the Northern Area and Altami- 
rano in the Central Area, in addition there were innumerable small 
bands committing depredations all through the north and along the 
rivers of the East Coast. The Departments of Leon and Chinandega 
and Chontales which later became subject to bandit attacks were at 
that time relatively quiet and safe. The remainder of the Republic was 
in its normal state of peace secured by the presence of Marines and 
Guardia in the larger towns. 

As the situation appeared then it was a matter of combating or- 
ganized banditry in the Segovias and a peace time police job in the 
remainder of the country. Hence, in November of 1931 of the 1650 
enlisted Guardia, 1000 were stationed in the Segovias, and 650 in the 
remainder of the country, and when this number was found insufficient 
to suppress banditry in the north, and President Moncada arranged to 
finance a larger number, 1500 were stationed in the Segovias. This left 
certain towns, and sections of the East Coast with insufficient protection 
and when the activities of the Guardia became too strenuous for the 
bandits in the north they transferred their operations to points not so 
well covered by Guardia patrols. In November 193 1, President Monca- 
da authorized the enlistment of 300 auxiliares, 150 of v/hom were re- 
cruited in the Departments of Chinandega and Leon. There were also 
a total of 90 regular Guardia paid by the railroad and by fruit companies 
of the East Coast, while for the electoral period of 1932, the number of 
auxiliares was increased to 400 distributed throughout all the Depart- 
ments of the Republic. These latter were utilized to guard the electoral 
mesas. 

GUARDIA MISSIONS 

The missions of the Guardia Nacional as defined in the Guardia 
Agreement were: 

"To preserve domestic peace and security of individual rights; 

To control arms and ammunition, military supplies, and super- 
vise the traffic therein throughout the Republic ; 

To control all fortification, barracks, buildings, grounds, prisons, 
penitentiaries, vessels, and other Government property used by the 
forces of the Republic; 

To furnish a guard of honor for the Palace of the President; 

To train Nicaraguan officers to replace the officers of the United 
States Marine Corps and Navy detailed by the President of the United 
States to assist the Government of Nicaragua in the organization and 
training of the Guardia." 

During the Electoral period of 1932, there devolved on the Guardia 
the additional mission of preserving law and order at the electoral mesas, 
protecting the electoral personnel, and preventing the interruption of 
the registrations and elections by the bandits. 



Due to the situation created by Sandino and organized banditry, 
the Guardia, upon its organization, found itself confronted with a state 
of civil war throughout an area covering more than half of the Republic. 
Martial Law was in effect in the Departments of Nueva Segovia, Esteli, 
Jinotega, Matagalpa and parts of Leon and Chinandega. 

This situation, not contemplated when the plans for the organiza- 
tion of the Guardia were made, was at first met by the troops of the 2d 
Marine Brigade, but was gradually turned over to the Guardia. 

The mission of the Guardia in and bordering on the zone of bandit 
activities became: 

The protection of lives and property, the security of crops, the 
protection of public works and the suppression of banditry 

As banditry was the principal menace to lives and property, and 
law and order, the principal mission of the Guardia in the bandit in- 
fested zone was: 

The suppression of banditry. 

Four possible plans suggested themselves for the accomplishment 
of this mission: 

1. Closing the Border. 

2. Concentration of all Guardia forces for a determined offensive 
with a view to destroying the main bandit groups ; 

3. Garrisoning all towns and valuable properties, public and pri- 
vate, thereby denying access to them by the bandits; 

4. A combination of some form of the two above plans: i.e., 
guarding the most vital points with a part of the available forces, while 
conducting offensive operations with the remainder. 

CLOSING THE BORDER 

The project of closing the border and so creating a rear for the 
bandits, was the subject of much thought and consideration at Guardia 
Headquarters. Its desirability was never questioned, but its practi- 
cability was beyond the limited resources of the Guardia Nacional. 
There were three main lines of bandit communications into Honduras 
from western and central Nicaragua, the Bocay River and the trail that 
ran through its valley to Bocay, located on the Honduras border at the 
junction of the Bocay and Coco Rivers, the sector from Poteca to Caca 
Mayor, which gave access to Danli, and the sector from Saca Mayor to 
the Gulf of Fonseca and the Pacific Coast which gave access to Cholu- 
teca. There were also routes north of the border by means of which the 
bandit groups were able to move from one sector to another without 
entering Nicaraguan territory. From the East Coast to Poteca, approxi- 
mately 200 miles, the Coco River forms the boundary between Honduras 
and Nicaragua. Many shipments of munitions were made into Hon- 
duras from the Carribean seaboard, by way of the Patuco River to 
points on the Coco as far west as Bocay. From there they found their 
way to the headquarters of the various bandit groups. From Poteca to 
the Pacific Coast the ill defined boundary ran through some two hundred 
miles of mountain, morass and jungle. There were several main trails 
crossing it leading to the towns of Danli, San Marcos, Yuscaran and 
Choluteca. Danli and Choluteca were notorious as rendezvous for gun 
runners and collection points for ammunition supplies for the bandits. 
In addition to the main trails, there were innumerable by-paths known 
to the bandits and their sympathizers on both sides of the border. The 
inhabitants of the adjoining sections of Honduras were practically allies 



of the bandits. They were doing a profitable business in stolen cattle 
and goods from Nicaragua, which they were able to purchase at bottom 
prices, and sell at the market in their own country. While at the same 
time they were carrying on a lucrative trade in ammunition. The Hon- 
duranian government appeared to be powerless to stop this trade, even 
had it been so inclined. 

Hence the problem of the Guardia was not to be solved by closing 
a few main trails, or by cooperation with the authorities of Honduras, 
but was one that required the practically continuous occupation of the 
whole border line. On the face of it, this was an impossibility with the 
limited resources of the Guardia. 

CONCENTRATION OF ALL GUARDIA FORCES FOR AN 

OFFENSIVE 

This plan at once appeals to the soldier's mind, it complies with the 
principles of The Objective and The Offensive, and if successful, would 
have accomplished the destruction of the main bandit groups, and made 
an end to banditry. Its weakness lay in the fact that due to the charac- 
ter of the terrain a large force could not live in the bandit country with- 
out carrying supplies and hence was limited to the main trails and was 
out of communication with its base. The bandits could not be compelled 
to fight for any terrain feature or other objective. They could only be 
forced into action when surprised. Large bodies of troops had not the 
mobility necessary to overtake bandit groups and force them to decisive 
action. The main groups never operated far from the Honduran border, 
except in the case of Pedro Altamirano, whose movements never carried 
him far from his refuges in the unexplored jungles of central and north- 
ern Nicaragua. If hard pressed they could always quickly withdraw 
across the border or scatter in the jungles. 

Then it was necessary to consider the fact that banditry as prac- 
ticed in Nicaragua was not conducted according to the rules of civilized 
warfare. The bandit objectives were not the armed forces of the Repub- 
lic, but murder and robbery and rapine, the destruction of property, 
driving of laborers away from the plantations and preventing the col- 
lection of the crops so necessary to the economic stability of the country. 
The Republic of Niaragua was without credit at home and abroad; it 
was compelled to do business on a cash basis. The arms, equipment and 
clothing of the Guardia were all purchased for cash. The firms of both 
the United States and Europe required that cash be produced before 
making deliveries of supplies, hence it was imperative that sufficient 
protection be afforded the coffee planters of Matagalpa, and the Sego- 
vias, the miners of Chontales and the interior, and the exporters of 
bananas and lumber from the East Coast, to enable them to produce 
commodities for export and get them to the sea-coast. Otherwise, the 
Government would have been bankrupt for the lack of income derived 
from the export of these important products. Exports were also neces- 
sary to maintain the value of the Nicaraguan Cordoba, (dollar) and to 
enable the population to purchase manufactured goods from abroad. 
Many foreigners living in the country appealed to their governments 
for protection, and the American State Department laid the burden of 
this protection on the Guardia immobilizing large numbers of its force 
as defensive garrisons and precluding their concentration for offensive 
purposes. In the departments of Matagalpa and Jinotega alone, there 



30 



were nine haciendas belonging to foreigners, Americans and Europeans, 
furnished with garrisons of Guardia. These guards were so placed in 
accordance with American policy of extending the fullest possible pro- 
tection to all foreign residents of the country, which was continued until 
the withdrawal of American armed forces from Nicaragua. Nine Officers 
and one hundred twenty-five enlisted men of the Guardia were utilized 
for this purpose in the two departments. 

Had Sandino and his followers been able to prevent the harvesting 
of the coffee crop alone, or its transportation to the seacoast, the econo- 
mic pressure created thereby would have brought the government to 
terms in a short time. 

The bandits, however, did not seem to appreciate the advantage 
of cutting off the revenues of the government and there is no evidence 
of that being one of their primary military objectives. It was, however, 
such a vital point to the Republic that the Guardia was always under 
the necessity of so disposing its forces as to prevent such a possibility. 

Moreover, the main bandit groups with their superior means of 
information were able to take quick and decisive advantage of the 
weakening of the defenses of any section of the country, as was con- 
clusively shown by their action in December, 1930, when all available 
Guardia patrols were concentrated for an offensive in the vicinity of 
Pena Blanca. Scarcely had the patrols left their bases and moved into 
the jungles, out of reach of all communication, when Altamirano's 
group began a raid of the Central Area, entering it from the northwest, 
moving south of Muy Muy, thence west, passing completely around 
Matagalpa and north through the Colon valley, and was only prevented 
from looting the countryside for miles by the extraordinary efforts of 
the depleted forces of the Guardia assisted by Marines stationed in 
Matagalpa. At the same time Ortez in Nueva Segovia, was enabled to 
operate undisturbed and lay an ambush that cost the lives of eight 
Marines. Returning secretly from the East Coast, Pedro Altamirano 
made an attack on a patrol commanded by Captain Power, on 14 June 
193 1, at Embocoderas, which drew all the available Central Area patrols 
into the Pena Blanca country, north of the Tuma River, he then dis- 
appeared from the scene of his usual activities and was next heard from 
on 19 July, when he raided the undefended town of Santo Domingo, 
100 miles to the southeast, in the Department of Chontales. Santo 
Domingo was a town of special economic importance because it was 
the site of the Javali gold mine, which, in addition to the gold it pro- 
duced, furnished employment, for an average of two hundred men, 
enabling them to support themselves and their families. Many of these 
men were, if idle, potential Sandinistas. In fact it was considered so 
important to keep this mine in operation, that the Government of 
Nicaragua loaned the proprietor ^25,000, using the Guardia Nacional 
as its agent in making the loan. While not desirous of becoming in- 
volved in the financial transactions of the Republic other than those 
relating to Guardia funds, the emergency was considered so great that 
it was reluctantly agreed to permit the Guardia to act in this case, with 
the understanding that payments on the loan, if not met when due, were 
not to become charges against the Guardia appropriations. Nor was 
the Guardia to be responsible for the collection of the loan or of the 
interest thereon. 



31 



As the mine employees refused to return to work after the raid 
without the presence of a Guardia garrison, it became necessary to 
establish a post of one officer and thirty men at Santo Domingo. 

In the summer and early fall of 1931, after a series ot strong Guar- 
dia offensives in the Northern and Central Areas, which followed in 
point of time close upon the death of Ortez, the most aggressive of the 
bandit leaders, and which procuded many contacts with excellent re- 
sults in the Northen Area (the Central Area patrols obtained very few 
contacts), bandit activities subsided in the Northern and Central Areas 
and it was believed for a time that real progress was being made in the 
suppression of banditry. It was found later that Altamirano's group had 
transferred its activities to the Eastern Area and the group that had 
been operating in Nueva Segovia, under its new leaders, Colindres and 
Umanzor, deserting their old haunts, suddenly appeared in the Depart- 
ment of Chinandega, announcing their arrival on November 22, 1931, 
by raiding the undefended railroad town of Chichigalpa, looting and 
robbing at will until the arrival of a patrol of four enlisted Guardia and 
23 volunteer civilians from the town of Chinandega, when they rapidly 
withdrew. While the loss to civilians was of property only, this raid 
caused panic in all the exposed railroad towns which extended even as 
far as Managua, causing the President to repair to Chinandega osten- 
sibly to take personal charge of operations, and restore the confidence 
of the people. Its final result was beneficial to the Guardia, as it caused 
the President to authorize the enlistment and maintenance of 1 50 AUX- 
ILIARIES, to serve as Guardia in the Departments of Leon and Chi- 
nandega. 

After his raid on Santo Domingo, Pedro Altamirano returned to 
his old haunts in the vicinity of Pena Blanca, but in crossing the Central 
Area, he was so hotly pursued by the combined patrols of Sajonia and 
Navarro, under command of Captain Bourne, that he saved his com- 
mand from destruction only by dispersing it in the wilderness north of 
the Tuma River. Having found the settled portions of the Central and 
Northern Areas untenable even for a short stay because of the number 
and aggressiveness of Guardia patrols, and even his haunts in the fast- 
nesses of the north being continually patrolled, "Pedron" removed the 
scene of his labors to the mining centers on the rivers emptying into the 
Carribean Sea, which were almost without protection, and to the com- 
missaries of the fruit and lumber companies of the East Coast, where 
the Guardia garrisons were not so numerous nor so strong as in the 
western portions of the Republic. 

As these incidents serve to show, the necessity of protecting the 
lives and property of foreign residents, of saving the towns from des- 
truction and pillage, of preserving the confidence of the population so 
that they would remain at the mines and on the plantations, as well as 
the necessity for keeping open the roads and rivers over which the crops 
were moved, and the railroad from Managua to Corinto, many points 
of which were exposed to bandit attacks and destruction, absolutely 
precluded even the temporary abandonment of these critical points for 
the concentration of a purely offensive force with little probability of 
its being able to obtain a final decision. 

The plan to garrison all points of tactical and economic importance, 
thus denying them to the bandits, had certain advantages in the pecu- 
liar situation created by the tactics of the bandits and their allied bands 

32 



of local marauders. It furnished a very real security at critical points^ 
the presence of the Guardia inspired confidence in the local inhabitants, 
and kept them at work, it permitted the merchants of the towns to 
carry on their business without fear of bandit raids, and it was the only 
kind of protection that satisfied the foreign residents, who almost in- 
variably took an extremely selfish view of the situation and protested con- 
tinually through the diplomatic representatives of their countries unless 
their properties were safeguarded by the actual presence of Guardia 
garrisons. It also gave the necessary police protection to the towns. 
It supplied satisfactory security for the mine owners, the labor camps, 
and the strategic points along the railroad. Then the garrisons which 
were strong enough for defensive purposes were usually of sufficient 
strength to permit local patrolling, which kept under control the small 
local bands. Excellent illustrations of the advantages of garrisoning a 
town are shown in the following extracts: 

"Report of Captain W. S. Fellers, G. N. (1st Lieut, U.S.M.C.)— 
Com-manding the District of Santa Maria, in Nueva Segovia, from 
where miany inhabitants had abandoned their homes and moved across 
the Honduran border — quote :- "The Guardia post at Santa Maria has 
done much to produce confidence, and bring back to this part of the 
country, those who left to avoid uncertain futures during the period 
of banditry — there are listed some 205 persons in the District whereas 
a year ago there were some 20 who were known to have good intentions. 
In concluding this little bit of personal information, I might add, that 
whereas the sections of Zapotal, Las Bricas, Agua Caliente, Guanral, 
are returning, the sections of the extreme northwest corner, are doing 
likewise, the promise of the inhabitants to return after November and 
December crops are gathered on Honduran soil, have been met by the 
assurance of peace at the protection offered by the Guardia." (GUAR- 
DIA NEWS LETTER NO. 21), and Captain Holdahl's report from the 
same district : "The school is now in full swing, and has increased from 
14 to 28. Don't know where they have appeared from — nephews and 
neices of local people have com.e into town from all sides. Have had to 
send to Managua for more books, slates, etc. Will have to put a limit 
on the thing as I can't afford to educate any more. At Present there is 
a boy's class, and a girl's class, and the Guardia class is held in the 
evening. The teacher is a very intelligent woman from Honduras and 
seems to be holding a good school." (GUARDIA NEWS LETTER 
NO. 35). 

"The Guardia commander at La Fundadora reports that at the 
request of the Administrator of La Fundadora, during the period 3 
June to 13 June, a guard of six enlisted was furnished a surveying party 
at Chimborroza. The guard enabled the survey of a finca, owned by 
Mr. Charles Potter, to be made in safety in a country over-run with 
local bandits. Without the protection of the Guardia, this work would 
not have been carried on." 

"The following is quoted from "EL ESFUERZO," a Jinotega news- 
paper dated July 5th, 193 1, under the heading, "There is a real vigilance 
in the Population." — With great satisfaction we have come to see that 
the commander of the Guardia has taken a real interest in the Vigilance 
of the Population. Municipal police and Guardias remain on duty on 



33 



the roads leading into the city and in other streets at all hours during 
the day as well as at night to control order." (GUARD I A NEWS 
LETTER NO. 56). 

The chief fault of this plan lay in the inherent weakness of the pas- 
sive defensive. It left the initiative entirely in the hands of the bandits 
who were able to concentrate as high as 300 men in one group, and so 
dispersed the Guardia that with the strength available it would have 
been weak at all points. Many of the valuable properties were isolated 
beyond supporting distances of each other, and without communication 
except by runner and their garrisons would have been wiped out piece- 
meal by the larger bandit groups. There were 32 towns in the Segovias 
alone that would have required garrisons of from 1 5 to 30 men each. It 
was, therefore, obvious that a complete defense of the entire country 
by this means, was not only, not the best method of combating banditry, 
but was an impossibility with the forces that the Nicaraguan Govern- 
ment was able to put in the field. The following is quoted from an 
Estimate of the situation in the Central Area as typical of the situation 
existing throughout the whole country : 

"There are in this area, besides Matagalpa and Jinotega, twelve 
towns that now have Guardia garrisons. There are south of the Tuma 
River not less than forty haciendas with a tax value of from ^10,000 to 
^60,000 each. The present garrisons of the towns total one hundred 
and ninety men, with Muy Muy, Matiguas and San Isidro very weakly 
held. An average garrison of ten men for each of the forty haciendas 
south of the Tuma would require four hundred men, implying the re- 
duction of the present garrisons at Corinto, Finca, Las Camelias and 
Navarro. There are at least four valuable properties north of the Tuma 
River whose garrisons could not well be less than one officer and twenty 
men each, otherwise they would be useless for protection, and being 
beyond supporting distance of other posts and without communication 
would be wiped out whenever the bandits decided to attack in force. 
This would require a total of eighty men. With the withdrawal of the 
Marines a garrison of ninety men each will be required for Matagalpa 
and Jinotega, as the Guardia will be responsible for the defense and 
police of the towns, and these numbers will have to include all casualties 
(for the area) and bear the shortages due to discharges, transfers, etc., 
as well as furnish the administrative patrols for supply, pay, communi- 
cation and inspection purposes and will constitute the Area reserve. 
This makes a total of eight hundred and fifty men with only four posts, 
Matagalpa, Jinotega, San Rafael and Yali capable of operating combat 
patrols. After the withdrawal of the Marines, the only means of com- 
munication in this area will be the telegraph lines between the principal 
towns and by runner. Hence, the possibility of mutual support be- 
tween outlying posts is precluded. The difficulties of supply, adminis- 
tration and inspection are believed to be insuperable. This plan, in 
addition to the administrative difficulties involved, disperses the forces 
of the Guardia making them weak everywhere, and gives up all idea of 
offensive operations, without which banditry can never be suppressed. 
The number of men required for this sort of passive defense limits the 
operations of the Guardia to the area south of the Tuma, and surrenders 
to the bandits a rich and fertile and partially developed country." 

Note. — This extract is part of an estimate based on a proposed 
strength for the Central Area of 683 enlisted. It was later found im- 
possible to bring the Area up to that strength. 

84 



COMBINING AN ACTIVE DEFENSE WITH OFFENSIVE 
OPERATIONS 

The system of combating banditry finally put into effect by the 
Guardia, was a combination of the two plans just discussed. It con- 
sisted of guarding as many as possible of the critical points, and at the 
same time, maintaining vigorous local offensive campaigns against 
bandit groups large and small wherever they were located. 

This system was partly a natural growth forced on the Guardia by 
circumstances, and partly the result of deliberate planning. It was 
found that both American and Nicaraguan governmental policies called 
for a certain amount of passive defense, that there were some things 
that could not be left undefended even temporarily without serious 
injury to the economic and social structure of the Republic; it was also 
clearly seen that banditry could never be suppressed by military forces 
without the assumption of the offensive. Hence, the problem of the 
Guardia became the limitation of the necessary defensive forces to an 
irreducible minimum and concentrating as many as possible for offen- 
sive operations. As the country was extensive and communications 
were poor, it was impossible to direct all operations from Managua, and 
the policy of dividing the country into Military Departments and Areas, 
with a responsible commander in each, was adopted. The geography of 
the country, its division into political departments, and location of the 
main bandit group which each had a separate field of activity and a 
separate line of communications into Honduras, all went to make this 
organization suitable to meet the situation. In general, an active de- 
fense was established along the railroad; the towns, which were usually 
the critical points, were garrisoned with detachments strong enough to 
send out combat patrols capable of taking the offensive against any 
ordinary bandit group. Civicos were enlisted, who could be used only 
for local defense, but could be called into service whenever an attack 
threatened or when it became necessary to send out a full strength 
combat patrol. The civico system was extended to the whole zone of 
bandit operations. 

In the Northern Area, the bandits were more numerous than in any 
other section, and in 1930 operated in many relatively small groups. 
The number of these groups and their continuous activity in many parts 
of the Area, as well as the large number of towns to be defended, caused 
a dispersion of the Guardia forces into numerous small garrisons. These 
garrisons were, however, of sufficient strength to send out patrols cap- 
able of defeating the groups with which they came in contact, and with 
the help of the civicos were able to successfully defend their towns 
against the most determined bandit attacks. There were probably more 
contacts in the Northern Area than in all the other active areas com- 
bined. The offensive system at this time in the Northern Area consisted 
of constant patrolling to keep the small groups on the move, and com- 
bined drives from several directions when the bandits were believed to 
be in force in any particular locality. So long as the bandits remained 
dispersed this was the proper and most successful method of combating 
them. During the latter part of 1931 and during the year of 1932, the 
bandits operating in Nueva Segovia formed into larger groups, and it 
became necessary for the Guardia to meet them with larger patrols. 
As a result a district organization was adopted with one strong combat 
patrol in each district, and as far as practicable, garrisons of sufficient 

35 



strength for defensive purposes, and for local patrolling, were kept in 
the other stations. (1). 

During this same period the bandits moved in strength into the 
Departments of Leon and Chinandega requiring the reinforcement of 
those Departments. Since few regular Guardia were available for this 
purpose, the President of Nicaragua authorized the enlistment of 150 
auxiliares. These auxiliares were used in the same manner as the regular 
Guardia, for patrolling, local defense, and as urban police, the only dif- 
ference being that they were not subject to transfer to any part of the 
Republic, and were not available tor promotion above the rank of pri- 
vate. They were found very useful and some became the equal of the 
regular guardia. With their enlistment, the garrisons were strengthened 
in the outlying towns of the two departments, especially near the Hon- 
duran border. There was also an additional defensive force in the De- 
partment of Leon. A number of the laborers doing road work were 
enlisted as civicos, armed with rifles, and organized under command of 
General Escamilla, lately of the revolutionary army under Moncada, 
for the defense of their camps. Every precaution was taken to prevent 
these armed laborers from becoming an independent force, and opera- 
ting without authority of the Jefe Director of the Guardia. Their rifles 
were kept under lock and key except when actually in use and under no 
circumstances were they permitted to carry arms at a distance of more 
than one half-mile from their camps. When under arms they automa- 
tically came under the command of the nearest Guardia officer. 

The situation in the Central Area differed somewhat from that in 
the other parts of the zone of bandit activities. It contained a rich 
stretch of coffee land lying east of the Colon Valley and south of the 
Tuma River, which was relatively thickly populated, and occupied by 
numerous hacienda and coffee fincas, many of which were owned by 
foreigners, either Americans or Europeans. This section, due to some 
extent to the activities of the Marines and the Guardia, but more to its 
distance from the border, was not the permanent habitat of any of the 
larger bandit groups. The Colon Valley, however, was a famous bandit 
runway and was filled with bandit sympathizers. While north of the 
Tuma River lay Pena Blanca, the Pantasma Valley, the Cua Valley and 
other bandit rendezvous, as well as the El Silencio and Chipote sections 
of the Northern Area, also well known bandit concentration points. 
The Pantasma, Cua and Bocay Rivers, all bandit highways, have their 
sources in the mountain range lying just north of the Tuma River. A 
trail to the Pis Pis mines and the east coast runs through this unsettled 
territory. The Guardia mission was the protection of this rich well 
populated salient projecting into the wilderness of Northern and Central 
Nicaragua. The method adopted was the establishment of a line of 
strong combat patrol posts in a semi-circle stretching from Yali to 
Muy Muy, covering the border of the settled section. Patrol posts were 
established at each end oi the Colon Valley, and garrisons were placed 
at Matagalpa and Jinotega, which served the double purpose of defend- 
ing and policing those municipalities, and as the reserves of the area. 
There were nine posts established on foreign haciendas, and three on 
native fincas. Three of these were made to do double duty as combat 
patrol posts, but nine were solely defensive posts, and of little use for 
(1) Appendix 25 — Chapter 3. 



36 



offensive purposes, beyond furnishing rural police patrols, ridding their 
neighborhood of local bad men and controlling the depredations of part 
time bandits. (1). The combat patrol posts were prepared to clear 
combat patrols to any part of the Central Area either for independent 
action or to participate in combined operations under the direction of 
the Area Commander. Under orders from the Area Commander, these 
combat patrols operated in the wild area bordering on the settled sec- 
tions for the purpose of locating and destroying any bandit groups that 
might be found. And they also participated in frequent combined 
operations into the bandit country to the east and north, either carried 
on by the patrols of the Central Area alone or in cooperation with the 
Northern Area. As, once outside of the settled areas they were beyond 
communication, all of the combat patrols were not employed in this 
manner at the same time, but some were held available to meet unex- 
pected bandit movements. A unique and important feature in the Cen- 
tral Area was the "roving patrol" Company "M." This company was 
based on Jinotega, but had no defensive responsibilities, and was used 
for offensive work only. It was often absent for weeks at a time on 
missions assigned to it, and in its travels covered the territory as far 
east as Yousca, as far south as Santo Domingo, Chontales, and far west 
as El Sauce in Leon, and scoured the jungles from the Tuma River 
north beyond the mouth of the Cua and the northern slopes of Pena 
Blanca. Its average strength .was two officers and thirty men. Its 
armament consisted of six automatic weapons, four grenades dischar- 
gers, and twenty rifles. It became the terror of Pedron's group against 
whom it conducted most of its operations, and was effective wherever 
used. Its morale and confidence were always high, it was well drilled, 
its members took great pride in its accomplishments and in the Central 
Area where it was of course best known, it was looked up to by the 
Guardia of other organizations. The fact that it had no defensive res- 
ponsibilities gave it its chief value as it could always be used aggressively 
in any sector without weakening the defenses elsewhere. 

On the East Coast the Eastern Area was divided into two Depart- 
ments. 

As there were never sufficient Guardia available to attempt a 
general offensive in the enormous territory that had to be covered, an 
active defense system was worked out. Bluefields, and Puerto Cabezas, 
the respective department headquarters were assigned relatively large 
garrisons so that from those points reinforcements could be sent to any 
post attacked or threatened, and combat patrols cleared on short notice 
to meet bandit movements. Posts were established at Cabo Gracios a 
Dios and at the settlements of the large American fruit and lumber 
companies. Where possible these posts were strong enough to assume 
the offensive against bandit raiding parties. A base was established at 
Puerto Cabezas for airplanes which rendered invaluable service, carry- 
ing supplies and pay to the isolated posts of the interior, reconnoitering, 
locating and attacking bandit groups. It is extermely doubtful if any 
interior posts could have been maintained without the assistance of 
Marine Corps Aviation. 

The successes of Company "M" in its footloose operations in many 
parts of western Nicaragua led to the conclusion that with limited re- 
sources the best method of combating banditry and revolt under the 
(1) Appendix 26 — Chapter 3. 

37 



conditions encountered by the Guardia Nacional, would have been to 
carry on the combined scheme of locally controlled defensive and offen- 
sive operations, but in addition to have a number of roving patrols 
with no defensive missions, each capable of waging constant aggressive 
warfare against the organized groups. A total of eight such patrols, 
would have required an additional 14 officers and 210 men actually in 
ranks, with possibly 3 officers and 30 men to allow for casualties and re- 
placements. These patrols would have been distributed, two each to 
the Northern, Central and Eastern Areas, and one each to the Depart- 
ments of Leon and Chinandega. This would have been the system, most 
economical of men and money that could have been devised. However, 
the funds, ^8,900 a month, (and hence the men), were not available, 
and It was never practicable to put this plan into execution. (1). 

GUARDIA OPERATIONS 

Under the plan of defending critical points, and leaving as large a 
number of troops as possible free for offensive purposes, with the coun- 
try divided into Military Areas and Departments, and the commanders 
ot each charged with the responsibility of carrying out the necessary 
measures tor both the local defense and the offensive operations in the 
territory under his command, there were many interesting and instruc- 
tive small wars campaigns. In these miniature wars there were many 
hotly contested combats, and acts of heroism were almost of daily oc- 
cur ance. Though the bandits had the advantage of being footloose while 
the majority of the Guardia were tied to their bases and to the towns 
that needed their protection, the bandits by no means always had the 
initiative. Their camps were subject to attack and destruction by the 
Guardia, and when moving about the country they were never free 
from the fear of encountering a Guardia patrol eager to fight and always 
ready to attack no matter what the odds were against it. While it is 
true that bandits seldom were willing to fight decisive battles for their 
camps, they were sometimes surprised in them and suffered heavy losses 
in men and property. Much loot was recaptured in these combats and 
no large bandit group could take the field for any length of time without 
information of its movements reaching the Guardia and drawing upon 
itself concentration of patrols from all sides. While under ordinary 
circumstances each military subdivision was self supporting and handled 
its own problems, nevertheless there was constant cooperation between 
the neighboring Areas and a healthful rivalry between them as to which 
would have the most contacts and inflict the greatest damage to the 
enemy. There was also a number of combined offensive movements, 
directed from Guardia Headquarters, in which patrols from the different 
Departments and Areas participated. During the Fall of 1931, patrols 
from both the Northern and Central Areas operated extensively in the 
Departments of Leon and Chinandega, to the discomfiture of the bandit 
groups who had moved down there to obtain relatively easy pickings, 
after having been roughly handled in the Northern Area. 

An excellent illustration of the operations of the Guardia as finally 
organized is the manner in which it met the bandit threat to interfere 
with the holding of the presidential election of 1932, which was supre- 
vised by an American Electoral Mission, under command of Rear 
(1) Appendices 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 & 23— Chapter 3. 

38 



Admiral C. H. Woodward, U. S. Navy. 

At the beginning of the electoral period there were many reports 
and rumors that the bandits intended to interrupt the elections. These 
reports coincided in point of time with information that the bandits 
were receiving large shipments of ammunition from various points in 
Honduras. During the months of September and October, signs of 
increased activity were noticed in all the usual fields of bandit opera- 
tions. In order to meet this situation vigorous offensive action was taken 
by the guardia, with the result that Company "M" administered a severe 
defeat to "Pedron's" group north of the Tuma River on 26 September. 
The combined patrols from El Sauce and Somotillo defeated decisively 
a large group under Colindres, Salgado, Jose Leon Diaz, Peralta and 
Quintera, in Northern Leon on 25 October, and a Chichigalpa patrol 
consisting of regular guardia, auxiliares and civicos under command of 
native officers fought a long drawn-out battle with a group under 
Umanzor at La Pelona in the Department of Chinandega on 28 October, 
which resulted in severe losses on both sides. In addition there were 
numerous smaller and less decisive contacts throughout the whole zone 
of bandit operations, with the result that when the time came for the 
election, the bandit groups had been dispersed, and compelled to expend 
the greater part of their ammunition, and as a consequence, were unable 
to prevent the voting in even a single mesa. 

This was a clear demonstration of the ability of the Guardia Nacion- 
al to meet any aggressive move on the part of the bandits, and defeat 
them in the field. It also showed that the Guardia as finally organized 
and equipped was capable of making a general offensive without leaving 
any important bandit objective unguarded, but as past experience had 
shown, the most successful offensives only served to disperse the bandit 
groups and drive them across the border, where it was impossible for 
the guardia to follow up its advantages, and that the bandits would 
after a time return to their old haunts and renew their careers of loot 
and pillage. 

GUARDIA MORALE 

The morale of the Guardia was always high. Patrols of twenty 
guardia led by Americans or trained Nicaraguan officers and armed with 
automatic weapons, rifles and rifle grenades, repeatedly demonstrated 
their ability to cope with the largest groups, but were not sufficiently 
powerful to effect their destruction, nor always able to defeat them. 
However, the officers and men of the Guardia had no hesitation in 
attacking forces of from five to ten times their numerical strength, and 
in most cases succeeded even against such odds in driving the bandits 
from the field. There was no case of a guardia patrol of more than twen- 
ty men, commanded by American officers being decisively defeated by 
any group of bandits, however large. The enlisted guardia were on the 
whole very loyal to their officers, both American and Nicaraguan, and 
fought exceedingly well when properly trained and led. They marched 
great distances and endured hardships with a spirit equaled only by the 
best of seasoned troops. They were able to live on the simple food that 
the country afforded and never complained so long as it was sufficient in 
quantity. While few of them never became really good rifle shots, many 
were possessed of the ability to shoot accurately in battle to a very high 
degree. They also rapidly developed a remarkable accuracy in the use 
of rifle grenades. Many of them who came from the hills had been hun- 
ters, and cowboys and could follow a trail and read the signs of the 
woods with uncanny skill. 

89 



GUARDIA INTELLIGENCE 

Gua dia intelligence was divided into two distinct classes, informa- 
tion of the strength dispositions and movements of the bandits and 
what might be termed political intelligence. The former was obtained 
by the forces in the field and the latter came to Guardia Headquarters 
from various sources. It consisted of reports of plots against the Govern- 
ment in power, of revolutions which were to start in the University of 
Leon, Communist uprisings, and many other dire happenings. The 
information from this source that was of most value proved to be the 
rumors of arms and ammunition smuggling from Honduras. It was 
usually ound that a series of persistent rumors of the accumulation of 
ammunition at Choluteca, even though they were never verified, was 
followed by activity of Umanzor in Northern Leon and Chinandega. 
The same was true of similar reports from Danli, which were usually 
followed by activity in the Segovia-. These reports came partly from 
the Naval Attache in Tegucigalpa, but principally from spies in Danli 
and Chouluteca. The informiation acquired by forces in the field came 
principally from natives suffering from bandit depredations, hired agents 
bandit prisoners and deserters, and the information picked up by opera- 
ting patrols, partly by questioning natives, and partly from inspecting 
old camp sites, reading the figns on the trails, etc 

Weekly intelligence reports were required of all Department and 
Area Commanders. These included information of all bandit groups 
reported, their movements, the names of the Jefes, the number of men 
and arms of the group, the source and reliability of the information; 
and an estimate of probable bandit activities during the coming week. 
Other important information was reported as received. 

While one individual report was often of little value the combined 
reports presented a surprisingly accurate picture of the military situa- 
tion. Pertinent important information was promptly orwarded to the 
units concerned by Guardia Headquarters, or by the responsible com- 
mander receiving it, and weekly combined intelligence reports were 
issued by Headquarters to the various Guardia units, a more complete 
monthly intelligence report was compiled for the information of all 
concerned, copies of which were sent to the Major General Comman- 
dant, Commanding General, 2d Brigade, the American Minis. er and 
the Marine Corps Schools. (1). 

Commencing July 1, 1930, a Guardia News Letter was published 
weekly and distributed to all stations and to the Second Brigade, U. S. 
Marine Corps offices. It was printed by mimeograph, and, at first, was 
composed of two pages and contained news items of general interest, 
such as contacts with bandits, important patrol operation accomplish- 
ments of the Guardia, and movements of officers traveling without 
troops. 

It soon became evident that the news letter was being received with 
wide-spread interest, and that it was a convenient vehicle for the re- 
cording and dissemination of data that would increase the effectiveness 
of cooperative action of, and between areas and smaller units by reason 
of increased knowledge of each other's movements, contacts, informa- 
tion, etc. Accordingly, all patrol movements were included, with a brief 
summary of the results of information gained, and complete contact and 
(1) Appendix 27 — Chapter 3. 

40 



patrol reports, letters relating to conditions at stations, and miscellan- 
eous material of general interest. Contact reports often contained dia- 
grams illustrating the important terrain features and the disposition of 
our own and the bandit forces, during successive stages of the contact; 
these diagrams or sketches were mimeographed and included in the 
news letter along with the detailed report. 

In this manner, the news letter soon was increased in size, and 
became correspondingly more valuable. Patrol leaders were encouraged 
to write reports, by seeing them in print, knowing that they would be 
read by many other people, and this doubtless influenced them to exer- 
cise a greater degree of care in their preparation than might otherwise 
have been the case. It was also a morale booster. 

Until the final turn-over of the Guardia to the control of Nicara- 
guan officers, publication of the news letter was continued, employing 
for each issue, the items received at Guardia Headquarters during the 
preceding week. Some issues contained as many as 27-28 pages. 

AVIATION SUPPORT OF THE GUARDIA 

The part that the Marine Corps aviation played in Guardia military 
operations is difficult to describe. Without its assistance in transporting 
supplies and troops, the Guardia would never have been able to accom- 
plish what it did. Its potential power was always recognized. For in- 
stance, it was well known that no group of bandits, however large, could 
continue its attacks on a town after the arrival of the planes. A seige 
was impossible to the bandits, for sooner or later the planes would be 
sure to arrive and no bandit group would stand a bombing attack from 
the air without scattering and taking cover. Hence, it was possible to 
leave exposed towns with small garrisons, which were safe so long as 
they did not permit themselves to be surprised, as because of the planes, 
the bandits were unable to continue their attacks for more than a few 
hours during daylight. The planes were also useful in slowing down 
bandit groups on the march as they would invariably scatter and take 
cover from air observation. They were also useful in denying certain 
sections to the bandits who avoided locations where the planes were 
operating, and fear of the planes kept them generally clear of the open 
country. 

For reconnaissance they were of less value in thick country as it 
was an impossibility for an observer to pick up troops on the ground, 
in the impenetrable jungles that covered the greater part of the zone of 
bandit operations. Where the country was relatively open they were 
often useful for liaison purposes, locating and dropping information and 
orders to patrols. But in many cases they were unable to locate patrols, 
even though the latter set off smoke bombs and made every effort to be 
seen. The effect of much flying in territory where it was hoped to en- 
counter hostile groups with ground patrols was to give the enemy warn- 
ing of the approach of the patrols and enable him to take measures to 
escape them. 



41 



There were in spite of these difficulties a number of successful at- 
tacks from the air. Sandino with a large force was driven from camp on 
Saraguasca Mountain in what he apparently believed to be a position, 
impregnable against ground attack, and was himself wounded. This 
happened in June, 1930, and was the last appearance of Sandino on the 
field of battle in Nicaragua while American Marines remained in the 
Guardia Nacional. (See inclosure for aviation's part in contacts near 
Neptune Mines). (1). 

In the Eastern Area where the country was less dense aviation was 
more valuable for attack purposes than in the heavily forested sections 
of western Nicaragua. Without its assistance and cooperation the prob- 
lem of the Guardia on the East Coast would have been infinitely more 
difficult, if not impossible of accomplishment. 
(1) Appendix 21 — Chapter 3. 

SUMMARY OF OBJECTIVES ATTAINED BY THE GUARDIA 

1. It kept tha Departments of Carazo, Chontales, Managua and 
Rivas and the District of San Juan del Sur, large parts of the Depart- 
ments of Leon, Chinandega, Matagalpa, and Bluefields, and the District 
of Cabo Gracias, with a combined area of 25,000 square miles, and a 
population of 400,000 free from banditry, and preserved in them a state 
of peace, law and order, more secure then had existed for many years. (1). 

2. It assisted in the preservation of law and order during the elec- 
tions of 1928 and 1930, and through its efforts alone preserved order 
during the Presidential election of 1932. (See footnote). 

3. It kept the railroad from Corinto to Granada open at all times. 

4. It secured the collection and exportation of the coffee and banana 
crops. 

5. It secured the operation of the mines at Pis Pis, Neptune and 
Santo Domingo. 

6. It participated in 510 contacts with bandits, in which there were 
1,115 known bandits killed, 526 wounded, and 76 captured, itself suffer- 
ing losses of 75 killed, 122 wounded, and none captured. 

7. It did not capture Sandino, but did force him to spend most of 
his time across the Honduran border, and did kill two of his most im- 
portant leaders. 

8. It did not suppress banditry, but did limit its activities to the 
sparsely inhabited sections near the Honduran border. 

9. It maintained in office, a legally elected President for a full term 
of four years. 

10. It assured the lawful election of the successor of the President, 
and his peaceful installation into office. 

11. It became an effective military organization, so organized and 
officered that it was capable of being turned over to Nicaraguan control, 
and possessed, even after the withdrawal of the American personnel, 
sufficient power to prevent Sandino, and his bandit hordes from over- 
throwing the Government, and to compel him to accept peace on terms 
that gave him no voice in the Government of the Republic. 

Footnote : 

(Par. 2) Some Marine Detachments were stationed in the lar- 
ger towns during the 1932 elections, but were in reserve only, and did 
not take an active part in operations against banditry. Their presence 
and readiness to act in emergency however, was of great value and 
released Guardia that would have otherwise been compelled to remain 
in reserve. 
(1) Appendix 28 — Chapter 3. 

42 



CHAPTER IV 

PUBLIC RELATIONS 

The Civil Government of Nicaragua 

The Government of Nicaragua is republican in form and is divided 
into three branches, executive, legislative, and judicial. 

The executive power is vested in a President elected for four years. 
He may not succeed himself. He, as well as the Vice-President, must 
be a native of Nicaragua and shall be a citizen in the exercise of his full 
rights of citizenship. The President cannot leave the country during 
his term of office without permission from Congress, nor after his term 
is ended if there is a suit pending against him for any official or common 
offense. 

The attributes and powers of the President affecting the military 
service of the Republic are: 

(1) The President of the Republic is the commanding general of 
the land and sea forces. 

(2) To confer rank, in time of peace, to include the rank of 
colonel and in time of war, to include the rank of general of a division. 

(3) To organize the land and sea forces and to distribute them 
according to the law and the needs of the Republic. 

(4) To declare martial law and to suspend the constitution in the 
case the public peace is threatened. 

(5) To care for the interior security and the exterior defense of 
the country. 

(6) To declare war with the sanction of Congress and to make 
peace when th2 national interests require it. 

(7) To direct war operations as Commanding General of the 
National Army and Navy. When he personally takes command of the 
Army, he turns over the presidential duties to the vice-president or 
first designate, if there be no vice-president, and remains vested only with 
the character of Commanding General. 

(8) To raise the necessary forces to repel any invasion or to 
subdue rebellions. 

(9) To dispose of sea and land forces for the security of and de- 
fense of the Republic; to maintain order and peace in the Republic. 

The Executive Authority in Nicaragua is administered by the 
President, members of his official cabinet, the jefe politicos of depart- 
ments, the administradores de rentas of departments, the alcaldes of 
incorporated cities and towns, jefes de sanidad of departments, agentes 
fiscales, jueces de la mesta, jefes de canton and capitanes de Canada. 
All of the officials of the executive department of the government were 
generally adherents of the party in power in the national and depart- 
mental governments. The results of the election of president vested 
the exercise of executive authority in the national and departmental 
government in the hands of the President and his personal official ap- 
pointees. The only local self-go vernm.ent found in Nicaragua is that 
vested in incorporated towns and cities. 

The local government of municipalities is vested in an alcalde and 
a municipal council elected by public and direct vote of the citizens of 
the respective municipality. 

The members of the President's Cabinet must be natural born 
citizens of Nicaragua in full rights, laymen, and over twenty-five years 
of age. 

43 



Cabinet ministers must promulgate within their respective depart- 
ments, the decrees, resolutions and ordnances of the President of the 
Republic. They may be present without voting during the deliberations 
of Congress and shall attend whenever they are so requested and must 
answer any questions that any member of Congress may make to them, 
regarding matters of administration, except those matters concerning 
war and foreign relations, when they deem it advisable to keep such 
matters secret, unless the Chamber decides to the contrary. 

The President's Cabinet is composed of five members: 

(1) Minister of Government, Police, Justice and Charities. 

(2) Minister of Foreign Relations and Public Instruction. 

(3) Minister of Treasury and Public Credit. 

(4) Minister of War and Marine, and 

(5) Minister of Promotion and Public Works. 

The Jefe Politico is the chief executive officer of each of the thirteen 
departments into which the Republic of Nicaragua is divided, and is 
appointed by the President. He corresponds generally, to a governor 
of a state or territory. He exercises considerable power over the people 
and all local officials within the department. He is the political repre- 
sentative of the president and is responsible to the national government. 
He is usually appointed from the party in control of the national govern- 
ment. In zones of active operations Jefes Politicos issued passes for the 
movements of the population from one point to another. His powers are 
generally enlarged under martial law. 

The Administrador de Rentas of a department is appointed by the 
president and has charge of: 

(1) Sale of stamps for legal documents, arms permits, aguar- 
diente, contraband, matches, etc., and control over all matters relating 
to collection of revenue and enforcement of revenue laws in the depart- 
ment. 

His quasi-judicial functions are given under the judiciary . 

The Jefe de Sanidad of the department has charge over the enforce- 
ment of the sanitary regulations. He is appointed by the President usual- 
ly from among the adherents of the party to which the President be- 
longed. 

The Alcalde of a municipality corresponds generally to a mayor of 
an American city. He is the chief executive of a municipality and is 
elected by popular suffrage. 

The Legislative Authority of the government is vested in the nation- 
al congress composed of two chambers: (1) Chamber of Senators, and 
(2) Chamber of Deputies. The senators are elected for six years, one 
third being elected every two years. A senator must be over forty years 
of age, be a citizen of Nicaragua and be a layman. The senate consists 
of one senator for each two deputies from each department. If the num- 
ber of deputies be odd, another senator is elected. A substitute senator 
is elected for each senator. 

The deputies are elected for four years, and must be citizens of 
Nicaragua, laymen, and over twenty-five years of age. The deputies 
are apportioned to the departments according to the population. Each 
department is divided into electoral districts, one for each 15,000 of 
population, adding another district for any fraction exceeding 8,000 
Each district elects a deputy and a substitute deputy. 



44 



< 



of: 



The Judicial Department of the Government of Nicaragua consists 



Judiciary Proper 

(1) The Supreme Court of Justice. 

(2) The Courts of Appeal. 

(3) The District Courts. 

(4) The Local Courts. 

Government Accounting 

(5) The Tribunal of Accounts. 

Settlement of Claims 

(6) The Claims Commission. 

Civil Officials Exercising Judicial Functions 

(7) Directores de Policia. 

(8) Jefes Politicos. 

(9) Administradores de Rentas. 

(10) Alcaldes. 

(11) Jueces de la Mesta. 

(12) Jefes de Canton. 

(13) Capitanes de Canada. 

Military Tribunals 

(14) Consejo de Guerra General. 

(15) Consejo de Guerra Ordinario. 

(16) Consejo de Guerra Sumario. 

(17) Consejo de Guerra Extraordinario. 

The civil judicial tribunals are authorized to demand the assistance 
of the armed forces to enforce their decisions, and if this be denied them, 
or there are not armed forces available, they can demand the assistance 
of private citizens. The official or private citizen who improperly denies 
his assistance shall be held liable. 

The Supreme Court of Justice consists of five magistrates and two 
substitute magistrates. These are selected by Congress in joint session 
and serve for a six year term. The magistrates must be over thirty 
years of age, be citizens of Nicaragua in the exercise of the full rights of 
citizenship, be laymen and attorneys at law. 

The attributes of the Supreme Court of Justice are: 

(1) To appoint and remove judges of the district and local courts. 

(2) To appoint and remove the court physicians (Medical 
forensos). 

(3) To appoint and remove the recorders of deeds. 

(4) To hear and determine appeals from the decisions of inferior 
courts. 

(5) To hear and determine appeals from the resolutions of the 
Tribunal of Accounts 

(6) Original jurisdiction in cases involving Admiralty Law. 
The Supreme Court of Justice sits in Managua, the capital. 

Courts of Appeals 

The Courts of Appeals are located in the following cities of Nicara- 
gua: 

45 



(1) Leon (3) Matagalpa 

(2) Granada (4) Biuefields 

The magistrates and substitute magistrates of the Courts of Appeals 
are elected in joint session of Congress, must be over thirty years of age, 
citizens in the exercise of the full rights of citizenship, laymen and at- 
torneys at law. The Court of Appeals exercises control over the District 
and Local Courts within its jurisdiction. It hears and determines civil 
and criminal appeals from the decisions of the District Courts. The 
Courts of Appeals are not courts of original jurisdiction. The term of 
office of a magistrate is four years, 

The Supreme Court of Justice and the Courts of Appeals are presid- 
ed over by competent magistrates of experience and who are well 
grounded in the law. 

The District Courts 

Nicaragua is divided into twenty judicial districts. Managua, Leon , 
Matagalpa, Granada, and Biuefields districts each have two judges, 
one for criminal and one for civil cases. The other districts have one 
judge who hears and determines both civil and criminal cases in the 
district. For each judge there is also appointed a substitute judge. 
The judges and substitute judges are appointed and removed by the 
Supreme Court of Justice. 

The District Court is a court of both first and second instance. It 
is a court of record. It supervises and reviews the actions of the local 
courts in the district. It, also, tries such cases as are transferred to it 
from the Local Court. 

In many cases the appointees to the office of district judge are 
young men who have just graduated from law schools, lacking legal ex- 
perience and judgment and who in some cases have not yet been admit- 
ted to the practice of law. The same situation obtains in reference to the 
local courts. The great weakness in the administration of justice in 
Nicaragua seems to lie in the fact that the trial judges are not necessarily 
men learned in the law and experienced in procedure. 

The Local Courts 

Nicaragua is divided into one hundred and seventeen Local Court 
Districts. The local jurisdictions of Managua, Leon, Chinandega, 
Chichigalpa, Matagalps, Jinotega, Masaya, Jinotepe, Granada, each 
have two judges assigned, one for criminal cases and the other for civil 
cases. In all other local jurisdictions the same judge hears and deter- 
mines both civil and criminal cases. For each local judge there is ap- 
pointed a substitute local judge. Appointments and removals of the 
local judges and substitutes are made by the Supreme Court of Justice. 
The Local Court is a court of first instance and is a court of record. 
There are one hundred twenty-six local judges in Nicaragua. 

The Tribunal of Accounts 

The Tribunal of Accounts really appertains to the executive depart- 
ment of the government, but exercises quasi-judicial functions. The 
members of this tribunal are appointed by the President. The functions 
of the Tribunal des Cuentas are: 

46 



(1) The examination, audit and closing of the accounts of the 
administrators of public funds. 

(2) Hears appeals and adjudicates cases arising out of the dis- 
bursement of government funds. 

(3) The decisions of this tribunal are subject only to review by 
the Supreme Court of Justice. 

The Claims Commission 

The Claims Commission consists of three members. The presiding 
member is an American citizen nominated by the State Department of 
the United States. The other two members are Nicaraguan citizens, 
one from each of the two historic political parties. The function of the 
claims commission is to hear and determine all claims against the Gov- 
ernment of Nicaragua either from the citizens of Nicaragua or the citi- 
zens of foreign nations. It fulfills in Nicaragua the function of a court 
of claims. The commission came into existence for the purpose, largely, 
of settling claims arising incident to the destruction of property during 
the recent revolutions and the loss sustained by property owners from 
the depredations of organized banditry. Its decisions are final and are 
not subject to review by any judicial tribunal. 

Directores de Policia 

The Directors of Police are appointed by the President, one from 
each department. The director of Police hears and determines cases 
involving the following offenses : 

(a) Violations of the Arms Law. 

(b) Stealing or embezzling of government funds or property. 

(c) Violations of Police Regulations. 

(d) Violations of Sanitary Regulations, provided the case would 
not involve a greater than a correctional sentence. In the event any 
offense involves a more than correctional sentence the Director of Police 
transfers the case to either the Local or District Court for action and 
trial. Appeals from his decisions must be made within twenty-four 
hours. In cases involving hygiene or sanitation, appeals are made to 
the departmental Jefe de Sanidad. In cases involving violations of the 
Arms Law, the stealing or embezzling of government funds or property, 
or infractions of the Police Regulations, appeals are made to the De- 
partmental Jefe Politico. The Director of Police largely functions as a 
police judge. 

The Jefes Politicos 

The Jefes Politicos are appointed and removed by the President. 
In addition to their executive duties they exercise the following quasi- 
judicial functions: Hear and determine appeals from the decisions of 
the Director de Policia. 

Administrador de Rentas 

The Administradors de Rentas are appointed by the President. 
The Administrador de Rentas tries and determines cases arising out of 
violations of the revenue laws and the seizure of contraband. Cases 
involving a more then correctional sentence are transferred to the Local 
or District Courts. 



47 



Alcaldes 

Alcaldes are elected by popular vote in incorporated municipalities. 
They try and determine cases arising out of the violation of local ord- 
nances; cases involving a more then correctional sentence are trans- 
ferred to Local or District Courts. 

Jueces de la Mesta 

The Jueces de la Mesta are appointed by the President, one for 
each canton in Nicaragua. They correspond very closely to our justices 
of the peace. The court of a Juez de la Mesta is not a court of record. 
They are authorized to award fines of not to exceed two dollars (^2.00), 
or confinement of not to exceed five days. They are required to submit 
a monthly report of the amount of fines imposed. They receive one-half 
of the value of the fines imposed by them. They receive no other re- 
muneration. 

The Jefes de Canton 

The Jefes de Canton are appointed by the President, two for each 
canton in Nicaragua. They are assistant to the Jueces de la Mesta. 
They are authorized to impose fines of not to exceed two dollars. They 
submit a report to the Jueces de la Mesta of the amount of fines imposed 
and are entitled to one-half of the amount of the fines imposed. They 
receive no other remuneration. 

Capitanes de Canada 

The Capitanes de Canada are Indian Chiefs appointed as such by 
the President in outlying districts where there is predominent Indian 
population. They exercise both police and judicial functions. 

Military Tribunals 

Military tribunals have jurisdiction only over the personnel of the 
Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua and over the members of the auxiliary 
arms of the Guardia Nacional for offenses committed in line of duty while 
in the actual performance of military service. The military tribunals are : 

Consejos de Guerra General; Consejos de Guerra Ordinario; Con- 
sejos de Guerra Sumario. 

For further information see Articles for the Government of the Guardia 
Nacional de Nicaragua. 

Extraordinary Military Tribunals 

Extraordinary military tribunals have jurisdiction over persons 
not in the military service of the Republic who in time of war or com- 
plete martial law are guilty of rebellion, sedition, treason, or conspiracy 
against the Government. 



48 



>9Wi 



THE POLICE MISSION 

Under the terms of the Tipitapa Agreement (Guardia Agreement), 
the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua constituted the sole military and 
police force of the Republic of Nicaragua. The designating of the Guar- 
dia Nacional as the sole police force in Nicaragua materially affected its 
development and employment throughout its history, and was far 
reaching in its effect. 

There devolved upon the Guardia Nacional two distinct missions: 
(1) police, and (2) military. The performance of the police mission in- 
volved the entire territory of Nicaragua; the accomplishment of the 
military mission involved only the so-called combat areas of the Re- 
public and therein comprised the conduct of active combat operations 
and defensive measures against organized banditry 

As a military organization the Guardia Nacional was charged with : 
1) The training of officers and men in the art of war applicable to 
conditions existing in Nicaragua. 

(2) The conduct of aggressive offensive operations against organized 
banditry. 

(3) The taking of such defensive measures against threatened raids 
of large organized bandit groups as were essential to the protection of 
lives and property. 

(4) The national security. 

(5) The maintenance of the Guardia Nacional as a non-partisan 
organization. 

As a police force, the Guardia Nacional was charged with : 

(1) The enforcement of law and order throughout the Republic. 

(2) The enforcement of the arms law. 

(3) The control of the traffic in arms ammunition and explosives. 

(4) The suppression of contraband activities. 

(5) The importation of arms, ammunition and explosives. 

(6) The control and administration of all government prisons and 
the subsistence of the prisoners therein. 

(7) The suppression of the illicit manufacture of intoxicants. 

(8) The enforcement of the police, traffic and sanitary regulations. 
(9 The security of life and property throughout the Republic. 

(10) The control over the Jueces de la Mesta, Jefes de Canton and 
Capitanes de Canada. 

1. Appendix 1 — Chapter IV. 

(11) The compilation of a monthly report of all fines awarded by the 
civil judiciary for violations of the penal code or police, traffic and sani- 
tary regulations, and its submission to the Supreme Court of Justice 
as a means for checking the reports of the various subordinate members 
of the judiciary. 

(12) The compilation of a monthly report of contraband seized and 
its submission to the Director General de Rentas for his use in checking 
the operations of the Administradores de Rentas and Agentes Fiscales. 



49 



(13) During the electoral period the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua 
by executive decree assumed full control over the sale, transportation, 
and possession of aguardiente in Nicaragua. 

Factors Entering into and Affecting the Police Mission 

The American officers of the Guardia Nacional were immediately 
confronted upon their assignment to duty in Nicaragua with the prob- 
lem of personal adjustment to a situation requiring a sympathetic 
understanding of a people who had originated from different racial 
strains and who had developed under entirely different conditions of 
environment and who were animated by different ideals. In western 
Nicaragua the people were generally derived from Spanish and Indian 
strains in various degrees of mixture of these strains ; in eastern Nicara- 
gua the population was derived from Spanish, Indian and African 
strains. Each strain had its corresponding effect upon the psychology 
of the people. The influence of environment materially affected the 
development of ideals animating the people of the different parts of the 
Republic. 

An innate courtesy, love of intrigue, love of politics and a strong 
feeling of personal allegiance to a personal leader rather than to abstract 
ideals and principles were among the marked and fundamental traits 
of the Nicaraguan people. The lack of adequate communications had 
materially retarded the development of a strong spirit of patriotism and 
nationalism. 

The fundamental differences between Latin and Anglo-Saxon ideals 
and characteristics is well expressed in the following quotation from 
Henry Ward Beecher: 

"There are two dominant races in modern history; the Germanic 
and the Romanic races. The Germanic races tend to personal liberty, 
to a sturdy individualism, to civil and political liberty. The Romanic 
race tends to absolutism in government ; it is clannish ; it loves chieftans : 
it develops a people that crave strong and showy governments to sup- 
port and plan for them." 

In Nicaragua a large proportion of the population is illiterate. This 
is due to the lack of compulsory education and inadequacy of school 
facilities. The country districts are almost entirely without facilities 
for even the most elementary instruction. In the large cities and towns 
there are a few public schools. These are inadequate for the instruction 
of the children of the lower social classes. Only children of the monied 
class are able to attend the private schools and colleges. 

The economic conditions in Nicaragua have prevented the develop- 
ment of an adequate public school system. The lack of public schools 
has deprived the lower social classes of an opportunity to obtain an 
education and has operated to prevent the development of a strong 
middle class in Nicaragua, so necessary and essential to stability of a 
republican government. 

The wealthy class are generally well educated as they have avail- 
able private schools and colleges. Many members of this class have been 
educated in the United States or Europe. This monopoly of education 
by the wealthy class has operated to retain in this one social class all 
of the learned professions and the financial and political control of the 
country. 

60 



Party organizations play a most important role in the social, poli- 
tical and economic life of the Republic. Here, party affiliations assume 
an importance unknown or unequalled in the United States. The 
bitterness engendered through political strife and rivalries has done 
much to delay the economic development of the country. Had the in- 
terest and time devoted to politics and political intrigue been more 
wisely devoted to the advancement of the national welfare, business, 
agriculture or mining, there would have been a greater development of 
the country's rich natural resources with the increased wealth and pros- 
perity incident thereto. There would be less personal animosity and 
fewer family feuds. The lives of the people would be happier and more 
contented 

The Liberal and Conservative parties are usually referred to as the 
two historic parties. So strong are party ties among the aristocraticos 
that usually the members of a family adhere to the same party genera- 
tion after generation. So strong is the party spirit that it permeates the 
social life of the Republic. It is not customary for the adherents of one 
political party to be invited to or to attend a social function sponsored 
by the adherents of the opposite party. 

The practice of the American officers on duty in the Guardia Nac- 
ional of inviting the members of both parties to all social functions 
without regard to their political affiliations has done something toward 
bringing about a better understanding between the adherents of the 
two parties. The maintenance of the Guardia Nacional as a strictly 
non-partisan organization has further contributed to the allaying of 
some of the partisan bitterness. It is difficult, however, to allay a bit- 
terness that has its origin so deeply imbedded in the past and so thor- 
oughly interwoven into the conciousness of a people. Party feeling has 
been literally bred into the people from their mother's breasts. 

There is lack of local government and civil service such as exists 
in the United States. As a result the election of supreme authorities 
assumes rightfully a great importance in the eyes of the people. It gives 
to the winning party an absolute control over the machinery of govern- 
ment for four years and means to the losing party a complete elimination 
from participation in the government of the country. 

The establishment of an efficient civil service based on merit, the 
development of a better system of communications, and the granting 
of local self-government to departments would, perhaps, in time accom- 
plish the elimination of the present political bitterness and build up a 
strong national feeling in the country. 

The geographical features of Nicaragua have materially affected 
the development of the country. They have influenced the location of 
the centers of population along the railroad in western Nicaragua. The 
mountainous condition of the country has so far hindered the building 
of adequate railroads and roads by reason of the excessive costs that 
such railroads or roads would entail. The inadequacy of means of com- 
munication has prevented the development of the large natural re- 
sources. The geographical features have, by denying ready means of 
communication, retarded the growth of a strong national spirit of pa- 
triotism. 

The principal occupations of the people are agriculture, coffee grow- 
ing, mining and cattle raising. The principal export item is coffee. The 

61 



price received for the coffee crop determines to a large extent the pros- 
perity and financial condition of the country. 

The revenues of the country are principally derived from import 
taxes, the government sale of aguardiente, stamp taxes on commercial 
papers, stamp taxes on legal documents and high rates of postage. The 
system of taxation is indirect. As a result commodities grown locally 
are cheap and articles imported are very high. 

The wealth of the country is concentrated in the hands of the aris- 
tocraticos, who constitute a relatively small proportion of the popula- 
tion. The abject poverty of the major portion of the population and 
their lack of education has reduced the poorer classes to a condition of 
economic slavery (to the aristocraticos.) (The wealthy upper class 
exhibits an unwillingness to permit the economic independence of the 
poorer classes) 

The fall in the price of coffee has reduced the country to a straitened 
financial condition. The inadequacy of transportation facilities and the 
activities of banditry have prevented the gathering and sale of a full 
crop of coffee. 

The poor sanitary conditions have increased the death rate and 
have operated to reduce the available supply of labor. 

The insecurity of life and property due to recent revolutions and 
to the activity of the bandits has prevented the wealthy class from 
making further investments involving the development of their proper- 
ties. The same condition has resulted in a number of the wealthy class 
leaving the country temporarily to reside abroad. 

The following distinct divisions of society obtain in Nicaragua: 

(1) The Aristocraticos (Alta). (4) The Melganos. 

(2) The Aristocraticos (Baja). (5) The Mozos. 

(3) The Artesanos. 

The first two classes are known as the "class social." The financial 
position and education possessed by a family determines to a large ex- 
tent whether it is classed as "alta" or "baja." The acquisition of wealth 
by a family in the "baja" section of the "clase social" operates to transfer 
it to the "alta" section and, vice versa, a family in the "alta" section 
losing its wealth in a generation or two drops into the "baja" section. 

The three lower classes are the industrial classes of Nicaragua. The 
artesanos stand at the top of these classes and include the skilled work- 
men, small shopkeepers, etc. The melganos stand midway between the 
artesanos and the mozos and includes the upper class of servants, house- 
servants, etc., while the mozos stand at the bottom of the social scale. 
They are the lowest class of servants, and include field hands, herders, 
etc. 

The, marks of each of the three classes is exhibited in their dress. 
The mozos wear neither coat nor shoes ; the melganos wear shoes, but no 
coats, and the artesanos wear both coat and shoes. No man of the clase 
social (aristocraticos) would appear in public without his coat. The 
wearing of a coat is truly a mark of social position in Nicaragua. 

There is a great gap between the clase social (aristocraticos) and 
the three industrial classes in Nicaragua. This gap is present in the 
relative financial position, the relative educational opportunities en- 
joyed, and in the relative political influence. There does not exist in 
Nicaragua a strong middle class. The fact that Nicaragua lacks such 



52 



a strong bulwark of Republican institutions probably accounts to a 
large extent for the instability of its government. History has abun- 
dantly proven that it is essential to the development and preservation 
of Republican institutions that a strong middle class be developed in 
any country aspiring to the adoption of such institutions and ideals. 
The artesanos and the present enlisted personnel of the Guardia Nacion- 
al will probably in time become the nucleus of a middle class. 

The political control of the country lies in the hands of the aris- 
tocraticos. The artesanos have some influence and are accorded some 
consideration. The melganos and the mozos are in a practical state of 
economic peonage, lack education and accordingly are ready to vote 
as their landlord dictates. They are easily bribed by a few drinks of 
cususa or aguardiente or a meal. In actuality we find in Nicaragua an 
oligarchical government masquerading in the guise of a Republic. 

COOPERATION WITH THE CIVIL OFFICIALS OF THE 

REPUBLIC 

The Guardia policy in dealing with civil officials may be briefly 
summarized as follows: 

(a) Maintenance of non-partisan character of the Guardia Nac- 
ional. 

(b) To give the fullest cooperation to the civil authorities and to 
insist upon a reciprocal action on their part toward the Guardia. 

(c) To avoid interference with the civil officials' performance of 
the functions of their office. 

(d) To demand non-interference on the part of the civil officials 
with the interior administration of the Guardia. 

(e) To require all requests for cooperation on the part of the civil 
officials to be made to the commanding officer of the Guardia and not 
to permit any civil official to deal direct with the enlisted personnel of 
the Guardia. 

(f) To require all Guardia complaints against civil officials to be 
couched in temperate language and confined strictly to a statement of 
facts based upon a full and complete investigation. 

(g) To cultivate a feeling of mutual respect and cooperation be- 
tween the officers of the Guardia and the civil officials of the Govern- 
ment on a basis of mutual independence of each other. 

The actual cooperation with civil officials of the Government of 
Nicaragua constituted one of the most difficult problems which con- 
fronted the Guardia Nacional. It constituted a problem requiring 
firmness, poise, tact, an understanding of the psychology of the Nicara- 
guan people, and a consistent adherence to an adopted policy. There 
was a constant attempt on the part of the local officials to reduce the 
Guardia Nacional to the same position of subordination to themselves 
as was occupied by the old national army. The principles under which 
the Guardia Nacional operated were an innovation in the political and 
military life of the Republic, hence it is not strange that there should be 
some misunderstanding and that a considerable period of time was re- 
quired for the new principles and ideas to permeate the conciousness 
of the people. Another factor was the necessity for the American officer 
serving in the Guardia to become adjusted to the local conditions and 

53 



to acquire an understanding of the civil government and the functions 
of its various agencies and officials. There was a necessity for a personal 
adjustment to new conditions to be accomplished by both the civil 
official and the Guardia officer before perfect cooperation between them 
could become an accomplished fact. 

The fact that in the end an almost perfect understanding and a 
spirit of mutual cooperation existed between the local officers of the 
Guardia and the local civil officials throughout Nicaragua reflects great 
credit upon the officers of the Guardia Nacional in having accomplished 
the police mission in the face of great difficulties. It won for the Guardia 
Nacional the esteem, confidence and the ever increasing support of the 
people of Nicaragua. 

The adherents of the party in power looked to the Guardia Nacional 
to maintain the sovereignty of the National Government, the party 
out of power looked to the Guardia Nacional as being its best guaranty 
against oppression by the party in power. The result was the evolution 
of a new conception of the functions of the Government as something 
apart from a party. This conception constituted a distinct contribution 
toward a stabilized Government in Nicaragua. 

The Guardia Nacional constituted the principal bulwark of the 
National Government. The maintenance of it as a non-partisan organi- 
zation gave to the people a new conception of loyalty to the Government 
rather than a loyalty to party. The example set by the Guardia in its 
ceremonies of raising and lowering the flag created a new pride in the 
national flag and the national sovereignty of the country. The main- 
tenance of peace and order gave increased security to person and prop- 
erty and encouraged more intermingling of the people of one section 
with other sections. Public officials were given an example in the honest 
administration of government funds and in a fairness to all citizens 
without respect to party affiliations in the administration of the law of 
the nation. It is highly probable that in the field of the exercise of police 
power, the influence of the Guardia Nacional will be more potent and 
lasting in its effect. 

The Guardia Nacional gave its fullest cooperation to the civil 
officials of the government at all times and occasions. One concrete 
example of such cooperation was its cooperation with the Jefes de Sani- 
dad during the small pox epidemics in effecting the vaccination of the 
populace. Not only did the Guardia assist in bringing in the people to 
the sanitary offices for vaccination but the medical officers of the Guard- 
ia actually vaccinated many people in the outlying districts. The Guard- 
ia were instructed not to use physical force to compel any person to 
submit to vaccination, but those persons who refused vaccination were 
taken before the Director of Police for action. 

THE SYSTEM OF ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE AND 

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 

Offenses are classified as public and private and are brought to the 
attention of the authorities by denouncing (reporting) the commission 
of the offense or by accusing a person or persons of having committed 
the offense. In making a denouncement there is no obligation to prove 
the facts reported, but when an accusation is made the person making 



54 



mmsab 



it is obligated to prove it. A denouncement is the reporting of the com- 
mission of an offense and the name of the delinquent need not be given. 
An accusation is the request of a person to a judge to punish a delin- 
quent. It may be made personally, or by means of an attorney especially 
authorized. The accusation must be in writing and must contain com- 
plete details concerning the offense alleged to have been committed. 

Under the provisions of article 1 1 2 of the constitution, the President 
may order the arrest and retention of any person or persons who con- 
stitute a menace to public tranquility and welfare. Individuals so ar- 
rested may not be held for a period of more than ten days without being 
granted a hearing before a properly designated judge. 

An "auto de detencion" is a warrant issued by a judge for the pur- 
pose of confining a suspect in order to investigate his alleged guilt. This 
period of confinement should not exceed eight days, plus the time re- 
quired to prepare and present the case before a competent judge. 

An "auto de prision" is issued by judges for the formal confinement 
in prison of an offender whose case has been duly investigated and where 
a prima facie case has been established against the offender. 

The Jefe Director was authorized to hold prisoners to his order 
who were guilty of participation in organized banditry or armed re- 
bellion against the government. The participation in organized ban- 
ditry must meet the legal requirements of the offense of banditry as 
defined in the Penal Code. Mere participation in robbery, murder, 
manslaughter, arson, larceny, or other crimes as an individual or as a 
member of a group sm.aller than necessary to meet the legal difinition 
of banditry did not warrant the holding of such to the order of the Jefe 
Director. In such cases the prisoner would be placed to the order of the 
local or district judge before the expiration of eight days. 

Prisoners in this class could be held for a reasonable time pending 
investigation and indefinitely if there was sufficient evidence of their 
participation in organized banditry. In July, 1932, orders were issued 
to all area and department commanders to submit form reports on all 
prisoners held to the order of the Jefe Director. These reports included 
the following information: (a) name, (b) date of confinement, (c) by 
whom arrested, (d) synopsis of circumstances attending his apprehen- 
sion, (e) offense charged against the prisoner, (f) names of witnesses and 
nature of evidence available and, (g) recommendation of area or depart- 
ment commander as to disposition. Subsequently, this report was 
submitted whenever a prisoner was confined to the order of the Jefe 
Director. These form reports were referred to the Law Department for 
further investigation, check with available intelligence data, check with 
the requirements of the law, and for recommendation as to disposition. 
The Jefe Director by letter to the area or department commander in 
dicated the action to be taken in each individual case. 

In the event a writ of habeas corpus was served on an area or de- 
partment commander in the case of a prisoner held to the order of the 
Jefe Director, the following instructions governed such officer in making 
reply thereto: 

55 



"HEADQUARTERS, GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA" 

MANAGUA, NICARAGUA. 

20 June, 1932. 

From: The Jefe Director. 

To : All Area and Department Commanders, Guardia Nacional . 

Subject: Habeas Corpus in the case of prisoners held to the order 

of the Jefe Director, Guardia Nacional. 

1. The following answer will be used in cases of Habeas 
Corpus of prisoners held to the order of the Jefe Director: 

"En la ciudad de , Departamento de..... 

, Nicaragua, a las de la del 

dia de mil novecientos trienta y Presente el 

Comandante de Departamento de la Guardia Nacional, Capitan 

a quien requeri en la forma 

legal, de acuerdo con lo ordenado por 

— - » 

y al afecto manifesto que actuando de acuerdo con las ordenes del Sr. 
Jefe Director de la Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua; manifesta que 

esta detenido como prisionero 

militar en la prision de , en virtud de la autoridad del 

articulo 99, parrafos 1 y 3-sub-parrafos (a) y (b) de los Articulos para 
el Gobierno y Disciplina de la Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, asi 
como, por lo dispuesto en el Decreto Ejecutive de dies y nueva de 
Noviembre de mil novecientosoeintinueve, de tal manera que la dis- 

posicion de dicho caso del referido 

sera de acuerdo con as provisiones de las leyes anteriormente citadas: 

Que , esta a a orden de la Guardia Nacional 

pesde de de segun disposicion 

del Jefe Director de la Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua de la misma 

fecha y que ...esta siendo 

procesado por su participacion an las actividades del bandolerismo de 
Nicaragua. Por lo tanto al Comandante de Departamento de la Guardia 
Nacional, se ve imposibilitado a proceder a la exhibicion personal de 

.a como lo ordena 

Se leyo esta acta y firma." 

2. The above answer will be written or typed immediately 
following or on the reverse of the same paper served on you. 

BY ORDER OF THE JEFE DIRECTOR, MAJOR GENERAL 
C. B. MATTHEWS, G. N. : 

/s/ JULIAN C. SMITH, 
Colonel, Guardia Nacional, 
Chief of Staff. 

In those departments of Nicaragua in which a state of seige (complete 
martial law) was in effect, the rights of Habeas Corpus proceedings were 
suspended during such period. Accordingly, officers of the Guardia 
Nacional did not have to make any replies to writs of Habeas Corpus. 
Another factor which tended to reduce the number of writs of Habeas 



56 



Corpus was the fact that most of the prisoners held by the Jefe Director 
were not in the exercise of the full rights of citizenship by reason of a 
past criminal record. 

The members of the Guardia Nacional were brought to trial by 
military tribunals for offenses which were of a purely military nature 
or which were committed in line of duty in the performance of assigned 
military or police missions. The policy was adopted of turning over to 
civil authorities for trial such members of the Guardia Nacional as 
had committed offenses of a non-military nature and which were not 
committed in line of duty or when in the actual performance of assign- 
ed duties. When a civil judge desired the turn over of a member of the 
Guardia Nacional for trial for an alleged offense, he submitted a request 
therefor to the Jefe Director. In no case was a member of the Guardia 
Nacional turned over to civil authorities without the express order of 
the Jefe Director. Area and Department commanders were directed 
to immediately investigate and report to the Jefe Director by radio or 
telegram the commission of any offense by the members of their com- 
mand in which they had reason to believe or knew the civil authorities 
would request a turn over for trial. They were directed to submit a 
written report by first available mail giving full details, status of com- 
plainant, whether or not the Guardia had creditable witnesses to support 
his version of the affair and a recommendation as to the proper action 
to be taken in the matter. 

The requests of a civil judicial authority for the turn over of a 
member of the Guardia Nacional for trial were carefully investigated 
before action was taken. In some cases, the Jefe Director directed that 
the case be tried by the appropriate military tribunal and so informed 
the judge requesting the turn over, together with his reasons. 

Under the Nicaraguan law a case once opened remains open until 
the trial is completed. Some of the judges appealed to the Supreme 
Court of Justice against the decision of the Jefe Director, which court 
took no action. Other judges upon receipt of a certified transcript of 
the trial by military tribunal filed such transcript with the record in 
the case and considered the case closed under the provisions of Article 
32 of the Constitution 

There was growing tendency in 1931 and 1932 on the part of the 
civil courts of Nicaragua to give full effect to the fact of a trial by a 
military tribunal as a bar to subsequent trial in civil court for the same 
offense. 

Criminal Procedure 

All cases calling for the adjudging of more than a correctional 
penalty are tried before a jury selected by the prosecution and the 
defense from those persons who have been duly designated as jurors. 
A jury is composed of seven members and four deputies who act as 
substitutes for any members who are legally unable to hear the case. 
The majority vote (four or more) determine the verdict of the jury. 
The minority, however, may submit a report which is attached to the 
record of the proceedings of the case. Without a previous jury verdict 
on the guilt of the offender, no sentence that is more than a correctional 
one may be imposed for the commission of an offense. 



57 



Contraband 

According to Nicaraguan law individuals including Guardia who 
denounced the presence of contraband are entitled to one-third of the 
proceeds of the sale of such contraband provided such denouncement 
results in the capture of the contraband reported. The persons, includ- 
ing the Guardia, who effect the capture of contraband are entitled to 
one-third of the proceeds from the public sale of the contraband. 

Monthly reports of the capture of contraband were submitted by 
the Department Commanders and Area Commanders to the Jefe Direc- 
tor. A copy of these reports was forwarded by the Jefe Director to the 
Director General of Revenue (rentas) for his information in checking 
the reports received from the Departmental Administradores de Rentas. 

In view of the dependence of the Government for its revenue col- 
lected on government sales of aguardiente and customs receipts, the 
apprehension of contraband, cususa and tobacco became one of the 
important duties of the Guardia. 

Traffic in Arms, Ammunition and Explosives 

In accordance with Presidential Decree No. 175, published in offi- 
cial gazette No. 242, 29 October, 1929, the Guardia took over from 
licensed arms dealers, all arms, ammunition, explosives, etc., and placed 
them in Guardia storerooms from where they have since been sold by 
the Guardia for the account of the dealers, and the money turned over 
at intervals to the owners. Since taking over the articles in question 
and placing them in Guardia storerooms, none of the dealers have made 
any further importations. 

Importation of Arms, Explosives, Munitions 

When authorization was issued to any person or corporation in 
Nicaragua to import arms, ammunition, or explosives, a letter was 
written to the Minister of Foreign Relations and certified copies were 
sent to the Nicaraguan Consul in the United States at the port of ex- 
portation; Commanding Officer, Guardia Nacional at Corinto or Blue- 
fields, Nicaragua; Department Commander of the Guardia concerned; 
the Recaudador General de Aduanas, Managua; the Recaudador de 
Aduanas, Corinto or Bluefields, and the person to whom authorization 
to import was granted. Upon receipt of the imported arms, ammunition 
or explosives at the port of entry such were not released through the 
customs until the Jefe Director specifically authorized such release. 

Martial Law in Nicaragua 

In general the zone of active military operations against organized 
banditry was limited to the Eastern Area, the Central Area, the North- 
ern Area, and the Departments of Chontales, Leon and Chinandega. 
During the greater portion of the period of the existence of the Guardia 
Nacional the departments included in the zone of active military opera- 
tions were under martial law. Accordingly an understanding of what 
constituted martial law under the law of Nicaragua is essential to a 
clear and complete understanding of the conditions under which the 
military and police operations were conducted. 



58 



Martial law under Nicaraguan law is a modification of martial 
law as it exists under American law in that the powers of the military 
commander are more circumscribed and limited and there is less inter- 
ference with the conduct of the civil government. 

Nicaraguan law recognizes two forms of martial law: 

(1) Complete martial law (state of seige). 

(2) Martial law in part (preventive state]^. 

Martial law is declared by the Congress when in session; when the 
Congress is in recess, the President at a council of ministers may declare 
martial law by issuing a decree. It may be declared in all or any part 
of the territory of the Republic. 

The state of siege (complete martial law) shall be declared in the 
following cases: 

(1) When the Republic is at war with another nation; 

(2) When there begins a rebellion, sedition, or there is imminent 
danger of a disturbance of the public order. 

In the first case, the state of siege is extended to all the territory 
of the Republic; and in the second case, it shall include the town or 
towns where the state of order is disturbed or where an attempt is being 
made to alter the state of public security. 

When the decree establishing martial law suspends one or more 
guarantees, it is called preventive state; if it suspends all guarantees, it 
is called a state of siege. The individual guarantees with the exception 
of those that establish the inviolability of human life, with their excep- 
tions; that which prohibits the trial by judges who have not been legally 
appointed; that which prohibits the application of perpetual punish- 
ment; that of whipping or flogging with sticks and all kinds of torture; 
that which prohibits the using of restrictive or confiscatory laws ; those 
stipulated in Articles 56 and 57 of the Constitution; and those regarding 
the legal immunities of ofificials, may be suspended totally or partially 
by the declaration of martial law. 

In case of war, guarantees are suspended, except those specified 
by Article 62 of the Constitution. 

The President has the authority to end the state of martial law 
when the circumstances that caused it no longer to exist. It should be 
ended by means of a decree which fixes the date on which the state of 
martial law will end. 

If the Congress meets during the state of martial law, the President 
should submit to it for its information his reasons for declaring it. The 
Congress in view of these reasons, shall issue a decree ordering its con- 
tinuation or termination. 

The President shall give an account to the Congress at its next 
meeting of the measures taken during the state of martial law. The 
authorities and officials shall be responsible for any abuses they might 
commit during the state of martial law. 

The tribunals of justice shall not suspend the exercise of their 
functions except in those towns in an actual state of war, besieged by 



59 



the enemy, or by a decree of the President, he therein determining wnat 
places are effected according to the gravity of the circumstances. 

When the state of martial law has been ended by any means, the 
military tribunals shall continue their operations on those cases pending 
before them, to their termination. 

During martial law, military authorities may: 

(1) Try cases: (a) involving offenses of treason, rebellion, and 
sedition; (b) involving offenses against the peace, independence and 
sovereignty. (1). 

(2) Compel a change of residence of those persons who are danger- 
ous to the peace and security, or against whom there exists well founded 
suspicions of participation in these offenses 

(3) During a state of siege, landed property may be occupied tem- 
porarily when it is necessary to establish on it a military post or camp; 
in which case the owner shall be indemnified by the nation as soon as 
normal conditions are restored 

(4) Use of the house and furniture of any person when it becomes 
a military necessity to do so. In this case the civil administrative 
authorities shall give a receipt to the owner concerned, fixing as near as 
possible the price and quality of the thing used so that the owner may 
be indemnified at the conclusion of the operations. The military au- 
thorities may only use the house and furniture, without the intervention 
of the civil administrative authorities in cases of absolute and urgent 
necessity, and then giving a receipt for the same and being responsible 
for any abuses they might commit in accordance with the law. 

(5) May break into a house at any hour with the object of arresting 
or confiscating any war material. 

The sentences pronounced by the military tribunals, may not be 
carried into effect without previous confirmation of the Commanding 
General of the Republic, except when in the state of war it is absolutely 
impossible that the case reach that official and the application of the 
penalty becomes urgent, the confirmation of the General in Chief of 
Operations or of the nearest division which may be encountered operat- 
ing against the enemy shall be sufficient. 

(1) Footnote. — The State Department of the United States pro- 
hibited the trial of civilians by the Guardia Nacional 
as long as there were any American officers on duty 
with it. 



60 



CHAPTER V 
BANDIT CHIEFS 
Section 1 — Augusto Calderon Sandino 

Augusto Calderon Sandino, alias Augusto Caesar Sandino, was 
born about 1895 at the ranch La Victoria, in Niquinohomo, Depart- 
ment of Masaya, Nicaragua, the son of poor Indo-Spanish parents, 
Gregorio Sandino and Catalina Calderon, and is reputed to have been 
an illegitimate child. His early education was very limited, although 
he learned to read and to write poorly. Sandino is of medium height, 
very slender and weighs about 115 pounds. He is an extreme optimist 
and possesses unusual ability in convincing others of the feasibility of 
his most fantastic schemes; is very energetic, extremely vain and so- 
phisticated, fully believing that his wisdom is infallible; he will not 
tolerate long, a subordinate of outstanding ability; he feigns modesty 
at all times, but in reality is most vain and selfish. 

During his youth he was involved in many difficulties due to his 
quick temper, lack of control and inconsiderately mean disposition, 
and was known as an erratic, undependable individual. In 1916, in 
Managua, during an argument over the price of ten fanegas of beans 
which he was selling, Sandino shot and wounded in the leg, Dagoberto 
Rivas, later a member of the House of Deputies from Niquinohomo, 
and fled to Mexico to avoid prosecution. There he is said to have joined 
Pancho Villa's revolutionary column and to have served with him for 
nine years. During this time he became inbued with the doctrines of 
communism, and early in 1926 returned to Nicaragua, after spending 
a short time in Guatemala, fired with the fanaticism of the socialistic 
societies and lodges of Mexico, whose aims are said to be to re-make the 
world by placing the laboring classes in control, forming a brotherhood 
of all men in sympathy with their cause, and destroying all who oppose. 
These ideas became imbedded in his mind, habitual in his speech, charac- 
teristic of the military organization which he later developed, and flaunt- 
ed by the emblem of bolshevism he adopted as the insignia of that 
organization. 

He arrived at the San Albino mine, near Jicaro, Department of 
Nueva Segovia, about May, 1926, and was given employment by the 
American owner, Mr. Charles Butters, as a filing clerk in the store at 
^25.00 monthly, for which position he proved to be inept. At this time 
a revolution was in progress in Nicaragua, and Sandino, unbeknown 
to the mining officials, busied himself recruiting miners and other em- 
ployees of the Company, all Liberals, into a skeleton force of revolu- 
tionaries. About three months after his arrival at San Albino, he dis- 
appeared with this force of men, and was joined by others and supplied 
with arms and ammunition in some manner. He attacked the Govern- 
ment troops at Jicaro, and both sides claimed to have been victorious. 

Whether as the result of his activities, or for other reasons, is not 
known, but the Government forces were shortly withdrawn from Nueva 
Segovia, and Sandino became known as the representative in that depart- 
ment of Doctor Juan Bautista Sacasa, who had set himself up at Puerto 
Cabezas on the Atlantic Coast, as the Constitutional President of the 
Republic. He attempted to secure ammunition from General Jose 

61 



Maria Moncada, leader of the Constitutional forces, but was unsuccess- 
ful owing to the fact that Moncada suspected him of having fanatical 
and communistic ideas, and also did not have confidence in the men 
under him, most of whom were native Segovianos. About this time, 
Sandino made a trip to Puerto Cabezas, and arrived opportunely to 
secure a supply of arms, ammunition, and other military equipment 
from Sacasa's Vice-Secretary of War. A neutral zone had been pro- 
claimed that included Puerto Cabezas, and these supplies were furnished 
to Sandino rather than to allow them to fall into the hands of the United 
States Naval forces. 

With these materials Sandino returned to the Segovias, and stop- 
ped at Santa Cruz, Department of Jinotega, where he was joined by 
Camilo Guillen and a small group from Quilali, Nueva Segovia, and by 
other recruits from near Santa Cruz. His force now numbered about 
eighty men, armed with seventy rifles and a few pistols. They marched 
to Yucapuca, a flat-topped, treeless mountain, where, in March, 1927, 
they were attacked by a Federal force of about four hundred men armed 
with rifles and six machine guns, under the command of General F. 
Gabriel Artola. After a hard fought battle lasting seven hours, the 
Federal forces were driven off with heavy losses, including many arms, 
which fell into Sandino's hands. 

A period of recruiting followed, during which Sandino moved about 
in the Department of Jinotega from town to town, although he spent 
more time in the town of San Rafael del Norte than in others. He also 
despatched a number of small patrols as far as Quilali, Bocay and Chi- 
pote to prevent Federal sympathizers from organizing in his rear. 
Sandino at this time was filled with a desire to emulate the Mexican 
leader, Pancho Villa, in military prowess and eagerly grasped the op- 
portunity to establish bolshevism in Nicaragua. The forces which he 
recruited were apt pupils and wore the bolshevist emblem. They carried 
a communist red flag, or banner, with a black stripe on the side and 
across from it a skull and cross-bones device which had painted below 
it the words, "Liberty or Death." When General Moncada met Sandino 
near Boeco, he ordered this slogan cut from the flag, an order which 
Sandino reluctantly obeyed while stating that this insignia was greatly 
beloved by his troops. 

On March 28th, Sandino with two hundred armed men attacked 
the city of Jinotega, and, after a full day of hard fighting, routed the 
Federals (Conservatives). His force was badly disorganized as a result 
of the fighting and promptly set to looting the town, whereupon Sandino 
ordered a withdrawal to San Rafael del Norte. He returned to Jinotega 
a few days later and remained there until the arrival of the Liberal 
Generals Francisco Parajon and Carlos Castro- Wassmer with their 
force. 

From Jinotega, Sandino and Parajon marched in separate and in- 
dependent columns to join General Moncada at Bejuco, near Mercedes, 
Department of Chontales, where the two forces arrived about April 28th. 
This time, Moncada welcomed Sandino's services (probably due to his 
victory at Yucapuca and capture of Jinotega), issued him 15,000 
rounds of rifle ammunition and two machine guns, one of which was a 
Thompson. It was at this time that Moncada issued the order prohi- 
biting the use of bolshevik emblems and the slogan on the communist 

C2 



flag carried by Sandino's troops. 

Sandino remained with the Moncada army until the commence- 
ment of the Tipitapa Conference. He agreed in the following letter to 
lay down his arms. 

"May 9, 1927. 
ESTEEMED GENERAL MONCADA: 

I take pleasure in informmg you 
that, having arrived at this place, I have found myself in a difficult 
position due to the fact that all my followers have not joined me, since 
I have found but a few chiefs, and the rest of my troops having gone to 
Jinotega, the place from whence they came. For this reason I feel that 
my remaining at this place will avail me nothing, all of my followers 
having disbanded. 

I have decided to go to Jinotega 
again to assemble my men, in order to collect all the arms. In this case 
I shall remain there awaiting your orders. 

I likewise delegate my rights in 
order that you may arrange the matter as may suit you best, informing 
me of the results at Jinotega, which I shall occupy with my troops. 

The disbanding of my men is due 
to their not finding anything to eat, and for this reason they have left. 
However, I assure that as soon as I arrive they must all come where I 
am and then I shall collect all the arms. 

A. C. SANDINO." 

Instead it appears that he became infuriated because he was not 
invited to be one of the conferees, and also at the prospect of failure of 
his socialistic dreams because of the agreements which he learned were 
expected to be reached at the conference. Thus disappointed that bol- 
shevism could not be saddled on the country through the medium of the 
Constitutionalist Army, he secretly moved north with about two hundred 
of his followers to establish it where it had a possibility of flourishing. 

Stopping at Yali in the Department of Jinotega, Sandino made a 
final gesture towards his objective in a letter which he wrote from that 
place to the Commanding Officer, U. S. Marines, in which he stated 
that the only condition under which he would lay down his arms was 
that an American Military Governor be appointed to assume power 
until it would be possible for the United States Government to supervise 
an election in an efficient manner. This sentiment does not seem to 
coincide with Sandino's dream of a communistic country, but it can be 
explained by the circumstances. Sandino at this time did not consider 
himself a very important figure, certainly not powerful enough to swing 
the entire country. He pinned his faith to bigger men who held the same 
radical desires, such as Doctor Escolastico Lara and Sofonias Salvatierra, 
and also even Doctor Sacasa himself (the latter probably because of the 
aid which he accepted from Mexico). He believed that a free election 
would result in a Liberal victory and with one of these men in power, 
he could see hope. But as long as Adolfo Diaz remained president he 
felt that a free election was an impossibility; hence his desire for an 
American Military Governor. No conditions outlined by Sandino were 
acceptable under any circumstances, and he was notified that his plan 
could not be adopted. He continued on his way north with his force, 
which by this time was dwindling, and entered Nueva Segovia. 

63 



Apparently his first intent was merely to assuage himself for the 
disappointment he had experienced by "killing Conservatives" as he 
stated in one of his letters. His force became known as the "Wild 
Beasts of the Mountain," and committed many crimes. On June 6, 
1927, Sandino demanded .^5,000 from Hipolito Agasse, a French subject 
who owned property in Telpaneca, on penalty of death of his store- 
keeper, Guillermo Ardon if he failed to meet the demand; however, 
Agasse in Ocotal settled with Sandino for ^1,358.18 cash and a ^60.00 
typewriter, and Ardon lived to be a good friend of both the Marines 
and the Guardia Nacional. 

Within a short time Sandino realized that he was an important 
figure among the people of Nueva Segovia and began to organize the 
department according to his own ideas, which included the formation 
of all his followers and sympathizers into a brotherhood and the pro- 
tection of those loyal to him. As the Conservative forces had been dis- 
banded, Sandino had an "army" but no one with whom to fight or from 
whom to protect his loyal followers. The only armed force nearby was 
the recently arrived Marine Corps detachment in Ocotal, so his imagina- 
tion evolved the concept that since the marines desired the surrender 
of Sandino's arms, Segovia needed protection from the "invader." He 
announced military rule over Nueva Segovia, with his headquarters and 
capitol at Jicara, which he re-named Sandino City, and that he would 
place garrisons at San Fernando, Ciudad Antiqua, Telpaneca, San Juan 
del Telpaneca, Quilali, Murra, San Albino Mine and Jalapa, defining 
his status in the proclamation as "Chief General Defending the National 
Rights." He also assumed the name Augusto Caesar in place of Augusto 
Calderon; Augustus Caesar evidently appeared to him to be a fitting 
name for so powerful and important a figure as he believed himself to be. 

Arriving at San Albino Mine with about fifty men, Sandino de- 
manded 500 pounds of dynamite, 1500 dynamite caps and 2,000 feet of 
fuse, and Mr. Butters, being threatened with death if he refused, 
delivered these items to him. Sandino stated at this time that all Ameri- 
cans should be killed or driven out of the country, an idea probably 
based on the refusal of his plan to appoint an American Military Gov- 
ernor in place of President Diaz, and also on various attempts made by 
the U. S. Marines to cause him to lay down his arms. "Mexico our friend, 
America our enemy," became a favorite expression with him. 

On July 11, 1927, he received a request from the Commanding 
Officer of Marines at Ocotal to turn in his arms. His reply showed his 
rising courage and sense of importance, but also denoted that his prin- 
cipal desire was victory for the Liberal party, which he apparently 
considered to be in accord with his own ideas. His stay in Mexico, and 
the fact that Mexico had helped the Liberals during the revolution, 
seem to have prevented it entering his head that Nicaraguan Liberalism 
was not all radical. His letter stated in part: "When I joined the Coast 
movement (Sacasa revolution) I did it with the firm resolve to have a 
free country or die, and, as we have not succeeded in gaining an effective 
freedom, and neither have I died, we shall continue with our resolve. 
Also, if the United States wants peace in Nicaragua, they will have to 
turn the Presidency over to a legitim.ate Liberal." Captain G. D. Hat- 
field's answer to this letter seems to have thrown Sandino and his troops 
into a frenzy, and they proceeded to Telpaneca, where three columns 

64 



were formed, totalling 175 men, and an attack was made on Ocotal on 
July 16th. The following day, after withdrawal from Ocotal without 
having effected its capture, he issued a statement giving as his reasons 
for precipitating the attack: (1) to demonstrate that he was still pro- 
testing and defending the right of Doctor Sacasa's constitutional au- 
thority, (2) to prove to those who thought his men were bandits that 
they were men of ideals, and (3) to prove that he preferred death to the 
"slavery" of the peace Moncada had accepted. He suggested in the 
same document that the intervention must be withdrawn, that the 
election must be held with candidates selected by the "genuine" Liberal 
Convention, and that his army would be pleased if that Convention 
selected Sofonias Salvatierra and Escolastico Lara as candidates. The 
adjective, "genuine" is the first evidence of his awakening to the fact 
that all Liberals except a few renegades were not satuated with "red" 
ideas similar to his own. He considered Moncada a renegade, and could 
not believe that the Liberal party would succeed by accepting the inter- 
vention and maintaining the Conservative in power. 

On August 3rd, he issued President Diaz a challenge by telegraph, 
stating : "I will give up my arms if you will grasp your pistol in hand and 
battle with me ; in this manner you will be able to wash with your blood 
the black stain that today defaces you." On August 26th, he addressed 
an open letter to the Liberals of Nicaragua stating in part: "The puri- 
tans and honorable Liberals, those who did not sell their arms or recog- 
nize Adolfo Diaz in exchange for public posts or join the Yankees to 
humiliate Nicaragua, will never allow the division of the Liberal party 
in the next election, because in that event the Conservatives would get 
the Victory." He did not yet realize what a minority he represented. 
On October 6th, he denounced Moncada as a traitor. 

Failing to receive the expected support and response from what he 
believed to be his own party, he turned to a foreign country, Honduras. 
Froilan Turcios, a Honduranian editor and poet, was in Tegucigalpa; 
he had been an official of some lodge of which Sandino had been a mem- 
ber, and the latter always addressed him as "maestro," that is, master 
or teacher, a term used by those under them in addressing teachers, 
professional leaders and the heads of artisan shops. Labor lodges and 
societies with radical ideas are numerous in Honduras, Salvador, Gua- 
temala, and Mexico. Among them is the All-America Anti Imperialistic 
League, which spreads also through South America and the United 
States. Turcios was well-connected with these organizations, as were 
Salamon de la Selva, Toribio Tijerino, Jorge Volio (Costa Rica), and 
Carleton Beals (author of "Banana Gold," and other incendiary works, 
and one of the original committee in the United States branch). 

Turcios advertised Sandino well. Exaggerated accounts of the 
battles pompous boasting of high ideals and bitter denunciations of the 
Nicaraguan occupation by marines spread through the Americas. The 
radical organizations, each branch having insufficient weight to accom- 
plish much in its own country, seemed to think that the combined weight 
of all might be able to accomplish its ends in one small country like 
Nicaragua. Unscrupulous methods were used. Of all the writers prais- 
ing Sandino and denouncing American foreign policy, not one has based 
his statements on plain, solid facts; all resorted to sensational distortion. 
About February — March, 1928, Sandino's prestige was high, but the 

65 



foreign countries that had been furnishing at least moral aid began to be 
occupied with troubles of their own and began withdrawing their sup- 
port. Sandino's military inability and lawlessness contributed to this 
loss of faith and he soon found that his prestige was falling, that he 
could not drive the intervention from the country, and that his support 
from the interior of the republic was mostly mythical. The Liberals of 
Nicaragua did not want the radical, pro-Mexican laborist government 
that Sandino thought they desired. His letters began to sound a slight 
note of despair; he quieted down in his boasting about his early march 
to the interior and the getting of the Liberals into power through force 
of arms. His boast of driving out the invader by defeat in battle changed 
to a less pompous one, that he would prevent the election. In August, 
1928, he addressed a letter to "all honorable Nicaraguans, to the end 
that they may know what (principles) the Army Defending the Sover- 
eignty of Nicaragua pursues." The letter is an in argumentative vein 
and seems to be a feeble attempt to justify the existance of his band. 
He argues that no government imposed by a foreign power can, out of 
gratitude, help but become a tool to that foreign power. He closes by 
stating that he will deposit his arms with a Governmient established 
without intervention. 

Some time during 1929, Sandino left Nicaragua and went to Yuca- 
tan, Mexico, where he remained at Merida until about May, 1930. He 
renewed his relations with the communistic elements of Mexico, and 
undoubtedly returned to Nicaragua with arrangements perfected for 
the supply of arms, ammunition and funds. For effective publicity, 
Doctor Pedro Jose Zepeda of Mexico was employed as an agent, and 
powerful propaganda emanated from his office and was picked up and 
published by communist organs throughout the world. Socrates Sandino 
a brother, who had been living in Brooklyn, New York became inter- 
ested in the affairs of Sandino and at a meeting of comm.unists held in 
Union Square, New York, on May Day, 1930, collected a large sum of 
money to be used for the advancement of the "cause" in Nicaragua. 

Shortly after Sandino's return to Nicaragua, he was wounded by 
a fragment of an aeroplane bomb during a contact on the mountain 
Saraguasca in the Department of Jinotega. From there he retired to 
camps located north of Santa Cruz and the Cua, and directed his opera- 
tions from these mountain fastnesses, surrounded by numerous outposts. 
He did not personally appear in any contact with either marines or 
Guardia Nacional after that time. However, he extended his control 
over certain parts of the Northern and Central territory by appointing 
civil government officials to represent him and his interests. These 
included alcaldes, jueces de la m.esta, jefes de canton, and communica- 
tion agents for the handling and forwarding of correspondence. Letters 
of appointment were issued in each case, signed by Sandino, and sealed 
with his rubber-stamp seal showing a member of his forces armed with 
an up-lifted machete, foot on the prostrate body of a marine, and left 
hand grasping the marine's hair, with the slogan, "Patria y Libertad" 
below, and a background of the volcanic peaks. This seal was used on 
all official correspondence of Sandino. 

In November, 1931, the suprem.e effort of organized banditry was 
made. Careful and lengthy preparation was made, arms and ammuni- 



66 



tion were secured, recruits were obtained in Nicaragua and in Honduras, 
groups were considerably strengthened to three or four times their 
usual size, and a sudden concentration made in the Departments of 
Leon and Chinandega. The object of the movement was to cut the 
lines of communication by capturing the railroad and important towns 
along it. The initial move was made on November 22nd at Chinci- 
galps, a small town on the railroad some twelve miles southeast of 
Chinandega. The ungarrisoned town was looted to the extent of about 
^4,000.00 and the sole municipal policeman killed. Upon arrival of a 
mixed patrol of guardias and civicos hastily organized and sent from 
Chinandega, the bandits evacuated the town. During several weeks of 
campaigning the groups were kept on the move and suffered several 
severe defeats, which forced them finally to give up the original plans. 
Sandino's socialistic brother, Socrates, was a member of one of the 
groups at this time. 

In the spring of 1932, another similar movement was attempted, 
and the bandit groups actually arrived in the Leon-Chinandega area, 
but were unable to penetrate to the railroad, and again they were forced 
to flee to Honduras for refuge. Sandino saw that he could not accom- 
plish his aim, that his forces were becoming depleted through disastrous 
contact with Guardia patrols, and that the latter were stronger, better 
equipped and more efficiently led than his groups. He realized by this 
time that his socialistic dreams were doomed to failure, and, although 
he continued to maintain that he and his forces would prevent the 1932 
elections, he must have known that he could not do so. His efforts 
throughout the summer and fall were weak and without important re- 
sult. Determined to make a display of his authority, however, Sandino 
appointed General Juan Gregorio Colindres, one of his leaders, as Presi- 
dent of an autonomous government to have jurisdiction over that part 
of Nicaragua which Sandino controlled. 

The elections were held without incident and Sandino's prestige had 
dropped to a low ebb. The Guardia was becoming stronger and better 
trained, whereas his forces were deteriorating, and there was dissension 
among some of the leaders. It was only a question of time, and probably 
a short time, when he would have had to flee the country. And so it 
was not at all surprising, "in view of the condition of his forces, and his 
slight prospect of any sort of success in continuing his campaign, that 
shortly after the departure of the marines from Nicaragua, Sandino 
negotiated with the Nicaraguan Government, was permitted to proceed 
to Managua, and there made certain agreements whereby the members 
of his "army" were granted amnesty and given government lands in an 
unsettled section of Nueva Segovia, in return for the deposit of their 
arms and agreement to discontinue fighting. It was the only course 
remaining to Sandino whereby his "face" might be saved ; this he realized 
and promptly took advantage of. In spite of all the killing, burning, 
raping, pillaging, extortion, and other crimes of every description that 
can be proved to have been committed by his troops, Sandino could 
still maintain that his actions were directed against the United States 
Marines, and that upon their withdrawal from the country, he, and his 
forces, considered their aims to have been accomplished. Yet, the whole 
history of his actions during the five and a half years that he was in the 
field after his withdrawal from Moncada's Army near Boaca cannot 

67 



fail to demonstrate his arch criminality, publicized in a manner to make 
him aDoear to be a patriot and a defender of the national sovereignty 
rather than the insurgent, bandit-communist that he was. And his 
submission was an open acknowledgement of the failure of his real pur- 
pose — to establish and maintain a communistic brotherhood in control 
of the Government of Nicaragua. 

SECTION 2 

OTHER LEADERS 

Juan Gregorio Colindres was born at Murra, eastern Nueva Sego- 
via, about 1894. He was a nephew of Juan Colindres, a wealthy prop- 
erty owner. His family possessed a gold mine at San Pedro de Colin- 
dres, to which they are said to have moved the mining machinery of 
Mr. Alexander from Murra when, in 1931, that place was almost com- 
pletely destroyed by bandits and deserted by the inhabitants. In 1927 
Colindres offered protection to bandits in the vicinity of Santa Rosa, 
and kept them informed of the movements of the marines in that 
area. Up to March, 1928, when it was broken up, San Pedro de Colindres 
had been a bandit rendezvous and supply depot. Colindres was a close 
friend of Sandinoand contributed nearly all of his wealth to the "cause." 
He was of material assistance in procuring supplies in Honduras and 
arranging for their forwarding to bandit groups in Nicaragua. He 
was active, intelligent, and courteous. He wore a mustache and beard. 
Late in 193 1, following the death of the principal bandit leader in Nueva 
Segovia, Miguel Angel Ortez y Guillen, Colindres was appointed by 
Sandino as leader of a large group, many of whom are said to have been 
Honduranians, and proceeded south with his men to actively participate 
in the concentration and movements in the Departments of Leon and 
Chinandega. Enroute he suffered severe losses in both men and supplies 
during contacts with Northern Area patrols. On January 13, 1932, he 
was reported to have been suffering with dysentery and to have been 
undergoing treatment at the San Felipe Hospital, Tegucigalpa, Hon- 
duras. Following his recovery he remained in Honduras for some time, 
and in September, made another foray south with a group. He was 
again hit by Northern Area patrols and lost a very large number of 
animals and supplies of various kinds. On October 23rd, he was named 
provisional President of Sandino's autonomous republic as related in 
the preceding section. 

Carlos Salgado was approximately six feet in height, light com- 
plexioned, with grey eyes, and was born about 1880 in the Valle Tal- 
quesal near Somoto, southwestern Nueva Segovia. He was poorly 
educated and could scarcely read or write; he was said to have been a 
barefoot mozo before turning his attention to military affairs, but of 
late years he wore boots. He has two bullet scars on his left leg between 
the knee and ankle, a scar on the right hand or wrist, and has no use of 
the little finger of his right hand. He was formerly very stout, but lost 
considerable weight during active campaigning. In the 1926-1927 revo- 
lution he was a general under Camilo Lopez Irias (senator rom Somoto, 
1932) and is said to have quarreled with him over the division of the 
money received from arm.s turned in; Salgado claimed that Lopez Irias 
kept all the money, and became a bitter enemy. He drinks considerably 

68 



and is quite reckless when drinking. He had many sympathizers scat- 
tered along the Honduran border and in the vicinity of Somoto, and 
became influential among them in support of Sandino, who appointed 
him a general and gave him important missions from time to time. He 
usually operated in southwestern Nueva Segovia, territory with which 
he was familiar, but in the spring of 1932, was assigned in charge of the 
main supply camp at Guambuco Mountain, on the Honduran border 
northwest of Apali. He and his forces were involved in the ambush of 
Guardia patrols at Las Puertas on April 2 1st of that year, and in a severe 
engagement fought a few days later at his camp when an attack was 
made by a strong guardia patrol from Apali. 

Jose Leon Diaz was a Honduranian, born about 1980, of dark com- 
plexion, short and heavy set, with a thick neck, black mustache and a 
loud, course voice. He was very energetic and active when not drinking, 
but was inclined to drink heavily, and during such periods had difficulty 
in retaining his followers. He had been an active revolutionist in both 
Honduras and Nicaragua, and had many friends along the border of 
the two countries and throughout southwest Nueva Segocia. He was 
commissioned a general by Sandino and operated extensively, although 
sporadically. During a large part of the time he had charge of the collec- 
tion of contributions from sympathizers and of forced collections from 
others. 

Juan Pablo Umanzor was an illiterate Honduranian, born about 
1904, and a fugitive from justice in Honduras. He was given charge of 
a part of the group of Miguel Angel Ortez y Guillen after the death of 
the latter in May, 1931, and operated in the Departments of Nueva 
Segovia, Esteli, Leon and Chinandega. When not in the field he fre- 
quented Las Manos and Danli, Honduras, where Sandinista agents were 
^ active. For some time his brother was Comandante de Armas at Las 
Manos, border town, about fifteen miles due noth of Ocotal, capital 
city of Nueva Segovia. 

Miguel Angel Ortez y Guillen was one of the most active and suc- 
cessful of Sandino's leaders. He was born in Ocotal about 1895, and 
was well-known and very popular with Sandinistas throughout Nueva 
Segovia. He operated constantly, always seeking contact with Marine 
and Guardia patrols, and was one of the few leaders of bandits who con- 
tinued a fight after the first burst of fire, who ambushed patrols success- 
fully, and who made valiant attacks on garrisons. In his third attack 
on Palacaguina on May 15, 1931, he was mortally wounded, and was 
buried in the Cuje Mine section, where a Palacaguina patrol discovered, 
exhumed and identified his body, with the aid of one of his former sub- 
jefes who had surrendered after the battle of Palacaguina. Many of his 
men had followed him simply because he was the leader, and not 
through loyalty to Sandino or to Sandino's cause, and upon his death 
presented themselves with their arms, asking for amnesty that was 
granted them, at various nearby Guardia stations. 

Pedro (Pedron) Altamirano was a native of the Department of 
Jinotega, born about 1870, did not know how to read or write, and was 
one of the most savage, cruel and sanguinary of Sandino's leaders. He 
was the father of a large family, but having killed a man while both 
were working on the roads, and being a fugitive from justice on that 
account, he turned to banditry. He operated in the Departments of 



69 



Jinotega, Esteli, Matagalpa and Northern Bluefields with which he was 
very familiar, and made one successful, and almost disastrous foray into 
the Department of Chontales. He avoided contact with patrols unless 
he had a large and certain advantage over them, and occupied himself 
to a large extent in looting, burning and killing. Operating in the un- 
explored jungles of Central Nicaragua he made the utmost use of in- 
terior lines threatening one point, and withdrawing he would disappear, 
with Guardia patrols in full pursuit, into the unexplored fastnesses of 
Central Nicaragua and reappear suddenly, making a devastating raid 
at a point far distant from where he was last seen. He dispersed his 
group widely for the purpose of subsisting it on the country, but seemed 
always able to concentrate it for a raid or for a fight. When Pedron 
himself fought he always had his entire group with him and many of the 
most desperate encounters of the Guardia were contacts with the bandits 
led by Pedron. His one great weakness as a guerilla leader, common 
among the bandit chiefs, was that he failed to personally lead his men 
in action and to push home his attacks. He had the arts of ambush, 
subsisting on the country, subterfuge, surprise, rapidity and secrecy of 
movement, down to a fine point and his use of interior lines was masterly. 

Pedro Blandon, an important leader, bom about 1899, usually 
operated in the Jinotega Area. He was blind in the left eye and wore 
dark glasses. Early in 1931, was sent by Sandino to command the 
groups in the Eastern Area, where he conducted an extensive campaign. 
During severe fighting in Logtown on April 14th, he was killed. 

Pedro Irias, a Honduran, was born about 1894, was short, thin, and 
quite white. He operated with Pedron in Nueva Segovia, Jinotega, 
Matagalpa and Chontales; his men were mostly from the Jicaro-Murra- 
Chipote area and numbered about sixty. 



70 



CHAPTER VI 
THE QUARTERMASTER'S DEPARTMENT 
Section 1 — Organization and Personnel 

The Quartermaster's Department was established on June 3, 1927, 
under charge of Major Glenn E. Hayes, G. N. (Captain, U.S.M.C.). 
On July 19, 1927, Colonel Robert W. Voeth, G. N. (Major, U.S.M.C), 
relieved Major Hayes and assumed the duties of the Quartermaster. 
He was relieved on February 28, 1928, by Captain Eli Savage, G. N. 
(First Lieutenant, U.S.M.C), who continued in his capacity until April 
19, 1930, in the meantime being promoted to the rank of Major, Guar- 
dia Nacional and Captain, U. S. Marine Corps. Other officers who 
served as Quartermaster, Guardia Nacional, were Major Maurice C. 
Gregory, G. N. (Captain, U.S.M.C), from May 20, 1930 to May 3 1, 193 1 ; 
Major Edward G. Huefe, G. N. (Captain, U.S.M.C), from May 31, 1931 
to April 9, 1932, and Major Leonard E. Rea, G. N. (Captain, U.S.M.C), 
from April 10, 1932 to January 2, 1933. 

Colonel Cyrus S. Radford, U. S. Marine Corps, was designated as 
Special Disbursing and Purchasing Agent for the Guardia in the United 
States. 

The Quartermaster was assisted by a staff of Lieutenants, one of 
whom was a Quartermaster Clerk in the Marine Corps, and the balance 
enlisted men of the Marine Corps, the number varying from time to 
time with changes in the organization and necessities of the department. 
Most of these officers had had previous experience in the work of the 
Quartermaster's Department in the Marine Corps. 

Early in 1928, the administration of the office was organized as 
follows : 

A. DISBURSING DIVISION. 

1. Voucher Section. — The preparation of all vouchers for pay- 
ment by the Paymaster, Guardia Nacional, for obligations contracted 
by the Quartermaster and the several units attached to the General 
Headquarters at Managua ; this includes the preparation of payrolls of 
civilian employees on duty at General Headquarters; the auditing of 
vouchers submitted by the Division Commanders for credit to their 
accounts ; maintaining records of the Quartermaster Department mone- 
tary obligations. 

2. Purchase Section. — The procurement of clothing and prop- 
erty, either by local purchase or by requisition on the Philadelphia 
Purchasing Agent ; the procurement of subsistence stores for the several 
units comprising the General Headquarters, exclusive of the National 
Penitentiary. 

3. Subsistence Section. — The proper accountability of monetary 
allowances authorized for the furnishing of rations to the enlisted per- 
sonnel of the Guardia; the proper accountability of rations purchased 
by the Purchase Section for the several units of the General Headquar- 
ters, exlcusive of the National Penitentiary. 

71 



4. Canteen Section. — The maintenance of the "Guardia Cantina" 
at General Headquarters, with a view to furnishing to the enlisted per- 
sonnel of the entire Guardia establishment, essential canteen articles 
necessary to their health and comfort, at the least possible cost. 

5. Transportation Section. — The maintenance, upkeep and re- 
pairs to Guardia Nacional motor vehicles, and records pertaining there- 
to; the procurement of water and land transportation incidental to 
troop movements and to officers travelling on official business without 
troops, and records pertaining thereto. 

6. Public Works Section. — The maintenance and alteration of 
buildings, upkeep of grounds, sewerage systems, and electrical and tele- 
phone systems, of, or pertaining to, those buildings comprising the 
General Headquarters and the several units centered in Managua. 

B. PROPERTY ACCOUNTING DIVISION. 

1 . Property Section. — Maintaining property accountability with 
all separate units of the Guardia for all property received by local pur- 
chase of shipments of property received from the Purchasing Agent in 
the United States. 

2. Clothing Section. — Maintaining proper accountability for all 
clothing received by local purchase, or from other sources. Maintaining 
proper records incident to the issue of clothing to enlisted personnel. 

3. Receiving and Forwarding Section. — The proper receipt, stor- 
age and shipment of supplies at the Quartermaster storerooms; in co- 
operation with the Disbursing Division, particular attention was given 
to the prevention of the accumulation of supplies at posts beyond actual 
needs due to over-requisition. 

4. Animal Section. — The maintenance of the corral at General 
Headquarters, the care of the animals therein, the reconditioning of 
animals when practicable, and the maintenance of records in connection 
with the animals of the entire Guardia. 

In April, 1929, a Depot of Supplies was organized under a Depot 
Quartermaster. This office became accountable for all property in store 
in the Depot and in use at Guardia Headquarters, and had charge of the 
receipt of all supplies, their shipment to the outlying stations upon 
requisition, and the issue to organizations in the vicinity of the Head- 
quarters. He also assumed charge of the Armory and of all labor in 
connection with the upkeep and maintenance at the Headquarters, 
including the Camp de Marte. Early in 1930 an Armorer's School was 
established under the direction of the Depot Quartermaster, wherein 
selected enlisted men were given a course of instruction in the main- 
tenance and repair of all types of weapons in use in the Guardia. The 
officer detailed as Armorer also was given charge of the maintenance 
and operation of the Guardia telephone system, and the maintenance 
and repair of all electrical wiring within the Guardia buildings in the 
Camp de Marte. 

The office of the Quartermaster was reorganized into two sections 
in April, 1929: 



72 



A. PURCHASING. 

1 . Procurement of clothing, equipment and other supplies, and 
all services. 

2. Allotment of funds to organizations for maintenance. 

3. Preparation of requisitions for funds. 

4. Vouchering and paperwork. 

5. Issue of transportation and supervision of, for the entire 
Guardia. 

6. Vouchering of transportation bills. 

B. AUDITING. 

1. Property and clothing accounts of all accountable officers. 

2. Duplicate property and clothing accounts, and duplicate 
clothing records of all enlisted men. 

3. Ration and forage returns. 

4. Paper work in connection with the foregoing. 

On May 1, 1930, the Commanding Officer, National Penitentiary, 
took over from the Quartermaster's Office the carpenter, plumbing, and 
paint shops, absorbing all expenses incurred in their operation. He 
furnished all labor and materials necessary for the upkeep and repair 
of the buildings and grounds of the Camp de Marte (Guardia Section), 
charging actual cost, plus ten percent, for the performance thereof. 
Control of expenditures was kept in the Quartermaster's Office by having 
all work done on job orders issued by that office. A monthly settlement 
was made through an exchange of authorized allotment of funds. 

On June 1, 1930, the corral adjacent to the Campo de Marte was 
transferred from the Quartermaster to the Commanding Officer, Na- 
tional Penitentiary, who assumed charge of the feeding of the animals, 
the maintenance of animals and equipment, and the providing of veter- 
inary service. 

Early in 1931 the Depot Quartermaster took over from the Com- 
manding Officer, National Penitentiary, the manufacture of all uniforms 
for the Guardia, and also the operation of the carpenter shop. Following 
the earthquake on March 31, 193 1, and the destruction of the National 
Penitentiary, all other activities which had heretofore been turned over 
by the Quartermaster to the Commanding Officer, National Peniten- 
tiary, were again brought under the Quartermaster's Office. By 1932, 
these had been placed under the charge of the Depot Quartermaster, 

Section 2 — Accountability, Clothing and Property 

At first, all Division (later called "Department") Commanders were 
accountable to the Quartermaster for all Guardia property, including 
items purchased by them as well as articles furnished by the Quarter- 
master. Property in use at Headquarters, Guardia Nacional, was issued 
on memorandum receipts held in the office of the Quartermaster. 

When the Depot of Supplies was established in 1929, the Depot 
Quartermaster became accountable for property in use at Headquarters. 

73 



During the spring of 1929, the Northern, Central, Western, and 
Eastern Areas were organized and Area Quartermasters appointed. The 
latter became the accountable officer for all property in use and store 
within their respective area. It was found, however, due to the location 
of certain departments and the presence, or lack, of suitable regular 
transportation facilities, that it was more economical and productive 
of efficient results to change the system of accountability. Accordingly, 
the Area Quartermaster, Northern Area, was made accountable only 
for the property in use and store in the Department of Nueva Segovia, 
and the Department Commander, Esteli, was made an accountable 
officer; the reason being that plane transportation facilities were avail- 
able at Esteli as well as at Ocotal, and Esteli was only about one half 
the distance between Managua and Ocotal, on the direct route. The 
lack of a suitable landing field for transport planes at Jinotega, and the 
fact that truck transportation was possible throughout most of the year 
between Managua and Matagalpa, caused the designation of the De- 
partment Commander, Matagalpa, as an accountable officer, in addition 
to the Central Area Quartermaster, who became accountable only for 
the property in use and store in the Department of Jinotega. In the 
Western Area, Leon and Chinandega had equal railroad facilities, hence 
the separation of accountability from the Area Quartermaster on May 
3, 1930, thereby eliminating double handling and paperwork, and saving 
time. In the Eastern Area an accountable officer was named for the 
Department of Northern Bluefields in addition to the Area Quarter- 
master, who was accountable only for the property in use and store in 
the Department of Southern Bluefields. 

The system of accountability employed was identical with that in 
use in the U. S. Marine Corps, and the same blank forms were used, with 
the exception that the headings and instructions were printed in Span- 
ish, being translations of the English appearing on the Marine Corps 
forms. Items of clothing and property were carried under both their 
Spanish and English names, and semi-annual returns were similarly 
prepared. 

Section 3 — Initial Supply 

When the Guardia was organized on May 12, 1927, there were 
practically no materials or supplies on hand with the exception of ord- 
nance. 

The U. S. Marine Corps authorized the sale of clothing, equipment, 
and other supplies required for the Guardia for the immediate needs in 
outfitting and equipping the recruits, and this assistance was taken 
advantage of. This policy was continued until January 1, 1928, when 
the Marine Corps discontinued furnishing supplier as required and 
stated the policy of furnishing only technical military material. 

Such materials as were available, and suitable, were pur based in 
local markets. This practice, as well as the manufacture of articles 
from materials obtained locally, was continued throughout the period 
of connection of U. S. Marine Corps officers with the Guardia, with a 
view to the furtherance of business and employment conditions within 
the country. 



74 



Inventories of ordnance materials taken in July, 1927, developed 
that the amount was sufficient for the initial needs of several thousand 
men. This, however, did not include an adequate supply of automatic 
weapons or ammunition, which had to be procured. 

Section 4 — Uniforms and Clothing 

During the latter part of 1927, looking to the eventual manufacture 
of clothing items locally, various foreign firms were asked to furnish 
samples and prices of uniform materials. By the spring of 1928, shirts, 
trousers and field scarfs were being manufactured at the National Peni- 
tentiary, employing prison labor, the materials being purchased abroad 
more economically than they could be obtained locally. Such items as 
socks, underwear, leggings and hats were purchased abroad at a saving 
over local prices. 

General orders laid stress on the close supervision of issues, the care 
of clothing by responsible officers, and the education of the enlisted men 
in the care of the clothing issued to them, as means of keeping the total 
cost of clothing item.s at a minimum. 

Commencing in 1930, it was found that due to the worldwide econo- 
mic depression, the prices paid for items of clothing were lower than 
theretofore had been the case. 

Considerable quantities of shoes manufactured in various parts of 
Nicaragua were purchased and issued in 1930 and succeeding years. 
At Jinotega, shoes were obtained at a very low figure, in sufficient quan- 
tity to care for the needs of the Central Area; likewise, in Esteli, for that 
Department, thus creating an additional saving on the cost of trans- 
portation necessary if furnished from Managua. At Granada, they were 
obtained at a reasonable figure, and were utilized in that department 
and in the Department of Rivas. Large amounts were purchased from 
Managua manufacturers with which to supply the balance of the Guar- 
dia. 

Tests were conducted during 1930, 1931, and 1932, to ascertain the 
relative wearing qualities of the various shoes obtained locally and those 
secured in the United States, and to determine the most economical, 
and satisfactory, shoe for routine procurement. It was found that the 
initial cost of a pair of Nicaraguan made shoes was much less (sometimes 
fifty percent less) than the cost of shoes manufactured in the United 
States. But the arduous service of the Guardia, especially in the "hill" 
departments, with their long marches over stony, mountainous country, 
through rivers and swampy land, played havoc with the native-made 
shoe, which was poorly constructed and of improperly cured leather. 
It was found, that under these conditions, a pair of Nicaraguan made 
shoes lasted only a month or less, and brought on much foot trouble, 
whereas the United States manufactured shoes would give satisfactory 
service for three or more months, and at the same time fit better, be 
more comfortable to the user, and make a much neater appearance when 
used in cities and towns for garrison duty. Accordingly, in 1932, a con- 
tract was made, through the Purchasing Agent in Philadelphia, with the 
Herman Shoe Company, to supply shoes at a cost but slightly more than 
the price paid in Managua, but which would outwear several pairs of 
the local item. 



75 



The Depot Quartermaster carried on the manufacture of shirts, 
trousers and field scarfs during 1931 and 1932, employing female labor 
to advantage. Another factor in the low cost of these items was the 
extensive decline of the value of the English pound in relation to dollars 
and cordobas, which made it possible to obtain the best grade of English 
khaki as low as slightly less than ^0. 1 1 a yard, CLE. Corinto, compared 
with a price of approximately ^0.19 a yard when sterling was at par. 

Section 5 — Arms and Equipment 

Due to the fact that a large supply of Springfield, Model 1 898, Krag 
Rifles were on hand when the Guardia was organized, having been 
turned in to the Government by the revolutionary armies in 1927, this 
weapon v/as adopted for use by the Guardia. During succeeding years, 
large quantities of spare parts were purchased to maintain these rifles 
in serviceable condition. 

A certain number of heavy Browning machine guns were also on 
hand, and more were purchased, as well as a considerable number of 
Browning Automatic Rifles, Lewis and Thompson Sub-Machine Guns. 
Due to intense bandit activity, necessitating constant operations against 
them, during which over five hundred major contacts were participated 
in, procurement of ammunition was a matter of constant and compelling 
necessity. Likewise, an adequate supply of grenades, hand and rifle, 
were required and obtained. 

All ordnance items were procured in the United States, or by pur- 
chase from the U. S. Marine Corps. 

Section 6 — Remounts and Forage 

In all departments, and at all stations, animal transportation was 
essential for the proper patrolling of the departments. In some cases, 
all-mounted patrols were utilized; in the majority of cases part-mounted 
and part on foot, and in some cases extensive operations were conducted 
by foot patrols, but utilizing animals for the transportation of necessary 
food, medical, ammunition and other supplies. 

To meet those conditions large numbers of horses and mules were 
purchased locally in all sections of the country. Animals captured from 
bandit groups were also utilized and became Guardia (government) 
property. 

Considerable saddle equipment, both pack and riding, was obtained 
from the U. S. Marine Corps; some was obtained through capture from 
bandit groups, and some other amounts were purchased locally, especial- 
ly during the early period of the Guardia. Later expenditures were 
largely confined to the repair of existing supplies rather than their 
replacement. 

Animals carried on property accounts that died, or became unser- 
viceable for any reason, were surveyed in the usual manner. 

The allowance for forage rations per animal was at first set at ^0.20 
daily, but ordinarily this amount was not necessary, especially in out- 
lying districts, and the utilization of pasturage at low rates, sometimes 
free, and timely purchase of feedstuffs when prices were low, made it 
possible to reduce the allowance to ^0.08 per animal daily, which was 



76 



done. Even at this rate a saving was effected, taking the Guardia as a 
whole. 

Section 7 — Motor Vehicles 

In 1928 purchases of motor vehicles were made as follows: 

8 Ford touring cars 
3 Ford trucks 
7 Dodge trucks 

This transportation was required for use in Managua, Leon, Gran- 
ada and Jinotepe, a touring car and Dodge truck being assigned to Leon 
and Granada, a touring car to Jinotepe, and the balance to Managua. 
A pool of touring cars was maintained at Guardia Headquarters, under 
the supervision of the Quartermaster, for the use of the staff officers on 
official business, when making calls at government offices, inspections, 
etc., and the truck pool for the handling of freight. The Police Depart- 
ment of Managua utilized a touring car for rapid transportation and for 
the official use of the Chief of Police, and a truck fiitted up to serve as a 
patrol wagon and for emergency transporting of members of the police 
force. A touring car was employed in a daily police patrol through the 
coffee growing sections of the highlands south of Managua. Trucks were 
utilized in the transportation of troops and supplies between Managua 
and Matagalpa in the Central Area to advantage, although this was not 
practicable at times during the rainy season. 

By the end of 1930 it was found that additional truck transportation 
was needed, and it was considered that the trucks in use between Mana- 
gua and Matagalpa were too light and unsuited for constant road use, 
which extended at times as far north as Jinotega, as well as to Sebaco, 
Esteli and Matagalpa. 

Accordingly, the following additional motor vehicles were purchased 
during 1931: 

1 General Motors, 5 J ton truck 

1 Ford Stake Body, 1 J ton truck 

1 Ford, pickup body truck 

1 Ford Station Wagon (for police use). 

Some spare parts were purchased for the upkeep of the motor trans- 
portation purchased in 1928, but the general policy was to place out of 
commission the oldest car or truck when its further repair became un- 
economical, strip it, and use the dissembled parts for the maintenance 
of the remaining vehicles of the same type. 

Extraordinarily heavy service was performed by all Guardia motor 
vehicles immediately after the earthquake in Managua on March 31, 
1931. It was imperative that all available transportation be mobilized 
to assist in the general effort toward the alleviation of suffering in the 
city. To this end all automobiles and trucks were constantly in service, 
and very little opportunity, if any, presented itself for the overhaul of 
the vehicles. This situation naturally caused a more rapid deterioration 
of parts, as the result of abnorrnal wear and tear, than would have ob- 
tained under normal conditions. 

77 



Section 8 — Transportation, Troops and Supplies 

In addition to the animal and motor transportation previously des- 
cribed, troops were moved by rail, water and air. Supplies were moved 
by all of the foregoing means, and also by bull cart, the latter being slow 
and relatively expensive for long hauls, such as between Leon and Ocotal, 
where the rate charged was an average of ^0.02 per pound in dry weather, 
and double that amount during the rainy season, when possible to get 
through at all. 

Supplies from the United States arrived by commercial steamers at 
Corinto on the west coast or at Bluefields and Puerto Cabezas on the 
east coast, and by U. S. Naval transport at Corinto. 

From Corinto the Ferrocarril del Pacifico de Nicaragua passed 
through Chinandega and Leon to the capital, Managua; thence to 
Granada via Masaya. A branch line from the latter city led to Jinotepe 
and Diriamba. Daily, or twice-daily, schedules made the transportation 
of troops and supplies an easy matter. Tickets were furnished, and ship- 
ments made, on transportation requests and shipping orders issued by 
the Quartermaster cr Department Commanders. 

Railway service between Leon and El Sauce, the principal town of 
northern Leon was not available during the period of service of the 
Marine Corps officers with the Guardia, but was inaugurated on Decem- 
ber 2*^, 1932. A line was also completed between San Jorge and San Juan 
del Sur in the Department of Rivas. 

At Granada, which lies on the northwestern shore of Lake Nicara- 
gua (102 miles long), a sea-going vessel, caught in the lake when an earth- 
quake destroyed the exit channel via the San Juan River many years 
before, gave steamer service between Granada and San Jorge, the port 
of Rivas, and to San Carlos in southern Chontales. From San Carlos 
small gasolene launches carried passengers and freight via the San Juan 
River to San Juan del Norte (Greyiown) and Bluefields. By this route 
supplies shipped from Managua to Bluefields, and troops, were carried. 
The principal item so shipped was rice, which was grown in western 
Nicaragua, and even plus the transportation charges, was available 
at a cheaper price than the rice otherwise obtainable in Bluefields. Tra- 
vel from Granada to Juigalpa, in northern Chontales, was by sailing 
vessel and lake steamer through the port of Puerto Diaz. 

The U. S. Marine Corps aviation service was of the utmost impor- 
tance and inestimable value to the Guardia, especially after the evacua- 
tion of the Marines from the Northern and Central Areas. Without 
this assistance the transportation of the troops and supplies could not 
have been so efficiently or expeditiously handled. Landing fields pre- 
viously in use by the Marine Corps were utilized, and others were con- 
structed in various localities where terrain features permitted. 

During the period of intensest bandit activity in the fall of 1931, 
when the bandits made their major attempt to capture important towns 
of the Departments of Leon and Chinandega, and to cut the lines of 
communication by holding the railroad, several large troop movements 
were made by plane. Reconnaissance missions, evaucation of sick and 
wounded, and liaison with ground forces were constant and invaluable 
duties performed by the Marine Corps pilots in connection with the 
Guardia mission, and materially aided in many successful operations. 



78 



For example during the fiscal year 1932, the Aircraft Squadrons made 
63 16 flights, flew 7193.70 hours, carried 666,454 pounds of freight, carried 
4532 passengers and transported ^313,717,75. While these figures in- 
clude services rendered to the Second Marine Brigade and the Electoral 
Mission, the great majority of them were for the Guardia. 

Section 9 — Rent, Repairs and Construction of Barracks 

In most places Guardia barracks were located in Government or 
municipal buildings at no rental cost, although in some instances muni- 
cipal authorities required the payment of rent. In Granada and at San 
Carlos, previously constructed government forts were utilized. "La 
Polvora" at Granada, was developed, through alteration, into a most 
desirable and attractive barracks. 

Where no such buildings were available, leases were entered into 
with civilian owners of suitable structures. 

In some parts of the country, especially in the bandit infested sec- 
tions, where towns were small and suitable buildings were not available, 
barrack were constructed, employing Guardia, prisoner and volunteer 
civilian labor and local materials, at surprisingly low cost to the Guardia. 
For example, the fort, with adequate enclosed structures, developed at 
Santa Maria in Nueva Segovia, was built at a cost of less than a hundred 
dollars. And the adobe block barracks and four story adobe block ma- 
chine-gun tower constructed at Macuelizo in the same department, cost 
approximately fifty dollars. Both were constructed at such low cost 
through the ingenuity of the Lieutenants (Marine Corps enlisted men) 
in command at those places. 

The construction of defensive works around barracks and in towns, 
was essential in the Northern and Central Areas, and in parts of the 
Eastern and Western Areas. These consisted usually of walls, composed 
of adobe blocks, or rock, or of double layers of timber, the space between 
the two layers being filled with earth or sand. Strong points and posi- 
tions for machine guns, automatic weapons and rifle grenadiers, were 
especially constructed, as well as towers of various types and sizes, 
offering both a vantage point for firing on roads, trails and open spaces, 
and shelter for the defenders. In most places the defensive works were 
placed in front and rear of the barracks, but in other localities, depending 
upon the terrain and isolation, the works completely surrounded the 
interior buildings, or building, such, for example, as the fort at Santa 
Maria previously referred to, and the stockade developed at Apali in 
the Northern Area. 

Section 10 — Rations 

The value of the ration was first fixed at .^0.30 daily, with a higher 
allowance authorized for some stations. However, as prices of food- 
stuffs receded, it was found that food of good quality, and sufficient as 
to quantity, could be provided at a lower rate, and in 1929, it was re- 
duced to ^0.25 daily, and in 1930 to ^0.20. Even at this figure a saving 
was effected. 

No difficulties were met with the purchase of components of the 
ration in cities ; in the smaller places, and isolated stations, the matter 
of transportation of food supplies was a constant burden on both men 

79 



and animals, especially in the rainy season. The dry winter of 1930. 
July to November of that year, caused a serious shortage of corn, beans 
and rice grown locally, and as a result, during 1931 until the new crops 
were harvested, prices were very high, and the items became so scarce 
that the American Red Cross was obliged to com.e to the relief of the 
population by shipping grain to various parts of the country. The effect 
of this situation on the Guardia ration was to raise the average cost of 
the ration, and to lessen the variety of food available for the men. 

It was thought at first that it might be possible to diversify the 
ration by the introduction of some articles of foreign origin, but this 
was found not to be feasible, due to the cost of such items and the fact 
that the enlisted men were not accustomed to such things and preferred 
the customary diet of the native Nicaraguans of their class. 

In some instances, consolidated procurement of food supplies was 
attempted, in order to gain the benefit of the cheapest prices. But 
in the main this was not done due to the fact that owing to the Nicara- 
guan custom of hand-to-mouth purchase of only the day's necessities, 
large sources of supply of even staple items were not available, and also 
on account of the transportation charges, and other difficulties. Pur- 
chases were made individually, therefore, locally or in nearby districts, 
by all station commanders, and subsistence stores were not carried in 
stock for general distribution at the Depot of Supplies. 

Section 11 — Turnover to Nicaraguan Officers 

For the purpose of training, and looking forward to the imminent 
turn-over of the Guardia to Nicaraguan officers, on June 1, 1932, a 
Nicaraguan officer was detailed by each organization commander having 
a Department Quartermaster, to duty under instruction in that office. 
In practically all cases these officers showed an interest in the work and 
a certain amount of ability and capacity to assume the duties involved. 
Reports on their progress were required to be made to the Chief of the 
Guardia from time to time. 

On October 1, 1932, all Nicaraguan Government property in the 
hands of North American officers was turned over to these Nicaraguan 
officers, who became accountable therefor. Thereafter, the receipt, care, 
issue and shipment of property, and all paperwork in connection there- 
with, was handled by them under the direct supervision of the former. 
This supervision and instruction was carried up on to the time of the 
evacuation of all Marine Corps officers and enlisted mien from the re- 
spective departments. The training and experience thus provided the 
Nicaraguan officers, and the existence of competent, trained enlisted 
personnel in all offices, gave promise that the work of the Quartermas- 
ter's Department would continue to go on properly and in substantially 
the same manner as theretofore. 



CHAPTER VII 

THE PAYMASTER'S DEPARTMENT 

Section 1 — Organization and Personnel 

The Paymaster's Department was organized by Major Leon L, 
Dye, G. N. (Captain, U. S. Marine Corps), on September 1, 1927. In 
addition to himself, the personnel consisted of a Marine Corps Pay 
Clerk, with the rank of Lieutenant, Guardia Nacional, and a civilian 
clerk-interpreter. 

Prior to that date the funds for the pay and maintenance of the 
Guardia had been disbursed and accounted for by the Quartermaster of 
the Guardia, who from June 3 to July 19, 1927, was Major Glenn E. 
Hayes, G. N. (Captain, U.S. Marine Corps), and from July 19 to August 
31, 1927, Colonel Robert W. Voeth, G.N. (Major, U.S. Marine Corps). 

Major Dye continued as the Paymaster until June 1, 1930, when 
he was relieved by Major William J. Livingston, G.N. (Captain, U. S. 
Marine Corps). Major Carl S. Schmidt, G.N. (Captain, U. S. Marine 
Corps), relieved Major Livingston on May 1, 1932, and performed the 
duties of the Paymaster, G.N., until December 1, 1932, when, prepara- 
tory to the evacuation of Nicaragua by all Marine Corps forces, a Nicara- 
guan officer assumed the office of Paymaster, under the supervision and 
instruction of Major Schmidt. 

The Paymaster, Guardia Nacional, was also an Assistant Paymas- 
ter, U. S. Marine Corps, and as such, carried the accounts of officers and 
enlisted men of the Marine Corps and Navy serving with the Nicara- 
guan National Guard Detachment, and, from his disbursing account, 
made the usual settlements of their pay and allowances, and performed 
the necessary paperwork in connection therewith, the registration of 
allotments, etc. 

Section 2 — Funds, Sources of 

The funds provided for the expenses of the Guardia during 1927, 
and the first three months of 1928, were procured from: 

(a) Budget appropriations for the Guardia Nacional; one half 
turned over semi-annually in January and July. 

(b) Budget items appropriated for the Departments of War and 
Marine, covering certain officers and employees whose positions were 
suppressed, or extinguished; budget items appropriated for the Depart- 
ment of Police in the cities and towns where these activities had been 
taken over by the Guardia Nacional ; items appropriated for the Depart- 
ment of Justice and for expenses of the National Penitentiary. Corres- 
ponding credit for all of these items was made to the Guardia Nacional 
account monthly, as it accrued. 

(c) Sales of condemned Guardia property and sales of equipment, 
etc., to officers. 

(d) Reimbursement from the Department of Justice for rations 
furnished by the Guardia to permanent prisoners incarcerated in the 
prisons and penitentiaries taken over by the Guardia. 

The funds provided from April 1, 1928 to October 1, 1931, were 
procured from: 

(a) Government loan by the National Bank, April, 1928. 

SI 



(b) Special taxes, May and June, 1928. 

(c) Suppressions from budget items appropriated for other De- 
partments of the Government. 

(d) Transfers from the Superavit; up to July 1, 1930, usually made 
quarterly, thereafter monthly. 

(e) Reimbursement for rations of permanent prisoners as pre- 
viously described. 

(f) Sales, transfers, refunds, collections and adjustments. 

The funds provided from October 1, 1931 to December 1, 1932, 
were procured from: 

(a) Same sources as for the period April 1, 1928 to October 1, 
1931, excepting items (a) and (b). 

(b) Interest on deposits, Philadelphia account. 

(c) Commercial firms for maintenance of extra guards 

Section 3 — Funds, by Whom Disbursed 

Payments of troops in Managua, and of dealers for supplies pur- 
chased by the Quartermaster in Managua, were effected by the Pay- 
master personally, or by his deputy. 

To secure prompt payment for supplies purchased in the United 
States by the Purchasing Agent, who was appointed to facilitate the 
procurement of items not obtainable locally, and to secure the advan- 
tage of discounts, an advance of funds was made to this officer by the 
Paymaster, from time to time as needed. In the disbursement of such 
funds he acted as an agent for the Paymaster, and accounted for the 
funds monthly. 

Funds for the payment of troops outside of Managua, and for the 
maintenance of all organizations, including those in Managua, were 
furnished by the Paymaster to Area Quartermasters, or Department or 
such other organization commanders, who disbursed the funds as agents 
of the Paymaster. 

Section 4 — Funds, Methods of Supplying 

Funds for the maintenance and pay of outlying stations were pro- 
vided by the Paymaster in various ways, depending upon the location 
of the station and banking and communication facilities. 

In the cases of the Departments of Chinandega, Leon, Managua, 
and Carazo, and Granada and Masaya, checks were furnsihed to the 
Department (at first called "Division") Commander, who cashed them 
at the local banks; the Department Commander, Chinandega, cashed 
his checks in Leon, making a special monthly trip for this purpose. 

Due to the uncertain, unsafe and, sometimes, infrequent transpor- 
tation facilities to Rivas and Matagalpa, and the fact that banks are 
located in the capital city of each of these departments, arrangements 
were made whereby telegraphic transfer of funds was made from he 
Banco Nacional in Managua to the local bank, for the credit of the De- 
partment Commander. For the Department of Southern Bluefields, a 
similar transfer of funds was made by means of radio. 

Cash was sent by U. S. Marine Corps planes to the Departments 
of Nueva Segovia, Jinotega, Esteli, Chontales and Northern Bluefields. 

82 



The Disbursing and Purchasing Agent in Philadelphia was fur- 
nished U. S. Treasury Checks procured in exchange for cash. 
In Managua both checks and cash were provided. 

Section 5 — Payrolls 

Payrolls (a combined pay and muster roll) were submitted to the 
Paymaster by the respective organization commanders in time to be 
audited and returned with the requisite funds about the first day of each 
month. 

Officer's accounts were carried on the payroll, and their signatures 
constituted a receipt for the payment to them of the amounts credited; 
no separate pay voucher was used. Enlisted men, in addition to signing 
their names if they could do so, placed a thumbprint alongside. This 
was made necessary by the fact that large numbers of the m.en were 
unable to sign their names and, instead, placed a cross or other mark on 
the roll, witnessed by an officer, which was a further protection against 
payment of the wrong person, necessitated by the frequent similarity 
of and complete duplication of names, and the usual unfamiliarity of new 
officers with the prevailing system of double surnames among Latin- 
American people. 

Excepting in the Northern and Central Areas, payroll payments 
were usually made by the Department Commanders in person. In the 
two areas mentioned, however, due to the ize of the command and scat- 
tered location of stations, this was not practicable, and the payments 
were usually made by the various station commianders. In the Central 
Area pay and maintenance funds were usually forwarded by patrols, the 
sheets of the payrolls being prepared separately for each station, so 
that they could be detached from the entire roll, and only the sheets 
pertaining to a particular station being forwarded to it. In the Northern 
Area m.ost of these station rolls and funds v/ere made up into packages, 
together with the monthly allotment of maintenance funds, and dropped 
to individual stations from the Marine Corps observation planes which 
made weekly patrols covering all stations of the area. During the several 
years that this practice was carried out, the only loss that occured out 
of the many thousands of dollars so dropped, was a very small one at 
several stations on the same day, when the fact that paper currency was 
not available and that pay and maintenance funds were paid in silver 
caused several of the heavy packages to be broken in the drop and the 
contents scattered in the tall grass and brush. The loss was less than 
ten dollars for all stations. 

Section 6 — Pay, Rates of 

Up to December 31, 1927, the officers and enlisted men of the 
Guardia were paid under a temporary decree, or agreement, of the Presi- 
dent of Nicaragua, dated June 18, 1927. The rates of pay under this 
temporary agreement were as follows: 

83 



OFFICERS 

Jefe Director ^250.00 per month 

Assistant Jefe Director 200.00 " " 

Paymaster and Quartermaster 200.00 " " 

Medical Director 200.00 " 

Department Inspector 150.00 " " 

Medical Inspector 150.00 

District Commander 150.00 " 

Sub-district commander, 1st Class 100.00 " " 

Sub-district commander, 2nd Class 60.00 " " 

ENLISTED MEN: 

First Sergeants 18.00 " " 

Sergeants 16.00 

Corporals 14.00 " 

Privates 12.00 " 
Under a new agreement between the United States and the Govern- 
ment of Nicaragua, signed by the Nicaraguan Government on December 
27, 1927, the rates of pay of officers and enlisted men of the Guardia 
were fixed as follows: 

OFFICERS: 
Brigadier-General (Jefe Director) 
Colonel (Chief of Staff) 
Colonel (Line and Staff) 
Major (Line and Staff) 
Captain (Line and Staff) 
First Lieutenant (Line and Staff) 
Second Lieutenant (Line and StafQ 
Student Officers (Line and Staff) 

ENLISTED MEN, Line and Staff: 

Sergeant-Major ^40 . 00 per month 

First Sergeant 35.00 '' 

Quartermaster Sergeant 30.00 '' " 

Sergeant 25.00 " 

Corporal 18.00 " 

Field Musician 14.00 '' 

Private 12.00 '' 

PAY OF THE BAND 

Leader $ 1 200 . 00 per annum 

Assistant Leader 900.00 '' 

Musician, 1st Class 30.00 " month 

Musician, 2nd Class 25.00 " 

Musician, 3rd Class 20.00 '' " 
New rates of pay were made effective May 1, 193 1, for those officers 
joining the Guardia on or after that date, or who were promoted sub- 
sequent to that date, as follows: 

84 



3000.00 


per annum 


2500.00 


// ft 


2400.00 


n H 


2100.00 


n n 


1800.00 


// n 


1200.00 


tf ff 


900.00 


n It 


600.00 


If H 



OFFICERS: 

J eh Director ^3000.00 per annum 

Chief of Staff and Colonel 2100.00 '' 

Major 1800.00 '' 

Captain 1500.00 " 

First Lieutenant 1 000 . 00 " " 

Second Lieutenant (Permanent) 900 . 00 " " 

Second Lieutenant (Temporary) 600 . 00 " '' 

Acting officers (all grades) No pay 

Section 7 — Maintenance Funds. 

^ Maintenance funds were advanced by the Paymaster about the 
first of each month, according to the various titles and sub-titles under 
which their expenditure was authorized, on approved requisitions 
submitted by the respective Area Quartermasters or Department or 
other organization commanders. Decision as to the approval, or re- 
duction, or requisitions as submitted, rested with the Quartermaster, 
under the direct supervision of the Jefe Director. 

Vouchers itemizing the services or supplies procured, and giving 
receipt for their payment, were prepared by the disbursing agent, and 
submitted monthly to the Paymaster, together with a list of such ex- 
penditures by name, amount, date and voucher number, and a grand 
total thereof, and an Account Current, showing receipts, expenditures, 
and obligated and unobligated balances. These were audited by the 
Paymaster without delay and any differences reported by letter to the 
disbursing agent. 

Each disbursing agent maintained a set of books, including a 
cash book and ledger accounts under the various titles and sub-titles, 
and kept a copy of all debit and credit vouchers to support the entries 
made therein. These accounts were audited from time to time by Com- 
manding Officers, Executive Officers, Inspectors and others authorized 
to do so by proper authority. The Paymaster's monthly report of 
audit, however, gave the disbursing agent a check on the current 
status of his accounts regularly, and was, therefore, of great value. 

Books were generally kept in the English language until the ap- 
pearance of Nicaraguan officers in the Guardia made it desirable, for 
instructional purposes, to change to Spanish. Vouchers were at first 
drawn up in English, but as they were audited by the Nicaraguan 
Treasury Department officials, it was soon found that it was essential 
to have them written in Spanish. Accordingly, this was required of all 
disbursing agents early in 1928, and continued to be required thereafter. 

Section 8 — Miscellaneous Activities. 

Pursuant to a general order of Headquarters, a Benefit fund was 
created, and commencing on the first of the following month the ac- 
counts of all the officers and enlisted men were debited the amount of 
ten cents monthly, the total amount so collected being credited to the 
Benefit Fund. Designated beneficiaries of deceased officers and enlisted 
men were paid the sum of twenty-five dollars of this fund. On January 
1, 1930, this payment was increased to forty dollars, non-retroactie. 



85 



In addition to the usual and customary duties of his office, the 
Guardia Paymaster was required to handle a number of special accounts, 
and to receive and disburse funds in connection therewith. These in- 
cluded: 

(a) Decorations incident to the entertainment of the North Ameri- 
can aviator, Charles A. Lindbergh. 

(b) Inaugural ceremonies and ball, January 1, 1929. 

(c) Second Anniversary party at Tipitapa, May, 1929. 

(d) Voluntarios, pay and maintenance. 

(e) Contraband collections and payments to enlisted men. 

(f) Auxiliares, pay and maintenance. 

Section 9 — Inspection of Paymaster's Accounts 

The accounts of the Paymaster were inspected and audited from 
time to time by the Brigade Paymaster, Second Marine Brigade, and by 
Brigadier General George Richards, U. S. Marine Corps, Paymaster of 
the Marine Corps. 

Section 10 — Summary 

During each year, despite occassional shortage of funds and frequent 
difficulty met with in the procurement of funds from the Nicaraguan 
Government, all payments to troops and to dealers for supplies furnished 
the Guardia, were made promptly and in full. 

On December 1, 1932, all funds, accounts and records of the Pay- 
master's Department were turned over by Major Schmidt, Paymaster, 
to the Nicaraguan officer detailed as Paymaster, in such condition that 
a continuation of the established policies and methods of disbursing and 
accounting for the public funds allotted by the Nicaraguan Government 
for the pay and maintenance of the Guardia, may be reasonably be 
expected. 



86 



CHAPTER VIII 

THE LAW DEPARTMENT 

The head of the Law Department was designated as the Law Officer 
of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua. He was in fact also Public Rela- 
tions Officer. The functions of the Law Department embraced the fol- 
lowing duties: 

(1) The conduct of all investigations arising from complaints re- 
ceived from government officials and civilians. 

(2) The investigation of the cases and records of prisoners held to 
the order of the Jefe Director. 

(3) The review and filing of all records of proceedings of courts- 
martial, extraordinary courts-martial, courts of inquiry, boards of in- 
vestigation and other boards. 

(4) The preparation of precepts for courts-martial, courts of in- 
quiry, boards of investigation and other boards convened by the Jefe 
Director. 

(5) The preparation and publication of the necessary court-martial 
instructions. 

(6) The preparation of opinions on points of Nicaraguan law arising 
throughout the Guardia. 

(7) Preparation of legal forms for use in the Guardia; contracts; 
enlistments contracts for Guardias, Guardias Municipales, Auxiliares, 
Civicos en Finca, Civicos; contract forms for contract surgeons, etc. 

(8) The perusal of all Nicaraguan newspapers and preparation of 
a synopsis of all items of interest to, or involving, the Guardia. 

(9) The study of all governmental decrees and the publication of 
such as applied to or effected the Guardia and the preparation of the 
necessary instructions as to their execution by the Guardia. 

(10) The enforcement of the arms law and the issue of arms permits. 

(1 1) The preparation of proposed legislation. 

( 1 2) During the electoral period when the possession and the control 
over the sale, transportation and traffic of aguardiente passed to the 
Guardia Nacional, the Law Department was charged with the prepara- 
tion of all orders and instructions for the Guardia service and the inves- 
tigation of all complaints in connection with the Guardia control of 
aguardiente. 

( 1 3) The preparation of orders defining and carrying out the electoral 
mission of the Guardia Nacional. 

(14) The collection and submission of monthly reports of the seizure 
of contraband to the Director General de Rentas from all departments. 

(15) The collection and submission of reports of fines awarded by 
judicial tribunals for violations penal code and of police and sanitary 
regulations throughout the Republic to the Supreme Court of Justice. 

(16) The collection and preparation of reports of arms confiscated. 

(17) The investigation and submission of report and recommenda- 
tion for disciplinary action in the case of offenses committed by the U. S. 
Naval and Marine Corps personnel serving with the Guardia. 



87 



CHAPTER IX 
THE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT 
Section 1 — Organization and Personnel 

From May 12, 1927, date or organization of the Guardia, until 
October of the same year, one U. S. Naval Medical officer, and two 
pharmacists mates, U. S. Navy, were assigned to duty with the Guardia, 
and conducted the medical activities during that time. The officer, 
Lieutenant John B. O'Neil, (M.C.) U. S. Navy, also participated in 
field service and was highly commended for bravery in action. 

On October 8, 1927, Colonel J. B. Helm, (MC), G.N., (Commander, 
MC, U. S. Navy) was detailed as Medical Director, and proceeded at 
once to organize the Medical Department. 

Doctor P. J. Cerna of Managua, a Nicaraguan physician and gradu- 
ate of Georgetown University, who had spent seven years in the United 
States, was employed from the outset as a contract surgeon, and made 
the physical examinations of all applicants for enlistment, vaccination, 
anti-typhoid innoculation and blood-testing of recruits, did other pro- 
fessional work, and also interpreting, translating and instructing in 
Spanish and English. 

Four enlistments for duty as hospital corpsmen were made in June, 
1927, the men having had experience as such in the old Guardia. 

During the latter part of 1927, three additional medical officers, 
one Chief Pharmacist, and seventeen chief pharmacists mates and phar- 
macists mates first class, medical corps, U. S. Navy, were assigned to 
duty with the Guardia. 

Activities of the Medical Department were established as follows: 

(a) An administration office at Guardia Headquarters, Managua, 
where medical regulations and instructions were prepared, medical 
reports received, compiled and analyzed. A complete Manual for the 
Medical Department was prepared, translated into Spanish and dis- 
tributed. 

(b) A medical supply depot, to procure and distribute medical 
supplies and equipment. Medical officers in outlying organizations made 
requisition on the depot for their requirements. 

(c) Training School for medical officers — giving a course of special 
training lasting several weeks, during which particular attention was 
paid to the policies of the medical department and the special conditions 
of this service in the Guardia. 

(d) Training School for hospital corpsmen. On December 6, 1927, 
the Jefe Director authorized the establishment of a Hospital Corps to 
consist of enlisted men who were then serving as hospital corpsmen, men 
undergoing training for this detail, and such others who might be enlisted 
for this purpose, or who might transfer from line duties, from time to 
time. By October 1, 1928, twenty-nine men had completed the three 
months course, and seven others were then undergoing training. All 
men accepted for the hospital corps were required to have had at least 
a grammar school education; some were college graduates. 

(e) General Hospital. At first the hospital was established in a 
barracks building in the Campo de Marte, but this was found to be in- 
adequate, and a set of buildings at Momotombo Barracks, on the east 

88 



side of Managua, was renovated and an excellent general hospital estab- 
lished on October 19, 1928. About May, 1929, the hospital was again 
moved to Campo de Marte, when all activities at Momotombo Barracks 
were so removed for reasons of economy. It remained there until the 
earthquake on March 31, 1931, during which all buildings were either 
destroyed or badly damaged, and quarters were obtained in a rented 
building in the city of Managua, about three blocks north of the Campo 
de Marte, and were utilized continuously thereafter. 

(f) Largely due to the initiative and efforts of Second Lieutenant 
Silas P. Buechlein (MC), G.N. (Pharmacist Mate First Class (MC), 
USN), a hospital was established in Ocotal, Nueva Segovia. The build- 
ing, grounds and conveniences were developed by him to an extent that 
would have been a credit to any organization, and the hospital was one 
of the show places on the Northern Area for visitors. It cared for the 
sick and wounded of the area whose condition did not require transfer 
by plane to Managua. 

(g) Infirmaries were established at Somoto (4 beds), Jinotega in 
the Central Area, and at Bluefields (5 beds), and Puerto Cabezas (20 
beds) in the combat areas, and at Leon and Granada. 

(h) Dispensaries were established at all stations under charge of a 
medical officer or hospital corpsmen. In combat areas a medical officer 
usually had charge of medical activities at several stations, and made 
regular trips to each when his services were required, or for routine 
inspection. This was also done by the Area Surgeons, who were regu- 
larly stationed at the Area Headquarters, and had charge of all medical 
department activities within the area. 

Section 2 — Collateral Activities 

On July 3, 1928, by Presidential Decree, the Medical Department 
of the Guardia assumed control over prostitution and the venereal pro- 
phylaxis work throughout the Republic. This involved a very large 
amount of work on the part of the medical officers, but was highly im- 
portant due to the prevalence of venereal diseases. The control was 
very effective, and good results were obtained. However, it was con- 
tinued only until the Spring of 1929, when for reasons of economy, the 
work was returned to the civilian sanitary authorities. 

During the first several years of existence of the Guardia it was 
the policy to give medical attention to certain civilians, such charity 
cases as could not otherwise obtain medical aid for financial reasons. 
No charge was made for these services, or for the medical supplies used. 
Up to October 1, 1928, a total of 1147 cases had been so treated, 3241 
treatments given and 36 operations performed, in all sections of the 
country. This was believed to have created much good feeling, favorable 
to both the Guardia and to American Officers. In later years, due to 
lack of funds to carry on the work, it was necessary to discontinue the 
practice, and medical attention was given only to those civilians who 
served with Guardia patrols in the field, and who became sick or were 
wounded in action, and to those civilians living in towns where no doc- 
tors or offices of the Sanidad were located. 

Lectures and demonstrations were given by medical officers to the 
cadets of the Military Academy during 1931 and 1932, and various 
pamphlets on minor surgery and first aid were distributed among the 
cadets and also among the commissioned Nicaraguan officers. 



Section 3 — Turnover to Nicaraguan Control 

Similar to the policy with respect to line officers, a number of native 
Nicaraguan physicians were commissioned as medical officers in the 
Guardia. On October 1, 1932, there were five such officers. They had 
been given a training period of six weeks in Managua in the routine 
duties and administrative work of the medical department, and then 
sent to one of the Area Headquarters, where their instruction was con- 
tinued by the Area Surgeon, followed by assignment to independent 
duty. 

Additional medical officers were commissioned during November 
and December, 1932, sufficient in number to replace all North American 
personnel. In some towns, where required and no medical officer was 
available for assignment, or where it was anticipated that the medical 
officer might be absent from time to time while carrying out duties in 
other places, contract surgeons were enlisted for part-time duty, at 
reduced salaries. 

All medical supplies and equipment on hand at stations were care- 
fully inventoried and a turn-over effected prior to the evacuation of 
North American personnel. The relieving Nicaraguan medical officer 
signed a receipt for all supplies and equipment on hand, and a statement 
to the effect that he was completely satisfied with the turnover as made. 
At each station a three to six months supply of medicines was then on 
hand. 



90 



CHAPTER X 

SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS 

Section 1 — General 

In Nicaragua the telephone and telegraph systems are owned and 
operated by the Government, and these national lines were available, 
therefore, for the use of the Guardia without cost, and no exchange of 
appropriations was required, or limit set as to amount of traffic. 

After the beginning of the year 1927, as a result of the revolution, 
there was no wire communication between the East and West Coasts 
of Nicaragua, and until 1932, when the Guardia installed its own radio 
systems, commercial radio service was utilized between these points. 

The wire lines gave generally satisfactory service, although it was 
slow and often irregular, and at no time could be compared with like 
service in the United States or many other countries. 

Section 2 — Telegraph 

Telegraph lines connected all important cities and towns of the 
interior (along the railroad) and extended to some places in Rivas, Chon- 
tales, Matagalpa, Jinotega, Esteli, and Nueva Segovia. Trunk lines 
extended south through Rivas into Costa Rica, and north to Honduras 
through three different Nicaraguan towns, Somotillo, Somoto and 
Dipilto. 

Operators were capable and when actually, engaged with traffic, 
handled it with speed, but in many places were inclined to delay trans- 
mission. Unavoidable delays also occurred from time to time in the 
bandit infested regions when the wires were cut by bandits, or when 
storms damaged the lines and repairs could be made only under patrol 
protection or by members of the patrol themselves. 

When one considers that for miles these lines extended through for- 
ests, jungles and swamps, nailed to trees and often with beer bottles and 
cow horns for insulators, the service actually performed by the telegraph 
system was remarkable. 

At the Guardia Headquarters in the Campo de Marte, Managua, a 
special office was opened to handle Guardia Nacional traffic, and an 
operator was kept on watch at all times. 

Section 3 — Telephone 

Telephonic communication was available between most of the im- 
portant cities and towns of the interior and also to a limited extent to 
Juigalpa, capital city of the Department of Chontales. Due to the type 
of installation (ground return), conversations between towns were carried 
on with considerable difficulty, a babble of voices and extraneous sounds 
being heard at all times. Frequent interruptions occurred when heed- 
less operators cut the connections. So it was not practicable to com- 
municate by telephone from Managua as far as Esteli, Matagalpa or 
Rivas, and at times it was also impossible to carry on an intelligible 
conversation with Corinto. 

A separate exchange was maintained at Guardia Headquarters, 
Managua, serving the lines connecting the various offices of the Guardia 
in the Campo de Marte, the National Penitentiary, the Police Station, 

91 



Momotombo Barracks, the Presidential House (later the Palace), and 
the private residences of the Guardia officers. It was connected with the 
local government exchange, through which calls to out of town points, 
and in the city of Managua, were made. 

In Ocotal, Jinotega and Matagalpa, Guardia switchboards were also 
used, although mainly for local purposes. During the latter part of 1 93 1 , 
by utilizing the national telegraph line and U. S. Marine Corps field 
telephones, good service was had between Ocotal and various nearby 
towns, particularly Somoto and Dipilto. During the telegrapher's strike 
in September, 1932, telephones were also installed at Totogalpa, Yala- 
guina, Pueblo Nueva and Palacaguina. These connected with the line 
which had been installed between Daraili and Condega in 193 1 . Another 
line which gave excellent results was that between Ocotal and Macuel- 
izo, built entirely by the Guardia, early in 1932. 

In the Central Area in 1932, telephonic communication was estab- 
lished between Navarro, La Isla, Algovia and Buena Vista, also a line 
between Muy Muy and La Pineda, a combination buzzer-telephone line 
connecting Matagalpa, Fundadora, Aran Juez and Las Camelias, and a 
telephone line between Las Cuatros Esquinas and La Cumplida. 

In the Department of Leon, in 1932, a line was built between El 
Sauce and Achuapa by General Escamilla, the Mexican revolutionary 
leader, in charge of the government road construction then going on in 
that vicinity. It served his road camp, and the Guardia stations in the 
two places. 

The earthquake at Managua, March 31, 1931, caused considerable 
damage to the communications system at Guardia Headquarters. The 
telephone switchboard and most of the telephones were badly damaged, 
and the wire that was not pulled down and lost, was so broken and 
tangled that it was necessary to take it down and repair it before using 
agains. 

There was a shortage of wire, and much effort was expended in the 
recovery of wire, along the streets of Managua, that had been in use and 
abandoned after the earthquake. Some wire was recovered from the 
National telegraph lines in Nueva Segovia that had been abandoned 
after the revolution, and in places occupied by Sandino and his forces 
in 1927. 

Many miles of twisted wire was untwisted so that a greater distance 
could be covered by a given amount, the earth being used as a return 
wire instead of another line. About six miles of retrieved wire was used 
in telephone installations in Managua, and about twice this amount 
was sent to the Northern Area for telegraph line between Palacaguina 
and Telpaneca. 

Section 4 — Radio 

When the Guardia Nacional relieved Marine Coros detachments as 
garrisons of towns in the Northern and Central Areas, the radio equip- 
ment in use at many of these places was allowed to remain, as it was 
the only means of signal communication, and was a vital necessity. 

In the Northern Area sets were maintained at Santa Maria, Ocotal, 
Telpaneca, San Juan de Telpaneca, Quilali, Apali and Jalapa. A buzzer 
line connected Jicaro with Apali. 

92 



In the Central Area radio sets were employed at Jinote^a, Mata- 
galpa, Corinto F'inca and El Consuelo. In 1932 a medium fre(|uency set 
was installed at Navarro, working with Matagalpa and giviag service 
to all stations connected by telephone with Navarro. 

In the Eastern Area sets were maintained at Kisalaya and Neptune 
Mines, working with the vStandard Fruit Company station jit Puerto 
Cabezas. Constant communication could not be maintained ^ith these 
sets owing to their low power and the distance over v/hich thef worked. 

The radio operators were enlisted men of the Marine Corpp, holding 
the rank of second lieutenant, without pay, in the Guardia. Later 
Guardia enlisted men who had been trained at Managua, wer<; assigned 
to various stations as assistants, and in some cases as operaljors. 

In 1932 high frequenc^^ sets were installed at Ocotal, Espeli, Blue- 
fields, Puerto Cabezas, Cabo Gracias a Dios, Neptune Mines afid Wauni, 
and two at Managua, one for handling traffic and the other fOr training 
purposes. 

For stations which had no other means of signal comn^unication, 
and for all stations, even between Area Headquarters and Managua, 
when the telegraph lines were out of order or not working, for any rea- 
son, the radio installations were of the utmost importance and value. 
Instances of this include the transmission of the news of bandit attacks, 
sudden bandit movements, arrangements for the transportation of 
wounded by plane, and forwarding of the results of national elections. 

Section 5 — Communications Office 

The Guardia communications office was established on June 3, 
1931, by Captain James M. Smith, G.N. (First Lieutenant, U.S.M.C.). 
It took over the installation and repairing of Guardia telephones and 
lines, and radio sets ; the receiving, clearing and distribution of messages 
at Guardia Headquarters, and all code and cipher work there. 

It served the Second Marine Brigade and the Electoral Mission. 
Through the use of this system the Nicaraguan Government and the 
Electoral Mission saved large sums over the cost of commercial mes- 
sages in traffic in the Eastern Area. It was computed that over the 
entire Guardia Nacional system, an average of 5,000 messages were 
handled monthly by radio, telegraph and telephone. 

A reconnaissance of the Northern Area communications system 
was made by Captain Smith from June 18 to July 9, 1931, and of the 
Central Area from September 19 to 30, 1931, and of the Central Area 
from September 19 to 30, 1931, resulting in improvements being made 
in various ways, such as adjustments to sets and aerials, changes in 
operating procedure, and new installations. 

On September 1, 1931, a radio training school was established at 
Managua. The students were twenty enlisted men picked from various 
stations, mostly with previous telegraphic experience. The course in- 
cluded code practice, clear and code transmission and reception, operat- 
ing procedure, simple electricity and theory of radio, radio nomenclature 
and installation, and practical work. An instruction pamphlet was 
written in English by Captain Smith and was translated into Spanish 
for the use of both students and regular operators. The course lasted 
eight months, at the end of which time fifteen of the original twenty 
were sufficiently well trained to be assigned to duty at outpost stations. 

93 



Their peiformance of duty, on the whole, exceeded expectations Some 
became is proficient as the Marine Corps enlisted personnel, and wSI 
entirely :ompetent to be placed in charge of isolated radio stIttonT 



94 



CHAPTER XI 
THE GUARDIA POLICE COMPANY, MANAGUA 

Prior to the establishment of the Guardia Nacional, the main- 
tenance of order in Managua was in the hands of civilian police, con- 
sisting of one (1) Director of Police, one (1) First Comandante of Police 
(Sub-Director), three (3) Comandantes of Police Stations, eight (8) In- 
spectors and sixty (60) Policemen. The Policemen were paid ^18.00 per 
month. 

On the 15th of March, 1928, these policemen were relieved by the 
Third Company, Guardia Nacional, which was organized for police 
duty in the city of Managua. The first Chief of Police was First Lieu- 
tenant Herbert S. Keimling, U. S. Marine Corps, who was appointed 
Comandante General de Policia on April 1, 1928. He was responsible 
to the division commander of Managua. 

Quarters were obtained in Momotomba Barracks, later the site of 
the Academia Militar de Nicaragua. As these quarters were on the 
eastern edge of the city, the police had to go into the city, a distance 
of sixteen blocks to the Police Station, when going on duty. This was 
necessary, as there were no other places available for quarters at the 
time. Later the police were quartered in the Police Station. 

As no records were avilable of the manner in which the old police 
force handled routine police matters, file cabinets had to be built, police 
blotters and index cards printed, and the whole system of operating a 
modern, efficient police station started. 

At this moment it would not be amiss to state what the final or- 
ganization became, for guidance in the future. Eventually, there were 
assigned to the police company seven (7) officers, all capable of speaking 
Spanish. One was the Chief of Police, one assistant to the Chief of 
Police, handling all administrative duties, one in charge of Traffic, one 
in charge of finger printing, photography, etc., and three on duty as desk 
officers. The latter three rotated as follows: twenty-four hours on duty 
as desk officer, handling all arrest cases, complaints, sending out reliefs, 
entries in the police blotter, index cards on all arrests and general super- 
vision of the jail. Twenty-four hours liberty followed next for the officer, 
and then the third day he acted as stand-by, visited posts in the city and 
handled outside investigations. In this way after losing touch with 
police affairs on his day of liberty, he became acquainted with all mat- 
ters before again doing his tour as desk officer. The Chief, his assistant, 
the finger print officer, and even the traffic officer, also worked on out- 
side cases. 

Fingerprinting was carried out in all cases of convictions, but photo- 
graphy was used only for criminal cases. Misdemeanor cases were not 
photographed, except for the more flagrant cases such as prostitution. 

Index cards were made on all persons arrested, record of the punish- 
ment, or acquittal, being entered when the case was settled. Thus, 
eventually, second, third and even up to sixteenth offenses began to 
appear against certain individuals. 

A regular police blotter was kept, showing person arrested, police- 
man making arrest, offense and final disposition of the case. 

To continue the chronological story of the police company. The 
city was divided into seventeen posts, making the smaller ones in the 

95 



center of the city, for better protection of the business houses, and the 
larger ones on the outskirts. Seventeen posts were all that could be 
handled with only sixty-five men in the company. A city the size of 
Managua, reputed to have 50,000 inhabitants, needed a far larger police 
force. Although it was never attained, a force of 1 50 men was the mini- 
mum estimated as necessary by practically all of the officers who were 
in charge. The seventeen posts so organized made the sm.allest post 
contain 30 city blocks, while the larger ones contained as high as 48. It 
is unnecessary to point out that one policeman cannot protect 30 blocks. 

Schools were immediately instituted to instruct the men in the 
police laws of the country, and were later used as a means to clarify 
points of law that were constantly arising. The change from the civilian 
policemen to Guardias was effected with no disturbance and as time 
passed on, the new police became far more efficient than the old had 
ever been. 

The original Guardia police system called for a small daytime force 
and a large night force, doubling almost all the posts during the dan- 
gerous hours. This was later discarded when the company became larger 
having been eventually increased by 30 Municipal Police. 

Difficulties immediately arose between the city officials and the 
Guardia police, but this was to be expected. It required a great deal 
of moral persuasion in the beginning to induce the police judge to give 
adequate punishment to offenders. Heretofore graft, friendship and 
influence had been the prime considerations and only those with no 
money, or no pull, had been punished. All officers encountered this 
tendency during their regimes, and only by careful scanning of each 
day's reports was the judge held in line. Much difficulty was also en- 
countered because policemen making arrests were often strongly pre- 
judiced for or against the defendent and permitted this prejudice to 
color their testimony. 

Later a lawyer was engaged as a secretary to the Chief of Police, 
who conducted the classes in police law, greatly improving the instruc- 
tion and efficiency of the police. He also advised the Chief of Police 
on all points of law, in addition to writing all letters in Spanish. 

The police at the outset were armed with rifles and carried whistles, 
but later this was changed to pistols, clubs and whistles. The services 
of the policemen immediately improved, as the rifle hampered more 
than it helped. 

In January, 1929, First Lieutenant Julian N. Frisbie, U.S.M.C., 
became Chief of Police, and during his time in office, the above change 
was made, that is, pistols and clubs instead of rifles. 

In April, 1930, Captain H. M. H. Fleming, U. S. Marine Corps, 
succeeded First Lieutenant Frisbie and it was at this time that Lieu- 
tenant Frisbie's scheme to enlarge the company bore fruit. Thirty men 
were enlisted as Policias Municipales under a one year contract. The 
regular Guardia were paid ^12.00 per month, with food, clothing and 
quarters furnished in addition. The Policia Municipales were paid 
,^18.00 per month, twelve for pay and six dollars for food. One outfit of 
clothing was given to the Policia Municipal each six months consisting 
of the following: 



96 



2 Shirts, khaki 1 Shoes, russet, pr. 

2 Scarfs, field 1 Hat, field 

2 Socks, prs. 

2 Trousers, khaki 

If the man ate in the Guardia mess he was obliged to give up his 
ration money, corresponding to his meals. This helped the mess and 
did no harm to the man. 

The men selected at first for duty as Municipal Policemen, were in 
16 cases discharged within three months, as they did not possess the 
necessary qualifications; but as regular Guardia were discharged, they 
were accepted in place of the other men, only men with excellent dis- 
charges being chosen. This rapidly improved the Municipal Police force. 

The force now consisted of 95 enlisted men. This number enabled 
the police to cover the 17 posts day and night, using one half of the 
men each day in six hour shifts, six on and six off. In addition a cor- 
Doral was turnkey in the police station, and assisted the desk officer, 
the sergeants of whom the company had three, stood duty as outside 
inspectors, on the same schedule as the desk officers. 

Due to the necessity of relieving men in the Northern and Central 
Areas who had completed their hill tours, the police company was 
heavily hit by the transfers in the Fall of 1930. This action was con- 
sidered necessary but seriously effected the efficiency of the police force. 
A trained policeman cannot be replaced by another man in less than 
three months. During this time the whole police force suffers. For this 
reason it is desirable that a police company for a large city should remain 
intact, except for such transfers as the Commanding Officer may recom- 
mend. There are, of course, times when a man should be transferred 
for the good of the force or for his own good. Among the replacements 
received for the policemen transferred, were men enlisted in the Central 
and Northern Areas, many of whom had never been in a large city. The 
training of this type as a city policeman was doubly difficult, as he did 
not understand his own people (city dwellers) and friction was constant. 
Furthermore, most of the men from the hills could not read or write. 
This is a necessary qualification of a policeman. 

On March 31, 1931, the city of Managua was badly shaken by an 
earthquake. In the ensuing confusion, the police company stood intact, 
losing only two men by desertion. Now the inadequacy of a force of 
100 men or less was demonstrated. Of course a force of 500 men would 
have been inadequate also, but practically all police functions in the 
center of the city were taken over by Marines, the police force being 
used in the important duty of guarding water tanks throughout the city, 
to supply the people with drinking water. 

In connection with the earthquake and the fire which followed, it 
may be well to state at this point that Managua had no fire protection, 
except 60 fire plugs. There was not even any hose. Both hose and a 
small chemical and pump truck had been requested time and again by 
the Chief of Police who volunteered to organize, as a part of the police 
force, a fire company. This request was turned down by the city officials 
because of lack of funds, with the result that there was no way to fight 

97 



the fire except by demolition and it burned steadily until sufficient 
buildings had been demolished to stop it. Thirty-three city blocks were 
burned over. 

The training of a fire company would have called for six addi- 
tional men — two truck drivers and four hosemen, doing duty day on 
and day off. The ordinary policemen off watch, could have acted as 
firemen when an alarm was sounded. 

Since the city treasury was bankrupted by the earthquake, the 
Policia Municipal had to be disbanded at this time. However, the 
Guardia Nacional helped the situation by increasing the force, tempor- 
arily, to 100 men. Within six months after the earthquake the city 
government allowed the enlisting of 24 Policias Municipales, thus per- 
mitting the company to drop back to its original strength of 65 of the 
regular Guardia. The men enlisted were all of the group that had for- 
merly been Municipales, so that no new recruits had to be trained. 
Matters from then on to the end of the American occupation continued 
without unusual incident. 

The attitude of the newspapers toward the police force was always 
antagonistic. Many times editors were requested to forward complaints 
that they had received to the Chief of Police, in order that they might 
be investigated before publishing; but this was rarely done. Articles 
were published without any attempt to verify the facts, the only re- 
quirement seeming to be that they should reflect discredit on the police. 

As far as the city government was concerned, the police fared very 
well. The chief reason for this was the fact that a basis of friendship 
was established between the Chiefs of Police and the three members of 
the National District, principally with Don Francisco Frixione, an ex- 
ceptionally patriotic and broad minded Nicaraguan citizen, and much 
friction was avoided through mutual understanding of each others prob- 
lems. 

The conditions existing between the police force and the officials 
of the National Government was maintained in the same manner, for 
some time, but the contact was not close enough to stand the strain in 
all instances, so that many cases of trouble arose. This is due entirely, 
it is believed, to the fact that the government officials thought that 
favors should be done for them and their friends because of their posi- 
tions. Failure to so act, caused them to become antagonistic toward the 
police force. 

The Police Judge was a member of the Executive branch of the 
governm.ent and amenable to the influence of the Chief of Police; but 
the criminal j udges as members of the j udiciary were beyond his influence . 
In one year out of 567 cases placed before the criminal judges, three 
convictions were made. At least 50% of these cases were convictable, 
but graft and inefficiency and unwillingness of the judiciary to cooperate 
with the Guardia accounted for these results. In this connection, all 
cases of arrests were carefully investigated by officers of the police force, 
before the person accused was sent before the criminal judges. 

To avoid graft when fines were awarded, the person so fined was 
not released until the fine was paid at the National Treasury and the 
receipt of payment received at the police station. 

98 



Prisoners arrested, convicted and given thirty days hard labor or 
less, were held at the police station and used for outside work. Those 
given a longer sentence were sent to the National Penitentiary or other 
designated prison. 

During the year 1930, the police took over the traffic situation, 
which heretofore had been a steady source of trouble. The issuing of 
the license plates, drivers permits, etc., were all handled by the traffic 
officer. In addition traffic signals were posted on all main intersections 
and one way streets were instituted. Considering the narrow streets 
and the blind corners which were everywhere prevalent, this measure 
was absolutely necessary. Traffic regulations written by Lieutenant 
Frisbie, embodying the principal features of the District of Columbia, 
Pennsylvania and California laws, were drawn up and printed. Every- 
one was supplied a copy on request. 

Captain Evans F. Carlson, G.N. (First Lieutenant, U.S.M.C.), 
relieved Captain Fleming as Chief of Police of Managua on 22 December, 
1931, and carried on in that capacity until the date of evacuation of 
American personnel from Nicaragua. 

In conclusion, it might be well to note, as far as enlisted men were 
concerned, the police force was excellent. Freed absolutely from outside 
influences, and backed by a judiciary that wanted to improve conditions, 
nothing would have been lacking. But this condition did not exist. 
Even though officially protected by Guardia Headquarters, officers and 
men of the police force of Managua were subject to many attempts at 
official persecution by the native government officials. 

The action of the judiciary was so uncertain that many serious 
cases were placed before the police judge and given thirty days, rather 
than give the criminal judge the opportunity of freeing them at once 
without any punishment. 

In the case of a future occupation of a country measures should be 
taken to prevent such conditions, going even to the extent of declaring 
martial law. Furthermore, the police force of a large city, particularly 
of the capital city, should not be disturbed by the transfer of its trained 
nersonnel to routine military duties. 



99 



CHAPTER XII 
DEPARTMENT OF CONSTRUCTION OF ROADS 

Through negotiations carried out between the State Department 
of the United States and the Government of Nicaragua, and at the spec- 
ial request of the President of the Republic, arrangements were made 
tor the organization of a Department of Construction of Roads, to be 
under the supervision of a commissioned officer of the Civil Engineer 
Corps of the U. S. Navy. This Department was organized in the Guardia 
Nacional on 23 August, 1929, under the supervision of Commander 
R. M. Warfield, (C.E.C.), U. S. Navy, who was appointed as a Colonel 
in the Guardia. Colonel Warfield was given the title of Director of this 
Department and he was furnished office space at Guardia Headquarters 
in Managua. The first move on the part of Colonel Warfield was to 
build up an organization of officers and men experienced in surveying 
and road building. As his chief assistant in charge of field operations, 
he obtained the services of Lieutenant Rufus C. Harding, (C.E.C.), U. 
S. Navy. Five enlisted men, who were Second Lieutenants in the Guar- 
dia Nacional, and who were found to have the necessary experience in 
the work to be performed, next joined this Department. All officers 
and men of the Navy and Marine Corps joining this Department for 
duty were paid out of funds allotted for the construction of roads by 
the Minister of Fomento (Public Works), of the Government of Nicara- 
gua, such funds being derived from a separate appropriation authorized 
by the Nicaraguan Congress, and the Director of this Department was 
directly accountable to the Minister of Fomento for all expenditures 
made. The main responsibility of the Guardia in this organization was 
to carry the American personnel attached thereto on the records of the 
Nicaraguan National Guard Detachment, and to furnsih protection at 
the various road construction camps outside of Managua. 

The main project was the construction of either all or as much as 
practicable of the road between Managua and Matagalpa, with minor 
repair projects on the road at Yali in the Department of Jinotega and 
the road from Villa Stimson to Teustepe in the Department of Chontales. 
A future large project was the construction of a road from Boaco in the 
Department of Chontales to Rama in the Department of Southern 
Bluefields, to open up a highway between the West and East Coasts of 
Nicaragua. 

Active work commenced in October, 1929, on the road from Villa 
Stimson (Tipitapa), to Matagalpa with a view of reconstructing this 
important road for unlimited motor vehicle traffic out of Managua to 
points in the rich and important agricultural section of Central and 
Northern Nicaragua. The main object was to place this road in condi- 
tion for continued traffic during the heavy rainy season. 

A complete survey of the projects to be worked on was made by 
Colonel Warfield with a view of determining the condition of the road 
and to ascertain just what parts of the road already in use between 
Villa Stimson and Matagalpa were the most in need of immediate re- 
construction. Nine sections running in length from 0.2 to 4.7 miles each 
were selected giving the department a total of 11.2 miles of new road for 
reconstruction. These sections of road were selected on the basis of the 
worst first, using November, 1929, as a basis. With approximately 



100 



^150,000 available for the work to be completed and a requirement of 
approximately ^500,000 for a completely reconstructed road between 
Villa Stimson and Matagalpa, it can readily be seen that the limited 
funds compelled a system of reconstruction to be adopted, whereby the 
nine worst sections, as previously mentioned, were the logical ones to 
work on to offset the possibility of the stoppage of funds for future 
complete reconstruction. Colonel Warfield in his final report submitted 
to the American Minister at Managua, giving his estimate of the work 
completed and to be completed within the ,^150,000 allowance, indicates 
that exclusive of the 11.2 miles of sectional repairs and permanent re- 
construction that would be made, his department would also complete 
repairs to or reconstruct approximately 36 small bridges and culverts. 
He further estimated that with future proper maintenance by the Nicara- 
guan Government the sections reconstructed should still be in good 
shape five years hence. 

In September, 1930, the minor reconstruction projects as outlined 
above were completed and in view of the Nicaraguan Congress failing 
to appropriate additional funds for continuance of road construction 
under the supervision of American officers, the Road Department of 
the Guardia was disbanded and all tools and other road equipment was 
transferred to the Department of Public Works of the Nicaraguan 
Government. 



101 



CHAPTER XIII 
THE NICARAGUAN NATIONAL MILITARY ACADEMY 

In the Guardia Agreement it was provided that the Government 
of the United States would detail qualified officers and men of the United 
States Marine Corps to establish a Nicaraguan Military Academy for 
the purpose of training Nicaraguan officers for service with the Guardia 
Nacional. These Nicaraguan graduate officers would gradually replace 
the officers and men of the United States Marine Corps serving with 
the Guardia, so that eventually the entire officer personnel of that 
organization would be Nicaraguan. 

With this mission, the Nicaraguan Military Academy was formally 
inaugurated on 1 April, 1930, in the buildings and grounds known as 
Momotombo, and located on the northeastern outskirts of Managua 
overlooking Lake Managua. The staff was composed of the following 
officers and men : 

1st Lieut. Edward J. Trumble, G.N. (2nd Lt.USMC) Director. 

1st Lieut. Francis J. Cunningham, GN. (2nd Lt.USMC) Sub- 
Director. 

2nd Lieut. Nicholas M. Grieco, G.N. (Gy-Sgt.USMC) 

The problems confronting the staff were many and varied. There 
were no text books in Spanish, there was no precedent on which to set 
a course, there was little or no money with which to operate, and there 
was no Aladdin's lamp to rub and summon the helpful genii. However, 
among the staff and corps of cadets there were enthusiastic and willing 
workers, and within a few days buildings were repaired, orders formu- 
lated, classes started, and the work of translating military textbooks 
into Spanish was begun. New ideals of discipline, orderliness and con- 
certed action arose and became firmly embedded. All regulations and 
activities of the Military Academy were based on similar regulations 
and activities of the United States Naval Academy. 

The first class of cadets was made up of nine worthy noncommis- 
sioned officers of the Guardia Nacional who had been specially recom- 
mended by their immediate commanding officers, and selected by a 
board of officers at Guardia Headquarters. From the very beginning 
particular stress was laid on the fact that in selecting candidates for 
admission to the Academy the political affiliations of the candidate bore 
no weight whatsoever. 

The curriculum was designed to cover a period of eight months 
theory and practice at the Military Academy and one month of practical 
experience in the field in active operations against bandits. The eight 
months course of instruction was divided into five departments, which 
covered the following subjects: 

1. Military Science and Tactics. 

2. Administration. 

3. Laws and Regulations. 

4. Infantry weapons. 

5. Military engineering. 

In addition certain academic subjects were included in the curricu- 
lum, such as Elementary Mathematics, Geography of Nicaragua, His- 
tory of Nicaragua, Composition, Customs and Traditions, Relations with 
Civilians and Diplomatic Ceremonies. 

102 



The staff of the Military Academy and the Corps of Cadets were 
subject to call for active field service against armed bandits at any time 
after the first three weeks of preliminary preparation and training. They 
were in fact a reserve for the fighting forces and were called out several 
times when the bandits were operating on a large scale. 

On June 22, 1930, after two and one half months of instruction and 
study, the first class of nine cadets was graduated as the result of a 
national emergency then existing in the Northern and Central Areas. 
The following morning at 7:00 A.M., the newly commissioned officers 
were on their way to the scenes of combat. 

The period from 22 June, 1930 to 19 November, 1930, was utilized 
in translating and printing Spanish Military textbooks, in constructing 
buildings to accommodate a larger class, and in the selection of the 
members of the new class. The second class when it entered on 19 
November, 1930, presented new problems. It was a heterogeneous col- 
lection of thirty-seven; four were officer students who had been com- 
missioned in November, 1929 prior to the establishment of the Military 
Academy, fifteen were noncommissioned officers from the Guardia, and 
eighteen were selected from civil life. There were ninety-seven appli- 
cants for admission. Selections were made by a board composed of the 
staff of the Military Academy in accordance with the recommendations 
of the Area and Department Commanders, who had first interviewed 
and looked into the qualifications of all candidates from their Departments 
or Areas. The list of selections was then submitted to the Jefe Director, 
and by him to the President of the Republic for final approval. This 
group progressed much more rapidly in its studies than the first class, 
due to the fact that more translations of textbooks were available, and 
the staff had improved through experience and preparation. An addi- 
tional officer, Subteniente Humberto Castillo Q., Guardia Nacional de 
Nicaragua, was added to the staff at this time. 

The members of the second class carried on their studies at the 
Academy until 2 January, 1931, on which date the entire staff and the 
Corps of Cadets were ordered as a special punitive patrol against the 
bandit groups participating in the disasterous Achuapa ambush for a 
period of one month. 

The spirit demonstrated during the month of field service was ad- 
mirable. The weaklings were discovered and weeded out, allowed to 
resign from the Academy. Those who survived the acid test were good 
soldiers, with the same spirit that keeps Marines on their feet when they 
want to drop. Exceptional marches were made, the hardships of cam- 
paign were endured and one contact was made with a bandit group 
during these days of active operations. On 5 February, 1931, the staff 
and the Corps of Cadets returned to the Military Academy to resume 
their studies. 

Rapid progress was noted following the period of active service until 
the disasterous earthquake at Managua on 3 1 March, 1931. Following 
this catastrophe, the officers and cadets worked hard and tirelessly in 
caring for the sick and injured, maintaining order in the northeastern 
section of the city, providing food and shelter for the unfortunate, and 
in general striving to better the horrible conditions that followed the 
disaster. Subtentiete Humberto Castillo Q., G.N. de N., a member of 
the Academy staff, died on 4 April, 1931, as a result of injuries received 

103 



while assisting the victims of the earthquake. Two members of the 
staff and four cadets, were awarded the highest decoration of the Nicara- 
guan Government, the Presidential Medal of Merit, for services ren- 
dered during and immediately following the earthquake. 

The earthquake was a severe blow to all of Nicaragua, since it 
paralized the principal city, which was also the seat of government. 
At one time it seemed that it would be a fatal blow to the Nicaraguan 
Military Academy. There had been little money for its maintenance 
since its beginning, the pay of cadets had been reduced from fifty dollars 
a month for the first class to eighteen dollars a month for the second 
class, and there seemed for a time to be little prospect of its continuance. 
However, in its short period of existence it had gained a firm hold on 
the hearts of the people and had the support of the press and the Govern- 
ment of the country. As a consequence, the Jefe Director was able to 
secure an appropriation of ,^3,200 monthly for its continuance. Out of 
these appropriations funds were obtained for the restoration of the build- 
ings destroyed by the earthquake and the construction of new quarters 
to provide for a class of seventy-five cadets in July, 1931. 

After the earthquake, the studies of the cadets were resumed, and 
on 1 June, 1931, twenty-eight cadets of the thirty-seven who entered 
were graduated and commissioned as Second Lieutenants. 

Immediately following the graduation of the second class of cadets, 
work of selecting the members of the third class was begun. Meanwhile, 
the popularity of the Military Academy had spread throughout the 
land. There were two hundred and ninety-seven candidates for admis- 
sion. Every area, department and district in the Republic was repre- 
sented. 

The requirements for entrance, besides a strict physical examination 
included the following: 

Age 20 to 35 Years. 

Nationality Nicaraguan, (born or naturalized) 

Height 5'V. 

Weight ..135 lb. 

Recommendations.. ..Two from well known Nicaraguans or foreign 
citizens living in Nicaragua. Also a confiden- 
tial report and recommendation on the part of 
the Area, Department or District Commander, 
following a personal interview with the candi- 
date. 

Education Competitive examinations formulated in ac- 
cordance with the requirements for the Secun- 
daria (the equivalent to two years in high 
school) as outlined in the Plan de Esiudios of 
the Minister of Public Instruction. 

Examinations were held at all Area and Department Headquarters 
on the same dates, under the supervision of commissioned officers of the 
Guardia, and all papers sent to Managua for marking by a central board 
whose recommendations were submitted to the Jefe Director and by 
him to the President of Nicaragua for final approval. 

During the time that candidates for the third class were being 
selected the work of rebuilding and construction of new quarters at the 
Academy was rushed in order that all would be prepared for the arrival 

104 



of the first contingent of cadets on 1 July. This class of seventy-five 
cadets reported for duty in groups by Departments as sufficient space 
was made available for their accommodation. The last group arrived 
on 15 July, 1931. Nineteen members were noncommissioned officers of 
the Guardia Nacional, and the remainder were selected from civil life. 
The majority of the civilians were college and university students. The 
pay of cadets was maintained at eighteen dollars per month, which ex- 
cluded the probability of any young men entering the class for purely 
monetary reasons, especially since each cadet was required to deposit 
five dollars each month during the entire course in order to partially 
defray the expenses of equipment and uniforms upon graduation. The 
staff of the Military Academy during the third academic term was com- 
posed of the following officers: 

Captain Edward J. Trumble, (1st Lieut. USMC), Director. 
Captain Francis J. Cunningham (1st Lieut. USMC), Sub-Director. 
1st Lieutenant John H. Coffman (2nd Lieut. USMC), Quartermaster. 
1st Lieutenant James H. Satterfield (Gy-Sgt. USMC), Instructor. 
1st Lieutenant Robert Colsky (Gy-Sgt., USMC), Instructor. 
Teniente Manual Gomez F., Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua. 
Subteniente Salvador Rizo, Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua. 

The third class was under instruction at the Academy from 1 5 July, 
to 6 October, 193 1 . On 7 October, the entire Corps of Cadets was trans- 
ferred to the Marine Corps rifle range for small arms and infantry wea- 
pons instruction. Upon the completion of this practical range work on 
29 October, the cadets were returned to the Academy and outfitted and 
prepared for active field service. On 2 November, 1931, the entire or- 
ganization moved into the field in the Southern Area for field training 
in preparation prior to campaign service against the bandits. On 19 and 
20 November, all officers and cadets were transferred to the Department 
of Esteli by planes to assist in operations against strong bandit groups 
that were menacing the Departments of Esteli, Leon and Chinandega. 
During these operations the cadets took part in four combats; Mayo- 
cunda, Ceniceras, Las Pozas and Guadaloupe ; and were given practical 
instruction in the duties of Post and District Commander in El Sauce 
and Villa Nueva. In addition, they trained a corps of eighty Auxiliares 
in these two posts. On 13 January, 1932, the Corps of Cadets was con- 
centrated at El Sauce and returned to Managua by Marine Corps planes. 

On 7 April, 1932, fifty-nine cadets of the original seventy-five who 
entered the third class were found qualified, graduated and commissioned 
as Acting Second Lieutenants. 

On March 23, 24 and 25, 1932, physical and competitive mental 
examinations were held in all Areas, Department and District Head- 
quarters of the Republic. There were three hundred and forty-eight 
applicants; of these, ninety-eight failed to qualify physically, failed to 
report for examination, or otherwise failed to comply with the entrance 
requirements. Two hundred and twenty-one applicants completed all 
of the physical and competitive mental examinations, which were so 
syncronized as to take place in all parts of the Republic at the same time. 

From those completing the competitive examinations, eighty cadets 
were selected in accordance with the percentage obtained by them in the 
examinations. They assembled at the Academy on 27 April and began 
their course on 1 May, 1932. This class received the same course of 

105 



instruction given the previous class, including practical work on the 
rifle range with infantry weapons, and two weeks of field service in 
northern Leon and Estili. 

Due to the necessity of replacing the American officers of the Guar- 
dia, the fourth class of cadets was graduated on 1 December, 1932, after 
seven months of instruction, when seventy-three cadets received their 
commissions as Acting Seconds Lieutenants. 

As shown by the increasing number of applicants the Military Aca- 
demy gained rapidly in popularity and was on its way to become an 
important institution in Nicaraguan national affairs. Before turning 
over the Guardia to Nicaraguan control, a complete set of texts was 
prepared in the Spanish language, and schedules were made for not 
only the next years course, but for the continuance of the Academy as a 
National Military School, offering a four years course of instruction. 
All of which were turned over to the Nicaraguan officers who succeeded 
to the command of the Guardia. 

The success of the Military Academy was clearly demonstrated by 
the ability of the graduates to perform their duties both in the field and 
in garrison. The standard of service rendered by the officers who re- 
ceived their commissions through the Academy was surprisingly high, 
and was a source of the greatest satisfaction to the Jefe Director 
other American officers serving with the Guardia 



106 



CHAPTER XIV. 
THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD 

Upon the assumption of the Presidency by General Jose Maria 
Moncada on January 1, 1929, a special guard was furnished him at the 
Presidential House for his personal protection. 

On March 15, 1929, this guard was organized into the Division of 
the Presidential Guard, and the detachment was known as the 16th 
Company. It consisted of three of^cers and seventy-five enlisted men. 
Of the officers, two were Aides de camp to the President, and were 
commissioned Marine Corps officers, the senior being assigned the duty 
of supervising the activities of the Guard in addition to his other duties. 
The junior officer was an especially selected Marine Corps non-com- 
missioned officer, with the rank of Lieutenant, Guardia Nacional, and 
was in active charge, being responsible for the administration, instruc- 
tion, discipline, etc., of the organization. 

The enlisted personnel were carefully chosen with a view of having 
the Guard composed only of men of established Liberal tendency prior 
to joining the Guardia, including personal friends of the President and 
his intimates, and men who had served with the Liberal forces during 
the recently ended revolution. From the standpoint of the personal 
safety of the President, it is natural that this should have been done, as 
it was not known, at that time, whether the enlisted personnel of the 
Guardia who had formerly been Conservatives, would be loyal and 
above the suspicion of treachery. 

Immediately after the organization of the Presidential Guard no 
effort was spared to make it an efficient, well-drilled and thoroughly 
military organization. The men were provided new and well-fitting 
clothing and, in so far as practicable, new equipment, and were taught 
and required to keep their appearance at all times in the best possible 
state. The barrels and other metal parts of rifles were emery-papered 
and burnished to the brilliance of nickle or chromium plate, and all 
metal parts of cartridge belts and other equipment, and uniform orna- 
ments, were polished. In 193 1 a special blue-grey uniform was adopted 
for the Guard, and it materially improved its appearance and added to 
the esprit de corps of the organization. 

Much attention was given to close order drill in order to instill 
discipline, smartness and prompt obedience, and, in conjunction with 
other Guardia troops stationed in Managua, numerous parades and 
other ceremonies were participated in. The separate quarters located in 
the rear of the Presidential House, were made adequate and comfortable, 
and always kept in the best condition as to cleanliness and sanitation. 

During the summer of 1930, the Presidential Palace on Loma de 
Tiscapa was completed, and the President took possession of it. The 
Guard was moved at the same time to its quarters in the rear of the 
Palace. This barracks, and a wing of the Palace, were destroyed during 
the violent earthquake on March 31, 1931, after which the President 
together with his Guard, removed to a building in the city of Managua. 
Later when the Palace was renovated, a new and very adequate barracks 
building was erected for the use of the Presidential Guard. 

107 



An out of town residence was maintained by the President at the 
Laguna, near Masatepe, where he spent considerable time. A detach- 
ment of one officer and ten men was kept at this place at all times, and 
was augmented whenever the President was actually present. 

Besides maintaining guards around the living quarters of the Presi- 
dent, detachments of the Presidential Guard accompanied him on all 
trips made by him to various parts of the Republic. In Managua, when 
using the Presidential automobiles, he was always accompanied by a 
number of well-armed members of the Guard. 

So well were these duties performed that although political assas- 
sinations occurred in other parts of the country, and there was an ever- 
present danger of an attempt on the life of the President, no untoward 
incident occurred during his incumbency in office. 



108 



CHAPTER XV 
MUTINIES 
Section 1 — General 

During the five years and seven months regime of Marine Corps 
control of the Guardia, there occurred ten instances of actual mutiny 
or events which could be construed as mutinous. All of these were local 
in character, having no connection with other stations, and, with the 
exception of the mutinies at Somotillo in January, 1928; at Somoto on 
Decem.ber 8, 1930; and at Quilali on April 11, 1932, in each of which 
bandit influence was manifest, can be attributed to internal factors at 
the particular station or place involved. 

In only five instances can it be said with certainty that careful plans 
had been evolved more than one day before the actual occurrences, i.e., 
the mutinies at Somotillo, at Telpaneca on October, 6, 1929 and again 
on October 21, 1929, at Somoto and at Quilali. In one case, that of 
Jicaro on April 18, 1930, which was a one-man affair, the plans were 
evidently made that same day. The other instances appear to have 
been spontaneous, without prior planning, and carried out in the heat 
of passion or of excitement. 

In addition to the ten cases above mentioned, there were a number 
of other instances of near-mutiny, which were prevented from develop- 
ing to serious proportions by prompt discovery and proper action on the 
part of the officers. These were based usually on some fancied wrong or 
series of grievances, which directly or indirectly as the case may be, 
brought on a display of passion and insubordinate conduct on the part 
of certain enlisted men, whose racial characteristics and ignorance were 
the primary cause of their actions, and, by the same token, enabled them 
as quickly to forget their troubles and to serve the Guardia faithfully 
thereafter. 

As a result of the ten instances cited, which will be briefly described 
in continuation, seven offtcers, two of whom were commissioned Marine 
Corps officers, and the balance Marine Corps enlisted men, lost their 
lives, two officers were captured and were to have been killed by their 
captors but escaped, and large quantities of government property, in- 
cluding machine guns, automatic weapons, rifles, grenades, ammunition 
and other supplies were lost. In a few instances substantial losses of 
money and property were incurred by the civilian population in the 
towns where a mutiny occurred in the garrison, when the mutineers 
sacked stores and private residences before leaving the vicinity. 

It should be noted that with the exception of the occurrence in 
Managua on April 4, 1931, wherein a special situation was involved, 
and which will be described later, all of the mutinies took place in the 
bandit-infested, isolated sections of the country, where routine service 
was extremely arduous and where little or no recreation afforded the 
necessary outlet for the surplus energies of naturally emotional and 
easily excitable men of slight military experience and discipline. 

109 



Section 2 — Somotillo 

Shortly after noon on January 8, 1928, the first revolt of the newly 
organized Guardia took place, when a portion of the garrison at Somo- 
tillo, Northern Chinandega, an isolated station about seventy miles 
from the railroad and near the Honduran border, mutinied. Nine en- 
listed men and a number of local civilians were involved, while the bal- 
ance of the command, some half a dozen men, remained loyal, but being 
taken by surprise and unable to coordinate their movements in defense 
of either the station or the officers, they scattered and remained in hiding 
until after the mutiny had ceased. 

The leader of the revolt, Corporal Manuel Chaverri, named himself 
a general, and a private as his colonel. It was unquestionably a well- 
planned movement and the result of a conspiracy between the leaders 
and civilian bandit sympathizers. Two groups of these civilians had 
been organized, one at Somotillo to assist the mutineering Guardias to 
kill the officers, loot the barracks and town, and carry off the arms and 
ammunition, and the other at Villa Nueva, a town some nine miles to the 
eastward. It had been planned that the latter group would join the 
former upon its arrival in Villa Nueva, and that the combined forces 
would then proceed to join the bandits in Nueva Segovia. 

The outbreak occurred as the three Guardia* officers were returning 
to the barracks from their noon meal. At this time a machine gun was 
so placed that it could be fired directly down the main street, over which 
the officers approached, and riflemen were stationed at various points 
in the vicinity of the barracks, particularly in the rear patio, which was 
large and connected with the back yards of other buildings in the same 
quadrangle, and also afforded some degree of shelter. 

Initial firing upon them as they neared the barracks \\as assumed 
by the officers to be a bandit attack, and they continued on. The Com- 
manding Officer, Second Lieutenant George H. Adams, G.N. (Corporal, 
USMC), reached the barracks, saw civilians outside arm^ed with rifles 
whom he took to be bandits, and three guardias inside whom he told 
to get out and join the fight, before he discovered and comprehended the 
nature of the heavy fire directed against him and the other officers; 
whereupon all retired down the main street to the Marine Barracks, 
where two Marines were stationed. 

From this point a fire fight was engaged in between the three guar- 
dia officers and two marines on one side, and the mutineers on the other, 
without apparent effect. The firing at this time was badly directed and 
ineffective on both sides. The mutineers began to assume offensive 
tactics, and when they made a circling movement towards the Marine 
Barracks, the five North Americans retreated to the Somotillo River, 
to the south of town, and here became separated. One Guardia officer 
and a loyal enlisted guardia whom he encountered, proceeded to Villa 
Nueva to communicate by telegraph with the Division Commander at 
Chinandega. The other two Guardia officers, one of whom was an en- 
listed man of the Navy Medical Corps, the two marines and one loyal 
guardia whom they met on the trail, took up a defensive position on a 
small hill on the south bank of the river, along the trail between Somo- 
tillo and Villa Nueva, believing that the mutinous group would pass that 

110 



way. This proved to be sound course and was a most fortunate decision, 
as it was the enabling factor in a decisive engagement that was fought 
later in the afternoon, in which the two leaders were killed, with the 
resultant failure of the balance of the plot. 

Following their lack of success in the attack on the Guardia officers 
and marines in the town, the mutineers turned their efforts to looting, 
and took all arms, including automatic weapons and a machine gun, 
ammunition and clothing, including officers' effects, that were on hand 
at the barracks, looted some of the stores and private residences in the 
town, and proceeded toward Villa Nueva. 

About 4:00 p.m., they approached the hill, occupied as before 
stated, and attacked the position, rushing up the slope in the face of 
rifle and pistol fire from the defenders. The latter remained cool and 
aimed carefully, with the result that the two leaders, one other guardia 
mutineer and one accompanying civilian, Were killed, and another 
guardia mutineer so severely wounded that he died the next day. This 
engagement brought about the total demoraliaztion of the balance of the 
group, and they scattered towards the frontier, and failed to reach Villa 
Nueva where the other group of civilians was awaiting their arrival. 

It was a good example of the value of training and practice on the 
rifle range and proper aiming and use of the sights, enabling a small, 
poorly-armed, but well-trained group to inflict substantial loss and de- 
moralization upon a much larger force armed with automatic weapons, 
but which lacked the training essential to good marksmanship. 
Section 3 — Telpaneca (First) 

At about 2:00 a.m., on October 6, 1929, Second Lieutenant Lewis 
H. Trogler, G.N. (Sergeant, USMC), Commanding Officer of the Guar- 
dia Nacional garrison at Telpaneca, Nueva Segovia, was shot to death 
in the town of Telpaneca by mutinous members of his command. The 
mutiny had been carefully planned and involved the entire garrison, 
although some were unwilling participants. 

A written agreement had been drawn up by First Sergenat Fer- 
nando Larios, hijo, as leader, and five others, and signed by them on 
October 3rd, providing that Lieutenant Trogler, who was the only 
officer then serving in Telpaneca, was to be killed, and, as circumstances 
permitted, all other North American officers, as a sign of their opposition 
to the "American occupation" of Nicaraguan territory. All other mem- 
bers of the garrison of twenty-three enlisted, signed the document, 
either voluntarily, or through fear for their personal safety if they re- 
fused. In each case a seal was placed opposite the signature, made from 
the blood of the respective individual, obtained by cutting and squeezing 
his thumb. Some of these signers had not read the document and had 
no knowledge as to its contents. 

It appears that First Sergeant Larios, and one of the other con- 
spirators who was a corporal, had been recommended for reduction by 
Lieutenant Trogler, and that both knew of this. Larios was undoubtedly 
the prime mover, and there is a strong probability that he was actuated 
also by other personal and political motives. He had been a Conserva- 
tive prior to joining the Guardia, and his father Fernando Larios, padre, 
a leader of the Conservative element, had been exiled only shortly there- 
tofore by the Liberal Government. His antipathy for North Americans 

111 



had not been revealed previously, but became apparent by his actions 
during the signing of the pact of blood and during the subsequent mu- 
tiny. It was related by witnesses that he gleefully viewed the body of 
Lieutenant Trcgler, and that he refused permission to civilians who 
desired to hold a wake over it. Several letters were found in the posses- 
sion of Larios which boldly stated his hatred of foreigners. 

There was dissatisfaction among some of the enlisted members of 
the comm^and over a dance given by Lieutenant Trogler for the civilian 
population of Telpaneca on the night of October 5th. No Guardia was 
invited, and it has been said that Lieutenant Trogler had stated that 
the guardias were of a lower social status than his intended guests, and 
that on this account he had not invited them to participate. Some were 
disgruntled because they had been sent by Lieutenant Trogler to carry 
chairs from other houses to the scene of the party, and they believed 
that they should not have been so employed : that in so doing they were 
being utilized in the capacity of servants. A concerted effort was made 
by various guardias to induce the civilians not to attend the fiesta, 
intimating that some untoward event might occur there. 

It was planned by the mutineers to simulate a bandit attack and 
to kill Lieutenant Trogler as he was returning to his quarters from the 
fiesta. To make it appear true in case of an investigation, men were 
stationed at various points throughout the town, with orders to open 
fire when they heard firing going on. That afternoon a civilian agent of 
First Sergeant Larios reported to Lieutenant Trogler, in accordance with 
Lario's instructions that a bandit attack on the town would take place 
that night. It does not appear that Lieutenant Trogler took any extra- 
ordinary precautions that night as to the security of the town. 

Because of the fact that he returned from the dance at about 1:30 
a.m., in company with a prominent civilian. Lieutenant Trogler was not 
fired upon at that time. However, soon after reaching his quarters the 
simulated attack commenced, and weapons were trained and fired upon 
the doorway of the officers' quarters, through which Lieutenant Trogler 
emerged and safely ran across the street to the barracks. He then started 
in the direction of the church plaza where some of the defensive works 
were located, doubtless with the intention of directing the defense, when 
he was struck and killed. 

Throughout the balance of the night sporadic firing took place, but 
it has been definitely established that no bandits attacked Telpaneca 
that night, and that the simulation of an attack was planned and carried 
out as a smoke-screen to hide the real purpose of the mutineers, the 
killing of Lieutenant Trogler. Having accomplished this object, no 
attempts were made to loot or to commit other violence, and no one of 
the command deserted. 

Proof of the complicity of First Sergeant Larios in the plot to 
mutiny was lacking at the time, but a strong suspicion rested upon him, 
and he was soon transferred to Ocotal, the Area Headquarters station. 
He was relieved by Sergeant Adrian Salinas, but his influence was to be 
felt within a short time in a second mutiny at Telpaneca. He was later 
tried before a general court-martial and convicted, when the investiga- 
tion of the Second Telpaneca mutiny brought to light the facts as to the 
first. 

112 



Section 4 — Telpaneca (Second) 

Following the death of Lieutenant Trogler, Second Lieutenant 
Charles J. Levonski, G.N. (Sergeant, U.S.M.C), was assigned to duty 
as Commanding Officer, Guardia Nacional, at Telpaneca, and assumed 
comimand. He was a capable, energetic and likeable officer, and the 
morale of the command seemed to improve. For two weeks he observed 
nothing which indicated to him that the men would not remain loyal. 

Rumors were received from Ocotal by the men to the effect that 
First Sergeant Larios had been executed as a punishment for his part 
in the mutiny of October 6th. This was untrue but was believed by some 
of them. A newspaper published in Managua, La Prerisa, at this time 
carried an article on the subject of the infliction of the death penalty 
upon members of the Guardia Nacional guilty of certain acts, and was 
read and discussed in Telpaneca. It should be remembered that prac- 
tically the entire command at this station remained unchanged, and 
that they had just recently participated in a mutiny following the sign- 
ing of the Larios Pact of Blood, and had treacherously murdered their 
Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Trogler. Unrest and a feeling of ap- 
prehension lest they be discovered and awarded the death penalty, 
filled the minds of the men. 

A fatal error was made in not relieving at least fifty percent of the 
command and replacing them with other men of known integrity, im- 
mediately after the death of Lieutenant Trogler, as a matter of precau- 
tion if for no other reason, and especially as, even at that time, the cir- 
cumstances surrounding the affair, with its "bandit attack" which every- 
one doubted, and other inconsistencies that pointed to mutiny, were 
sufficiently evident to warrant such action, particularly when one con- 
siders the isolated location of Telpaneca in the mountains, the lack of 
communications and the impossibility of bringing prompt relief in case 
of necessity. It was not until October 20th that a patrol under command 
of Second Lieutenant James C. Rimes (Sergeant, U.S.M.C), arrived at 
Telpaneca via Palacaguina with ten replacements for the station. The 
patrol was composed of seventeen enlisted, all but two of whom were 
recruits. 

The rumors of the execution of First Sergeant Larios and discussion 
of the newspaper article on the death penalty, brought to the minds of 
enlisted men and civilians in Telpaneca the thought, which soon became 
a thoroughly believed conviction, that the ten men ordered replaced 
and transferred were going to Ocotal to be executed for their part in the 
recent mutiny. 

It was established later that one of the members of Lieutenant 
Rimes' patrol carried a letter from First Sergeant Larios in Ocotal to 
Sergeant Salinas, who had relieved him as Acting First Sergeant at 
Telpaneca, and who had previously served with him, and was a good 
friend of his. This letter was not recovered, but it is known that Salinas 
announced to various of his men, following the second Telpaneca mu- 
tiny, that Larios would join the column of mutineers on the trail near 
Santo Domingo, between Telpaneca and San Juan de Telpaneca, and 
that Salinas and his group waited for him at this point until it became 
evident to them that he was not going to arrive. 

113 



It is highly probable that Lario's letter also contained plans, or 
suggestions, for another mutiny of the garrison at Telpaneca, and it 
may have been he who suggested the idea of the intended execution of 
the ten men being transferred, in order to induce Salinas and the others 
to carry out his plans for this mutiny, a continuation of his pact of blood 
scheme to kill North American officers and to demonstrate opposition 
to the presence of these officers in Nicaragua. 

At any rate Sergeant Salinas, who theretofore had been a mild man- 
nered company clerk, seemingly trustworthy and incapable of becoming 
the leader of a revolt (he had been Captain Burwell's sole body-guard on 
numerous pay trips earlier that year to the outlying stations of the De- 
partment of Managua and Carazo), held a meeting of various members 
of the command at about 12:30 a.m., October 21st, and formulated 
plans for a mutiny. Salinas named himiself as a colonel. 

At 6:50 a.m., that same morning while Lieutenants Levonski and 
Rimes were about to have breakfast, they were surprised by six armed 
guardias, three having entered the house via the front door and three 
from the rear. Lieutenant Rimes was not armed; Lieutenant Levonski 
was disarmed, and both were taken prisoner, marched to the Guardia 
brig and confined. Expostulations on the part of the officers were si- 
lenced with threats of immediate death if they continued talking. 

Lieutenant Rimes had intended clearing for Ocotal with his patrol 
at 7:30 a.m., had given the necessary orders for the movement, and, be- 
fore going to breakfast, had noted that the men were getting themselves 
and the animals ready. These men knew nothing about the plans of the 
mutineers, and were as much surprised at the events which transpired 
as the two officers. Some attempted to leave town, but were appre- 
hended, and all were forced, through fear of death, to stand watches and 
to accompany the group when they cleared town later in the day. 

The mutineers at once placed sentinels over all trails leading out 
of town, also machine guns, destroyed the radio set and threw it into the 
river, and ordered the inhabitants to close their doors and not to leave 
their homes. Groups then looted the principal stores and private resi- 
dences for money and merchandise, and secured animals upon which to 
carry their stolen goods. Guardia Nacional funds, and the cash, clothing 
and jewelry of the officers was taken, and all Guardia property, including 
machine guns, automatic w^eapons, grenades, ammunition, etc., was 
gathered together to be taken along. The services of various male civil- 
ians were impressed for the loading of the pack animals, and later for 
help in the crossing of the Rio Coco just below town, in boats. 

About noon two Marine Corps planes passed over Telpaneca and 
one made a drop of official and personal correspondence. The aviation 
panels at the station had been permanently laid out, and one of the 
mutineers, dressed in Lieutenant Rimes' uniform, recovered the drop, 
so that there was nothing apparent to the pilots that anything irregular 
was going on. 

During the entire day the two officers remained in confinement, 
without food and hourly expecting to be taken out and shot. A record 
of events and some of their thoughts, written by them, was later found 
on the cell wall. 



114 



About 5:00 p.m., the officers were removed from confinement, and 
taken, with hands tied and lead-rope around their necks, to the river. 
They were accompanied by all members of the mutinous group, includ- 
ing both the regular garrison and Lieutenant Rimes' patrol, the cargo 
and animals. At this time they begged the mutineers to shoot them at 
once, for they feared torture. The crossing of the river was completed 
at about 7:00 p.m., and many bulky articles were left behind at this 
point, due either to haste and lack of direction or to insufficient animal 
transportation. However, all machine guns, automatic weapons and 
ammunition were taken. 

The column continued the march all night, and at daybreak arrived 
at the Polanco ranch near Santo Domingo Valley. A number of the men 
who did not wish to accompany the mutineers were able to escape during 
the night, and did so. The following day others deserted the column as 
the opportunity presented itself. Lieutenant Levonski and Rimes were 
told by Salinas that they were going to be killed. Salinas, however, was 
courteous at all times, stood at attention when addressing them, and 
shared his food and drink with them. 

One of the men agreed to assist the officers to escape, but lost heart 
and disappeared from the column alone. Later, about 8 :00 p.m., Levon- 
ski and Rimes found a favorable moment when an accident to a cargo 
caused a halt and a separation of the force into two groups. They escaped 
and rushed precipitously up a side trail and into the brush, becoming 
separated almost immediately. Levonski sprained his ankle, but both 
encountered some of the loyal men, and with them returned to Telpan- 
eca, Rimes arriving first. 

Practically all of the personnel of Lieutenant Rimes' patrol, and a 
few of the original Telpaneca garrison, reported in either at Telpaneca 
or at Palacaguina. The balance continued on and made their way to 
Honduras, where the arms and ammunition were confiscated, and the 
men jailed temporarily. They were not returned to Nicaragua. 

Section 5 — Paso Real, Jinotega 

Captain Edward Selby, G.N. (First Lieutenat, U.S.M.C.), was 
killed at Paso Real, Department of Jinotega, at about 9:00 p.m., March 
9, 1930, by rifle shots fired by a Guardia sentinel. 

At the time. Captain Selby was in command of a Guardia patrol 
operating out of the city of Jinotega, and had camped for the night near 
Paso Real. Shortly before his death he set out, in company with a 
Lieutenant (Marine Corps noncommissioned officer), to inspect the 
security of the corral gate where the animals had been placed for the 
night. Apparently he committed a grave error in not notifying members 
of the guard, and especially the sentinels on post, that the officers in- 
tended going beyond the limits of the camp and outside the line of 
sentinels. Particularly was this true in view of his own defective hearing 
and the fact that the patrol was, at the time, in a bandit-infested region. 

Instructions had been issued by Captain Selby to the members of 
the patrol that when posted as sentinels, before firing at a suspicious 
object or noise, they should challenge and fire three shots in the air. 



115 



This order was disregarded by the sentinel on post at the time the offi- 
cers made their inspection of the corral gate, and while they were return- 
ing to camp he fired upon them at a range of about fifty-two yards, no 
challenge or warning shots having been made. Captain Selby was struck 
and instantly killed. 

The sentinel in question had absented himself prior to the departure 
of the patrol from Jinotega in order to avoid accompanying it, and re- 
ported in only when he thought the patrol had gone too far for him to be 
ordered to join it. To escape punishment, however, he agreed to proceed 
to join the patrol, and did so. These incidents do not appear to have had 
any relation to the firing upon the two officers, but are stated to show 
the character of the individual. An investigation of the affair showed an 
apparent lack of premeditation on the part of the sentinel. He was an 
illiterate native-Nicaraguan of limited military training and experience, 
and under the circumstances would likely have been under a nervous 
tension, and, believing that bandits were approaching in the darkness, 
probably fired without giving a thought to his orders or to the possi- 
bility that those approaching might not be bandits. 

Section 6 — Jicaro 

A one-man mutiny was staged at Jicaro, Eastern Nueva Segovia by 
Corporal Simon Ortiz Morales, G.N., on the night of April 17-18, 1930, 
resulting in the deaths of Captain Veryl H. Dartt, G.N. (First Lieut., 
U.S.M.C.), and the wounding of Sergeant Rodolfo Gonzales, G.N. 

Corporal Ortiz had felt himself aggrieved by a recent reduction 
from the rank of Sergeant, for misconduct. On April 17th, he had been 
acting sergeant of the guard, and was discovered by Sergeant Gonzales to 
be under the influence of intoxicating liquor. He was relieved from duty 
by Lieutenant Young and doubtless anticipated further reduction for 
this new offense. He had also been harboring a personal enmity against 
Sergeant Gonzales, and the events of this day inflammed his anger, and 
caused him to make threats of violence to Gonzales, who reported the 
facts to Lieutenant Young. On this account, and because of the condi- 
tion of Ortiz as to sobriety, the Lieutenant directed Sergeant Gonzalez 
to sleep that night in the office next to the officers' quarters. 

The fact that Ortiz was under the influence of intoxicating liquor 
did not interfere with his formulation of plans during the day. But it 
will never be known just what his intentions were, and against whom he 
desired vengeance — whether his objective was to kill Sergeant Gonzalez 
alone, whether he planned only to kill some of the officers stationed at 
Jicaro, or both Gonzalez and the officers. It seems, however, in view of 
all events, both prior to and during the mutiny, that Sergeant Gonzalez 
was to have been the victim, and that the killing of the two officers was 
not intended, and was accidental, due to their crossing the line of fire. 

During the day Ortiz had secreted a rifle in a convenient location 
in a toilet near the barracks, and about 12:45 a.m., approached the 
heavy Browning machine gun emplacement, where, without opposition 
on the part of the sentinel, he removed the gun and placed it in the 
street in front of the officers' quarters. About a half hour later he opened 
fire with it upon the door and windows of the office in which Sergeant 

116 



Gonzalez was sleeping. Some shots also went through a window of the 
officers' section of the building, and others struck the walls of a house on 
the adjacent corner. 

As Sergeant Gonzalez started out to investigate the cause of the 
firing, he was struck and wounded. Captain Dartt and Lieutenant 
Young were aroused, and, doubtless believing that a bandit attack was 
in progress, armed themselves and hurried out to investigate. 

As they came to the doorway of the office both were struck by the 
spray of machine gun fire directed at it. Captain Dartt was instantly 
killed, while Lieutenant Young lived until 7 :40 a.m., that same morning. 

Throughout the firing although there were sentinels on post at 
the barracks, and other guard ias were aroused by the noise and came 
out to take up positions along the defense wall, no attempt was made 
by anyone to put a stop to it. All appeared to be dazed and stood help- 
lessly by, when a well-directed shot might have been the means of saving 
the life of one, or both, of the officers. The firing of the machine gun was 
allowed to continue until finally Corporal Ortiz himself brought it to a 
halt by committing suicide. He had previously, before opening fire with 
the machine gun, removed his right shoe and sock; and fired a single 
shot into his head from the rifle which he had secreted during the day 
and carried out into the street with the machine gun, by pulling the trig- 
ger with his toe. 

It appears now that when Ortiz was first reduced from the rank of 
sergeant for misconduct, he should have been transferred to some other 
station instead of being allowed to remain at Jicaro, where there was 
little or no amusement available to cheer him up, and where he would 
undoubtedly suffer a loss of prestige among the other men of the com- 
mand, and at the very least would be discontented. Giving him the 
opportunity of a fresh start at a new station might have been his salva- 
tion, as well as that of the two officers who died at his hand. 

But the fatal error in the situation unquestionably was made on 
April 1 7th in not immediately confining Ortiz when he was found to be 
under the influence of intoxicating liquor while on duty as Acting Ser- 
geant of the Guard, and for having made threats of violence against 
Sergeant Gonzalez, with whom he had a known enmity, and especially 
when the situation was considered so serious as to warrant the issue of 
orders to Gonzalez to sleep that night in the office as a measure of se- 
curity. 

Section 7 — Somoto 

Influenced by bandits and bandit sympathizers in and around the 
town of Somoto, Western Nueva Segovia, several members of the Guar- 
dia garrison at that place planned a mutiny, to occur at 1 :00 a.m., De- 
cember 8, 1930. 

Two of the mutineers were to disarm the two sergeants by taking 
their pistols from them while they slept. They were then to open the 
prison doors and release the eighteen prisoners, cover the barracks with 
a Lewis machine gun, collect all arms and ammunition from the men 
in the barracks, arm the prisoners, kill all noncommissioned officers, 
excepting one, then kill the officers, loot the town, and the entire force 
of mutineering guardias and armed civilian prisoners was then to clear 
for the hills and join the bandits. 

117 



The instigators of the plot attempted to enlist the assistance of 
the Gutierrez brothers, a corporal and a private respectively, who 
promptly reported the circumstances to the Commanding Officer, 
Captain Oregon A. Williams, G.N. (First Lieutenant, U.S.M.C.). Con- 
finement of the leaders brought an end to the attempted mutiny. 

Investigation developed that one of the leaders had been seen with 
a large roll of bills, although he had had no money that same morning, 
and had been in company with a young girl whose family was closely 
associated with the bandit chief Jose Leon Diaz. 

Section 8 — Presidential Guard, Managua 

On April 4, 1931, four days after the Managua earthquake, at a 
time when tension was high and the nerves of the over-worked and 
sleepless officers and enlisted men were jumpy, a series of events took 
place at the Guardia section of the Campo de Marte and camp of the 
Presidential Guard, which resulted in the death of Second Lieutenant 
William H. Pigg, G.N. (Sergeant, U.S.M.C.), and the wounding of 
Sergeant Francisco Fernandez, G.N. 

A private attached to the Presidential Guard happened to be within 
the Camp de Marte compound when an order was issued to allow no 
more guardias to leave, and to put all men to work on the ruins of the 
buildings recovering government property. This man attempted to 
return to his own organization via the east gate, and was stopped by the 
sentinel on duty there. He explained his status and continued on through 
the gate in the direction of the camp of the Presidential Guard. In the 
meantime the sentinel dispatched a runner to inform the Officer of the 
Day. 

The runner could not locate the Officer of the Day, but met Lieu- 
tenant Pigg and informed him. The latter, without authority to do so, 
proceeded to the camp of the Presidential Guard, and attempted to 
apprehend the private in question. He encountered the Sergeant of the 
Guard, Sergeant Carlos Paniagua, and ordered him to arrest the private 
and take him to the Camp de Marte. The sergeant stated that as he was 
on duty as sergeant of the Guard he could not leave camp so could not 
carry out the order, whereupon Lieutenant Pigg drew his pistol, pointed 
it at the Sergeant and disarmed him, stating at the same time that it 
was he who was giving orders. 

Sergeant Fernandez of the Presidential Guard walked in the direc- 
tion of the Browning machine gun, and Lieutenant Pigg, evidently 
thinking that he intended firing it at him, opened fire upon the sergeant 
with his pistol, wounding him. Other men on the flank, observing the 
actions of the officer, immediately fired their rifles at him and he was 
struck and killed. 

It was very probable that the tension, previously referred to, had 
some influence upon the actions of Lieutenant Pigg, and possibly upon 
the actions of Sergeant Fernandez and the various men who fired upon 
the Lieutenant. But there is no doubt that the latter exceeded his au- 
thority in attempting to make an arrest in the camp of the Presidential 
Guard for a minor infraction of orders in the Campo de Marte, since 
he had no connection with the Presidential Guard. Furthermore, he 

118 



was entirely wrong in assuming that he could give orders to the Sergeant 
of the Guard in the camp of the Presidential Guard, and in disarming 
the sergeant, and taking on an aggressive attitude there. This officer 
was new in the Guardia and was not able to speak or understand Spanish 
very well, so it is possible that he did not comprehend the original situa- 
tion and that his subsequent actions were based on erroneous initial 
information, which to his mind made his course justifiable. 

Section 9 — Kisalaya 

At 4:30 p.m., on April 4, 1932, a mutiny occurred at Kisalaya, 
Department of Northern Bluefields, and the Commanding Officer, 
First Lieutenant Charles J. Levonski, G.N. (Sergeant, U.S.M.C), who 
had been captured during the second Telpaneca mutiny(see section 4), 
was killed, and Second Lieutenant Carlos Reyes, G.N., second in com- 
mand, and only other officer present, was wounded. 

That morning the Department Commander, Captain Orrel A. 
Inman, G.N. (Captain, U.S.M.C), had visited the station, paid the 
command and m.ade an inspection. He found everything satisfactory — 
the men cheerful and apparently thoroughly contented. At 1 :00 p.m., 
he had cleared for Puerto Cabezas, his headquarters, by plane. 

During the afternoon an issue of clothing was made to the men. 
It was a limited quantity, brought there that morning by the Depart- 
m^ent Commander, and was unsufficient to supply all men. Accordingly 
the officers issued it to those whom they considered to be most in need 
of it. Private Pablo P. Salmeron was dissatisfied because he had not 
been given clothing and made some disrespectful remarks to Lieutenant 
Levonski, who ordered him confined. Lieutenant Reyes passed on these 
instructions to Sergeant Sebastian Jimenez, who became insolent, re- 
fused to obey, and stated that what Private Salmeron had said was cor- 
rect. Lieutenant Reyes then told the sergeant that he was going to 
confine him as well. 

Sergeant Jimenez hurried into the barracks, returned with a sub- 
Thompson machine gun, and ordered all men to get their automatic 
weapons and rifles and take up positions in the trenches around the bar- 
racks. This was done, Lieutenant Levonski, in the meantime, asking 
him what was going on. The sergeant replied that they wanted to kill 
Lieutenant Reyes, who by that time had disappeared inside of the bar- 
racks, and told Levonski to produce him, which he refused to do. The 
sergeant stated that they intended no harm to Lieutenant Levonski 
but wanted to kill Reyes. At this moment the latter jumped out of the 
barracks, ran for the brush, and was fired upon and wounded. Levonski 
went to the heavy Browning machine gun position and, standing beside 
the gun, was shot and killed by Private Juan R. Pantoja, with a Brown- 
ing automatic rifle. Apparently no violence to Lieutenant Levonski was 
intended at first, but as the situation developed the motives of the men 
changed, and Levonski became a victim of the passion and excitement 
of the mom.ent, possibly because of his refusal to produce Lieutenant 
Reyes upon demand, and possibly because of his attempts to halt the 
proceedings and apparent intention of using the heavy Browning ma- 
chine gun against the mutineers. 

119 



Not all enlisted members of the command participated in the firing; 
during this part of the mutiny some hid in the trenches, the radio opera- 
tor remained in the radio shack trying to call and inform Puerto Cabezas 
although he did not succeed ; a cook hid behind some bunches of bananas 
in the galley, and some others ran away. 

The fifteen mutineers ramsacked the station and then proceeded 
upstream, to the westward, in two boats, carrying the automatic wea- 
pons, a very large amount of ammunition, a quantity of grenades, and 
other supplies, and forcibly accompanied by a few unwilling guardias 
who escaped at the first opportunity, and a woman, common-law wife 
of Lieutenant Reyes. 

It was held by an investigating board that "the mutiny was not 
due to any fault, negligence or inefficiency on the part of the officers 
concerned, and that it could not have been averted by any action that 
could have been taken at that time." 

On April 21st, the mutineers, led by Sergeant Jimenez, who had 
been appointed a colonel of bandits, and accompanied by thirty armed 
bandits, returned to Kisalaya and made an attack on the new garrison. 
It was successfully repulsed, and during the fighting. Sergeant Jimenez 
was killed. 

Section 10 — Quilali 

Bandit agents and sympathizers in and around Quilali were the 
instigators of a plot that brought about an attempted mutiny at Quilali, 
Southeastern Nueva Segovia, on April 11, 1932. This station was the 
furthest from Ocotal, in a wildly mountainous location on the fringe of 
that part of Nueva Segovia and Jinotega continuously held by the 
bandit groups. 

The plan was developed with the assistance of three guardias of 
the Quilali garrison. It was intended first to lure the Commanding 
Officer, and only officer present. Second Lieutenant Joseph K. Roberts, 
G.N. (First Sergeant, U.S.M.C.), away from the barracks, situated on 
a high hill on the south edge of the village, down into the town, and there 
kill him. Returning to the barracks, the mutiny was to be further un- 
folded by the leaders, who were to impress the services of the balance 
of the command, capture all the arms and ammunition, and then desert 
the post with the object of joining the bandits and delivering over to 
them the weapons and munitions. 

On the night of April 10-11, 1932, the first part of the scheme was 
set in motion by Sergeant Garcia, theretofore a capable noncommis- 
sioned officer and expert machine gunner, induced Lieutenant Roberts 
to accompany him to the town to the house of one of the civilian plotters. 
As they were proceeding down the hill together, Roberts observed two 
other guardias coming behind, but thought they were going on author- 
ized liberty. Arriving in the town, Roberts noticed that Sergeant Garcia 
was armed with a Browning automatic rifle and the other two, one of 
whom was Corporal Comejo, the noncommissioned officer in charge of 
the Armory at the barracks and an arms expert, were both armed with sub- 
Thompson machine guns. This he considered most unusual, and becam.? 
further suspicious when the civilian asked him to accompany him tc 



120 



the edge of town. In the meantime, the three guardias had secreted 
themselves near this point, Lieutenant Roberts, however, becoming 
alarmed, returned to the barracks. 

Having failed to accomplish their purpose, the three guardias aban- 
doned the balance of the plans, and deserted taking with them the 
weapons and ammunition which they carried, and proceeded north and 
west to Guambuco Mountain on the Nicaraguan frontier northwest of 
Apali, and joined the Salgado group of bandits at its main camp there. 
They were identified during several later contacts in which they fought 
aggressivly and employed the automatic weapons most effectively, 
particularly at Las Puertas, near Apali, Eastern Nueva Segovia, on 
April 21st when three North American officers and seven enlisted guar- 
dias were killed, and during both contacts at Guambuco Mountain on 
April 23rd and 26th. 

Section 11 — ;San Isidro 

The sole instance of actual mutiny wherein a Nicaraguan officer was 
a participant, occurred at San Isidro, Department of Matagalpa, about 
1:00 a.m., June 30, 1932, and resulted in the murder of Second Lieu- 
tenant Edward H. Schmierer, G.N. (Gunnery-Sergeant, U.S.M.C.), 
and the loss of valuable government arms and munitions. 

The revolt was planned at least several hours before it occurred and 
involved four enlisted men of the station. The balance of the command 
knew nothing of the scheme, and later stated that they knew of no reason 
for dissatisfaction among the men at the station and that Lieutenant 
Schmierer was well-liked by both guardias and civilians, and that he had 
no enemies. 

During the evening of June 29th, a dance was given at the quarters 
of Lieutenant Gonzalez, attended by most of the guardias, and it was 
testified at the investigation held following the death of Lieutenant 
Schmierer, that Gonzalez repeatedly gave intoxicating liquor to the four 
guardias whom he had taken into his confidence and with whom he had 
planned the mutiny. Gonzalez was to have been transferred the follow- 
ing day to Matagalpa, and this fact appears to have been the only griev- 
ance which he held against Lieutenant Schmierer. He evidently believed 
that the transfer had been arranged or made at his order for personal 
reasons, when as a matter of fact it had been ordered by the Department 
Commander as a routine procedure. Gonzalez was to have been assigned 
to special duty under instruction in the work of the Quartermaster's 
Department in accordance with the policy of Headquatrers, Guardia 
Nacional, incident to the turn-over of the Guardia to Nicaraguan offi- 
cers. 

About midnight Lieutenant Schmierer sent orders for the return 
of all guardias to the barracks, and this complied was with. Lieutenant 
Gonzalez, and the four guardias whom he had chosen to assist him, 
proceeded at once with arrangements for clearing San Isidro, getting 
together animals, arms, ammunition, grenades, and other supplies. 
They awakened one other guardia, told him that they were going on 
patrol, and ordered him to accompany them. 



121 



Assembling in the street, and with all preparations for their depar- 
ture complete, Lieutenant Gonzalez went to the house of Lieutenant 
Schmierer, opened the door, and, as Schmierer sat up in bed, awakened 
by the noise, emptied his pistol into Schmierer's body, killing him. The 
mutineers then ransacked the quarters, took everything of value and 
deserted clearing San Isidro in a northwesterly direction, taking with 
them the Browning automatic rifle, sub-Thompson machine gun. and 
other supplies they had previously gathered together. They continued 
on, and eluded capture, although several patrols were in hot pursuit 
with the intention of apprehending them. 

The balance of the San Isidro garrison was alert throughout the 
night, and most of the men remained in the trenches, anticipating the 
return of Lieutenant Gonzalez, whom they feared might attempt some 
vengeance against them. This did not occur, however. 

The five enlisted Guardia who accompanied Gonzalez in his flight 
eventually surrendered themselves with their arms including both auto- 
matic weapons, at Guardia Headquarters in Managua. Gonzalez es- 
caped capture. 



122 



CHAPTER XVI 
ACTIVITIES OF THE GUARDIA NACIONAL DURING THE 
EARTHQUAKE IN MANAGUA 

The earthquake that visited Managua, Nicaragua at approximately 
10:22 a.m., March 31, 1931, found the Guardia Nacional prepared to 
step into the breach and take control of the situation. 

It was fortunate that the earthquake struck the city during Holy 
Week, when many thousands of the population, especially of the middle 
and upper classes, were out of the city sojourning at the mountain, lake 
and sea resorts as was customary at this season of the year. There 
is no doubt but that the casualties would have been more extensive but 
for this customary leave taking during Holy Week. 

Hardly had the first great shock ceased its terrific rumbling and 
destruction, than the Guardia Nacional commenced its work of re- 
stablishing and maintaining order, safeguarding of life and property, 
prevention of looting, the establishment of a water supply, rescue of 
the injured and the removal and burial of the dead, from the wreckage. 

The first official act by which the Jefe Director of the Guardia took 
control of the situation, was the declaration of Martial Law in the city 
of Managua. This act of the Jefe Director was carried out in the absence 
of the President of the Republic, who was at his summer camp at Vene- ' 
cia Laguna. The President on his return to Managua later in the day 
gave his approval to the action of the Jefe Director in the establishment 
of Martial Law. Orders issued later by the Jefe Director covered the 
handling of looters, the distribution of water and food and clothing to 
the destitute. 

The immensity of the task pertaining to policing, guarding of pro- 
perty and the searching for the dead and injured required the closest 
cooperation between the Marine Corps forces and the Guardia Nacional. 
These two military organizations functioned together and assisted one 
another without friction throughout the emergency period. With the 
added aid of the Marine forces in Managua, the Guardia still found the 
task of property protection of such proportions that a system of ap- 
pointments of civilians as Civicos was adopted by the Jefe Director. 
Prominent citizens and others of reputable character were appointed 
to Civico rank by the Jefe Director, each was armed with a rifle or pistol, 
furnished with a reasonable amount of ammunition, given some instruc- 
tion in police duties and placed on duty in the down town sector as as- 
sistants to the regular Guardia police force. Their immediate command- 
ing officer was the Chief of Police of Managua, Captain Hamilton M. 
H. Fleming, G.N. (Captain, U.S.M.C). The duties of these Civicos 
Were mainly to prevent looting and to arrest all those caught in the act 
of looting. The original order issued concerning looters was to kill all 
persons caught in the act. This was later changed to arrest all looters, 
in order to preclude the possibility of endangering the lives of bonafide 
owners of property who inadvertently might attempt to enter their 
homes or business establishments and be mistaken for looters. Orders 
had previously been issued and distributed to the public prohibiting 
anyone from entering any of the buildings in the destroyed area without 

123 



proper authority, even though the person concerned was the rightful 
owner. One of the main duties performed by the Civicos was the pre- 
vention of entrance to buildings and the removal of property, until 
regulations were issued in this connection. Every effort was exerted to 
assure some protection of property either by Marines, Guardia or Civi- 
cos. Within a few hours when the work of taking care of the injured and 
removal and burial of the dead became mere routine, the citizens began 
to turn their thoughts to rescue of their household effects in the fire- 
swept and other wrecked areas. To facilitate this matter of removal of 
property and also to offset the possibility of unauthorized persons enter- 
ing and making way with the property of rightful owners, a pass system 
was inaugurated by the Jefe Director. Passes were issued to individuals 
upon proper and authentic identification by persons known to the is- 
suing officer, (in this case, Colonel Walter G. Sheard, G.N. (Major, 
U.S.M.C.), assisted by the Jefe Politico, Colonel Sheard acting as Chief 
of Staff of the Guardia vice Colonel Robert L. Denig, G.N. (Major, 
U.S.M.C.), who suffered a fractured leg as a result of the earthquake 
and was evacuated to the hospital), authorizing such rightful owner to 
enter his own home or place of business for the purpose of removing his 
property to a place of safety. The removal of the property in question 
was as far as practicable supervised by either a Marine, Guardia or 
Civico. Another important pass or permit system was established 
whereby certain selected citizens of the community were authorized to 
commandeer articles of food, medicines and clothing and other neces- 
sities of life to alleviate the suffering of the injured and to feed and 
clothe the destitute. Whenever practicable, and where the original 
ownership of the commandeered items could definitely be established, 
proper receipts were given for all items taken, with a view to adjustment 
when conditions became more settled. 

The citizens to the greatest extent possible worked for their food 
and they, in a majority of cases, were glad to do this even though their 
only return for their labor was their food. Later the American Red 
Cross, through its Central Relief Committee, provided work clearing 
up the debris at a wage of $0.40 per diem, the standard labor wage in 
Nicaragua. Thousands of the males, and many females, ranging in age 
from husky youths in their teens to those on the verge of feebleness, 
turned to with a willingness to assist in the work of clearing debris from 
all the destroyed areas, in preparation for opening the streets to traffic 
and thus expedite the work of removal of the dead from beneath the 
fallen walls. There were numerous cases sometime after the quake 
where unwillingness was displayed on the part of some of the men to 
assist in any sort of work; this class was drafted by the Guardia and 
placed in working gangs with a guard in control. 

Within a period of one-half hour after the earthquake struck, all 
activities at Guardia Headquarters were functioning out in the patio 
in rear of the General Headquarters buildings. Desks were pulled out 
from under piles of plaster, stone and broken wood; file cabinets were 
removed with great difficulty and under dangerous conditions due to 
the cracked condition of the building walls. There was no telling when 
another shock of great severity might occur and topple the already 
weakened walls. A considerable number of Guardia records were lost. 
One can safely state that the general functioning of the activities at 
Headquarters of the Guardia was only disrupted for a period of less than 
a half hour. 

124 



Shocks persistently recurred for a period of about five days and it 
was impossible to determine when one of greater force than the original 
shock might take place. All sections of the staff headquarters established 
their activities under either the open sky or canvas. Every desk was a 
headquarters for some nature of work having to do with relief. To the 
Chief of Staff fell the bulk of work. All sections worked hard and with- 
out complaint for days and nights in the effort to establish and maintain 
a proper functioning and coordination of all relief activities. Despite 
the heavy burden on Guardia Headquarters because of the earthquake, 
there was still the regular routine administrative work to be done in 
connection with activities in the various outlying departments and areas. 
Several threats of bandit attacks on Managua required formation of 
patrols at vital points of entry in the city. Although no bandit attacks 
miaterialized from these rum.ors, still a great added work befell the GN-2 
and GN-3 sections of the Guardia in the formation of these patrols as 
the men who composed them had to be withdrawn from very urgent 
duties in the destroyed areas. Every officer and enlisted man had a task 
assigned him and some had three or four to perform. Several officers 
who were on leave in Managua from outlying stations at the time of the 
quake, were immediately called into service in various capacities. Ad- 
ditional officers were detailed to the police department; extra offixers 
were detailed to handle the rationing of food to refugees and workers 
in the Camipo; officers were placed in charge of various relief activities 
throughout the city; Guardia officers, line and medical, assisted in the 
maintenance of a huge refugee camxp on La Loma Golf Course and in the 
rationing of food, milk and water to the thousands of occupants of this 
camp. Every Guardia officer called into service by this great emergency 
displayed a spirit of great enthusiasm in his work and there was never 
a case where a complaint was registered against any Guardia offixer for 
the manner of performance of his multitudinous duties. They were all 
tried by fire and found not wanting. To name some of the Guardia 
officers at this time will take but little space: 

Major General Calvin B. Matthews, G.N., Jefe Director, (Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel, U.S.M.C.), had as his Chief of Staff up to the time of the 
quake. Colonel Robert L. Denig, G.N. (then Major, tJ.S.M.C). Due to 
injuries received as a result of the quake, Colonel Denig was evacuated 
to the hospital and Colonel Walter G. Sheard, G.N. (Major, U.S.M.C.) 
took over the duties of Chief of Staff. Major Otto Salzman, G.N. (Cap- 
tain, U.S.M.C), was GN-2 and 3, in charge of Operations and Training 
and Intelligence; First Lieutenant Charles Davis, G.N. (Sergeant-Major, 
U.S.M.C), was GN-1 and Adjutant of the Guardia in charge of the per- 
sonnel section; the Law section was also controlled by Colonel Sheard, 
assisted by First Lieutenat Arthur E. Buckner, G.N. (First-Sergeant, 
U.S.M.C); Colonel Gordon D. Hale, (MC), G.N., was Medical Director 
and assisted by First Lieutenant Roy Aikman, (MC), G.N. (Chief Phar- 
macist, (MC), U.S.N.) ; Major William J. Livingston, G.N. (Captain, 
U.S.M.C.) was Paymaster of the Guardia and assisted by First Lieu- 
tenant Erwin, G.N. (Chief Pay Clerk, U.S.M.C); Major Maurice C 
Gregory, G.N. (Captain, U.S.M.C.) was Guardia Quartermaster and 
assisted in his work by First Lieutenant Frank H. Williams, G.N. (Quar- 
termaster-Sergeant, U.S.M.C); Captain H. M. H. Fleming, G.N. (Cap- 
tain, U.S.M.C), v/as Chief of Police of Manaqua, while Captain Evans 

125 



F. Carlson, G.N. (First Lieutenant, U.S.M.C.) was in command of the 
Department of Managua-Carazo and was also appointed as liaison offi- 
cer between the civil government and the Guardia. Others who played 
important parts in the activities during the earthquake period were 
Captain Edward J. Trumble, G.N. (First Lieutenant, U.S.M.C), Cap- 
tain Francis J. Cunningham, G.N. (First Lieutenant, U.S.M.C), First 
Lieutenant Nicholas M. Grieco, G.N. (First-Sergeant, U.S.M.C.), the 
latter three as Director, Sub-Director and Chief Instructor at the Ni- 
caraguan Military Academy, respectively; Captain Lewis B. Puller,G.N. 
(First Lieutenant, U.S.M.C.) who performed valuable duty in various 
capacities; Major Glenn D. Miller, G.N. (Captain, U.S.M.C.) who hap- 
pened to be in Managua at the time under orders to the United States, 
was appointed as commanding officer of the Penitentiary area, vice 
Captain James L. Denham, G.N. (First Lieutenant, U.S.M.C.) who had 
been injured by falling stones. First Lieutenant Harry E. Hurst, G.N. 
(First Sergeant, U.S.M.C.) as second in command at the prison area 
assisted Major Miller in the enormous task of caring for the injured and 
removal and burial of the dead resulting from the collapse of the Peni- 
tentiary. First Lieutenant Walter E. Anderson, G.N. (Gunnery Ser- 
geant, U.S.M.C.) was Transportation Officer of the Guardia and on his 
shoulders fell the task of furnishing trucks and other transportation for 
the purpose of hauling water in barrels and large gasolene drums to 
newly established water distribution stations throughout the city. 
Water was also hauled into the burning area in an effort to stem the 
onward march of the flames. 

Water was of no avail with a strong east wind blowing steadily and 
fanning the flames into greater fury. Finding that the continued and 
unchecked spread of the flames would eventually destroy the entire 
city it was decided that the use of dynamite must be resorted to check 
the flames. For this important duty the services of the United States 
Army Engineers, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Dan L 
Sultan, (Corps of Engineers), U. S. Army, then stationed in Granada, 
were requested. A selected group under Colonel Sultan immediately 
came to Managua to handle this work. The Engineers, who were in 
Nicaragua in connection with the Nicaraguan Canal Survey, immedi- 
ately on arrival in Managua with a supply of demolitions, commenced 
their task of clearing a path in the face of the flames to halt their advance. 
In this task the Engineers were assisted by both Guardia and Marine 
Corps personnel. With lack of any fire-fighting apparatus or water 
service the job was a difficult one. However, after a persistent battle 
of almost five days the fire, through the use of explosives, was brought 
under control and finally extinguished. To the use of dynamite can be 
given credit for saving the entire city from destruction by fire; by means 
of demolitions the fire was confined to the downtown area and within 
a few blocks of its point of origin, the market buildings. 

The immensity of the task of the Guardia and Marine forces in their 
multitudinous duties can be realized by visualizing the extent of the 
damage done by the original shock, intermittant tremblers and the 
fire that followed the first shock. It has been conservatively estimated 
that over thirty-three down town city blocks were completely gutted 
by the fire and hundreds of other business establishments and private 

126 



homes were either totally or partially destroyed in the sections outside 
of the fire zone. Destruction reached every point within the boundaries 
of the city and considerable damage was done to structures in the out- 
lying districts. The total damage, only fractionally covered by insurance 
ran well into the millions of dollars. 

In the market buildings hundreds of lives were lost, a great ma- 
jority being women and children. At the time of the quake, the busiest 
shopping time of the morning, the markets were jammed with house- 
wives and their children making their daily purchases. The almost 
instantaneous outbreak of the flames in the market buildings, following 
the crumbling of the thick walls, created a panic among the women and 
with the fallen walls blocking the exits escape was almost impossible. 
They were trapped in what became a blazing inferno. The Guardia who 
were first on the scene of the market fire had great difficulty in prevent- 
ing men and women from rushing into the blazing buildings in search 
of their loved ones whom they knew were or had been in these buildings 
making purchases. To form fire lines back of which the crowds could be 
kept was practically impossible, and in fact unnecessary, as the oncom- 
ing flames and intensity of the heat soon drove all back to a safe distance. 
Many minor casualties were suffered among the Guardia and Marine 
personnel due to burns received in the efforts to rescue persons from the 
flames. The military personnel, in the face of a losing battle to halt the 
flames, fought doggedly on without respite and it can never be said that 
the fighters relaxed their efforts while there remained a chance to save 
even a single life. 

It was soon ascertained that the Guardia police station, located 
in the heart of the downtown sector, was in the direct path of the fire, 
and it was found necessary to remove such property and records as 
could be salvaged from the almost demolished building, to space in 
Campo de Marte. A temporary open-air police headquarters was 
therefore established on the Guardia tennis courts. The prisoners 
formerly confined in the police station were placed in working parties 
and utilized in rescue work and other activities of relief. The fact that 
the headquarters of the Guardia Police was destroyed did not hinder for 
one moment the continuance of the efficient activities of that organi- 
zation under the able leadership of Captain Fleming, its chief, and his 
assistants. Like other members of the Guardia the police labored day 
and night without halt for an indefinite period in their work of main- 
taining order, security of lives and property and the prevention of 
looting. Their every task was accomplished without complaint and 
they performed all of their duties in a highly commendable manner. 
Through the efforts of the Guardia police, looting was kept to a mi- 
nimum and possible rioting was eliminated. 

The National Penitentiary which was under control of the Guardia, 
was completely destroyed by the first shock of the quake, with a loss 
of life among the Guardia and prisoners running well over one hundred. 
It was at the Penitentiary that the American personnel of the Guardia 
suffered their greatest casualties, in the loss of the lives of Major 
Hugo F. A. Baske (MC), G.N. (Lieutenant-Commander, MC,-U. S. 
Navy), Medical officer in charge at the prison, and First Lieutenant 
James L. Dickey, G.N. (Chief Quartermaster Clerk, U. S. M. C), 

127 



both of whom were instantly killed by falling walls. Second Lieutenant 
Lieutenant Robert G. Crawford, G.N. (First Sergeant, U. S. M. C.), 
who was assisting Lieutenant Dickey in making an audit of the prison 
accounts, was buried for many hours under huge blocks of stone. For 
a time it was thought that he had been instantly killed but later was 
removed from the wreckage alive^but suffering from serious internal 
injuries and broken pelvis bones. First Lieutenant Louis Rossich, G. N. 
(Gunnery Sergeant, U.S.M.C.) Mess officer at the prison, was likewise 
buried under tons of huge blocks of stone but later in the day was re- 
moved alive though suffering serious internal injuries, fractures of the 
bones of the right leg and hand and severe scalp wounds. Numerous 
other minor casualties were suffered by Americans on duty at the 
prison but their injuries did not stop them from pitching into the work 
of rescue and relief after having thsir injuries dressed The escapes 
from instant death of Lieutenants Crawford and Rossich were mirac- 
ulous and it is beyond human comprehension how they survived their 
burial under tons of debris for hours. The Penitentiary was construc- 
ted of huge blocks of lava rock, each block weighing five hundred pounds 
or more. 

The uninjured prisoners of the Penitentiary were grouped into 
working parties under control of Guardia and proceeded in the work of 
removing dead and injured from the v.reckage. This was an immense 
task in view of the size and weight of the blocks of stone that covered the 
wrecked area. They labored under the most difficult and dangerous 
conditions without thought foi personal safety, and for this excellent 
performance of labor many of them were later pardoned by the President 
of the Republic. Prisoner details were also utilized in digging trench 
and individual graves to bury the dead at the New Cemetery and other 
burial places. A trenchlike fissure opened in the ground by the earth- 
quake near the Penitentiary was used as a common grave for interment 
of approximately 120 or the Penitentiary dead. A huge wooden cross 
now stands at one end of this long grave as a memorial to those trapped 
under the prison walls. 

The Republic lacking funds for the reconstruction of the Peniten- 
tiary, it became necessary to transfer the surviving prisoners of the 
institution to prisons in Leon, Granada, Masaya and Matagalpa, for 
completion of their terms of sentence. At the time of the collapse of 
the prison there w^ere over three hundred prisoners booked for confine- 
ment on various serious charges The transfer of the surviving prisoners 
to other towns for safekeeping made more Guardia available for the 
moie necessary work of policing in the city. 

The students at the Nicaraguan Military Academy were enjoying 
a short Holy Week holiday at the time of the quake and many of them 
had departed from Managua for their home towns. However, on re- 
ceiving news of the disaster, the majority of them immediately returned 
to Managua to be available for such services as they might be detailed 
to. The student group under command of Captain Edward J . Trumble, 
G.N., Captain Francis J. Cunningham, G.N. and First Lieutenant 
Nicholas M. Grieco, G.N., performed outstanding duty in various 
capacities above and beyond the ordinary call of duty. With their own 
Academy buildings practically a mass of ruins they established quarters 
for themselves under such canvas as could be obtained. They also 



128 



established a relief camp in the academy grounds where hundreds of 
refugees were given shelter, fed and clothed. The students acted as 
traffic police on the roads leading out of Managua and assisted hundreds 
of refugees who were hastily departing from the stricken city for more 
distant points of safety. It was a pitiful sight to witness the fear 
stricken survivors fleeing the city, most of them on foot, with all their 
worldly belongings on their backs, or in carts drawn by hand, a few 
in bull carts, in the superstitious belief that the entire city would eventu- 
ally be destroyed by recurrent shocks and swallowed by the waters of 
the lake. The inhabitants of the lower and more ignorant classes surely 
believed that the prediction of years of standing was now coming true 
and the time had arrived when Managua and the surrounding country 
would be totally destroyed, sink below the lake level and be no more. 
This belief caused an exodus from the city running inco many thousands. 
This exodus however was in a way a great Godsend to those who were 
laboring day and night in their untiring efforts to render relief to those 
remaining. It greatly reduced the number to be cared for by the relief 
agencies. Military academy students under charge of First Lieutenant 
Nicholas M. Grieco, G.N., acted in a very efficient capacity in expediting 
the transportation of milk from the outlying fincas into the city. They 
They regulated this source of food supply so that on arrival of milk 
caits at the city limits, their contents were evenly apportioned to assure 
a reasonable supply of milk at each of the food distributing stations 
throughout the city. They likewise regulated incoming supplies of 
meats and oth'^r rations, and maintained a distribution station for 
gasolene for use in cars taking refugees out of the city. The work of 
the staff and student body of the academy cannot be commended 
too highly. They saw their job and did it without complaint through- 
ouu he emergency period. 

Thousands of men, women and children were fed and sheltered at 
kitchens and camps supervised by Guardia and Marine Corps personnel. 
Food was even furnished to the President of the Republic and his 
Cabinet and their families, from Marine Corps supplies. A huge refugee 
camp on La Loma Golf Course on the slopes of the Presidential Palace 
hill, was constructed and maintained by Guardia and Marine Corps 
personnel where thousands were fed and given shelter in tents, as early 
as the afternoon of the quake. Dressing stations and hospital facilities 
were also provided at this camp and supervised by the medical depart- 
ment personnel of the Guardia and Marine Corps. This large camp 
continued its service of mercy for a period of approximately two weeks 
by which time the various civilian committees for relief were well 
organized and capable of caring for the thousands formerly provided 
for at the Loma camp. 

Great credit must be given to the medical department personnel 
of the Marine Corps and Guardia for the expeditious and efficient man- 
ner in which they handled the thousands of injury cases in hastily 
improvised dressing stations in Campo de Marte, the military center. 
At these dressing stations American medical personnel treated on the 
first day of the quake alone over one thousand injury cases, a great 
many of them being major operative cases. In addition to the more 

129 



serious cases, over 8000 cases of minor injuries were treated the first 
week. A final clieck on the casualties among the natives shows that 
over one thousand lives were lost. Great and deserving credit is due 
Lieutenant Commander Hetfield, (MC), U. S. Navy, and his staff at the 
Brigade Field Hospital for their untiring and unselfish services in their 
efforts to alleviate suffering; and to Colonel Gordon D. Hale, (MC), 
Guardia Nacional Commander, (MC,) U. S. N. ),and his staff, for the 
efficient manner in which he handled the organization and functioning 
of a sanitary corps to ward off the possibility of an epidemic of disease. 
The city's water supply was cut off, the sewer system being therefore 
without water to operate it. Thousands of refugees were under tem- 
porary shelter or living in the open without any sanitary arrangements. 
Latrines had to be provided even for those fortunate enough to be in 
partly demolished homes. The scarcity of water drove the populace 
to abandoned wells, the lake and other polluted sources. The popula- 
tion was undernourished and further weakened by injuries and exposure. 
The shadow of epidemic was near. Colonel Hale met this situation 
with good judgment and great energy and through his untiring 
efforts in establishing sanitary measures the danger of an epidemic 
soon passed. The best possible proof of the adequacy of the sanitary 
measures adopted is found in the fact that the public health of the city 
remained practically normal throughout the entire emergency period. 

At the time of the quake the Presidential guard was quartered 
in a newly constructed barracks (supposedly earthquake proof by re- 
enforcement with steel and concrete), on Loma Hill, directly to the right 
rear of the Presidential Palace. The first shock caused the barracks 
to collapse completely, however without loss of life or injury on the 
part of members of the Guard. The Presidential Palace suffered con- 
siderable damage, the rear portion that extended out over Lake Tiscapa 
(an extinct crater lake), dropping off into the lake a hundred or so feet 
below. The main buildings were also severely damaged, large cracks being 
found in the foundations and walls. Engineers later declared the 
buildings to be unsafe and recommended that they be completely 
demolished as a measure of safety. The President would not permit 
this however as it was his belief that the Palace could be later restored 
to its original form with stronger reenforcement material. The President 
as stated before, was not in the Palace at the time of the quake, and 
among the personnel of the household, no reported casualties were 
suffered. A temporary home was provided for the President in the 
house of General Anastacio Somoza, then Sub-Secretary of Foreign 
Affairs, which house withstood the shocks of the quake very well with 
a few minor cracks. This temporary palace of the President was 
situated across from the Guardia compound. A temporary camp was 
also established for the enlisted members of the Presidential Guard 
under canvas in a vacant lot diagonlly across from the abode of the 
President. The usual functions of the Presidential Guard in protecting 
the President were carried out very efficiently even under these dis- 
rupted conditions. 

The barracks buildings of the Department of Managua-Carazo, 
which were located in the Guardia compound of Campo de Marte, 
completely collapsed and thus left the members of that organization 

130 



■TCTT 



without quarters. This matter was taken care of after a day or so by the 
construction of a sufficient number of tents to quarter the officers 
and enlisted men. A regular field service camp was established with 
sufficient latrines to take care of the personnel involved. Drinking 
water was furnished through the use of Lister bags, loaned to the 
Guardia by the Marine Corps, and water for cooking was contained in 
large gasolene drums. A small camp was also established in rear of 
Guardia Headquarters for General Matthews and his staff. Families of 
the Marine Corps and Naval personnel on duty in the Brigade and 
Guardia were given shelter in the frame barracks buildings in the Marine 
Corps compound and they were fed in the Marine Corps mess hall. The 
families of the American personnel were thus taken care of until their 
final evacuation by planes to Corinto a few days later, to be transported 
to their homes in the United States via government vessels. 

It is almost unbelievable that no serious injuries were suffered 
by the officers and enlisted men on duty at the Guardia Barracks in 
the Department of Managua. At the time of the first shock the Pay- 
master of the Guardia was in the process of paying the enlisted personnel 
of that organization money due them for the month of March. The 
headquarters office was full of officers and men at the time. However, 
with few minor exceptions, all escaped from under the collapsing walls 
uninjured. A few seconds later this entire group of buildings, approxi- 
mately two hundred feet in length adjoining the Guardia compound 
wall, was razed, with the heavy tile roof fiat on the ground. The 
Paymaster likewise was fortunate in being able to save all funds that 
he had spread out on one of the desks, with the exception of about 
^25.00. The complete pay roll of this particular organization ran into 
the thousands of dollars. The Commanding Officer of the Department 
of Managua, Captain Evans F. Carlson, G.N., established his head- 
quarters out under the open sky until such time as tents could be ob- 
tained. 1 1 was particularly fortunate for those in the Guardia compound 
that the quake struck during the dry season as otherwise considerable 
more suffering would have resulted from lack of shelter. 

Within a week after the earthquake it was found necessary to seek 
inside quarters in some substantial building that had withstood the 
fury of the quake, for establishment of the offices of the Guardia Head- 
quarters section. The dry season was on the wane and in a short while 
heavy rains could be expected which would make the functioning of the 
staff sections impracticable under temporary canvas. The heavy winds, 
bringing on a continuous stream of dust, and the intense heat from the 
sun made working in the hastily improvised canvas protected offices 
almost unbearable. The important work of the headquarters could not 
be halted. The Guardia Quartermaster, Major Gregory, G.N., was 
directed by the Jefe Director to make a canvas of such buildings of 
suitable size to accomodate the activities of the entire staff sections and 
to obtain space to house the entire group. The Christian Brothers 
College buildings, though severely shaken up and cracked in places, 
still withstood the quake to such an extent as to be pronounced safe 
for occupancy on all its three floors. Through the courtesy of the Direc- 
tor of the College the Guardia Quartermaster was enabled to obtain 
sufficient space on the first and second floors of one of the wing buildings 

131 



of the college to house the offices of the Jefe Director, Chief of Staff, 
Personnel Section, Operations and Training and Intelligence Sections, 
Law Section, Paymaster and Quartermaster Departments. This 
allotment of space gave these activities four of the school's large class 
rooms and space on the large porches for filing cabinets and the excess 
equipment that could not be placed inside of the rooms. On the porch 
of the college was also established the Guardia telegraph officer to insure 
communication with the outlying stations. However the havoc 
created by the earthquake completely destroyed the telegraph lines 
in the city proper and due to single lines having to bz placed in service, 
requiring relays through various temporary stations throughout the 
city, messages to be sent had to be pooled at the last relay point and 
sent out later in routine order of importance of the message. To send 
messages during the emergency period from Managua to Leon or some 
other outlying station no great distance from Managua, sometimes took 
a whole day. Messages were received from outlying stations of the 
Guardia that were sometimes three days old. However, with the co- 
operation of the Guardia Nacional, telephone and telegraph lines were 
repaired rapidly and within a week or ten days service in these two 
lines of communication was again functioning on a fairly satisfactory 
basis. At the time of the quake the Guardia did not have a regularly 
established communication branch and therefore radio communication 
was not available to any of the outlying Guardia stations, excepting 
throught the Tropical Radio Company to the Bluefields area. 

In view of the fact that space occupied temporarily by the head- 
quarters activities of the Guardia in the Christian Brothers College 
would have to be vacated sometime in May, 193 1 , in order to make room 
for the regular students of the college on its reopening date, it was 
necessary to rush construction of the damaged buildings formerly 
occupied by the staff sections in Campo de Marte. Lack of funds made 
it necessary that the reconstruction of these buildings be handled by 
the Guardia Quartermaster and that such funds as the Guardia had 
available be used. Numerous deductions had to be made from appro- 
priations and allotments for other purposes in order to accomplish the 
rebuilding expeditiously. Under the direction of the Guardia Quarter- 
master, the work progressed rapidly. Second Lieutenant Robert J. 
Mitchell, G.N., (Sergeant, U.S.M.C.) was placed in general charge of 
the reconstruction of the Headquarters group of buildings and of the 
Guardia compound wall extending on First Avenue, Southeast, from 
5th Street to the La Loma Golf Course. All workmen on this project 
came under his direct charge. Likewise it was found necessary to con- 
struct a set of barracks buildings for the enlisted personnel of the 
Department of Managua-Carazo and for office and storage space. 
Second Lieutenant John Krawie, G.N. (Sergeant, U.S.M.C.), with 
considerable construction experience, was placed in charge of this 
building project, one sufficient to accomodate approximately 300 men. 
The services rendered by these two Marines in supervising this work 
were outstanding and early in May the entire headquarters activities 
of the Guardia moved back into their old quarters from the Christian 
Brothers College. The Department of Managua barracks buildings 
for the enlisted men were also ready for occupancy at about this time 

132 



and the men moved into them just in time to escape the oncoming 
rainy season. The work of clearing the Guardia compound of its tent 
city was then carried out, and the clearing of the debris of the old 
barracks and quartermaster buildings was another job to be completed. 
In a comparatively short time the Campo began taking on the appear- 
ance of a post whose activities had never been disrupted. 

Lists of the dead and injured among the American personnel on 
duty with the Guardia include: 

DEAD: 

Major Hugo F.A. Baske, (MC), G.N. (Lt-Comdr. MC, USN), instantly 

killed by falling walls at Penitentiary, March 31, 1931. 
First Lieutenant James L. Dickey, G.N. (Chief Quartermaster Clerk 

USMC) instantly killed by falling walls at Penitentiary, 31 Mar 

1931. 
Second Lieut. William H. Pigg, (Gy-Sgt. USMC), shot and killed by a 

member of the Presidential Guard through a misunderstanding. 

INJURED: 

Colonel Robert L. Denig, G.N. (Lt-Col. USMC) fracture of right leg. 
Captain James L. Denham, G.N. (Ist-Lieut. USMC), scalp injuries. 
First Lieutenant George Occhionero, G.N. (Gy-Sgc. USMC) fracture 

right hip, severe scaip injuries and body bruises. Occhionero 

is a cripph today as a result of the earthquake injuries. 
First Lieutenant Louis Rossich, G.N. (Gy-Sgt. USMC), buried under 

walls at Penitentiary; internal injuries, severe scalp injuries, 

fracture bones right knee and hand; body bruises. 
First Lieutenant Charles Davis, G.N. (Sgt-Major, USMC), slight bruises 

top of head and left instep. 
Second Lieutenant Robert G. Crawford, G.N. (First Sgt. USMC), 

buried under walls at Penitentiary; internal injuries, serious; 

broken pelvic bones; severe body bruises. 
Second Lieutenant McKinley D. Hoskin, G.B. (Sgt. USMC), bruises 

back and face. 
Second Lieutenant Hugo Makus, G.N. (Sgt. USMC) body bruises and 

right foot severely bruised. 

Numerous minor injuries were also sustained by other American 
members of the Guardia and several deaths and severe injuries by 
Nicaraguan personnel. 

On June 1, 1931, President Jose MariaMoncada formerly conferred 
the Presidential Gold Medal of Merit on nineteen officers and enlisted- 
men of the United States Army, Navy and Marine Corps for their 
valiant and self-sacrificing services following the earthquake in con- 
nection with the relief of Managua. Several of these officers and enlisted 
men were serving with the Guardia Nacional, and four Nicaraguan 
officers of the Guardia were similarly decorated at the same time. The 
personnel decorated include: 



183 



GUARDIA NACIONAL (USMC AND NAVY): 
Major-General Calvin B. Matthews, Jefe Director, G.N. 

(Lt-Col. USMC) 
Colonel Walter G. Sheard, G.N. (Major, USMC) 
Colonel Gordon D. Hale, G.N. (Commander, MC, USN) 
Major Otto Salzman, G.N. (Captain, USMC) 
Major Maurice C. Gregory, G.N. (Captain, USMC) 
Major Horace R. Boone, G.N. (Lieut-Comdr. MC, USN) 
Captain H. M. H. Fleming, G.N. (Captain, USMC) 
Captain Edward J. Trumble, G.N. (First Lieut. USMC) 
Captain Evans F. Carlson, G.N. (First Lieut. USMC) 
Captain Herbert S. Keimling, G.N. (First Lieut. USMC) 
First Lieutenant Charles Davis, G.N. (Sgt-Major, USMC) 
First Lieutenant Nicholas M. Grieco, G.N. (First Sgt. USMC) 

SECOND BRIGADE, USMC, AND U. S. ARMY ENGINEERS: 

Brigadier-General Frederic L. Bradman, U.S.M.C. Brigade Commander 

Lieutenant-Colonel Franklin B. Garrett, U.S.M.C. 

Lieutenant-Colonel William C .Wise, U.S.M.C. 

Lieutenant-Colonel Dan. I. Sultan, U. S. Army Engineers. 

Major Paul R. Hawley, (MC), U. S. Army 

Major Ralph J. Mitchell, U.S.M.C. 

First Lieutenant L. R. Groves, U. S. Army Engineers. 

NICARAGUAN OFFICERS, GUARDIA. 

Second Lieutenant Gabriel Castillo, G.N. 
Second Lieutenant Jose Maria Castrillo, G.N. 
Second Lieutenant Lisandro Delgadillo, G.N. 
Second Lieutenant Francisco Bello, G.N. 

The following extract is quoted from the "Official Report of the 
Relief work in Nicaragua after the Earthquake of March 31, 1931" 
as issued by the American Red Cross : 

"The citations of services are an eloquent tribute to the sound 
judgment, tireless efforts, devotion to duty and keen sympathy for 
suffering humanity displayed by the officers receiving the medals 
when confronted by an emergency calling for the ability of high degree 
and sustained effort for several days with complete disregard for personal 
welfare and safety. They present striking examples of initiative in 
crisis, calmness in moments of confusion, fortitude in the face of danger, 
and leadership in the midst of chaos. They are the generous expression 
of the gratitude of a Nation, made by its Chief Executive, for the 
humane services rendered by the stranger within its gates in the hour 
of great distress." 



1S4 



CHAPTER XVII. 
DECORATIONS, CITATIONS, ETC. 

During the period that American officers were serving in the 
Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, the President of the Republic awarded, 
with appropriate citations, the Presidential Medal of Merit, the Medal 
of Distinction and the Nicaraguan Medal of Merit. As there was 
no copy of the Medal of Distinction in existence, though several had 
been awarded, a design was made in Guardia Headquarters, and after 
being approved by the President was adopted for the Medal of Distinc- 
tion. 

On the recommendation of the Jefe Director of the Guardia, 
another medal, the Cross of Valor, was adopted to be awarded for 
extraordinary heroism in the line of duty. 

While Guardia regulations called for the individual recommenda- 
tions by commanding officers, and the approval of those recommenda- 
tions by a Board of Awards sitting at Headquarters, Guardia Nacional, 
many medals of all types were awarded by the President of the Republic 
of Nicaragua to officers and men of the Guardia without reference to the 
Jefe Director, and without being passed upon by the Board of Awards. 

In addition to the medals, citations were awarded to enlisted men 
individually and as members of organizations, the recipients of which 
were authorized to wear appropriate chevrons. Chevrons were also 
authorized for wounds, contacts, service in the Segovias and for reenlist- 
ments. 

The extracts from Chapter Six of the Guardia Personnel Manual 
quoted below contain the regulations for the award of both medals and 
chevrons : 



135 



"CHAPTER 6 

DECORATIONS, ETC. 

6-1. CHEVRONS: — The following service chevrons and stripes 
are authorized and will be worn on the sleeves of the field shirt by all 
enlisted men entitled thereto ; 

(a) CITATION CHEVRONS: 

To be worn by men cited in general orders; one chevron for 
each citation or commendation. 

(b) CONTACT CHEVRONS: 

To be worn by all men who have participated in contacts with 
the enemy; one chevron for each contact. 

(c) WOUND CHEVRONS: 

To be worn by all men who have been wounded in a contact 
with the enemy; one chevron for each wound received. 

(d) ONE YEAR S SERVICE IN THE NORTHERN OR 

CENTRAL AREA CHEVRON : 

To be worn by all men who have had one year's service in 
the Northern or Central Area, the El Sauce District of Leon 
or the Somotillo District of Chinandega. One chevron for 
each year of such service. 

(e) SERVICE STRIPE: 

To be worn by all re-enlisted men; one stripe for first complete 

enlistment, regardless of duration, and additional stripes 

for each three years of reenlisted service. 

Chevrons and stripes will be of white tape in accordance with the 

sample in the hands of the Quartermaster, Headquarters, Guardia 

Nacional, Managua, a supply of such tape to be issued to each activity 

for issue to the men concerned. 

Chevrons and stripes will be of the size shown in the illustrations 
appended in Uniform Regulations, this Manual, and will be placed on 
the sleeve as indicated, except that a space of one half inch will be left 
between the citation chevron and the chevron indicating rank on the 
right sleeve. (See illustrations in Uniform Regulations, G.N. Volume 3. 

6-2. MEDALS: — Recommendations for and award of: 

(a) The President of Nicaragua having approved a recommenda- 
tion from the Jefe Director that certain Nicaraguan Medals 
be adopted for award to officers and enlisted men of the 
Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, the following regulations 
under which the various medals can be awarded are hereby 
promulgated: 

(b) Classification of medals is as follows : 

1 . Presidential Medal of Merit. 

2. Medal of Distinction. 

3. Cross of Valor. 

4. Nicaraguan Medal of Merit. 



136 



The PRESIDENTIAL ]>4EDAL OF MERIT may be presented 
by the President to any person in the service of the Government of 
Nicaragua who has distinguished himself, or who shall hereafter dis- 
tinguish himself, by extraordinary heroism beyond the call of duty or 
by exceptionally meritorious service to the Government in a position 
of great responsibility; or to any person who shall have rendered, 
or who shall hereafter render, any exceptionally meritorious service 
to the Nicaraguan Government. 

The MEDAL OF DISTINCTION may be presented by the Presi- 
dent to any person who had distinguished himself, or who shall here- 
after distinguish himself, by extraordinary heroism or distinguished 
service to the Government of Nicaragua, such heroism or distinguished 
service not being sufficient to justify the presentation of a Presidential 
Medal of Merit. 

The CROSS^ OF VALOR may be presented by the President to 
any person who while in the service of the Nicaraguan Government has 
distinguished himself, or who shall hereafter distinguish himself, 
by extraordinary heroism in the line of his profession. 

The NICARAGUAN MEDAL OF MERIT may be presented by 
the President to any person who has distinguished himself, or who may 
hereafter distinguish himself by extraordinary heroism or distinguished 
service to the Nicaraguan Government, such heroism or distinguished 
service not being sufficient to justify the presenting of a Presidential 
Medal of Merit, a Medal of Distinction, or a Cross of Valor. 

(c) No more than one Presidential Medal of Merit, Medal of 
Distinction, Cross of Valor, or Nicaraguan Medal of Merit 
will be issued to any one person; but for each succeeding 
deed or service sufficient to justify the award of a Presidential 
Medal of Merit or a Medal of Distinction, the President may 
award a gold palm. For each deed or service sufficient to 
justify the award of a Cross of Valor or a Nicaraguan Medal 
of Merit, the President may award a bronze palm. These 
palms are to be worn with the respective decorations. 

(d) A Board of Awards has been appointed at Headquarters, 
Guardia Nacional, Managua, Nicaragua, to consider all 
recommendations submitted by Area and Department Com- 
manders for awards of medals, letters of commendation, 
citations and other awards to officers and enlisted men of the 
Guardia Nacional, and to further make recommendations to 
the Jefe Director in the premises. It is not the function of the 
board to originate any recommendations. It wil therefore 
be necessary for Area and Department Commanders to submit 
a separate recommendation for each individual, accompanied 
by a citation setting forth in detail the facts pertaining to 
the specific act or acts for which the individual is recom- 
mended. Furthermore, the recommendations submitted will 
specifically state the medal for which the individual is rec- 
ommended. Former Area and Department Comm.anders 
may submit recommendations for awards to officers or en- 
listed men who served under them while they were in command 
of their respective areas or departments. 

(e) The final decision for the award of a medal in all cases rests 
with the President of Nicaragua." 

137 



CHAPTER XVIII. 
THE ELECTION OF 1932. 

Prior to the election of 1928, the candidates of the two contending 
parties, General Moncada and Senor Adolfo Benard, agreed by an 
exchange of letters that the one who was successful would request the 
supervision of the next presidential elections in 1932 by the United 
States. 

Shortly after his inauguration in 1929, President Moncada address- 
ed a formal communication to the Government of the United ■ States 
stating that the Governm.ent of Nicaragua had arrived at an agreement 
with the Supreme Court by which that High Tribunal would appoint 
a citizen of the United States of America, previously designated by 
the President of the United States, as President of the National Board 
of Elections, and requested the designation of the American who would 
serve in this capacity. The President of the United States accordingly 
designated Captain Alfred W. Johnson, U. S. Navy, who was appointed 
by the Nicaraguan Supreme Court on May 20, 1930, and supervised 
the congressional elections of 1930. 

President Moncada made a similar request on June 18, 1931, 
for the cooperation of the United States in the 1932 Presidential elec- 
tions, and Rear Adm.iral Clark H. Woodward, U. S. Navy, was similarly 
appointed as Chairman of the National Board of Elections for the 
1932 electoral period. 

The electoral period of 1932 was of special significance to the 
Guardia Nacional, as in the election of 1928, it was an infant organiza- 
tion able to assist only feebly the troops of the Marine Brigade in pro- 
tecting the voters and the personnel of the Electoral Mission. In 1930 
the Guardia Nacional had grown to a strength and size where it could 
assist materially in the preservation of law and order during the electoral 
period, but there were marines located in the larger towns throughout 
the country furnishing much protection and operating actively to see 
that the personnel engaged in electoral duties were properly safe- 
guarded. In 1932 the marines had been withdrawn from all sections 
where there was likelihood of their coming into contact with any forces 
in armed revolt against the constituted government, and it was the 
stated policy of the American Government that even for the purpose 
of insuring a fair and impartial election no marines should be sent to 
stations where they were exposed to attack by bandits. 

Upon his return from Nicaragua after the elections of 1932, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Charles F. B. Price, U. S. M. C, prepared for the 
Department of State a personnel plan for the supervision of the 1932 
elections. This plan which later became known as Plan "A" was based 
on the assumption that the degree of supervision to be extended over 
the 1932 elections would be as complete as that extended in 1930 and 
1928, and called for a total of 1115 electoral personnel to supervise the 
432 voting mesas, and approximately 1800 Marines, in addition to those 
of the Second Brigade and the Special Service Squadron already in 
Nicaragua or in Central American waters, for use as security troops. 



138 



Meanwhile serious opposition to keeping United States Marines 
in Nicaragua had developed in the United States, among the people 
and in Congress, and no appropriations were available to the Navy 
Department to meet the expenses incident to organizing and trans- 
porting the necessary personnel to Nicaragua. 

These points were discussed at a conference between representa- 
tives of the State and Navy Departments, with the result that Colonel 
Price prepared an alternate plan known as plan "B" which contemplated 
the substitution of Nicaraguan personnel at 178 mesas out of the total 
of 432, and a reduction of the total personnel of the mission to 47 
officers and 596 enlisted men, or a total of 643, instead of the 1115 
contemplated by the previous plan. It was estimated that this plan 
would cost about ^184,000.00 to the Naval appropriations, with a total 
cost to the United States Treasury of ^200,000.00 for the Electoral 
Mission alone. 

The question of what protection would be necessary under this 
plan, over and above that furnished by the Second Brigade was referred 
to the Commander, Special Service Squadron and the Commander, 
Second Brigade as the responsible agencies for furnishing such pro- 
tection. 

The number of troops necessary to furnish adequate protection 
under plan "B" was estimated at 690, by the Commander Second Brigade 
and Commander Special Service Squadron, the Guardia Nacional 
having offered to afford protection to American personnel in towns 
where the Guardia had posts commanded by commissioned officers of 
the Guardia Nacional. This provided for the security of the personnel 
of 178 mesas and all Department Headquarters. 

The Jefe Director of the Guardia further stated "If the American 
Legation secures from the Nicaraguan Government assurances that 
the Nicaraguan Government will provide for an adequate force of 
selected citizens to be approved, armed, and controlled by the Guardia 
Nacional. said citizens being selected from those who are willing to 
engage themselves as 'CI VI COS' of the Guardia Nacional. The 
Guardia Nacional will furnish protection to the electoral personnel of 
the 178 mesas to be supervised by Nicaraguan citizens, in addition to 
those mesas supervised by American personnel where the Guardia 
Nacional had posts commanded by an officer." (Memo. J.D GN 5 
April, 1932). 

Meanwhile a provision had been inserted in the Naval Appro- 
priation bill for 1933 that no part of the funds appropriated be used 
for the supervision of the Nicaraguan elections, and the Commander 
of the Special Service Squadron was notified that the additional 690 
troops needed for the security of the Electoral personnel could not be 
furnished. In a letter of 17 April, 1932, to the Chief of Naval Operations 
the Commander, Special Service Squadron stated, "Further careful 
consideration of plan "B" made it extremely doubtful if there could be 
any material reduction in the additional troops necessary for guards if 
the plan were to be rigidly adhered to. Other means were therefor 
sought to furnish a satisfactory solution. 



139 



"Attention is invited to the enclosure which is a suggested modifica- 
tion of plan "B" 

"This plan was thoroughly gone over in our conference here and 
was satisfactory to those present, the American Minister, Jefe Director 
of the Guardia Nacional, Commanding General of the Second Brigade 
and Comsperon. It will be noted that no additional combatant troops 
or guards to those now on hand need be furnished. It is assumed that 
the marine allowances of the Second Brigade and the Special Service 
Squadron will be kept up to strength." 

This plan which was finally adopted, provided that no Americans 
be sent into remote or dangerous districts, but the electoral duties 
in such districts were to be taken over by Nicaraguans selected by the 
National Board of Elections and taken from both the leading parties. 
Marine Security detachments were to be placed in the towns of Mata- 
galpa, Juigalpa, Granada, Leon and Chinandega, with such protection 
as might be neces ary in Managua, Carazo and Masaya Departments 
to be furnished from the garrison at Managua. The usual supervision 
of the Nicaraguan coasts by ships cf the Special Service Squadron to 
continue during the electoral period. Destroyers to be held so as not 
to be more than 24 hours steaming distance from any Nicaraguan port 
and to make routine trips to these ports fromi time to time during the 
electoral period. 

The orders to the Marine security detachments clearly stated the 
State Department policy that they were not in any sense to be con- 
sidered as available for the general preservation of peace during the 
Electoral Period, and limited their duties to protecting American person- 
nel engaged in the supervision of the election. 

(1) — (A-ppendix 1 — Chapter 18) 

This left to the Guardia the task of preserving law and order, pro- 
tecting Am.erican personnel in 178 voting mesas, and all the Nicaraguan 
personnel assigned to the Electoral Mission. 

The Electoral Law as applied to the situation placed the Chair- 
man of the U. S. Electoral Mission in com.miand of all troops both Mar- 
ines and Guardia on duty in Nicaragua during the period of registration 
and election. Most of the American members of the Mission v/ere line 
officers of the Navy or Marine Corps. The Letter of Instructions of 
the National Board of Elections as first issued placed this responsi- 
bility in case of emergency or bandit attack, with com^m^ensurate au- 
thority in the hands of the Departmiental Chairmen of the Electoral 
Mission who were in many cases line officers junior to the Marine and 
Guardia officers charged with the protection of the mesas. This mat- 
ter was quickly adjusted when brought to the attention of the Chair- 
man of the Electorial Mission by the Jefe Director of the Guardia, 
and the following resolution clarifying the situation was adopted and 
made a part of the letter of instructions of the National Board of Elect- 
ions: 

Leg-Div. Elec. Mis. 
REW: 9/10/32/ 

140 



i 



WHEREAS: 
The contents of paragraph (b), under the subject "GUARDIA 
NACIONAL", as contained in the "Letter of Instructions" adopted 
by the National Board of Elections at the fifth session on 1 September 
1932, appear to require further amplification and extension in order 
to clearly establish the electoral mission of the Guardia Nacional, and 
to fix responsibility for the exercise of command under certain cir- 
cumstances during the electoral period; be it 

RESOLVED: 
That the aforesaid paragraph (b) is hereby amended to provide as 
follows, and that said amendment shall be furnished all persons and 
officers in possession of one or more copies of the said "Letter of Instruc- 
tions" for their information and guidance: 

"(b) In view of the foregoing, the Guardia Nacional shall, 
under the direction of the Jefe Director thereof, cooperate in every 
way with the National Board of Elections to insure a free and fair 
election of Supreme Authorities of the Republic of Nicaragua 
during the current electoral period of 1932. It shall, upon the 
request of the respective Chairm.en of the Departmental Boards of 
Elections, assign the necessary personnel to guard and preserve 
order at each electoral mesa as far as the available personnel of 
the Guardia Nacional make this possible. 

"The paramount duty of both the U. S. Electoral Mission 
and the Guardia Nacional on the days of the registrations and 
the election shall be the preservation of a free and fair election. 
For the accomplishment of this purpose, Guardia Commanders 
shall comply to the fullest extent with all requests of the Chairmen 
of Departmental Boards of Elections, and shall utilize all regular 
Guardia, Auxiliares, and Municipal Police under their control 
for this purpose. 

"The Guardia Nacional shall retain its responsibility for the 
security of lives and property, and shall use every resource at its 
disposal to prevent bandits and armed forces in revolt against 
the existing government of the Republic of Nicaragua from 
intimidating peaceful, lawabiding inhabitants and interfering with 
the exercise of the right of qualified electors to register and vote. 
"In any case of general rioting, attack by bandits, or other 
grave and immediate emergency threatening the successful ac- 
complishment of the purpose of the U. S. Electoral Mission, or 
the lives of personnel engaged in the supervision of the aforesaid 
elections or in the guarding and maintaining of law and order at 
the electoral mesas, the senior line officer of the Navy or Marine 
Corps present shall immediately assume command of all forces, 
including those of both the Guardia Nacional and the U. S. Elec- 
toral Mission, and take such steps as are necessary to meet the 
military situation. In all such cases, the officer assuming 
command, as herein set forth, and all of the foregoing personnel 
thereby engaged in the maintenance of law and order, shall pass, 
for this purpose, under the command of the Jefe Director 
of the Guardia Nacional. Prompt reports of all disorders and 



141 



emergencies, as described above, shall be transmitted to the Jefe 

Director of the Guardia Nacional and the President of the National 

Board of Elections." 

Upon arrival of the personnel of the United States Electoral 
Mission in Nicaragua, a Departmental Chairman was sent to each 
political department, where after a study of the situation and in 
consultation with the Department Commander of the Guardia, he 
prepared a recommendation as to ths number and location of the mesas 
to be established in his Department. After the mesas had been decided 
upon it became the duty of the Guardia Nacional to make the necessary 
arrangements for their protection. 

These arrangements fell into two categories, the preservation 
locally of law and order, safeguarding the lives of the electoral personnel 
and the security of the ballot boxes; and the protection of the areas 
against bandit attacks, and depredations, securing safe conduct to the 
voters on their way to and from the voting mesas for the purpose of 
voting, and furnishing protection to the propaganda activities of both 
parties. The problem of the Guardia was rendered more difficult 
by the fact that the Jueces de la Mesta and Jefes de Canton, a sort of 
rural constable whose cooperation had been found very useful, were 
relieved of their duties and authority for the Electoral period, which 
extended from 7 September, 1932, the first day of registration, to 6 
November, 1932, the day of the election, inclusive. 

After the number and the location of the mesas had been deter- 
mined, it was found, as had been anticipated, that the available strength 
of the Guardia was insufficient to meet the demands of the situation. 
The Jefe Director, therefore sent the following letter to the President 
of Nicaragua requesting authority to enlist a limited number of auxil- 
iares for usa as mesa guards and for the maintenance of order: 



142 



HEADQUARTERS, 
GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA, 
MANAGUA, NICARAGUA. 
13 September, 1932. 

Excelentismo Sr. Presidente: 

The National Board of Elections has requested the services of the 
Guardia Nacional to furnish guards and maintain order during the 
electoral period, in excess of the number of Guardias now authorized. 

I highly appreciate the economic support given by your Excellency 
to the Guardia Nacional in the past, and due to the economic situation 
of the country I do no dssire to request from Your Excellency another 
additional ciedit. 

As a result of strict economy during a long period, the Guardia 
Nacional has now on hand some funds in excess which are available 
for immediate use. With the funds now on hand, a limited number of 
Auxiliares could be maintained during the electoral period by trans- 
ferring the savings from the account of the Guardia Nacional and Prison 
maintenance to the credit granted by Your Excellency, for pay and 
maintenance of Auxiliares. 

In view thereof, it is requested that Your Excellency authorize the 
enlistment of a number of Auxiliares which may be maintained with 
previously approved credits, and transfer the necessary funds from the 
account of the Guardia Nacional and prisons to the credit of pay and 
maintenance of Auxiliares under Guardia Nacional control. 

Con toda consideracion, me suscribo del Excom. Senor Presidente, 
atento y seguro servidor, 

/s/ C. B. MATTHEWS, 
Jefe Director, G.N. 



Sr. Don Jose Maria Moncada, 
Presidente de la Republica de Nicaragua, 
Casa Presidencial, 
Managua, Nicaragua. 



Copies to: American Minister by cover letter. 

Admiral Woodward, 

FILE. 



I 



143 



At this time the total strength of the Guardia Nacional was 242 
officers and 2250 enlisted, to this could be added 150 auxiliares, in the 
Departments of Leon and Chinandega, and 203 Municipal Police, 
making a total strength available for all purposes 242 officers, including 
Medical officers, and 2603 men. The Jefe Director under the authority 
granted by President Moncada in response to the former's request of 
September 13th enlisted 300 auxiliares, who performed duty as mesa 
guards releasing regular Guardia for combat and patrol duties. 

In addition to safeguarding the electoral personnel, and furnishing 
protection to the citizens of Nicaragua while registering and voting at 
the general election, the Guardia was charged with the duty of preserv- 
ing order during the plebiscite of the Liberal Party held on 31 July 
and 7 August, 1932, (1), and complete control over the manufacture, 
sale possession, transportation and distribution of alcoholic liquors. 
The manufacture of Aguardiente, and its sale to retailers was a govern- 
ment monopoly. This monopoly did not extend to beer which was 
brewed and sold both at wholesale and retail by private citizens. (2) 

At the beginning of the Electoral period there were many rumors 
in circulation that Sandino and his bandit groups were going to prevent 
or at least seriously interfere with the holding of a free and fair election. 
At the same time reports were received of accumulation of arms and 
ammunition in the Honduran towns of Danli and Choluteca. Guardia 
intelligence indicated that the main bandit groups were mobilizing 
for some activity. The Guardia therefore planned and executed strong 
offensive campaigns against each of the three principal bandit groups 
with the result that two of them were decisively defeated, and the other 
was fought to a stand-still in a long drawnout battle with a patrol com- 
posed mostly of auxiliares, under command of native officers, compelled 
to expend the bulk of its ammunition and thus deprived of its offensive 
power until after the election had been held. In addition numerous 
small patrols operated constantly throughout the areas subject to 
bandit depredations, making many contacts and succeeded in com- 
pletely preventing interference with the registration and voting and 
reduced the intimidation of voters to a minimum, so that both the 
number of registrations and the number of votes cast exceeded those 
of the 1928 elections. 

(1) Appendix 2 — Chapter 18 

(2) Appendix 3 — Chapter 18 

The task of providing a free and fair election to the people of 
Nicaragua was recognized as the paramount mission of all forces of 
the United States Naval Service participating therein, and after a few 
administrative difficulties were ironed out, the members of the four 
organizations involved, i.e., Special Service Squadron, Second Brigade, 
USMC, The American Electoral Mission, and the Guardia Nacional 
de Nicaragua, displayed a remarkable spirit of cooperation and single- 
ness of purpose, as each played its separate part in the accomplishment 
cf the task of fulfilling a promise made by Constituted and Responsible 
Authorities of the Government of the United States of America to a 
weaker and smaller country, for the purpose of assisting it to maintain 
its independence and meet its obligations as a member of the family 
of civilized nations of the world. As to the manner of performance of 

144 



duty by the Guardia, Admiral Woodward expressed his appreciation of 
its activities in the following letter to the Jefe Director, copies of which 
wei e made a part of the official records of all the commissioned personnel 
of the organization : 



UNITED STATES ELECTORAL MISSION 

TO 

NICARAGUA 

Managua, Nicaragua. 
28 November, 1932. 

From: Chairman, U. S. Electoral Mission to Nicaragua. 

To: Major General Commandant, Headquarters, U. S. Marine 

Corps. 

Subject: Performance of the Guardia Nacional under command of 
Lieutenant Colonel C. B. Matthews, USMC, (Major 
General, G.N.). 

1. During the recent electoral period, the Guardia Nacional 
de Nicaragua, under the able leadership of Lieutenant Colonel C. B. 
Matthews, U. S. Marine Corps (Major-General of the Guardia Nacional) 
performed outstanding service in the maintaining of law and order 
throughout the Republic of Nicaragua. Greatly handicapped by the 
lack of sufficient personnel and funds, this organization conducted 
itself in a manner that would be a credit to any military organization. 
Their determined persistence to accomplish their difficult task, their 
complete non-partisan attitude and the exemplary conduct of the 
personnel as a whole and especially those who are members of the U.S. 
Marine Corps merits the highest praise. 

2. It was the bold self-sacrificing and determined action of 
the Guardia Nacional that made possible the outstanding success 
attained by the Electoral Mission in its supervision of the National 
Elections of Supreme Authorities this year. 

3. From my personal observation of the Guardia and my 
close association with Colonel Matthews in military affairs through- 
out the electoral period, during which the Guardia Nacional was under 
my command, it is apparent that the wonderful morale and efficiency 
of the Guardia Nacional is due in high degree to Colonel Matthews' 
ability as an organizer, his calm, sound judgment, thorough knowledge 
of military matters and his comprehensive understanding of human 
nature. 

4. I request that a copy of this letter be made a part of the 
military record of Lieutenant Colonel Matthews. 

/s/ C. H. WOODWARD 
145 



To the native Nicaraguan officers and enlisted men of the Guardia 
is due great praise for their devotion to duty and the manner in which 
they preserved their neutrality during the elections, when party feeling 
was at its height. With remarkably few exceptions their work was as 
conscientiously and impartially done as was that of the American officers. 

Attached are copies of the orders issued in the Guardia Nacional 
covering its activities in connection with its electoral duties. (1) (2) (3) 
(4) (5) (6) (7) 

(1) Appendiz 4 — Chapter 18 

(2) Appendix 5 — Chapter 18 

(3) Appendix 6 — Chapter 18 

(4) Appendix 7 — Chapter 18 

(5) Appendix 8 — Chapter 18 

(6) Appendix 9 — Chapter 18 

(7) Appendix 10-Chapter 18 



146 



CHAPTER XIX. 
THE TURN OVER 

When the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua was first organized with 
officers of the United States Marine Corps and Medical Corps of the 
United States Navy to command it and act as inscructors for a corps 
of Nicaraguan officers, it was assumed that the time allowed to put 
the Guardia on its feet and build up an officer personnel to command 
it would be set by treaty, and would be a matter of at least ten years. 
On the change of administration in the United States as a result of 
the elections of 1928, the American policy became opposed to the 
military intervention in Nicaraguan affairs, and it was soon known that 
the American military forces would be withdrawn earlier than was first 
expected. 

This withdrawal could not be made immediately because of the 
commitments already made by the American government. Mr. Stimson 
at the signing of the Tipitapa agreement had promised that the United 
States would use its armed forces to disarm any of the troops of either 
of the armies engaged in the revolution who refused to lay down their 
arms. Furthermore the United States was morally obligated to super- 
vise the elections of 1930 and 1932, having encouraged and given its 
approval to the agreement of the two Nicaraguan presidential candi- 
dates in 1928 that the one who was successful would request supervision 
of the elections to be held during these two years. Hence it devolved 
upon the officers in command of the Guardia to prepare plans for the 
procurement of a corps of native officers to replace the American officers 
at an early date, presumably some time after the election of 1932. 

The situation offered many difficulties, first due to the revolt 
of Sandino it was necessary to keep as many as possible of the Guardia 
in the field operating against the forces of the revolt. This situation 
required that experienced officers be placed in command of the troops 
of the north which were actively engaged with the enemy. It was 
impracticable to place untrained native officers in the higher offices 
thus giving them command over the experienced American officers 
of the Guardia, and no natives of the type desired for the higher offices 
would accept commissions as Second Lieutenants, or in other junior 
ranks in order to gain the experience necessary to enable them to prop- 
erly assume the duties and responsibilities of higher command. 

The first step taken was to commission a number of worthy non- 
commissioned officers who had proven themselves in battle, and pro- 
mote them to the rank of Second Lieutenant, but keeping them at all 
times junior, for the purpose of command, to the American officers 
of the same grade. Eight native officers were commissioned in Novem- 
ber, 1929. A military academy was established from which the first 
class of nine Cadets graduated on June 22, 1930, and were commissioned 
Second Lieutenants. By the date of the evacuation four classes 
totalling 166 cadets had been graduated. The third and fourth classes 
were commissioned as Second Lieutenants (Temporary), upon gradua- 
tion in order that they might have a period of probation before receiving 
permanent commissions. 



147 



While these newly commissioned officers were in the aggregate 
all that could be expected with the amount of training and instruction 
that could be given them in the time allowed, they were all young 
men and relatively inexperienced, not so much in military affairs as 
in administrative problems. The Jefe Director of the Guardia as well 
as the President of the Republic of Nicaragua, was not willing to turn 
over to them the responsibilities of administering and maintaining 
the Guardia organization, which had hardly been in existence long 
enough to function efficiently under its experienced commandres, 
and could hardly even with their assistance be called a well oiled 
machine. These facts were made known to the American Minister, 
and at his request, the Jefe Director of the Guardia recommended a 
plan for the turnover to the control of Nicaraguan officers. The 
story is best told by the correspondence between the two : 
"3-CBM-wsl. 



.4S 



HEADQUARTERS, 

GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA, 

MANAGUA, NICARAGUA. 

15 June, 1932. 

Sir: 

In compliance with your verbal request that I give you my further 
views on the subject of the turnover of the command of the Guardia 
Nacional to native Nicaraguan officers, I wish to state that, while 
the turnover once started should be completed as promptly as possible 
to avoid responsibility devolving on a small number of American officers 
without their having the commensurate authority and force of numbers 
to meet it, an orderly turnover is vitally important and the short time 
available under the present plan makes such a turnover highly proble- 
matical. 

It will in all probability not be practicable to secure the appoint- 
ment of suitable native officers for the higher commands during the 
current administration. The President who will be elected on 6 Novem- 
ber, 1932 and inaugurated on 1 January, 1933, will have to be depended 
upon to make these appointments. I believe that some time should 
be allowed the incoming President for the making of these appoint- 
ments after he takes office. It is probable that these appointments 
could be made and an orderly turnover effected in one month. How- 
ever in the instructions issued to the Jefe Director he should be allowed 
some latitude. A maximum of two months after the inauguration of 
the new President should be sufficient. The Jefe Director should be 
allowed to retain fifty American officers until the turnover is completed. 

I do not believe that the little bit of training in higher command 
that could be given the newly appointed officers in the time allowed, 
would be of enough importance to warrant serious consideration. 
The best that can be hoped for is that men of character and standing 
in the country with some experience in administrative matters and 
in handling men and with a minimum of political bias may be secured. 
It would be most helpful if these officers could be selected in equal num- 
bers from the two political parties and I recommend that our Govern- 
ment use its good offices with the new President to bring about this 
result. 

Very truly yours, 

/s/ C. B. MATTHEWS, 
JEFE DIRECTOR, G. N. 

The Honorable Matthew E. Hanna, 
The American Minister, 
Legation of the United States of America 
Managua, Nicaragua. 



149 



Secstate 



Gray 



July 19, 1932 4 p.m. 
72 



Legation's dispatch 828 June 21 . The Department has given care- 
ful consideration to the question of turning over the Guardia to Nicar- 
aguan control (period) While it agrees with General Matthews that an 
(quote) orderly turnover is vitally important(end quote) and notes 
his opinion (quote) that the short time available under the present 
plan mades such a turnover highly problematical (end quote) the 
Department is strongly of the opinion that it would not be advisable 
to leave any Marines in Nicaragua after the date already announced 
for their withdrawal and considers it essential to adhere to the plan 
to withdraw the Marines immediately after the new President takes 
office (paragraph) 

The Department notes that General Matthews does not believe 
that (quote) the little bit of training in higher command that could be 
given the newly appointed officers in the short time allowed (parenthesis) 
he apparently means two months (end parenthesis) would be of enough 
importance to warrant serious consideration (end of quotation) (period) 
The basis of a really orderly turnover that would not immediately 
breakdown would seem to lie not merely in the transfer of positions 
to Nicaraguan officers but in the ability of these officers to handle 
capably and efficiently their new duties when once assumed it appears 
to the Department therefore that the first step should consist in the 
immediate selection by Matthews of those Nicaraguans who will hold 
the higher commands upon the withdrawal of the Marines particularly 
of those men who will occupy the key positions both on headquarters 
staff and in the field in order that they may serve an apprenticeship 
by working along side the American officers now holding those positions 
for the time remaining before January 1st In this connection the 
Department is seriously concerned that there are no Nicaraguan officers 
of higher rank than Lieutenant (period) In fact it understands that all 
but two of these officers are Second Lieutenants (period) It is in order 
that such inexperienced men shall not be suddenly appointed to positions 
of responsibility that the Department feels steps should be taken to 
select and appoint immediately those who will hold higher commands 
in the Guardia after American withdrawal (period) In this connection 
it is suggested that General Matthews divide his selections as nearly 
as possible both as to number and rank between Liberals and Con- 
servatives (period) The important point would seem to be that those 
Nicaraguans who are to occupy highest and responsible positions obtain 
as much instruction and experience as possible in order to prepare them 
to take over their commands when the new President takes office 
(paragraph) 

Furthermore the commander of the Guardia will be able to judge in 
those succeeding months and especially by their conduct in the electoral 



150 



period how trustworthy these officers are and any who do not measure up 
to requirements can be removed before the Guardia is turned over 
July 19 5 p.m. 

Stimson. 



3-CBM-JCS-wsl. 

HEADQUARTERS, 

GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA, 

MANAGUA, NICARAGUA. 

8 August, 1932. 

Sir: 

I note that in dispatch No. 72 of July 19, 1932, from the Secretary 
of the State, Washington, D. C, that the State Department agrees 
with me that an orderly turnover of the Guardia to Nicaraguan control 
is vitally important but is strongly of the opinion that it would not be 
advisable to leave any Marines in Nicaragua after the date already 
announced for their withdrawal, and considers it essential to adhere 
to the plan to withdraw the Marines im.mediately after the new Presi- 
dent takes office. 

This of course renders impossible the adoption of my original 
plan that the new President appoint, upon his assumption of office, 
Nicaraguans in the higher offices of the Guardia and that the present 
incumbents, Marine Corps officers, remain for a period of not to exceed 
two months in order to insure an orderly turnover. 

In view of the conditions of the political unrest and financial 
instability existing in Nicaragua and the fact that there is no immediate 
prospect of the cessation of the armed resistance to the governm.ent, 
led by Sandino v/ho has announced that he will continue his resistance 
against any president elected under American supervision, it is incon- 
ceivable to me that any President will accept or continue in office 
Nicaraguan officers, of high rank in key positions in the Guardia, of 
whose personal loyalty to himself and to his party there is the slightest 
doubt. His Excellency, the present Chief Executive, has shov/n con- 
clusively that party and personal loyalty are large considerations in the 
appointment of even the present junior Nicaraguan officers of the 
Guardia and of the cadets of the Military Academy, who because of 
their youth have not become seriously involved in politics. He has 
passed personally on each applicant for appointment and rejected 
many who appeared in every way eligible for appointment, except for; 
their policical or fam.il^^ affiliations. In certain cases I have been re- 
quired to investigate the enlistments of members of the Conservative 
party as privates in the Guardia. 

151 



In view of these conditions, the existence of which I believe every 
one familiar with the situation here will admit, it is obviously impossible 
to select for the higher commands of the Guardia, Nicaraguans who will 
be acceptable to the new President until it is known who the new Presi- 
dent will be. Hence my alternate plan is : Immediately upon the nomi- 
nation of the candidates of the leading political parties, to arrange 
with each candidate for the selection of a list of names, composed equally 
of members of both parties acceptable to him ; and immediately after 
the election has been decided, request the present Chief Executive 
to appoint to the higher commands the persons on the list of the 
successful candidate, to work alongside the American personnel until 
January 2nd when their appointments will be made permanent by the 
new President. This plan overcomes the objection to leaving any 
Marines in Nicaragua after January 2nd, and is one which I hope can 
be put into effect without serious difficulties. 

It will be necessary to give the additional officers appointed under 
this plan the rank and pay of at least Captains, and for this purpose 
an additional appropriation will be required. The number of this 
class of officers should be thirty (30 )and the additional appropriation 
should therefore be three thousand seven hundred and fifty cordobas 
(C^3750.00) per month. 

I have considered and rejected as impracticable the plan of re- 
questing the President to appoint Nicaraguans whom I believe to be 
qualified for the higher ranks before the candidates of the leading parties 
are known; both because I am certain that the present Chief Executive 
will refuse to make the necessary appointments because of the expense 
involved, and because no one would accept an appointment without 
assurance that it would be made permanent by the new President, 
an assurance which it is of course impossible to give at the present time. 
There is another plan that suggests itself which has much in its favor 
but in addition to the expense involved presents so many difficulties, 
due to the uncertainty of the political situation, that I have also rejected 
it as impracticable at this time. It is to have the leading candidates 
agree upon a list of names and request President Moncada to make the 
necessary appointments from this list, both candidates pledging them- 
selves to continue these appointments in office. This also rests upon 
the uncertainty as to the identity of the leading candidates, and its 
success depends upon the possibility of obtaining the agreement between 
them. 

Very truly yours, 
/s/ C. B. MATTHEWS, 
JEFE DIRECTOR, G. N. 

The Honorable Matthew E. Hanna, 
The American Minister, 
Legation of the United States of America, 
Managua, Nicaragua. 



152 



No. 885 Managua, August 9, 1932. 

Subject: General Matthew's plan for turning over the Guardia to 
Nicaraguan officers. 

The Honorable 

The Secretary of State, 
Washington, D. C. 

Sir: 

With reference to the department's telegram No. 72 of July 19, 
4 p.m., regarding the question of turning over the Guardia to Nicar- 
aguan control, I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of a letter 
of August 8, 1932, from General Matthews in which he presents for 
the Department's consideration the plan he suggests for the selection 
of the Nicaraguan officers to replace the American officers serving with 
the Guardia. 

The essential points of Matthews' letter are as follows : 

(1) To arrange with each Presidential candidate of the leading 
political parties, immediately after the nomination of the candidates, 
for the selection of a list of names composed equally of members of 
both parties acceptable to such candidate. 

(2) To request President Moncada, immediately after the Presi- 
dential election has been decided, to appoint to the higher commands 
in the Guardia the persons on the list of the successful candidate, such 
appointments to be made permanent by the new President on January 
2, 1933. 

It will be specially noted that the list approved by each Presi- 
dential candidate is to be composed equally of the members of both 
political parties. 

The officers thus appointed would begin their service about the 
middle of November and the additional appropriation for their salaries 
would be approximately ,^5,625 until January 1, 1933. 

General Matthews has set forth in his letter his reasons for re- 
jecting other plans considered by him and for recommending the pro- 
posed plan as the one best suited for an orderly turnover of ths Guardia 
under the conditions confronting him. 

General Matthews will proceed to carry out this plan as soon as 
he has learned it has received the Department's approval. He has 
not consulted President Moncada in this connection nor have I. I 
think President Moncada should be advised of the plan adopted when 
it has received the Department's approval and I would appreciate 
the Department's instructions as to the manner in which that advice 
should be given to him. 

Respectfully yours, 

/s/ MATTHEW E. HANNA. 



153 



The Jefe Director's plan of August 8, 1932, met with the approval 
of the State Department and he was directed orally by the American 
Minister to proceed to put it into effect. Meanwhile Mr. Hanna, 
the Minister, advised President Moncada as to the details of the plan 
for the turnover. They met with his approval and he agreed to make 
the necessary temporary appointments, and suggested that the two 
Presidential candidates sign an agreement in the presence of the 
American Minister, pledging themsslves to preserve the non-partisan 
character of the Guardia during the period that either was President 
of Nicaragua. (1) 

It was decided as the most practical method of working out the 
plan, that th2 Jefe Director would furnish each candidate with a list 
of names of Nicaraguan citizens considered suitable for officers in the 
higher ranks of the Guardia, which had previously been prepared 
under his direction. From this list, or from other suitable citizens, 
each candidate was requested to select fifty names of persons that were 
acceptable to him^; an equal number from each political party. From 
the list of the successful candidate President Moncada was to com- 
mission thirty, half from each party, as soon as practicable after the 
result of the election had been officially determined. 

In the absence from the country of Senor Adolfo Diaz, the Con- 
servative candidate, the matter as far as the Conservative party was 
concerned was handled by the candidate for vice-president. General 
Emiliano Chamorro 

The toliowing translation of letters from the Guardia files record 
the events as they happened; 



154 



"3-CBM 
JCS-fam 



HEADQUARTERS, 

GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA, 

MANAGUA, NICARAGUA. 

20 October, 1932. 

My dear Doctor Sacasa (General Chamorro) : 

I have received appropriate instructions to proceed with the 
execution of the plan set forth below for selecting Nicaraguan officers 
to replace American officers serving with the Guardia Nacional, which 
plan has received the approval of the Government of Nicaragua and 
the Government of the United States: 

(a) Each of the Presidential candidates of the two Historical 
Parties in Nicaragua will be requested to present immediately 
a list of names acceptable to each candidate from which may be 
selected the Nicaraguan officers who are to replace the American 
officers now serving in the Guardia. The list of names thus pre- 
sented by each candidate shall be composed equally of members 
of both political parties. 

(b) The two Presidential candidates will be requested to 
sign an agreement in the presence of the American Minister in 
which they pledge themselves respectively to preserve strictly 
the non-partisan character of the Guardia during the period that 
one or the other of the candidates is President of Nicaragua. 

(Note: I am advised that this feature of the plan has been 
communicated to the respective candidates by the American 
Minister.) 

(c) President Moncada will be requested, immediately after 
the Presidential election has been decided, to appoint to the higher 
commands in the Guardia the persons on the list of the successful 
candidate. 

(d) The Nicaraguan officers thus appointed will work along- 
side the American officers until January 2 when their appointments 
will be made permanent by the newly inaugurated President of the 
Republic. 

In accordance with our conversation of recent date and in com- 
pliance with your request, I have the pleasure of submitting herewith 
a list of names of Nicaraguan citizens who have been recommended 
to me as suitable for officers in che higher ranks of the Guardia Nacional. 

Will you please furnish me at your earliest convenience a list of 
fifty names of Nicaraguan citizens composed equally of members of 
both political parties whose appointment to the Guardia is desired by 
you should the Liberal Party (Conservative Party) be successful in 
the coming elections. These names may be taken from the list I am 
submitting to you or may be those of any other suitable citizens whom 
you may select. 

155 



I am, my dear Doctor Sacasa (General Chamorro), 

Very truly yours, 
/s/ C. B. MATTHEWS, 
JEFE DIRECTOR, G.N. 



Dr. Juan B. Sacasa, 

City. 

(General Emiliano Chamorro, 

City). 

3-CBM 

JCS-cd. 



156 



HEADQUARTERS, 

GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA, 

MANAGUA, NICARAGUA. 

29 October, 1932. 

Senor Juan B. Sacasa, (General Chamorro), 

Managua, Nicaragua. 

Distinguido Dr. Sacasa: (General Chamorro): 

In accordance with your verbal request of this date I am sub- 
mitting herewith for your information a list of the higher commands 
and executive ranks in the Guardia Nacional. 

POSITION: RANK: 

Jefe Director Major-General 

Chief of Staff Colonel 

Operations & Training Officer (GN-2&3) Colonel 

Law Officer Colonel 

Area Commander, Northern Area Colonel 

Area Commander, Central Area Colonel 

Area Commander, Eastern Area Colonel 

Paymaster, Guardia Headquarters Major 

Quartermaster, Guardia Headquarters Major 

Executive Officer, Northern Area Major 

Executive Officer, Central Area Major 

Executive Officer, Eastern Area Major 

Department Commander, Leon Major 

Department Commander, Granada Major 

Communications Officer, Headquarters GN Captain 

Adjutant, Guardia Headquarters, GN-1 Ist-Lieutenant 

It is my view that those officers to fill the above positions should 
be selected from the names on the list submitted to you, and from among 
other citizens of like mature age, experience and general reputation, 
the balance of the final list of thirty (30) to be appointed Captains as 
assistants to those appointed to the higher ranks. 

It is also my intention under the final agreement to be drawn up 
in connection with the turnover of the Guardia, to recommend that 
the officer appointed to fill the position of Chief of Staff of the Guardia 
Nacional hold the rank of Brigadier-General and that of Adjutant 
and GN-1 shall have the rank of Captain. 

/s/ C. B. MATTHEWS, 
JEFE DIRECTOR, G. N. 



W7 



Information of the appointment of officers without previous mili- 
tary training to the higher commands was not favorably received by 
the native commissioned officers of the Guardia. In order to quiet 
the many false rumors that were being circulated and assure the Nicara- 
guan officers already in the Guardia of fair treatment the Jefe Director 
had a plan prepared providing for their promotion to the next higher 
rank. 

Special Order Number 38, containing this information was pub- 
lished on October 21, 1932. President Moncada approved of the idea 
and made the promotions recommended by the Jefe Director without 
exception. This had the desired effect of quieting many of the rumors 
in circulation and by assuring promotion and furnishing definite 
information as to their future status, it allayed much of the dissatis- 
faction among the junior officers of the Guardia. 



158 



3-CD-fam. 

HEADQUARTERS, 

GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA, 

MANAGUA, NICARAGUA. 

October 21, 1932. 

SPECIAL ORDER ) 
NUMBER 38-1932) 

1. Arrangements are being made for the appointment of a 
number of officers selected from, citizens of Nicaragua of mature age 
and experience to some of the higher executive and command positions 
in the Guardia Nacional. 

2. It is the present intention of the Jefe Director, upon grad- 
uation of the new class at the Military Academy on or about November 
30, 1932, to recommend the following promotions among the Nicar- 
aguan officers of the Guardia. 

(a) All Nicaraguan offixers down to and including Second Lieu- 
tenant Lisandro Delgadillo, G.N., for promotion to the rank of 
Captain. 

(b) All officers of the class of 1931 of the Military Academy, 
and other Permanent Second Lieutenants, for promotion to the 
rank of First Lieutenant. 

(c) Nicaraguan Medical officers for promotion as recommended 
by the Medical Director. 

(d) All Nicaraguan Second Lieutenants (Temporary) for promotion 
to the rank of Second Lieutenant (Permanent). 

3. Examination questions for promotions to the grades of 
Captain and First Lieutenant, with exception of Medical Officers, are 
now being prepared by the faculty of the Military Academy. Officers 
due for promotion in these grades will be examined in accordance with 
Guardia regulations prior to November 30, 1932. 

4. Examinations for promotions of Medical Officers will be 
prepared by the Medical Director and those recommended will be 
examined prior to November 30, 1932. 

5. Second Lieutenants (Temporary) will be recommended for 
permanent commissions on their records alone, and no examination 
will be required of them. 

6. This order will be published to all Nicaraguan officers 
of the Guardia and every opportunity for study afforded to those officers 
of whom promotion examinations will be required. 

BY ORDER OF THE JEFE DIRECTOR, MAJOR-GENERAL 

C. B. MATTHEWS, G. N.: 
/s/ J. C. SMITH, 

COLONEL, G. N. 

CHIEF OF STAFF 

OFFICIAL: 
/s/ C. DAVIS, 
1st Lieut. G. N. 
GN-L 

159 



The lists of names were duly furnished by the two candidates and 
presented to President Moncada by the Jefe Director of the Guardia. 
Immediately after the election Doctor Sacasa, the successful candidate, 
requested permission to withdraw his list and substitute another. 
His request was acceded to by President Moncada and the American 
Minister. The new list was accordingly prepared and submitted 
through the Jefe Director to the President, who proceeded to make 
the necessary appointments. 

3-CBM 
JCS-fam 

HEADQUARTERS, 

GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA, 

MANAGUA, NICARAGUA. 

17 November, 1932. 

Excelentismo Senor Presidente: 

In accordance with the plan of turning over the Guardia Nacional 
to the control of Nicaraguan officers and the approved agreement 
entered into before election to insure the non-partisan status of the 
Guardia, I have the honor to submit to your Excellency a list of names 
furnished me this date by Doctor Juan B. Sacasa, President-Elect 
of the Republic of Nicaragua. 

This list is a revision of the list of names furnished me prior to 
the election by Doctor Sacasa and was made, according to my under- 
standing, with the approval of your Excellency and the American 
Minister. 

Doctor Sacasa requests that thirty-five of the gentlemen named 
on this list, in addition to General Anastacio Somoza who already has 
been appointed as Assistant Jefe Director of the Guardia, be com- 
missioned as officers of the Guardia Nacional to take over the higher 
commands. In view of the fact that one of these officers is to be Chief 
of Staff, and in accordance with the above agreement the Chief of Staff 
is to be a member of the party of the successful candidate, it is requested 
that of the thirty-five names selected eighteen be members of the Liberal 
Party and seventeen be members of the Conservative Party. 

In view of the short time remaining before the turnover must be 
completed, I respectfully request that your Excellency take the nec- 
essary action to have the new officers commissioned at the earliest 
practicable date. 



Con toda consideracion etc.. 



/s/ C. B. MATTHEWS, 
JEFE DIRECTOR, G. N. 



Sr. Don Jose Maria Moncada, 
Presidente de la Republica de Nicaragua, 
Palacio Presidencial, 
Managua, Nicaragua. 

160 



While the original plan called for thirty officers of high rank to be 
appointed from civil life, by December 31, 1932, thirty-eight appoint- 
ments had been made in addition to the Jefe Director, as shown: 

RANKS: CONSERVATIVES: LIBERALS: TOTAL: 

COLONELS 3. .....3 6 

MAJORS 5 ..5 10 

CAPTAINS 11 .11 22 



38. 

Upon receiving their commissions the Nicaraguan officers were 
given a few days to supply themselves with uniforms and equipment, 
which were purchased from the Guardia Post Exchange and the Depot 
of Supplies, where they were allowed credit sufficient to permit them 
to procure their first outfits. They were then sent directly to their 
stations, and command of the various posts, Departments and Areas 
was turned over to them by the American officers as the latter evac- 
uated. Full control and command passed to Nicaraguan officers 
immediately after the inauguration of President Sacasa on 1 January, 
1933, and the next morning the American personnel of the Guardia 
Nacional de Nicaragua bade farewell to their former comrades in arms, 
and joined the officers and men of the Second Marine Brigade in the 
second complete evacuation of the Republic of Nicaragua by American 
Naval Forces. 



161 



CHAPTER XX. 
THE EVACUATION. 

The plan for the evacuation of Nicaragua by the United States 
Naval forces was promulgated in a letter from the Chief of Naval Oper- 
ations dated 16 September, 1932. (1). It called for the turnover of 
the command of the Nicaraguan National Guard to Nicaraguan au- 
thority as soon as possible after the inauguration of the new President on 
1 January, 1933, and not later than 2 January, and the withdrawal of 
all personnel of the Naval Service from Nicaragua as soon thereafter 
as practicable. 

On 29 October, 1932, the Brigade Commander, Second Marine 
Brigade, who was charged with the evacuation of all Naval personnel 
including that assigned to the Guardia, requested the Jefe Director 
of the Guardia to advise him as to his plans for the relief of the Ameri- 
can personnel and the details regarding its evacuation. (2). In response 
to this request, the Jefe Director had a plan prepared for the concentra- 
tion of the American personnel in the railroad and coast towns. (3). 
The details of the Jefe Director's plan as well as those of the Brigade 
for the evacuation, were discussed at a conference with the Commander, 
Special Service Squadron in the early part of November. The plan for 
the Guardia was approved substantially as originally submitted, and 
it was decided to suspend the aviation service on December 15. This 
date was therefore fixed as the last day of the turnover in the posts of 
the interior where there was danger of bandit interference with the 
relief of the American officers. 

On 16 November a tentative plan of concentration for evacuation 
was forwarded to all Area and Department Commanders who were 
directed to advise Guardia Headquarters in case they considered nec- 
essary any changes in so far as their respective areas were concerned. 

1. Appendix 1 — Chapter 20. 

2. Appendix 2 — Chapter 20. 

3. Appendix 3 — Chapter 20. 

Copies were sent to the Commanding General, Second Marine Brigade 
and to the Commanding Officer, Aircraft Squadrons, Second Marine 
Brigade, to ascertain if the contemplated arrangements fitted into their 
plans. (1). It was found advisable, on the recommendation of certain 
Department Commanders, due principally to the desirability of meet- 
ing regular train and boat schedules, to make some minor modifications 
in the plan. These were made and incorporated in the final order of 3 
December, 1932. (2). 

The concentration was effected without difficulty. The details 
were kept secret until the last moment. The Marine Corps planes 
performed their part of the evacuation with their usual promptness and 
efficiency. The defeats administered to the groups of Altamirano and 
Colindres before the elections effectively quieted them until after the 
withdrawal, and Umanzor was the recipient of the most decisive defeat 
ever inflicted on a group of Nicaraguan bandits by either Marines or 
Guardia, when, on December 26, 1932, he encountered a combined 
patrol at El Sauce where he went with the probable intention of inter- 
fering with the ceremony of opening the railroad by the President of 
the Republic on 29 December. 

162 



Wherever officials were required to move long distances over the 
trails to reach concentration points, they were accompanied by strong 
combat patrols of Guardia, who, officers and enlisted men, maintained 
to the last minute their loyalty to their American comrades in arms. 

1. Appendix 4 — Chapter 20. 

2. Appendix 5 — Chapter 20. 



163 



CHAPTER XXI. 

The Proposed Legislation Submitted by the Guardia 
Nacional : 

The last military code of Nicaragua was enacted on or about 
October 15, 18%. The present Constitution of Nicaragua became 
effective March 1, 1912. The Guardia Nacional came into existence 
and operated entirely under the terms of the Tipatapa Agreement and 
Guardia Agreement, entered into between the Governments of the 
United States and Nicaragua in 1927. These agreements became non- 
effective on January 1, 1933, upon the withdrawal of American military 
personnel serving with the Guardia Nacional. 

In view of the above stated facts it was deemed necessary and 
essential to the future continued existence of the Guardia Nacional 
that it be accorded a recognized legal status in the laws of Nicaragua. 
The Military Code of 1896, adopted before the present Constitution 
was obsolete and did not meet the existing conditions in Nicaragua. 
Accordingly there was prepared for submission to the Congress of 
Nicaragua a proposed draft of legislation to constitute the Military 
Code of the Republic of Nicaragua, embodying what was believed to 
be the fundamental principles for the continued operation of the 
Guardia Nacional. 

It was especially desired to give a legal status to the military 
tribunal of the Guardia Nacional as part of the judicial system of the 
nation by the enactment of appropriate legislation by the Congress 
of Nicaragua so that trial by a court-martial would operate as a bar 
to further trial in the civil courts of Nicaragua for the same offense 
as provided for in article 32 of the National Constitution. This ap- 
peared desirable in view of the fact that the validity of trials by courts- 
martial has never been officially recognized by the Supreme Court of 
Justice. 

The Jefe Director first submitted the proposed legislation to the 
Minister of the United States to Nicaragua for his approval. The 
Minister in turn submitted it to the Department of State of the United 
States. The State Department submitted a letter setting forth its 
desires with reference to certain changes and modifications. The 
proposed legislation was carefully revised to conform to the expressed 
desires of the Department of State except where such changes or 
modifications were not clearly a violation of the Constitution of Nicar- 
agua. A letter was written to the Minister of the United States to 
Nicaragua setting forth the revisions made and the reasons for not 
making certain revisions which were contrary to the Constitution. 
The final draft was then approved by the Minister. 

The proposed legislation was then submitted to the President of 
Nicaragua by the Jefe Director in Spanish with the following letter 
(English version): 



164 



CUARTEL GENERAL, 

GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA, 

MANAGUA, NICARAGUA. 

19 December, 1932. 
Excelentisimo senor Presidente : 

I have the honor to submit, for your consideration, the original 
and one copy of the "TEXT OF PROPOSED LEGISLATION FOR 
ENACTMENT BY THE CONGRESS OF NICARAGUA TO CON- 
STITUTE THE BASIC LAW FOR THE FOUNDATION OF THE 
MILITARY STRUCTURE OF THE REPUBLIC OF NICARAGUA." 

It is recommended that this proposed legislation be submitted 
to the Congress of Nicaragua, for its consideration and formal incor- 
poration in the laws of Nicaragua. It is, further, reconjmended that 
this legislation, if enacted, be designated as "THE MILITARY CODE 
OF THE REPUBLIC OF NICARAGUA." 

I feel that I can not too strongly recommend to Your Excellency, 
and, through Your Excellency, to the Congress of Nicaragua, the 
desirability and necessity for the enactment of this proposed legislation 
or some similar legislation as soon as practicable for the government 
and orderly administration of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua. 

My reasons for making these recommendations are as follows: 

(1) The Guardia Agreement by which the Guardia Nacional de 
Nicaragua was created, and under which the Guardia Nacional has 
function until the present time, will cease to exist on 1 January, 1933, 
upon the withdrawal of American personnel from duty with the Guardia 
Nacional de Nicaragua. 

(2) The last Military Code of Nicaragua was published on or 
about 15, October, 1986, prior to the adoption of the present Constitu- 
tion of Nicaragua on 21 December, 1911. 

(3) It is obvious that the Military Code of 1896, enacted and 
published 36 years ago, fails to and cannot meet the present and more 
modern conditions existing in the Republic of Nicaragua. 

(4) If the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua is to be expected to 
operate with the maximum efficiency, it must have a recognized legal 
status in the laws of Nicaragua. 

(5) I believe that the proposed legislation which I have the honor 
to submit herewith to Your Excellency includes the necessary principles 
for establishment of the military structure of the Republic of Nicaragua 
on a sound basis in accord with the latest military thought, develop- 
ments and experiences of other nations. 

Con la mayor consideracion y aprecio, me suscribo del Excel- 
entisimo senor Presidente, 

Muy atento y seguro servidor, 
C. B. MATTHEWS, 
Jefe Director. 
Sr. Gral. don Jose Maria Moncada, 
Presidente de la Republic de Nicaragua, 
Palacio Presidencial. 

ENGLISH VERSION OF LETTER SUBMITTED TO PRESIDENT 

OF NICARAGUA. 
19 December, 1932. 

165 



The proposed legislation which was submitted in Spanish was as 
follows: (English version) 



TEXT OF PROPOSED LEGISLATION FOR ENACTMENT BY 
THE CONGRESS OF NICARAGUA TO CONSTITUTE THE 
BASIC LAW FOR THE FOUNDATION OF THE MILITARY 
STRUCTURE OF THE REPUBLIC OF NICARAGUA. 

Be it enacted by the Camara de Senadores and the Camara de 
Diputados de Nicaragua en asemblea de Congreso: — 

The provisions of this law shall constitute the basic legislation for 
the foundation of the Military structure of the Republic of Nicaragua; 
all existing laws, rules, decrees, regulations and orders now in effect 
which are in conflict with this law are hereby abrogated; Provided, 
thac if this legislation be enacted prior to January 2, 1933, it shall 
become effective on January 2, 1933 ; if it be enacted on or subsequent 
to January 2, 1933, it shall become effective as provided for in Article 
94 of the Constitution of the Republic of Nicaragua. 

PART I— GENERAL PROVISIONS 

Article 1. 

The Military force of the Republic of Nicaragua shall be known 
as the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, and it shall constitute the only 
armed national force of the Republic. Any additional armed forces 
which are now or may hereafter be authorized shall be as additions to 
the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua and shall become an integral part 
of that organization, but this provision shall not be interpreted to 
prohibit the organization of Municipal Police forces by municipalities 
or Hacienda Guards or Customs Guards or other forces dedicated 
solely to the enforcement of civil or criminal laws. Any such forces 
as now exist, or as shall hereafter be organized, except Hacienda Guards 
or Customs Guards, shall immediately become subject to the authority 
and control of the Jefe Director of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua 
and be subject to the provisions of the Articles for the Government of 
the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua in the same manner and to the 
same extent as the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua. 

Article 2. 

The Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua is clothed with full power to 
preserve domestic peace and the security of individual rights. It 
shall have control of all arm.s and ammunition, military supplies and 
supervision of the traffic therein throughout the Republic. It shall 
have control of all fortifications, barracks, buildings, grounds, prisons, 
penitentiaries, vessels and other government property used by the 
Guardia. 

166 



Article 3. 

The President of the Republic of Nicaragua shall be ex-officio 
Commanding General of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, and all 
orders from him pertaining to the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, except 
in cases of emergency, shall be delivered through the Minister of War 
to the Jefe Director for execution. 

Article 4. 

The strength of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua shall be fixed 
annually by the Congress upon recommendation of the President of 
the Republic, and for the ensuing year is hereby fixed as follows: 

OFFICERS, LINE. 

RANK: NUMBER: 

MAJOR GENERAL, Jefe Director 1 

BRIGADIER GENERAL, Chief of Staff 1 

COLONELS 4 

MAJORS 8 

CAPTAINS 26 

FIRST LIEUTENANTS 40 

SECOND LIEUTENANTS (Permanent) 50 

SECOND LIEUTENANTS (Temporary) 70 

TOTAL LINE 200 



MEDICAL 

COLONEL, Medical Director 1 

CAPTAINS 3 

FIRST LIEUTENANTS 3 

TOTAL MEDICAL COMMISSIONED 7 

MEDICAL CONTRACT SURGEONS 10 

DENTAL CONTRACT SURGEON 1_ 

TOTAL MEDICAL 18 

AGGREGATE 218 

ENLISTED, LINE 

SERGEANTS MAJOR 4 

QUARTERMASTER SERGEANTS 15 

FIRST SERGEANTS 34 

SERGEANTS 1 1 5 

CORPORALS 238 

TRUMPETERS 14 

PRIVATES 1638 

TOTAL LINE 2058 

167 



MEDICAL 

FIRST SERGEANTS 4 

SERGEANTS 10 

CORPORALS 3 1 

PRIVATES 17 

TOTAL MEDICAL 62 

BAND 

SECOND LEADER 1 

FIRST CLASS MUSICIANS 10 

SECOND CLASS MUSICIANS 5 

THIRD CLASS MUSICIANS 14 

TOTAL BAND 30 

AGGREGATE ENLISTED 2150 

TOTAL OFFICERS AND ENLISTED 2368 

(Including ten (10) Medical Contract Surgeons 
and one (1) Medical Contract Dentist). 

Article 5. 

Moneys shall be appropriated annually to defray the expenses 
for pay, subsistence, allowances, equipment, uniforms, transportation, 
administration and other current expenses of the Guardia Nacional 
de Nicaragua. The proportionate monthly installments of the amount 
appropriated for the fiscal year shall be delivered on or befoie the first 
day of each month to the Jefe Director, Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, 
who shall make allotments from these moneys for the various needs of 
the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua. 

Article 6. 

The rates of pay of the various ranks, commissioned and enlisted, 
of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, shall be fixed annually by the 
Congress upon recommendation of the President of the Republic, and 
for the ensuing year is hereby fixed as follows: 

COMMISSIONED 

MAJOR GENERAL, Jefe Director 

BRIGADIER GENERAL, Chief of Staff 

COLONEL (Line and Medical) 

MAJOR (Line and Medical) 

CAPTAIN (Line and Medical) „.. 

FIRST LIEUTENANT (Line and Medical) 

SECOND LIEUTENANT (Line and Medical) 

SECOND LIEUTENANT (Temporary) 

(Medical Contract Surgeons and Medical Dental 
Surgeons will receive one-half the regular pay of the 
ranks which are assigned to them). 



168 



ENLISTED 

SERGEANT MAJOR 

FIRST SERGEANT (Line and Medical) 

QUARTERMASTER SERGEANT 

SERGEANT (Line, Medical and Drum Major) 

CORPORAL (Line and Medical) 

FIELD MUSICIAN (Trumpeter) 

PRIVATE (Line and Medical) 

PRIVATE (Medical after three (3) months training) 

BAND 

DIRECTOR (Leader) 

SUB-DIRECTOR (Second Leader) 

MUSICIAN, First Class 

MUSICIAN, Second Class 

MUSICIAN, Third Class 

(The Drum Major of the band will be paid the 
pay of a sergeant). 

PART II— COMPOSITION 

ARTICLE 1. 

The Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua shall consist of a General 
Staff Corps, line combatant troops, the Medical Department, Quarter- 
master Department, Paymaster Department, and such other adminis- 
trative staff departments as may hereafter be created by law, and of 
all officers and men who may be called into the military service as 
volunteers or auxiliares and all such persons as are drafted into the 
military service of the Republic of Nicaragua in accordance with the 
authority contained in Article 142 of the Constitution of Nicaragua. 

ARTICLE 2. 

The Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua shall at all times be organized 
so far as practicable into companies, battalions, regiments and brigades, 
and whenever the national interests so require and the President may 
deem it expedient, into divisions or larger units. For the purpose of 
administration and tactical control the territory of Nicaragua shall be 
divided into military areas and departments with an appropriate num- 
ber of troops assigned to each in accordance with the existing situation. 

PART III— THE CORPS OF OFFICERS 

ARTICLE 1. 

All officers commissioned in the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua 
shall be commissioned as either line or medical officers. 

Officers of the line shall be detailed in the number required for 
duty in the General Staff Corps, Quartermaster Department, Pay- 
master Department and other staffs departments; while so serving they 
shall be designated as staff officers. 

169 



ARTICLE 2. 

All officers of the line of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua shall 
be carried on one lineal list and take rank and precedence in accordance 
therewith, the officer holding the commission of oldest date in his 
rank being senior officer in that rank, the officer holding the second old- 
est commission being the second senior officer in his rank and so on 
from the Jefe Director downward through the lineal list to the foot of 
the rank of second Lieutenant. Officers of the same rank and date of 
commission shall take rank among themselves in accordance with the 
number stated on their commissions, a lower number being senior in 
rank to a higher number. 

All officers of the Medical Department shall be carried on one 
lineal list and take rank and precedence therewith, the officer holding 
the commission of oldest date in his rank being senior officer of that 
rank, the officer holding the second oldest commission being the second 
senior officer in his rank and so on from the Medical Director downward 
through the lineal list to the foot of the rank of second Lieutenant. 
Officers of the same rank and date of commission shall take rank and 
precedence among themselves in accordance with the number stated 
on their commissions, a lower number being senior to a higher number. 

All officers commissioned in the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua 
after the passage of this act shall enter the Guardia as and be commis- 
sioned as second Lieutenants and be placed at the foot of the Lineal 
list in accordance with the dates of their commissions. Officers com- 
missioned on the same date shall be placed on the lineal list and their 
commissions numbered in accordance with their relative standing as 
determined by a competitive examination. 

ARTICLE 3. 

All promotions of officers from one rank to another shall be made 
by seniority after having demonstrated before an examining board 
appointed by the Jefe Director, their professional moral and physical 
fitness for promotion to the next higher rank. Should the senior officer 
of a rank due for promotion to the next higher rank fail to pass the 
prescribed examination, the next senior officer shall be examined to 
fill the existing vacancy. Examination of officers to fill the vacancy 
will be continued until an officer is found competent. 

ARTICLE 4. 

Examining boards for the appointment or promotion of officers 
of the line and Medical Department shall be convened by the Jefe 
Director and shall be composed as follow^s: 

(a) In the case of examination for original appointment as 
a second lieutenant of the line, of three line officers. 

(b) In the case of examination for promotion of line officers, 
of three officers of the line senior in rank to the officer being 
examined. 



170 



(c) In the case of examination for original appointment as 
a second lieutenant in the Medical Department, of three Medical 
officers. 

(d) In the case of examination for promotion in the Medical 
Department, of three Medical officers senior in rank, if practicable, 
to the officer being examined. 

(e) Appointments to office as Jefe Director and Medical 
Director shall not be made subject to examination by either a 
Medical Board or Examining Board. 



ARTICLE 5. 

All candidates for appointment as commissioned officers in the 
Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, shall, prior to appearing before an 
Examining Board, for examination for appointment, be examined by 
a board of medical examiners convened by the Jefe Director, which 
shall determine the candidate's physical fitness or unfitness for appoint- 
ment. The report of the board of medical examiners shall be referred 
to the Examining Board. 



ARTICLE 6. 

All officers who are to be examined for promotion from one rank 
to a higher one shall, prior to appearing before an Examining Board 
for examination for such promotion, be examined by a board of medical 
examiners, convened by the Jefe Director, which shall determine the 
officer's fitness or unfitness for promotion. The report of the board 
of medical examiners shall be referred to the Examining Board. 



ARTICLE 7. 

A board of medical examiners convened for the examination of 
candidates for appointment as commissioned officers of the Guardia 
Nacional de Nicaragua or for promotion of commissioned officers of 
the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua to a higher rank shall consist of 
two officers of the Medical Department of the Guardia Nacional de 
Nicaragua. 

In the event a candidate for original appointment as a com- 
missioned officer in the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua fails to pass 
successfully the prescribed physical examination by the board of 
medical examiners, the Examining Board will not proceed with the 
mental, moral or professional examination. 

In the event an officer, due for promotion, fails to pass the required 
physical examination for promotion before a board of medical examiners, 
the Examining Board will not proceed with the professional examination 
of the candidate but shall definitely determine whether the physical 
incapacity is a result of the officer's own misconduct or whether it 
was incurred in line of duty and incident to the service. 



171 



ARTICLE 8. 

Any officer found physically incapacitated for further service or 
for promotion will be retired from the service. If the disability results 

as an incident to service, he shall be placed on the retired list at 

of his regular pay of his rank; if the disability results from his own 
misconduct or is not incident to service he shall be retired without pay. 

ARTICLE 9. 

Any officer found professionally unqualified for promotion shall, 
provided he be found physically, mentally and morally qualified for 
such promotion, be re-examined within six months by an examining 
board. If he again fails, either mentally, morally or professionally, 
he shall be discharged from th2 service. If he is found physically, 
mentally, morally and professionally qualified he shall be promoted 
subject to the following provisions: 

(a) When the examination is for promotion from major to 
colonel he shall lose one number from what he would have had 
had he not failed in his first examination. 

(b) When the examination is for promotion from captain to 
major he shall lose two numbers from what hz would have had 
had he not failed in his first examination. 

(c) When the examination is for promotion from first lieu- 
tenant to captain he shall lose three numbers from what he would 
have had had he not failed in his first examination. 

(d) When the examination for promotion is from second lieu- 
tenant to first lieutenant he shall lose five numbers from what he 
would have had had he not failed in his first examination. 

ARTICLE 10. 

No commissioned officer of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua 
shall hold any other elective or appointive office in the Government of 
the Republic, nor take active part in promoting the election of any 
political candidate to any office. The acceptance of any other office 
by a commissioned officer of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua shall 
be considered as his resignation from the Guardia: Provided, That a 
Guardia officer may be appointed by the President to fill the office of 
Jefe Politico of a department in time of internal disorder, rebellion, or 
war, or when Martial Law has been declared in that department, and 
the officer so appointed may detail offiicers serving under his command to 
subordinate positions for the administration of Martial Law throughout 
the department. In such a case the officer so appointed shall be known 
as the Military Governor of the department. 

ARTICLE 11. 

No commissioned officer of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua 
shall be arbitrarily dismissed from the Guardia service, without cause, 
by any authority. 

172 



ARTICLE 12. 

All officers shall be required, upon their original appointment as 
commissioned officers, to take an oath to sustain the Constitution of 
Nicaragua and to abstain from an active participation in politics during 
their service in the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua. 

PART IV— THE ENLISTED PERSONNEL 

ARTICLE 1. 

In time of peace all enlistments in the Guardia Nacional de Nicar- 
agua shall be voluntary. Each person enlisting shall take an oath to 
sustain the Constitution of Nicaragua and sign a contract to serve 
faithfully for a period of two years, and to abstain from active participa- 
tion in politics during the period of their enlistment. 

The ranks of enlisted men and their distribution therein shall 
be such as the President may from time to time direct. 

The Jefe Director with the approval of the President shall pro- 
mulgate special rules and regulations regarding all matters of recruiting, 
instruction, training, promotion, examination, discipline, operations, 
clothing, rations, arms and equipment, quarters and administration, 
but for the purpose of this act the existing orders, rules, and regulations 
now in force in the Guardia Nacional continue in effect until revoked or 
modified by competent authority. 

ARTICLE 2. 

No enlisted man shall be discharged by any authority except by 
the order of the Jefe Director, the President of the Republic, or, pur- 
suant to the sentence of a consejo de guerra. In every case of the 
separation of an enlisted man from the Guardia Nacional, except in 
cases of death or desertion, there shall be delivered to the man a certi- 
ficate of discharge signed by the Jefe Director or an officer designated 
by him to sign each certificate. 

PART V— MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
ARTICLE 1. 

The Jefe Director shall, subject to the approval of the President 
of the Republic, promulgate the necessary regulations for the adminis- 
tration of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, but for the purpose of 
this law the rules and regulations now in effect pertaining to the staff 
departments shall be continued in full effect and force until they shall 
have been revoked or modified by competent authority. 

ARTICLE 2. 

The Jefe Director shall, subject to the approval of the President 
of the Republic, promulgate the necessary regulations for the adminis- 
tration of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, but for the purpose of 
this law the regulations now in effect shall remain in full force and effect 
until revoked or modified by competent authority. 

173 



ARTICLE 3. 

It shall be the duty of the Jefe Director to issue the necessary and 
timely orders for the interior government of the Guardia Nacional de 
Nicaragua and the conduct of its military operations. 

It shall be the duty of all officers who are in command of stations, 
districts, departments and areas, to issue such necessary and timely 
orders as may be necessary for the proper interior government of their 
respective commands and the conduct of military operations. 

ARTICLE 4. 

Officers and enlisted men of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua 
shall have the right to purchase for their personal use articles carried 
on the property account of the Quartermaster Department, under the 
provisions of such regulations as shall be issued by the Jefe Director. 

ARTICLE 5. 

It shall be illegal for any person not in the military service of the 
Republic of Nicaragua to wear any distinctive parts of the uniform or 
insignia of rank adopted by and prescribed for the Guardia Nacional de 
Nicaragua. 



PART VI— JURISDICTION OF CIVIL AND CRIMI- 
NAL COURTS AND CONSEJOS DE GUERRA 
DEFINED IN RELATION TO MEMBERS 
OF THE GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NIC. 

ARTICLE 1, 

All offenses committed by members of the Guardia Nacional de 
Nicaragua in violation of the Articles for the Government of the Guardia 
Nacional de Nicaragua shall be subject to trial by a consejo de guerra 
composed of commissioned officers of the Guardia Nacional de Nicar- 
agua in accordance with the provisions of the Articles for the Govern- 
ment of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua. 

ARTICLE 2. 

All offenses committed by members of the Guaraia Nacional de 
Nicaragua against the civil and criminal laws of the country, if com- 
mitted as individuals not in the performance of assigned military or 
police duties, shall b^ tried by the civil or criminal courts of the Re- 
public. 

All offenses committed by members of che Guardia Nacional de 
Nicaragua while in the performance of their assigned military or police 
duties, or in time of martial law, shall be tiied by a consejo de guerra 
and punished as such consejo de guerra may direct. 



ARTICLE 3. 

In cases where an offense is committed by a member of the Guardia 
Nacional de Nicaragua which is in violation of both the Articles for the 
Government of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua and the civil or 
criminal laws of the Republic, the decision as to which tribunal shall 
take jurisdiction shall rest with the President, who will be furnished 
with the report of an investigation of the case conducted by an officer 
or officers of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, but if the offense is 
committed in the performance of an assigned military or police duty or 
in time of martial law, a court-martial shall have exclusive jurisdiction. 

ARTICLE 4. 

The findings of the consejos de guena of the Guardia Nacional de 
Nicaragua, after approval by the Jefe Director in the cases of enlisted 
men and after approval by the President in the cases of officers, are 
final, and not subject to appeal or review except by the Supreme Court 
of Justice of Nicaragua, and then only on matters of jurisdictional 
authority. 

ARTICLE 5. 

An enlisted man of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua who has 
been turned over to civil or criminal courts shall, at the discretion of 
the Jefe Director, be either discharged from the Guardia Nacional 
de Nicaragua or be suspended from the pay and allowances of his rank 
during the time he is absent from duty while in the hands of such 
authorities. In every case of conviction of a criminal charge in which 
more than a correctional sentence involving confinement is adjudged, 
the enlisted man concerned shall be discharged from the Guardia 
Nacional de Nicaragua. 

ARTICLE 6. 

A commissioned officer of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua who 
has been turned over to a civil or criminal court for trial, shall be 
suspended from his rank, pay and allowances of his rank during the 
period he is in the hands of such civil authorities. In all cases of con- 
viction in a civil or criminal court in which more than a correctional 
sentence involving confinement is adjudged, the officer concerned shall 
be dismissed from the Guardia Nacional. 

ARTICLE 7. 

All trials by consejos de guerra in the cases of officers and enlisted 
men of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua which have been had prior 
to the enactment of this law under authority of the Articles for the 
Government of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, shall have full 
validity and effect and such trials shall constitute a bar to further 
trial by military, civial or criminal tribunals of the Republic of Nicar- 
agua as provided for in Article 32 of the Constitution of Nicaragua. 

175 



ARTICLE 8. 

Officers and enlisted men of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, 
who prior to the enactment of this legislation, have committed offenses 
in line of duty as members of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua and 
who have not, prior thereto, been brought to trial by consejos de 
guerra as provided for in the Articles for the Government of the Guardia 
Nacional de Nicaragua. 

PART VII 

ARTICLES FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE 
GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA 

CHAPTER 1 

PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS 

ARTICLE 1. 

Conduct and morals in general: The commanders of all 
patrols, stations, districts, departments, areas, companies, battalions, 
regiments or other units of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, and 
all other officers of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, are required 
to show in themselves a good example of virtue, honor, patriotism, and 
subordination; to be bigilant in inspecting the conduct of all persons 
who are placed under their command; to guard against and suppress 
all dissolute and immoral practices, and to correct, according to the laws 
and regulations of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, all persons who 
are guilty of them; and any such commander, or other officer, who 
offends against this article shall be punished as a consejo de guerra may 
direct. 

In determining what tribunal shall take jurisdiction in case of 
offenses committed by members of the Guardia Nacional the provisions 
of Part VI, Jurisdiction of Civil and Criminal Courts and Consejos 
de Guerra, defined in relation to members of the Guardia Nacional 
de Nicaragua of this present law, shall govern. 

The trial of persons by military tirbunals shall be governed by 
provisions of the Articles for the Government of the Guardia Nacional 
de Nicaragua as hereinafter set forth. 

ARTICLE 2. 

Definitions: The following words when used in these articles 
shall be construed in the sense indicated in this article, unless the con- 
text shows that a different sense is intended, namely: 

(a) The word "officer" shall be construed to refer to a commis- 
sioned officer; 

(b) The words "enlisted men" and the word "guardia" shall be 
construed as meaning a non-commissioned officer, a private, 
or any other enlisted man; 

178 



(c) The word "company" shall be understood as including a troop 
or battery. 

(d) The word "battalion" shall be understood as including a 
squadron. 

(e) The word "enemy" shall be understood to include those 
persons who are members of a revolutionary force or an 
armed band operating in violation of the laws of Nicaragua 
or against the recognized authorities of the Government 
of Nicaragua. 

(0 The word "confinement" where used in sentences adjudged 
by competent authorities shall be understood as including 
and cairying with it compulsory labor at public works, and 

(g) The word "tribunal" shall be understood as including any 
form of consejo de guerra, court, commission, inquiry, inquest, 
investigation or military board. 

ARTICLE 3. 

Persons subject to military law: The following persons are 
subject to these articles and shall be understood as included in the 
term "any person subject to military law," or "persons subject to military 
law," whenever used in these articles: 

(a) All officers and enlisted men belonging to the Guardia 
Nacional de Nicaragua; all volunteers, from the dates of their 
muster or acceptance into the military service of the Republic of 
Nicaragua; and all other persons lawfully called, drafted, or ordered 
into, or to duty or for training in, the said service, from the dates 
they are required by the terms of che call, draft or order to obey 
the same; 

(b) Cadets ; 

(c) All persons attached to and serving with the Guardia 
Nacional de Nicaragua; 

(d) All retainers to the camp and all persons accompanying 
or serving with the forces of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua 
when operating against the enemy, and 

(e) All persons under sentence' adjudged by consejos de 
guerra. 



177 



CHAPTER II 

CONSEJOS DE GUERRA 

ARTICLE 4. 

Consejos de guerra classified: Consejos de Guerra shall be 
of three kinds, namely: 

First, Consejo de guerra general; 
Second, Consejo de guerra ordinario, and 
Third, Consejo de guerra sumario. 

A. COMPOSITION 

ARTICLE 5. 

Who may serve on consejos de guerra: All officers in the 
service of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua shall be competent to 
serve on consejos de guerra for the trial of any persons who may be 
lawfully brought before such consejos de guerra for trial. When ap- 
pointing consejos de guerra the appoincing authority shall detail as 
members thereof those offtcers of the command who, in his opinion, 
are best qualified for the duty by reason of age, training, experience, 
length of service and judicial temperament. 

ARTICLE 6. 

Consejo de guerra general: A consejo de guerra general may 
consist of any number of officers not less than five nor more than eleven 
and a judge advocate 

ARTICLE 7. 

Consejo de guerra ordinario: A consejo de guerra ordinario 
may consist of any number of officers not less than three nor more than 
seven and a judge advocate. 

ARTICLE 8. 

Consejo de guerra sumario: A consejo de guerra sumario 
shall consist of one officer. 

B. BY WHOM APPOINTED 

ARTICLE 9. 

Consejo de guerra general: The Jefe Director of the Guardia 
Nacional de Nicaragua or an officer designated by him may appoint 
consejos de guerra general and any other form of military tribunal. 
The appointing authority may detail as one of the members of a consejo 
de guerra general a law member, who, in addition to his duties as a 
member, shall perform such other duties as the Jefe Director of the 
Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua may be regulations prescribe. 

178 



ARTICLE 10. 

Consejo de guerra ordinario: The commanding officer of an 
area, a department, a designated district or a designated detached 
command may appoint consejos de guerra ordinario and such courts 
as may in any case be appointed by a superior authority when by the 
latter deemed desirable. 

ARTICLE 11. 

Consejo de guerra sumario : The commanding officer of a dis- 
trict, post, garrison, camp or other place where troops are on duty may 
appoint a consejo de guerra sumario, and such consejo may in any case 
be appointed by a superior authority when by the latter deemed 
desirable: Provided; That when but one officer is present with a 
command he shall be the consejo de guerra of that command and shall 
hear and determine cases brought before him. 

ARTICLE 12. 

Appointment of judge advocate and counsel: For each 
consejo de guerra general and consejo de guerra ordinario the authority 
appointing the consejo de guerra shall appoint a judge advocate and 
a defense counsel. 

C. JURISDICTION 

ARTICLE 13. 

Consejos de guerra general: Consejos de guerra general shall 
have powier to try any person subject to military law for any crime 
or offense made punishable by these articles, and any other person 
who by the law of war is subject to trial by military tribunals. 

ARTICLE 14. 

Consejos de guerra sumario: Consejos de guerra sumario 
shall have power to try any person subject to military law, except an 
officer, for any crime or offense not capital, made punishable by these 
articles; Provided: That Guardias holding certificates of citation 
for exemplary conduct shall not, if they object thereto, be brought to 
trial before a consejo de guerra sumario unless such trial is directed 
by an officer competent to bring them to trial before a consejo de 
guerra ordinario. 

D. PROCEDURE 

ARTICLE 16. 

Judge advocate to prosecute; counsel to defend: The judge 
advocate of a consejo de guerra general or of a consejo de guerra 
ordinario shall, under the direction of the consejo de guerra, prepare 
the record of its proceedings. The accused shall have the right to be 
represented in his defense before the consejo de guerra by a military 
counsel of his own selection provided that detail of such counsel does 
not interfere with the demands of the service. 

179 



ARTICLE 17 

Challenges: Members of a consejo de guerra general or of a 
consejo de guerra ordinaro may be challenged by the accused or the 
judge advocate for cause stated to the consejo de guerra. The consejo 
de guerra shall determine the relevancy and validity thereof, and shall 
not receive a challenge to more than one member at a time. Challenges 
by the judge advocate shall ordinarily be presented and decided before 
those by the accused are offered. Each side shall be entitled to one 
peremptory challenge; but the law member of the consejo de guerra 
shall not be challenged except for cause. 

ARTICLE 18. 

Oaths: All testimony before a consejo de guerra general or a 
consejo de guerra ordinario shall be given orally, upon oath of affirma- 
tion, administered by the senior member of the consejo de guerra. 

Before proceeding to trial the president of the consejo de guerra 
general shall administer the following oath or affirmation to the judge 
advocate or person officiating as such: 

I, A.B., do swear (or affirm) that I will keep a true record of the 
evidence given to and proceedings of this consejo de guerra; that I 
will not divulge or by any means disclose the sentence of the consejo 
de guerra until it shall have been approved by the proper authority; 
and that I will not at any time divulge or disclose the vote or opinion 
of any particular member of the consejo de guerra. 

The oath or affirmation being duly administered, each member 
of the consejo de guerra, before proceeding to trial, shall take the fol- 
lowing oath or affirmation, which shall be administered by the judge 
advocate or the person officiating as such: 

"I, A.B., do swear (or affirm) that I will truly try without pre- 
judice or partiality, the case now depending, according to the evidence 
which shall come before the consejo de guerra, the rules for the 
government of the Guardia Nacional, and my own conscience; 
that I will not by any means divulge or disclose the sentence of the 
consejo de guerra until it shall have been approved by the proper 
authority; and that I will not at any time divulge or disclose the 
vote or opinion of any particular member of the consejo de guerra." 
An oath or affirmation, in the following form, shall be administered 
to all witnesses before any consejo de guerra, by the president thereof: 
"You do solemnly swear (or affirm) that the evidence you give 
in the case now before this consejo de guerra shall be the truth, the 
whole truth, and nothing but the truth, and that you will state every- 
thing within your knowledge in relation to the charges So help you 
God; (or "this you do under the pains and penalties of perjury.)" 
Before proceeding to trial the members of a consejo de guerra 
ordinario shall take the following oath or affirmation, which shall be 
administered by the recorder: 

"I, A.B., do swear (or affirm) that I will well and truly try, with- 
out prejudice or partiality, the case now depending, according to the 
evidence which shall be adduced, the laws for the government of the 
Guardia Nacional, and my own conscience." 

180 



After which the recorder of the consejo de guerra shall take the 
following oath or affirmation, which shall be administered by the senior 
member of the consejo de guerra: 

"I, A.B., do swear (or affirm) that I will keep a true record of the 
evidence which shall be given before this consejo de guerra and of 
the proceedings thereof." 

The judge advocate, or person officiating as such, shall administer 
to the m.embers of any military tribunal other than a consejo de guerra, 
the following oath or affirmation : 

"You do swear (or affirm) well and truly to examine and inquire 
according to the evidence, into the matter now before you, without 
partiality;" 

After which the president shall administer to the judge advocate 
or person officiating as such, the following oath or affirmation: 

"You do swear (or affirm) truly to record the proceedings of 
this consejo de guerra and the evidence to be given in the case in 
hearing." 

Every reporter of the proceedings of a consejo de guerra shall, 
before entering upon his duties, make oath or affirmation in the following 
form: 

"You swear (or affirm) that you will faithfully perform the duties 
of reporter to this consejo de guerra. So help you God." 

Every interpreter in the trial of any case before a consejo de 
guerra shall, before entering upon his duties, make oath or affirmation 
in the following form : 

"You swear (or affirm) that you will truly interpret in the case 
now in hearing. So help you God." 

In case of affirmation the closing sentence or adjuration will be 
omitted. 

ARTICLE 19. 

Continuance: A consejo de guerra may, for reasonable cause, 
grant a continuance to either party for such time and as often as may 
appear to be just. 

ARTICLE 20. 

Refusal or failure to plead : When an accused arraigned before 
a consejo de guerra fails or refuses to plead, or answers foreign to the 
purpose, or after a plea of guilty makes a statement inconsistent with 
the plea, or when it appears to the consejo de guerra that he entered 
a plea of guilty improvidently, or through lack of understanding of 
its meaning and effect, the consejo de guerra shall proceed to trial 
and judgement as if he had pleaded not guilty. 

ARTICLE 21. 

Process to obtain witnesses: Every judge advocate of a con- 
sejo de guerra general or a consejo de guerra ordinario and every consejo 
de guerra sumerio shall have power to issue like process to compel wit- 
nesses to appear and testify which courts of the Republic of Nicaragua, 
having criminal jurisdiction, may issue; but such process shall run to 
any part of the Republic of Nicaragua. 

181 



ARTICLE 22. 

Refusal to appear to testify: Every person not subject to 
military law who, being duly subpoenaed to appear as a witness before 
any consejo de guerra or any form of military tribunal, or before any 
officer, military or civil, designated to take a deposition to be read in 
evidence before such consejo de guerra or other form of military tri- 
bunal, wilfully neglects or refuses to qualify as a witness, or to testify, 
or produce documentary evidence which such person may have been 
legally subpoenaed to produce, shall be deemed guilty of misdemeanor, 
for which such person shall be punished on information in the respective 
court of first instance of the Republic of Nicaragua, jurisdiction being 
hereby conferred upon such courts for such purpose; and it shall be 
the duty of the civil officer prosecuting for the Government in any such 
court, on the certificate of the facts to him by the military court, com- 
mission, court of inquiry, or board, to file any information against and 
prosecute the person so offending, and the punishment of such person, 
on conviction, shall be a fine of not more than ,^40.00, or confinement 
for 30 days, or both. 

ARTICLE 23. 

Compulsory self-incrimination prohibited: No witness be- 
fore a military court, commission, court of inquiry, or board, or before 
any officer conducting an investigation, or before any officer, military 
or civil, designated to take a desposition to be read in evidence before 
a military court, commission, court of inquiry, or board, or before 
an officer conducting an investigation, shall be compelled to incriminate 
himself or to answer any question the answer to which may tend to 
incriminate him, or to degrade him. 

ARTICLE 24. 

Depositions — When admissable: A duly authenticated de- 
position taken upon reasonable notice to the opposite party may be 
read into evidence before any consejo de guerra or military tribunal in 
any case not capital, when it appears to the consejo de guerra or military 
tribunal that it is impracticable to obtain the oral testimony of the 
witness at the place of the trial or hearing. 

ARTICLE 25. 

Depositions — Before whom taken: Depositions to be read in 
evidence before consejos de guerra and military tribunals or for other 
use in military administration, may be taken before and authenticated 
by any officer, military or civil, authorized by the laws of the Republic 
of Nicaragua to administer oaths. 

ARTICLE 26. 

Court to announce action: Whenever the consejo de guerra 
has acquitted the accused upon all specifications and charges, the 
consejo de guerra shall at once announce such result in open court. 

182 



Under such regulations as the Jefe Director of the Guardia Nacional 
may prescribe the findings and sentence in other cases may be similarly 
announced. 

ARTICLE 27. 

Closed sessions: Whenever a consejo de guerra general or a 
consejo de guerra ordinario shall sit in closed session, the judge advocate 
and the assistant judge advocate, if any, shall withdraw; and when 
their assistance in reference to the recorded evidence is required, it 
shall be obtained in open court, and in the presence of the accused and 
of his counsel, if there be any. 

ARTICLE 28. 

Method of voting: Voting by members of a consejo de guerra 
general or consejo de guerra ordinario upon questions of challenge, 
on the findings, and on the sentence shall be by secret written ballot. 
The junior member of the consejo de guerra shall in each case count the 
votes, which count will be checked by the president, who will forthwith 
announce the result of the ballot to the memibers of the consejo de 
guerra. The law memiber of the consejo de guerra, if any, or if there 
by no law member of the consejo de guerra, then the president, may rule 
in open court upon interlocutory questions, other than challenge, 
arising during the proceedings: Provided, that unless such ruling be 
made by the law member of the consejo de guerra if any member object 
thereto the consejo de guerra shall be cleared and closed and the ques- 
tions decided by a majority vote, viva voce, beginning with the junior 
in rank: And provided further, that if any such ruling be made by 
the law member of the consejo de guerra upon any interlocutory question 
other than an objection to the admissibility of evidence offered during 
the trial, and any member object to the ruling, the consejo de guerra 
shall likewise be cleared and closed and the question decided by a 
majority vote, viva voce, beginning with the junior in rank. 

ARTICLE 29. 

Contempts : A military tribunal may punish as for contempt any 
person who uses any menacing words, signs, or gestures in its presence, 
or who disturbs its proceedings by any riot or disorder; Provided, 
that such punishment shall in no case exceed one months confinement, 
or a fine of .^40.00, or both. 

ARTICLE 30. 

Proceedings: The proceedings of all consejos de guerra and 
military tribunals shall be conducted with as much conciseness and 
precision as may be consistent with the ends of justice, and all such 
proceedings shall be transmitted in the usual mode to Headquarters of 
the Guardia Nacional where they shall be kept on file for a period of 
three years fromx date of trial after which time they may be destroyed 
in the discretion of the Jefe Director of the Guardia Nacional. 

183 



ARTICLE 31. 

Rules governing : Consejos de guerra and other military 
tribunals shall be governed in all the details of their composition, 
constitution, powers, procedure, and modes of proof, except as herein 
provided, by such rules and regulations as the Jefe Director of the 
Guardia Nacional may prescribe. 

ARTICLE 32. 

Irregularities — Effect of: The proceedings of a consejo de 
guerra shall not be held invalid, nor the findings or sentence disapproved 
in any case on the ground of improper admission or rejection of evidence 
or for any error as to any matter of pleading or procedure unless in the 
opinion of the reviewing authority or confirming authority, after an 
examination of the entire proceedings, it shall appear that the error 
complained of has injuriously affected the substantial rights of an ac- 
cused: Provided, that the act or omission upon which the accused 
has been tried constitutes an offense denounced and made punishable 
by one or more of these articles: Provided further, that the omission 
of the words "hard labor" in any sentence of a consejo de guerra ad- 
judging imprisonment or confinement shall not be construed as de- 
priving the authorities executing such sentence of imprisonment or 
confinement of the power to require hard labor as a part of the punish- 
ment in any case where it is authorized by the laws prescribing maximum 
punishments. 

E. LIMITATIONS UPON PROSECUTION 
ARTICLE 33. 

As to number: No person shall, without his consent, be tried 
a second timiC for the same offense; but no proceeding in which an ac- 
cused has been found guilty by a consejo de guerra upon any charge 
or specification shall be held to be a trial in the sense of this article 
until the reviewing, and if there be one, the conhrming authority shall 
have taken final action upon the case. 

No authority shall return a record of trial to any consejo de guerra 
for reconsideration of: 

(a) An acquittal; or 

(b) The sentence originally imposed, with a view to increasing 



Its severity. 

F. PUNISHMENTS 

ARTICLE 34. 

Cruel and unusual punishments : Cruel and unusual punish- 
ments of every kind, including flogging, branding, marking or tattooing 
on the body are prohibited. 

ARTICLE 35. 

Places of confinement: The Jefe Director of the Guardia 
Nacional may from time to time designate the places of confinement. 

184 



ARTICLE 36. 

Death sentence — When lawful: No person shall, by consejO' 
de guerra general, be convicted of an offense for which the death 
sentence is made mandatory by law, nor sentenced to suffer death, 
except by the concurrence of all the members of said consejo de guerra 
present at the time the vote is taken, and for an offense in these articles 
expressly made punishable by death; nor sentenced to life imprison- 
ment, nor to confinement for more than ten years, except by the con- 
currence of two-thirds of all the members present at the time the vote 
is taken. All other convictions and sentences, whether by consejo 
de guerra general of consejo de guerra ordinario, may be determined 
by a two-thirds vote of those members present at the tim.e the vote is 
taken. All other questions shall be determined by a majority vote. 

ARTICLE 37. 

It shall be the duty of a consejo de guerra in cases of conviction 
to adjudge a punishm.ent adequate to the nature of the offense, but the 
members thereof may recommend the person convicted as deserving 
of clemency, and state on the record their reasons for so doing. 

ARTICLE 38. 

Any punishment which a consejo de guerra ordinario is authorized 
to inflict may be inflicted by a consejo de guerra general. 

ARTICLE 39. 

Consejo de Guerra ordinario: May sentence non-commis- 
sioned officers and persons of inferior ratings to any one of the following 
punishments, namely: 

1. Discharge from the service with a bad-conduct discharge. 

2. Solitary confinement, not exceeding 30 days, on bread and 
water, or on diminished rations. 

3. Solitary confinem.ent not exceeding 30 days. 

4. Confinement not exceeding six months. 

5. Reduction to the rank of private. 

6. Deprivation of liberty. 

7. Discharge from the service with a bad-conduct discharge, 
extra fatigue duties, and loss of pay, not to exceed three 
months, may be added to any one of the above mentioned 
punishments; except that extra fatigue duties may never 
be added to the punishment noted above in sub-paragraph 2 
of this article. 

ARTICLE 40. 

Consejos de guerra sumario may sentence an enlisted man of 
the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua to any one of the following punish- 
ments, namely: 

1. Solitary confinement, not exceeding 20 days, on bread and 

185 



water, or on diminished rations. 

2. Solitary confinement not exceeding 20 days. 

3. Confinement not exceeding 20 days. 

4. Deprivation of liberty not exceeding one month. 

5. Reduction in rank. 

6. Extra fatigue duties and loss of pay not to exceed 20 days 
may be added to any one of the above mentioned punish- 
ments ; except that extra fatigue duties may never be added 
to the punishment noted above in sub-paragraph 1 of this 
article. 

ARTICLE 41. 

A consejo de guerra shall not, by a single sentence which does not 
include a bad-conduct or a dishonorable discharge, adjudge against 
an accused: 

1. Forfeiture of pay at a rate greater than two-thirds of his pay 
per month. 

2. Forfeiture of pay in amount greater than two-thirds of his 
pay for six months. 

3. Confinement at hard labor for a period greater than six months. 
A consejo de guerra shall not, by a single sentence, adjudge against 

an accused: 

Detention of pay in an amount greater than two-thirds of his 
pay for three months. 

ARTICLE 42. 

Maximum limits: Whenever the punishment for a crime or 
offense made punishable by these articles is left to the discretion of the 
consejo de guerra the punishment shall not exceed such limit or limits 
as the Jefe Director of the Guardia Nacional may from time to time 
prescribe. 

G. ACTION BY APPOINTING OR SUPERIOR AUTHORITY 

ARTICLE 43. 

Approval and execution of sentences: 

(a) Sentences of consejos de guerra general must be confirmxcd 
by the Jefe Director of the Uuardia Nacional. 

(b) Sentences of consejos de guerra ordinario must be confirmed 
by the Immediate Superior in Command to the Convening 
Authority. 

(c) Sentences of consejos de guerra sumario will be carried into 
execution when approved by the Convening Authority. 

(d) No sentence of a consejo de guerra extending to the loss of 
life shall be carried into execution until confirmed by the 
President. 

(e) The proceedings, findings, and sentence of all consejos de 
guerra and military tribunals will be subject to review by the 
Jefe Director of the Guardia Nacional; who in all cases has 

186 



the power to remit, mitigate, commute or suspend any part 
or the whole of the sentence adjudged. 

(f) The execution of all sentences of consejos de guerra except 
those sentences extending to discharge from the service or 
loss of life will be carried into effect upon the approval of the 
Convening Authority. 

(g) Every officer who is authorized to appoint a consejo de guerra 
shall have power, on revision of the proceedings, to remit or 
mitigate, but not to commute, the sentence of any such consejo 
de guerra which he is authorized to approve or confirm. 

ARTICLE 44. 

Suspension of sentences: The authority competent to order 
the execution of the sentence of a consejo de guerra may suspend the 
execution, in whole or in part, of any such sentence as does not extend 
to death, and may restore the person under sentence to duty during 
such suspension. The death or honoiable discharge of a person under 
a suspended sentence shall operate as a complete remission of any un- 
executed or unremitted part of such sentence. 



r 



187 



CHAPTER III 

PUNITIVE ARTICLES 

A. ENLISTMENT: MUSTER: RETURNS: 

ARTICLE 45. 

Fraudulent Enlistment: Any person who shall procure himself 
to be enlisted in the military service of the Guardia Nacional de Nicar- 
agua by means of wilful! misrepresentation or concealment as to his 
qualifications for enlistment, and shall receive pay or allowances under 
such enlistment, shall be punished as a consejo de guerra may direct. 

ARTICLE 46. 

Officer making unlawful enlistment : Any officer wiio know- 
ingly enlists or musters into the military service any person whose 
enlistment or muster in is prohibited by law, regulations, or orders shall 
be dismissed from the service or suffer such other punishment as a 
consejo de guerra may direct. 

ARTICLE 47. 

False muster : Any officer who knowingly makes a false muster 
of man or animal and who signs or directs or allows the signing of any 
muster roll knowing the same to contain a false muster of false state- 
m.ent as to the absence or pay of an officer or guardia, or who wrong- 
fully takes money or other consideration on mustering in a regiment, 
company, or other organization, or on signing muster rolls, or who 
knowingly musters as an officer or guardia a person who is not such 
officer oi guardia, shall be dismissed from the service and suffer such 
other punishment as a consejo de guerra may direct. 

ARTICLE 48. 

False returns — Omission to render returns: Every detach- 
ment commander whose duty it is to render to the Guardia Nacional 
a return of the state of the troops under his command, or of the arms, 
ammunition, clothing, funds, or other property thereunto belonging, 
who knowingly makes a false return thereof shall be dismissed from the 
service and suffer such other punishment as a consejo de guerra may 
direct. And any officer who, through neglect or design, omits to render 
such return shall be punished as a consejo de guerra may direct. 

B. DESERTION; ABSENCE WITHOUT LEAVE 

ARTICLE 49. 

Desertion: Any person subject to military law who deserts or 
attempts to desert the service of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua 
shall, if the offense be committed in time of war, suffer death or such 
other punishment as a consejo de guerra may direct, and, if the offense 
be committed at any other time, any punishment, excepting death, 
that a consejo de guerra may direct. 

188 



ARTICLE 50. 

Advising or aiding another to desert: Any person subject to 
military law who advises or persuades or knowingly assists another 
to desert the service of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua shall, 
if the offense be committed in time of war, suffer death or such other 
punishment as a consejo de guerra may direct, and, if the offense be 
committed at any other time, any punishment, excepting death, that 
a consejo de guerra miay direct. 

ARTICLE 51. 

Apprehension of deserters: Any person subject to military 
law who knows the whereabouts of a deserter or a declared absentee 
and does not without delay give information thereof to his commanding 
officer shall suffer such punishm.ent as a consejo de guerra may adjudge. 

ARTICLE 52. 

Absence without leave: Any person subject to military law 
who fails to repair at the fixed time to the properly appointed place of 
duty, or goes from the same without proper leave, or absents himself 
from, his command, guard, quarters, station or camp without proper 
leave, shall be punished as a consejo de guerra may direct. 

C. DISRESPECT: INSUBORDINATION: MUTINY 

ARTICLE 53. 

Disrespect toward superior officer: Any person subject to 
military law who behaves himself with disrespect toward his superior 
officer shall be punished as a consejo de guerra may direct. 

ARTICLE 54. 

Assaulting or wilfully disobeying superior officer : 

Any person subject to military law who, on any pretense whatsoever, 
strikes his superior officer or draws or lifts up any weapon or offers 
any violence against him, being in the execution of his office, or wilfully 
disobeys any lawful command of his superior officer, shall suffer such 
punishment as a consejo de guerra may direct. 

ARTICLE 55. 

Insubordinate conduct toward non-commissioned officer: 

Any guardia who strikes or assaults, or who attempts or threatens to 
strike or assault, or wilfully disobeys the lawful order of an officer or a 
non-commissioned officer while in the execution of his office, or uses 
threatening or insulting language, or behaves in an insubordinate or 
disrespectful m.anner toward an officer or a non-commissioned officer 
while in the execution of his office, shall be punished as a consejo de 
guerra may direct. 

189 



ARTICLE 56. 

Mutiny or sedition: Any person subject to military law who 
attempts to create or who begins, excites, causes, aids or joins in any 
mutiny or sedition in any company, party, post, camp, detachment, 
guard or other command, or at any place, shall suffer death or such 
other punishment as a consejo de guerra may direct. 

ARTICLE 57. 

Failure to suppress mutiny or sedition : Any officer or guardia 
who, being present at a mutiny or sedition, does not use his utmost 
endeavor to suppress the same, or, knowing or having reason to believe 
that a mutiny or sedition is to take place, does not without delay give 
information thereof to his commanding officer shall suffer death or such 
other punishment as a consejo de guerra may direct. 

ARTICLE 58. 

Quarrels: frays: disorders: All officers and non-commissioned 
officers have power to part and quell all quarrels, frays, and disorders 
among persons subject to military law and to order officers who take 
part in same into arrest, and other persons subject to military law who 
take part in the same into arrest or confinement, as circumstances may 
require, until their proper superior officer is acquanited therewith. And 
whosoever, being so ordered, refuses to obey such officer of non-com- 
missioned officer, or draws a weapon upon or otherwise threatens or 
does violence to him, shall be punished as a consejo de guerra may direct. 

ARTICLE 59. 

Releasing prisoner without proper authority: Any person 
subject to military law who, without proper authority, releases any 
prisoner duly committed to his charge, or who through neglect or design 
suffers any prisoner so committed to escape, shall be punished as a 
consejo de guerra may direct. 

ARTICLE 60. 

Charges; action upon: No charge will be referred for trial 
until after a thorough and impartial investigation thereof shall have 
been made. This investigation will include inquiries as to the truth 
of the matter set forth in said charges, form of charges, and what dis- 
position of the case should be made in the interest of justice and dis- 
cipline. At such investigation full opportunity shall be given the 
accused to cross-examine witnesses against him if they are available 
and to present anything he may desire in his own behalf, either in defense 
or mitigation, and the investigating officer shall examine available 
witnesses requested by the accused. If the charges are forwarded after 
such investigation, they shall be accompanied by a statement of the 
substance of the testimony taken on both sides. 



190 



When any person subject to military law is placed in arrest or 
confinement immediate steps will be taken to try the person accused 
or to dismiss the charge and release him. 

E. OFFENSES COMMITTED IN TIME OF WAR, 
INSURRECTION OF ARMED REBELLION AGAINST THE 
AUTHORITY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF NICARAGUA 

ARTICLE 6L 

Misbehavior before the enemy: Any officer or guardia who, 
before the enemy, misbehaves himself, runs away, or shamefully aban- 
dons or delivers up or by any misconduct, disobedience, or neglect 
endangers the safety of any fort, post, camp, guard, or other command 
which it is his duty to defend, or speaks words inducing others to the 
like, or casts away his arms or ammunition, or quits his post or colors 
to plunder or pillage, or by any means whatsoever occasions false alarms 
in camp, garrison, or quarters, shall suffer such punishment as a consejo 
de guerra may direct. 

ARTICLE 62. 

Subordinate compelling commander to surrender. Any 

persons subject to military law who compels, or attempts to compel, any 
commander of any garrison, fort, post, camp, guard, or other command, 
to give it up to the enemy or to abandon it shall suffer such punishment 
as a consejo de guerra may direct. 

ARTICLE 63. 

Improper use of countersign: Any person subject to military 
law who makes known the parole or countersign to any person not 
entitled to receive it according to the rules and discipline of war, or 
gives a parole or countersign different from that which he received, 
shall, if the offense be committed in time of war, insurrection or armed 
rebellion against the authority of the Government of Nicaragua, suffer 
death or such other punishment as a consejo de guerra may direct. 

ARTICLE 64. 

Forcing a safeguard: Any person subject to military law who, 
in times of war, insurrection or armed rebellion against the authority 
of the Government of Nicaragua, forces a safeguard shall suffer such 
punishment as a consejo de guerra may direct. 

ARTICLE 65. 

Captured property to be secured for public service: All 

public property taken from the enemy is the property of the Guardia 
Nacional de Nicaragua and shall be secured for the service of the 
Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, and any person subject to military 
law who negelcts to secure such property or is guilty of wrongful 
appropriation thereof shall be punished as a consejo de guerra may 
direct. 

191 



ARTICLE 66. 

Dealing in captured or abandoned property: Any person 
subject to military law who buys, sells, trades, or in any way deals in or 
disposes of captured or abandoned property, whereby he shall receive 
or expect any profit, benefit, or advantage to himself or to any other 
person directly or indirectly connected with himself, or who fails when- 
ever such property comes into his possession or custody or within his 
control, to give notice thereof to the proper authority without delay, 
shall, on conviction thereof, be punished by a fine or imprisonemnt, or 
by such other punishment as a consejo de guerra, military commission, 
or other military tribunal may adjudge, or by any or all of said penalties. 

ARTICLE 67. 

Relieving, corresponding with, or aiding the enemy : Who- 
soever relieves, or attempts to relieve, the enemy with arms, ammuni- 
tion, supplies, money, or other things, or knowingly harbors or protects 
or holds correspondence with or gives intelligence to the enemy, either 
directly or indirectly, shall suffer death or such other punishment as a 
consejo de guerra or military commission may direct. 

ARTICLE 68. 

Spies: Any person who in time of war, insurrection or armed 
rebellion against the authority of the Government of Nicaragua, 
shall be found lurking or acting as a spy in or about any of the fortifica- 
tions, posts, quarters, or encampments of any of the forces of the 
Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, or elsewhere, shall be tried by a consejo 
de guerra general or by a military commission and shall on conviction 
thereof, suffer death. 

F. MISCELLANEOUS CRIMES AND OFFENSES 

ARTICLE 69. 

Military property — Wilfull or negligent loss, damage, or 
wrongful disposition: Any person subject to military law who 
wilfully or through neglect, suffers to be lost, spoiled, damaged, or 
wrongfully disposed of, any property belonging to or in the possession 
of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua shall make good the loss or 
damage and suffer such punishment as a consejo de guerra may direct. 

ARTICLE 70. 

Waste or unlawful disposition of property issued to enlisted 
men: Any enlisted man who sells or wrongfully disposes of or wilfully 
or through neglect injures or loses any horse, arms, ammunition, 
accounterments, equipment, clothing, or other property issued to or 
intended for the use of the military service, shall be punished as a 
consejo de guerra may direct. 



192 



ARTICLE 71. 

Drunk on duty: Any officer who is found drunk on duty shall, 
if the offense be committed in time of war, insurrection or armed 
rebellion against the authority of the Government of Nicaragua, be 
dismissed from the service and suffer such other punishment as a consejo 
de guerra may adjudge; and if the offense be committed in time of 
peace, he shall be punished as a consejo de guerra may direct. Any 
person subject to military law, except an officer, who is found 
drunk on duty, shall be punished as a consejo de guerra may direct. 

ARTICLE 72. 

Misbehavior of sentinel: Any sentinel who is found drunk or 
sleeping upon his post, or who leaves it before he is regularly relieved, 
shall, if the offense be committed in time of war, suffer death or such 
other punishment as a consejo de guerra may direct; and if the offense 
be committed in time of peace, he shall suffer any punishment, except 
death, that a consejo de guerra may direct. 

ARTICLE 73. 

Personal interest in sale of provisions: Any person subject 
to military law in any garrison, fort, barracks, camp or other place 
where troops of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua may be serving who, 
for his private advantage, lays any duty or imposition upon or is 
interested m the sale of any victual, forage or other supplies brought 
into such garrison, fort, barracks, camp or other place for the use of 
troops, shall suffer such punishment as a consejo de guerra may direct. 

ARTICLE 74. 

Intimidation of persons bringing provisions: Any person 
subject to military law who abuses, intimidates, does violence to, or 
wrongfully interferes with any person bringing provisions, supplies, 
or other necessaries to the camp, garrison, or quarters of the forces of 
the Guardia Nacional shall suffer such punishment as a consejo de 
gueria may direct. 

ARTICLE 7^. 

Good order to be maintained and wrongs redressed: All 

persons subject to military law are to behave themselves orderly in 
quarters, garrison, camp, and on the march; and any persons subject 
to military law who commxits any waste or spoil, or wilfully destroys 
any property whatsoever (unless by order of his commanding officer), 
or commits any kind of depredation or riot, shall be punished as a 
consejo de guerra may direct. Any com.manding officer who, upon 
complaint made to him, refuses or omits to see reparation made to 
the party injured, in so far as the offender's pay shall go toward such 
reparation, as provided for in Article ^'^, shall be dismissed from the 
service, or otherwise punished, as a consejo de guerra m^ay direct. 

193 



ARTICLE 76. 

Provoking words, menaces and maltreatment : Such punish- 
ment as a consejo de guerra may adjudge may be inflicted on any person 
in the Guardia Nacional : 

(1) Who is guilty of cruelty toward, or opression or maltreatment 
of any person subject to his orders; 

(2) Or quarrels with, strikes, or assaults, or uses provoking or 
reproachful words, gestures, or menaces toward any person 
in the Guardia Nacional; 

(3) Or endeavors to foment quarrels between other persons in the 
Guardia Nacional; 

(4) Or, when on duty or liberty, plunders, abuses, or maltreats 
any inhabitant or injures his property in any way. 

ARTICLE 77, 

Dueling: Any person subject to military law who fights or 
promotes or is concerned in or connives at fighting a duel, or who, 
having knowledge of a challenge sent or about to be sent, fails to report 
the fact promptly to the proper authority, shall, if an officer, be dis- 
missed from the service or suffer such other punishment as a consejo 
de guerra may direct; and if any other person subject to military law, 
shall suffer such punishment as a consejo de guerra may direct. 

ARTICLE 78. 

Murder — Rape: Any person subject to military law who com- 
mits murder or rape shall suffer punishment as a consejo de guerra may 
direct. 

ARTICLE 79. 

Various crimes: Any person subject to military law who com- 
mits manslaughter, mayhem, arson, burglary, housebreaking, robbery 
theft, fraud, larceny, embezzlement, perjury, subordination of perjury, 
forgery, sodomy, assault with intent to commit any felony, assault 
with intent to do bodily harm with a dangerous weapon, instrument, 
or other thing, or assault with intent to do bodily harm, shall be punish- 
ed as a consejo de guerra may direct. 

ARTICLE 80. 

Frauds against the Governinent: Any person subject to 
military law who makes or causes to be made any claim against the 
Government of Nicaragua or any officer thereof, knowing such claim 
to be false; or 

Who presents or causes to be presented to any person in the 
civil or military service thereof, for approval or payment, any claim 
against the Government of Nicaragua, or any officer thereof, knowing 
such claim to be false or fraudulent; or 



194 



I 



Who enters into any agreement or conspiracy to defraud the 
Government of Nicaragua by obtaining, or aiding others to obtain, 
the allowance or payment of any false or fraudulent claim ; or 

Who for the purpose of obtaining or aiding others to obtain, 
the approval, allowance, or payment of any claim against the Govern- 
ment of Nicaragua or against any officer thereof, makes or uses, or 
procures, or advises the making or use of, any writing or other paper 
knowing the same to contain any false or fraudulent statements; or 

Who for the purpose of obtaining, or aiding others to obtain, 
the approval, allowance, or payment of any claim against the Govern- 
ment of Nicaragua or any officer thereof, makes or procures, or advises 
the making of, any oath to any writing or other paper knowing such 
oath to be false; or 

Who for the purpose of obtaining, or aiding others to obtain, 
the approval, allowance, or payment of any claim against the govern- 
ment of Nicaragua, or any officer thereof, forges or counterfeits, or 
procures, or advises the forging or counterfeiting of any signature 
upon any writing or other paper, or uses, or procures, or advises the 
use of any such signature, knowing the same to be forged or counter- 
feited; or 

Who, having charge, possession, custody or control of any 
money or other property of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, 
furnished or intended for the military service thereof, knowingly 
delivers, or causes to be delivered to any person having authority 
to receive the same, any amount thereof less than that for which 
he receives a certificate or receipt; or 

Who, being authorized to make or deliver any paper certify- 
ing the receipt of any property of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua 
furnished or intended for the m.ilitary service thereof, makes or delivers 
to any person such writing, without having full knowledge of the 
truth of the statements therein contained and with intent to defraud 
the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua; or 

Who steals, embezzles, knowingly and wilfully misappro- 
priates, applies to his own use or benefit, or wrongfully or knowingly 
sells, or disposes of any ordnance, arms, equipments, ammunition, 
clothing, subsistence stores, money, or other property of the Guardia 
Nacional de Nicaragua furnished or intended for the military service 
thereof; or 

Who knowingly purchases or receives in pledge for any 
obligation or indebtedness from any guardia, officer, or other person 
who is a part of or emiployed in said forces or service, any ordnance, 
arms, equipment, ammunition, clothing, subsistence stores, or other 
property of or in the possession of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, 
such guardia, officer, or other person not having lawful right to sell 
or pledge the same; 

Shall, on conviction thereof, be punished by fine or imprisonment, 
or by such other punishment as a consejo de guerra may adjudge, or 
by any or all of said penalties. And if any person being guilty of any 
of the offenses aforesaid while in the military service of the Guardia 
Nacional de Nicaragua, receives his discharge or is dismissed from the 
service he shall continue to be liable to be arrested and held for trial 
and sentence by a consejo de guerra in the same manner and to the 
same extent as if he had not received such discharge nor been dismissed. 

195 



And if any officer, being guilty, while in the military service of the 
Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, of embezzlement of ration savings, 
post exchange, company, or other like funds, or of embezzlement of 
money or other property intrusted to his charge by an enlisted man or 
men, receives his discharge, or is dismissed, or is dropped from the rolls, 
he shall continue to be liable to be arrested and held for trial and 
sentence by a consejo de guerra in the same manner and to the same 
extent as if he had not been so discharged, dismissed, or dropped from 
the rolls. 

G. MISCELLANEOUS 

ARTICLE 8L 

Weapons, possession of: Unless specific written authority is 
granted by commanding officers, it is prohibited for any member of 
the Guardia Nacional to have in his possession firearms or any other 
dangerous weapon other than those issued by the Government and then 
only in the performance of duty. 

ARTICLE 82. 

General article: Though not mentioned in these articles, all 
disorders, neglects and offenses to the prejudice of good order and 
military discipline, all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the 
military service, and all crimes or offenses not capital, of which persons 
subject to military law may be guilty, shall be taken cognizance of by 
a consejo de guerra general or a consejo de guerra ordinario, according 
to the nature and degree of the offense, and punished at the discretion 
of such consejo de guerra. 

ARTICLE 83. 

Disciplinary powers of commanding officers: Under such 
regulations as the Jefe Director of the Guardia Nacional may prescribe, 
the commanding officer of any detachment, company, or higher com- 
mand may, for minor offenses, impose disciplinary punishments upon 
persons of his command without the intervention of a consejo de guerra. 

The disciplinary punishments authorized by this article may in- 
clude admonition, reprimand, withholding of privileges for not exceeding 
one week, extra fatigue for not exceeding one week, restriction to certain 
specified limits for not exceeding one week, but shall not include for- 
feiture of pay or confinement under guard. A person punished under 
authority of this article, who deems his punishment unjust or dispro- 
portionate to the offense, may, through the proper channels, appeal 
to the next superior authority, but mxay in the meantime, be required 
to undergo the punishment adjudged. All punishments, except ad- 
monition and reprimand, awarded by the authorities micntioned in this 
article, shall be fully entered in a book reserved for that purpose. 

ARTICLE 84. 

A Department Commander or higher commander may reduce 
in rank any non-commissioned officer or other person of inferior rank 
serving under his command for incompetency. 

196 



ARTICLE 85. 

Authority to administer oatks : Any judge advocate or acting 
judge advocate, the president or senior member of any consejo de 
guerra or military tribunal, any officer designated to take a deposition, 
any officer detailed to conduct an investigation, any commanding 
officer of a designated detached command, and the adjutant of any 
com.mand shall have the power to administer oaths for the purpose of 
the administration of military justice and for other purposes of military 
administration; and shall have the general powers of a notary public 
of Nicaragua in the administration of oaths, the execution and acknow- 
ledgement of legal instruments, the attestation of documents and all 
other forms of notarial acts to be executed by persons subject to military 
law, and by any person who is a party to any subject matter under 
discussion or investigation with the Government of Nicaragua or its 
representative. 

ARTICLE 86. 

Appointment of Reporters and Interpreters: Under such 
regulations as the Jefe Director of the Guardia may from time to time 
prescribe, the president or senior member of a consejo de guerra or any 
military tribunal shall have power to appoint a reporter, who shall 
record the proceedings of and testimony taken before such consejo de 
guerra or commission and may set down the same, in the first instance, 
in shorthand. Under like regulations the president or senior member 
of a consejo de guerra or of any miilitary commission or tribunal may 
appoint an interpreter, who shall interpret for the consejo de guerra 
or military tribunal. 

ARTICLE 87. 

Injuries to property — redress of: Whenever complaint is 
made to any commanding officer that damage has been done to the 
property of any person or that his property has been wrongfully taken 
by any person subject to military law, such complaint shall be investi- 
gated by a board consisting of any num.ber of officers from one to three, 
which board shall be convened by the commanding officer and shall 
have, for the purpose of investigation, power to summon witnesses 
and examine them upon oath or affirmation, to receive depositions or 
other documentary evidence, and to assess the damages sustained 
against the responsible parties. The assessment of damages made 
by such board shall be subject to the approval of the commanding 
officer, and in the amount approved by him shall be stopped against 
the pay of the offenders. And the order of such commanding officer 
directing stoppages herein authorized shall be conclusive on any dis- 
bursing officer for the payment by him to the injured parties of the 
stoppages so ordered. 

Where the offenders cannot be ascertained, but the organization 
or detachment to which they belong is known, stoppages to the amount 
of dam.ages inflicted may be made and assessed in such proportion as 
may be deemed just upon the individual members thereof who are 

197 



shown to have been present with such organization or detachment at 
the time the damages complained of were inflicted as determined by 
the approved findings of the board. 

ARTICLE 88. 

Political activities: Any person subject to miUtary law who 
indirectly or directly attempts to use or uses his influence in any 
manner whatsoever to assist anyone to be nominated or elected to any 
political office will be subject to such punishment as a consejo de guerra 
may adjudge. 

ARTICLE 89. 

Oath of enlistment : At the time of his enlistment every guardia 
shall take the following oath: 

"I, — ----- --- , by this present do voluntarily 

consent to enlist as 

of Nicaragua, for the duration of three years, unless I be discharged 
prior to that time by a competent authority. And I solemnly 
swear that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the Republic of 
Nicaragua; that I will serve her honestly and faithfully against 
all her enemies whomsoever; and that I will obey the orders of 
the President of the Republic of Nicaragua and the orders of my 
chiefs and superior officers, in accordance with the laws and regula- 
tions for the government of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, 
and I do swear that all I have said and that appears in this docu- 
ment is correct. I also swear to hereby renounce all political 
affiliations, and that never, during my enlistment will I speak 
of or associate myself with any political organization or activity." 
This oath may be executed before any officer. 

ARTICLE 90. 

Certain acts to constitute desertion: Any officer who, 
having tendered his resignation and prior to due notice of the acceptance 
of the same, quits his post or proper duties without leave and with 
intent to absent himself permanently therefrom shall be deem.ed a 
deserter. 

Any person subject to military law who quits his organization or 
place of duty with the intent to avoid hazardous duty or to shirk im- 
portant service shall be deemed a deserter. 

A prima facie case of desertion is deemed to be established if the 
individual : 

(a) Has been absent without authority from his station and duty 
for more than 14 days, or 

(b) During unauthorized absence secures employment, or wears 
civilian clothing, or changes his name, or if sick fails to notify 
the nearest Guardia commander, or 

(c) Has been absent without authority for more than 48 hours 
and has in his possession any weapon issued to him by the 
Guardia, or 

198 



(d) If he is apprehended at a point more than 15 miles from his 
station and duty, or 

(e) If he sells or disposes of any article of clothing or equipment 
issued to him by the Guardia. 

ARTICLE 91. 

If an individual after unauthorized absence voluntarily sur- 
renders himself to the Guardia, due weight will be given that fact in 
connection with the circumstances noted in the preceding article. 

ARTICLE 92. 

All matters of recruiting, appointment, instruction, training, 
promotion, examination, discipline, operation and movement of troops, 
finances and expenditures, clothing, rations, arms and equipment, 
quarters, administration and control and regulation of prisons and 
penitentiaries shall be under the jurisdiction of the Jefe Director of the 
Guardia Nacional who may issue rules and regulations governing the 
same. 

ARTICLE 93. 

Uniforms and equipment — not to be sold, etc. The clothes, 

arms, military outfits, and accounterments furnished by the Guarida 
Nacional to any enlisted man shall not be sold, bartered, exchanged, 
pledged, loaned, or given away; and any member of the Guardia Nac- 
ional so disposing of the aforesiad articles will be subject to such 
punishment as a consejo de guerra may adjudge; and no person not 
an enlisted man, or duly authorized officer of the Guardia Nacional 
who has possession of any such clothes, arms, military outfits, or 
accounterments, so furnished and v/hich have been the subject of any 
such sale, barter, exchange, pledge, loan, or gift, shall have any right, 
title, or interest therein ; but the sam.e m.ay be seized and taken wherever 
found by any officer of the Guardia Nacional, and shall thereupon 
be delivered to any quartermaster, or other officer authorized to receive 
the same. The possession of any such clothes arms, military outfits 
or accounterments by any person not an enlisted man or officer of the 
Guardia Nacional shall be presumptive evidence of such a sale, barter, 
exchange, pledge, loan, or gift. 

ARTICLE 94. 

Enlisted men to make good time lost: Every enlisted man 
who in an existing or subsequent enlistment deserts the service of the 
Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, or without proper authority absents 
himself from his organization, station, or duty for more than one day, 
or who is confined for more than one day under sentence, or while 
awaiting trial and disposition of his case, if the trial results in conviction, 
or through the intemperate use of drugs or alcoholic liquor, or through 
disease or injury the result of his own misconduct, renders himself 

199 



unable for more than one day to perform duty, shall be liable to serve, 
after his return to a full duty status, for such period as shall, with the 
time he may have served prior to such desertion, unauthorized absence, 
confinement or inability to perform duty, amount to the full term of 
that part of his enlistment period which he is required to serve with his 
organization. 

ARTICLE 95. 

Enlisted men — Separation from the service: No enlisted 
man, lawfully inducted into the military service of the Republic of 
Nicaragua shall be discharged from said service without a certificate 
of discharge signed by the Jefe Director of the Guardia Nacional 
or an officer empowered by him to do so, and no enlisted man shall 
be discharged from said service before his term of service has expired 
except by order of the Jefe Director of the Guardia Nacional, an officer 
empowered by him to do so, or by sentence of a consejo de guerra. 

H. CONSEJOS DE GUERRA EXTRAORDINARIOS 

When martial law is proclaimed in Nicaragua, or any part thereof, 
it is essential that those cases be handled expeditiously and in a uni- 
formly legal manner, where the offender is not in the military service 
of the Republic of Nicaragua and when the offense or crime is of such 
a nature that trial by civil court is either undesirable or impracticable. 

Therefore, when there is an armed disturbance, or when martial 
law has been declared, or when there is rebellion against the supreme 
authority of the Republic ,or, in time of invasion, the following pro- 
visions will be applicable: 

ARTICLE 96. 

The President or an official delegated by him may appoint 
one or more consejos de guerra extraordinario in each Department 
for the purpose of hearing and determining cases brought before it 
and to adjudge sentences within the limitations prescribed by law. 

ARTICLE 97. 

Composition: A consejo de guerra extraordinario will be com- 
posed of not less than three nor more than seven members and a fiscal 
militar. 

ARTICLE 98. 

Jurisdiction: A consejo de guerra extraordinario shall have 
the power to try any person not in the military service of the Republic 
of Nicaragua for any crime or offense made punishable by these articles, 
martial law, the law of war, or any and all rules and regulations duly 
promulgated for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the afore- 
said articles and laws. 

(1) Same: Jurisdiction as to place: The jurisdiction of a 
consejo de guerra extraordinario extends to every part of the Republic 
of Nicaragua. 

200 



(2) Same: Jurisdiction as to time: If the court have juris- 
diction of the person and offense, it may proceed, if the offense was 
committed within a martial law district, and in case of war, insurrection 
or armed rebellion against the authority of Nicaragua, anywhere 
within the territorial limits of Nicaragua, even if it was of a date anterior 
to the proclamation of either martial law or war, insurrection or armed 
rebellion against the authority of Nicaragua, at the place of the trial. 

(3) Same: Jurisdiction as to oifenses: In time of war, 
martial law, armed disturbance, invasion, or rebellion against the 
supreme authority of the Republic of Nicaragua, such punishment as 
a consejo de guerra extraordinario m.ay adjudge may be inflicted on 
any person not in the military service of the Republic of Nicaragua, who : 

(a) Is a member of a revolutionary force or an armed band opera- 
ting in violation of the laws of Nicaragua or against the recog- 
nized authorities of the Government of Nicaragua; or 

(b) Incites, intends, prepares or attempts to commit or commits 
any act of hostility against the forces of the recognized Govern- 
ment or against any pacific inhabitant or the Republic of 
Nicaragua; or 

(c) Shall be found lurking as a spy in or around the detachm_ents 
or encampments of the armed forces of the Republic of Nicar- 
agua; or 

(d) Attempts to commit or commits certain crimes of violence 
such as murder, poisoning, rape, mayhem, malicious assault 
and battery, robbery or theft against any individual of the 
constituted forces of the supreme authority or against any 
pacific inhabitant of the Republic of Nicaragua; or 

(e) Attempts to commit or commits the wanton desecration or 
destruction except by order of a superior officer representing 
the supreme authority of the Republic, of public or private 
property; or 

(f) In any manner whatsoever aids or attempts to aid, conceals 
or attempcs to conceal, or procures or gives refuge to, or 
protects any person who ma^/ be judged guilty or may be 
suspected or alleged to have violated any of the provisions 
herein contained. 

ARTICLE 99. 

Arrest, etc: All offenders in the matters aforesaid shall be 
promptly seized, confined and reported for trial before a consejo de 
guerra extraordinario. 

ARTICLE 100. 

Procedure: When conditions permit, the modes of procedure 
and proof, voting and the recording of the proceedings shall be the 
same as provided herein for consejos de guerra general. 



201 



ARTICLE 101. 

Confirmation and execution of sentences: No sentence 
adjudged by a consejo de guerra extraordinario will be carried into 
effect without the previous confirmation of the President of the Re- 
public; except that in case of war or other absolute emergency when 
it is impracticable to secure the decision of the President of the Republic 
the confirmation of the Commander-in-chief of the forces operating in 
the field will be sufficient to effect the execution of the sentence. 



202 



I 



i 



VOLUME II 



k 



CONTENTS 
VOLUME II. 
APPENDICES TO CHAPTERS II, III, IV, XVIII, XIX, AND XX. 
CHAPTER II. 

NUMBER. PAGE 

1 . Letter Stimson to Moncada concerning terms of disarmament 203 

2. Letter Stimson to Moncada stating terms of amnesty 204 

3 . Executive Order designating ranks and pay of American officers 

in Guardia 205 

4. Executive Order authorizing Guardia increase 205 

5. Executive Order authorizing appointment of 60 officers 206 

6. Executive Order directing police service in Department of Chinandega 

be taken over by the Guardia 206 

7. Presidential Decree #54, directing the Guardia to take over police 

functions of the Republic 207-208 

8. The Guardia Agreement 208-212 

9. Navy Department instructions for forces in Nicaragua 213-214 

10. Modification of Appendix number 9 215 

11. Executive Order directing Guardia to take over police service of 

the capital 215 

12. Executive Order authorizing increase of Guardia 216 

13. Strength and distribution table 217-221 

14. Copy of contract with municipalities for maintenance 

of Municipal Police 222-223 

15. Civico contract 223 

16. Civico en Finca contract 224 

17. Order creating Auxiliares 225-226 

18. Auxiliar contract 226 

19. List of Jefe Directors, Staff, Area and Department Commanders, 

and Executives 227-233 

CHAPTER III. 

1. Letter Sandino assuming authority over towns in Segovias 234 

2. Proclamation Sandino declaring certain villages out of Diaz' control. . 234-238 

3. Regulations for civil and military authorities of the territory 

claimed by Sandino 239 

4. Letter Sandino to Altamirano defying American authorities, and 

other subjects 240-242 

5. Newspaper articles quoting Sandino propaganda and intentions 242-243 

6. Sandino bulletin listing combats and proclaiming fraternity 

with people of Honduras 244-245 

7. Entry of Sandino into Honduras 246 

8. Letter Jefe Director advising American Minister that Sandino is 

reported in Honduras 247 

9. Decree of Sandino directing contributions to bandit organizations 248 



XV 



CONTENTS (Cont.) 
VOLUME II. 

NUMBER. PAGE 

10. Order of Altamirano to Lieutenant Herera to collect contributions 

and ordering the death of all enemies 249 

11. Letter Altamirano decreeing a contribution to bandit organizations. . . . 250 

12. Outline of bandit activities and plans in Central Area 251-252 

13. Account of ambush of Captain Anderson near San Juan de Telpaneca . . 253 

14. Account of ambush of Lieutenant Clark at Los Pinos 254-259 

15. Attack on Captain Powers patrol at Embocaderos 260-263 

16. Attack on Limay 264-266 

17. Attack on Somoto 267-271 

18. Guardia attack at Biltigni River 272 

19. Engagements of Company "M" at RIO AUYUBAL, LINDO 

LUGAP.E, SAN ANTONIO AND LA CEIBA 273-275 

20. Operations in Eastern Area, (death of Blandon) 276-277 

21 . Operations near Neptune Mines by Guardia and Airplanes 277-279 

22. Pursuit of Altamirano by Captain Bourne's patrol 280-283 

23. Pursuit of bandits by Captain Williams 284 

24. The Convention of Peace with Sandino 285-287 

25. Organization of Nueva Segovia 289-290 

26. Organization of Central Area 291-292 

27. Weekly summary of Guardia intelligence 293-295 

28. Message of President Moncada to National Congress, and address to 

President Elect Sacasa outlining peaceful accomplish- 
ments during his administration expressing appreciation 
for the assistance of the United States to the Nicaraguan 
people, and voicing the necessity for the continuance of 
the Guardia Nacional 296-299 

29. Official List of Contacts with Official List of Marine Corps and 

Navy casualties 300-412 

CHAPTER IV 

1 . Outline o^ Police and Military missions of the Guardia in Northern 

and Central Areas under Martial Law * 413-415 

CHAPTER XVIII. 

1. Letter of Instructions, National Board of Elections 417-439 

2. Instructions of Jefe Director regarding Plebiscite of Liberal Party 441 

3. Instructions concerning control by the Guardia of all distilleries 

during electoral period 442-443 

4. Confidential letter Jefe Director to all Area and Department Com- 

manders regarding Plebiscites 444 

xvi 



CONTENTS (Cont.) 
VOLUME II. 



5. Instructions regarding Electoral Mission of the Guardia Part I 445-447 

6. Instructions regarding Electoral Mission of the Guardia Part II 448-449 

7. Instructions regarding Electoral Mission of the Guardia Part III .... 450-451 

8. Sale of Beer during electoral period 452 

9. Letter of appreciation Chairman Electoral Mission for services 

rendered by Guardia prior to Election Day 453 

10. Presidential Decree forbidding use of fireworks during certain part 

of Electoral Period 454 

CHAPTER XIX. 

1, Agreement of Presidential candidates pledging preservation of 

non-partisan character of Guardia 456 

CHAPTER XX. 

1. Order Chief Naval Operations directing evacuation from Nicaragua. . . 457-458 

2. Memorandum Commander, 2nd Marine Brigade to Jefe Director con- 

cerning details of evacuation 459 

3. Plan for concentration of Guardia personnel submitted to Commander 

2nd Marine Brigade 460-461 

4. Plan of concentration for evacuation 462-463 

5. Order for concentration of Marine Corps and Navy personnel 

in Guardia for evacuation 464-465 

FINIS 
SKETCHES 

(Bound in Volume) 

L Captain Anderson's Ambush Following Page 252 

2. Lieutenant Clark's Ambush " " 254 

3. Attack on Captain Power's Patrol " " 260 

(two plates) 

4. Attack on Limay " " 266 

5. Guardia attack at Biltigni River " " 272 

FINIS 



APPENDICES II, III, IV, XVIII, XIX, AND XX 

CHAPTER II. 



Tipitapa, May|4, 1927. 



General Jose Maria Moncada, 
Tipitapa. 



Dear General Moncada: 

Confirming our conversation of this morning, 
I have the honor to inform you that I am authorized to say that the 
President of the United States intends to accept the request of the 
Nicaraguan Government to supervise the election of 1928; that the 
retention of President Diaz during the remainder of his term is regarded 
as essential to that plan and will be insisted upon; tl\at a general dis- 
armament of the country is also regarded as necessary for the proper 
and successful conduct of such election; and that the forces of the United 
States will be authorized to accept the custody of the arms of those 
willing to lay them down, including the government, and to disarm 
forcibly those who will not do so. 

Very respectfully, 

/s/ HENRY L. STIMSON. 



203 



Tipitapa, Nicaragua, May 11, 1927. 

General Jose Maria Moncada, 

Tipitapa. 
Dear General Moncada: 

I am glad to learn of the authority that has been placed in you 
by your army to arrange for a general disarmament. I am also glad 
to make clear to you and to your army the attitude of the President 
of the United States as to this matter. In seeking to terminate this 
war, President Coolidge is actuated only by a desire to benefit the 
people of Nicaragua and to secure for them a free, fair and impartial 
election. He believes that only by such free and fair elections can 
permanent peace be secured for Nicaragua. To insure this in 1928 he 
has consented to the request that American representatives selected 
by him shall supervise the election. He has also consented to assign 
American officers to train and command a non-partisan national con- 
stabulary for Nicaragua which will have the duty of securing such a 
fair election and of preventing any fraud or intimidation of voters. 
He is willing also to leave in Nicaragua until after the election a suffi- 
cient force of marines to support the work of the constabulary and 
insure peace and freedom at the election. 

As further evidence of the good faith of the American Government 
and of the present Nicaraguan Government in this matter, I am glad 
to tell you what has already been done. It will answer the questions 
contained in the letter of your soldiers which you have shown me. 
General amnesty has already been granted by the President of Nicara- 
gua. I have recommended to President Diaz that the Supreme Court 
be reconstituted by the elimination of the illegal judges placed in that 
court under Sr. Chamorro. President Diaz has already called upon 
those judges for their resignations and I believe that those resigna- 
tions will be obtained. I have already advised that the Congress be 
reconstituted by the holding of special elections in those Liberal 
districts where elections were not held in 1926 under conditions which 
will insure that the Liberal voters will be amply protected in their 
rights. I have also recomm.ended that members of Congress illegally 
expelled by Sr. Chamiorro whose terms have not yet expired be re- 
instated. I have been assured that this will be done. 

I have recommended that Liberal Jefes Politicos be appointed in 
the six Liberal districts of Bluefields, Jinotega, Nueva Segovia, Esteli, 
Chinandega and Leon. I have been assured that this will be done. 

In short, I have recommended that steps be taken so far as pos- 
sible to restore the political condition as it existed in Nicaragua before 
the Chamorro coup d'etat and I believe that so far as possible it will 
be done. 

I hope that these steps will assure you and your army of the fair- 
ness of the United States Government and its desire to see peace, justice 
and freedom re-established in Nicaragua without any unfairness or 
favoiitism towards any party but being regardful of the rights of 
Liberals and Conservatives alike. 

Very respectfully yours, 

/s/ HENRY L. STIMSON, 

204 



Private Correspondence 

of the 
President of the Republic 

of Nicaragua. June 18, 1927. 

EXECUTIVE ORDER 

Sr. Jefe Director de la Guardia Nacional. 
City. 

Sir:- 

From the date of the reorganization of the Guardia Nacional 
was undertaken on May 12, 1927, until permanent designations are 
authorized for the commissioned and non-commissioned officers of 
the U. S. Marine Corps that have been or may be, ordered for duty 
in the said Guardia and for the purpose of the appointment of these 
officers and non-commissioned officers, the following designation and 
pay is hereby effective until further orders: — 

Jefe Director ^250.00 

Asst. Jefe Director 200.00 

Paymaster and Quartermaster.. 200.00 

Medical Director 200.00 

Departmental Director 200.00 

Departmental Inspector 150.00 

Medical Inspector 1 50.00 

District Commander 150.00 

1st Sub-District Commander..... 100.00 

2nd Sub-District Commander.... 60.00 

Very truly yours, 

/s/ ADOLFO DIAZ 
PRESIDENT. 



President of the Republic 

Managua, 13 July, 1927. 

Sr. Jefe Director de la Guardia Nacional. — 
City. 

From and including this date, you are authorized to recruit men 
for the Guardia Nacional and increase its strength to six hundred (600) 
men as soon as you may deem it convenient ; and also to appoint officers 
and non-commissioned offixers of the U.S. Marine Corps and Naval 
Service, as of^cers of the Guardia Nacional when you deem it necessary, 
up to six and a half per cent (6i%) of the enlisted strength hereby au- 
thorized. 

Very truly, 

/s/ ADOLFO DIAZ 
PRESIDENT. 

205 



Managua, September 8, 1927. 

Sr. Jefe Director de la Guardia Nacional, 
City. 

From and including this date you are authorized to appoint 
officers and non-commissioned officers of the U. S. Marine Corps and 
Naval Services for duty with the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, 
as soon as you deem it necessary, up to ten percent (10%) over the 
strength of six hundred (600) men, which, up to the present, is the 
authorized strength of that organization, by order issued the 13th 
July, 1927. This large percentage of officers is considered necessary 
for the establishment and maintenance of the activities of the different 
headquarters, consequent with the expansion of the Guardia. 

Yours very truly, 

/s/ ADOLFO DIAZ, 
PRESIDENT. 



Presidente 

y 

Comandancia General 



MANAGUA. July 29, 1927. 

Sr. General Elias R. Beadle, 

Jefe Director de la Guardia Nacional, 

City. — 

My dear General : 

Wishing that the Guardia Nacional under your command 
may contribute, in an efficient manner, to establish a permanent 
peace throughout the Republic, my Government would be pleased 
if that organization would take over the police service in the country 
as soon as possible. 

In this connection, it seems to me that it would be convenient 
to commence with the Department of Chinandega, so that in accordance 
with the Decree issued this date by the Executive, a detachment of 
the Institution under your command, is sent over to take over the 
policing of that Department. 

Very truly yours, 

/s/ ADOLFO DIAZ, 
PRESIDENT. 



206 



NO. 54. THE PRESIDENT OF NICARAGUA 
DECREES: 

1. As the strength, the resources and training of the Guardia 
Nacional de Nicaragua will permit, it will take over and thereafter 
carry out the policing of the Republic. 

2. The Police forces of the Republic now in authority will con- 
tinue to exercise their functions until their duties have been taken 
over by the Guardia Nacional in accordance with the preceding Article 
and when the Government so directs. 

3. The funds assigned for the pay and expenses of all the police 
organizations will be alloted for the operation and maintenance of 
the Guardia Nacional as it takes over the duties of the present police 
force. 

4. When the duties of the police officials have been formally 
taken over by the Guardia Nacional, the said police officials will cease 
to hold office as police officials. 

5. The directors of police will remain in exercise of their judicial 
functions. 

6. As the Guardia Nacional takes over the policing of any section 
of the Republic it shall take over control of all fortifications, barracks, 
buildings and grounds, prisons, penitentiaries, vessels and other Gov- 
ernment property which were formally assigned to or under the control 
of the Army, Navy and Police forces of the Republic of Nicaragua. 
The Guardia Nacional will furthermore take over the supervision and 
control of all arms, ammunitions, military supplies and traffic therein. 

7. The Guardia Nacional shall be subject only to the Direction 
of the President of Nicaragua. 

8. The Chief of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua shall provide 
and issue the Regulations for the Government of the members of the 
Guardia Nacional. 

9. 1 he personnel of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, except- 
ing the citizens of the United States of Am^erica, will be subject for all 
military offenses and for acts committed in the line of duty to the 
jurisdiction of the courts-martial established under the regulations 
for the government of the Guardia Nacional as aforementioned. 

10. The findings of these courts-martial of the Guardia Nacional 
after approval by the Chief of the Guardia Nacional are final and are 
not subject to appeal or review, except by the Supreme Court of Nicara- 
gua and then only in question of excess of power or question of juris- 
diction. 

11. In civil cases only, members of the Guardia Nacional may be 
subject to civil courts. 

12. The officers of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua who are 
citizens of the United States of America will be replaced by Nicaraguans 
when they have successfully completed the instruction and service 
prescribed by the Chief of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua and have 
shown by their conduct and an examination that they are fit for com- 
mand. 

207 



13. Members of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua who are 
citizens of the United States of America will not be subject to the 
courts of Nicaragua but will be subject to trial by the courts-martial 
under the laws of the United States. 

14. This law repeals any other law which is in conflict with it, 
and is effective from the date of its publication as a decree. 

OFFICIAL: PRESIDENTIAL MANSION— MANAGUA, 30 July, 
1927. ADOLFO DIAZ— THE MINISTER OF POLICE, RICARDO 
LOPEZ C. 

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE 
REPUBLIC OF NICARAGUA. 

Whereas the Republic of Nicaragua is desirous of preserving 
internal peace and order and the security of individual rights, and 
is desirous of carrying out plans for the maintenance of domestic tran- 
quility and the promotion of the prosperity of the Republic and its 
people ; 

And whereas the assistance and cooperation of the Government 
of the United States is deemed essential to an early realization of the 
measures to be adopted; 

And whereas the United States is in full sympathy with these 
aims and objects of the Republic and is desirous of contributing in 
all proper ways to their attainment the undersigned duly authorized 
thereto by their respective governments have agreed as follows: 

I. 

The Republic of Nicaragua undertakes to create without delay 
an efficient constabulary to be known as the Guardia Nacional de 
Nicaragua urban and rural composed of native Nicaraguans, the 
strength of which and the amounts to be expended for pay, rations, 
and expenses of operation, et cetera, shall be as set forth in the following 
table : 

COMMISSIONED PERSONNEL 

$ Gold Per annum 

1 Brigadier General 3,000.00 

1 Colonel, Chief of Staff 2,500.00 

3 Colonels (Line) at ^2,400.00 per annum_„„... 7,200.00 

1 Colonel, Quartermaster- 2,400.00 

1 Colonel, Medical 2,400.00 

4 Majors (Line) at ,^2,100.00 per annum. 8,400.00 

1 Major, Paymaster 2,100.00 

1 Major, General Headquarters Inspector. 2,100.00 

1 Major, Law Officer 2,100.00 

2 Majors, Medical, at ^2,100.00 per annum. 4,200.00 

10 Captains at ^1,800.00 per annum. 18,000.00 

2 Captains, Medical, at ,^1,800.00 per annum 3,600.00 

20 First Lieutenants, at ^1,200.00 per annum. 24,000.00 

208 



2 First Lieutenants, Medical, at <^ 1,200. 00 per annum. 2,400.00 

20 Second Lieutenants, at ^900.00 per annum._ 18,000.00 

3 Second Lieutenants, Medical, at ^900.00 per annum.... 2,700.00 
20 Student Officers (Cadets), at ^600.00 per annum 12,000.00 



93 



$ 117,100.00 



ENLISTED PERSONNEL 

$ Gold Per annum 

4 Sergeants Major, at ^40.00 per month. 1,920.00 

10 First Sergeants, at ^35.00 per month.. 4,200.00 

10 Q. M. Sergeants, at ^30.00 per month._ 3,600.00 

60 Sergeants, at ^25.00 per month..._ 18,000.00 

120 Corporals, at ^18.00 per month. 25,920.00 

20 Field Musics, at ^14.00 per month. 3,360.00 

840 Privates, at ^12.00 per month. 120,960.00 

1064 



77,960.00 



1 

1 

10 

10 

15 

37 



BAND 

$ Gold Per annum 

Leader 1,200.00 

Assistant Leader 900.00 

Musicians, First Class, at .^30.00 per month. 3,600.00 

Musicians, Second Class, at ^25.00 per month. 3,000.00 

Musicians, Third Class at ,^20.00 per month 3,600.00 



^12,300.00 



ENLISTED MEDICAL PERSONNEL 

$ Gold Per annum 

1 First Sergeant, at ^35.00 per month. 420.00 

4 Sergeants, at ,^25.00 per month 1,200.00 

20 Corporals, at ^18.00 per month. 4,320.00 

10 Privates, at ^12.00 per month. 1,440.00 

35 ^7,380.00 



OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE 

Civil employees; uniforms and clothing; arms equip- 
ment and target practice; remounts and forage; motor 
vehicles and maintenance; repairs and replacements; 
transportation of supplies and troops; maps, stationery 
and office supplies; intelligence service; rent, repairs and 
construction of barracks; gasolene, kerosene; lights; tools 
and miscellaneous expenditures for operations and main- 
tenance of the Constabulary 



^200,000.00 



209 



RATIONS 

Expenses of procuring and preparing rations for 1136 
enlisted at ^0.30 per diem ^124,392.00 

PRISONS AND PENITENTIARIES 

Operation and Maintenance $ 40,000.00 

Medical supplies and Maintenance of Constabulary 

Hospitals, Prison Dispensaries, etc_.. $ 10,000.00 

GRAND TOTAL ,^689.132.00 



The foregoing provisions shall be regarded as the minimum require- 
ments for the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua. If the condition of the 
Nicaraguan Government's finances shall so warrant, the strength of the 
Guardia Nacional commissioned and enlisted, and the expenses thereof 
may be increased upon the recommendation of the Chief of the Guardia 
Nacional and upon the consent in writing of the President of Nicaragua. 

If the condition of the Nicaraguan Government's finances shall so 
warrant a suitable Coast Guard and a suitable Aviation Unit may upon 
the recommendation of the Chief of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua 
and upon the consent in writing of the President of Nicaragua be made 
a part of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, similarly officered and 
manned with appropriate ranks and subject in the same manner to 
regulations and discipline as provided herein for the personnel of the 
Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua. 

II. 

The Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua shall be considered the sole 
military and police force of the Republic, clothed with full power to 
preserve domestic peace and the security of individual rights. It 
shall have control of arms and ammunition, military supplies and super- 
vision of the traffic therein throughout the Republic. It shall have 
control of all fortifications, barracks, buildings, grounds, prisons, peni- 
tentiaries, vessels, and other government property which were formerly 
assigned to or under control of the Army, Navy and Police forces of 
the Republic. It shall be subject only to the direction of the President 
of Nicaragua; all other offixCials desiring the services of the Guardia 
Nacional de Nicaragua shall be required to submit requests through 
the nearest official of that organization. The guard of Honor for the 
Palace of the President shall be a company of selected men and officers 
from the personnel of the Guardia Nacional, and will wear distinctive 
insignia while employed on this service. 

III. 

All matters of recruiting, appointment, instruction, training, pro- 
motion, examination, discipline, operation of troops, clothing, rations, 
arms, and equipment, quarters and administration, shall be under the 
jurisdiction of the Chief of the Guardia Nacional. 

210 



IV. 
Rules and regulations for the administration and discipline of the 
Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, Prisons and Penitentiaries, shall be 
issued by the Chief of the Guardia Nacional after being approved by 
the President of Nicaragua. Infraction of these rules and regulations 
by members of the Guardia Nacional may be punished by arrest and 
imprisonment, suspension from duty without pay, forfeiture of pay, or 
dismissal, under regulations promulgated by the Chief of the Guardia 
Nacional and approved by the President of Nicaragua. 

V. 

Other offenses committed by members of the Guardia Nacional de 
Nicaragua shall be investigated by of^cers of the Guardia Nacional as 
directed by the Chief of the Guardia Nacional. If it should appear on 
investigation that an offense has been committed the offender will be 
turned over to the civil authorities. 

VI. 

Courts-martial constituted under the rules and regulations of the 
Chief of the Guardia Nacional may try native Nicaraguan officers and 
enlisted men of the Guardia for infraction of the rules and regulations. 
The findings of the courts-martial of the Guardia Nacional after appro- 
val of the Chief are final, and not subject to appeal or review except 
by the Supreme Court of Nicaragua and then, only in questions of 
excess of power or questions of jurisdiction. 

VII. 

Persons violating the Regulations (if there is no civil law) or the 
Laws (if there is a civil law) governing traffic in arms, ammunition and 
military stores, shall be punished by a fine of from fifty to one thousand 
cordobas or imprisonment of from ninety days to five years, or both; 
for which purpose the Government of Nicaragua will present to Con- 
gress a project of law to amend the criminal laws in the sense indicated. 

VIII. 

The Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua shall be under the control of 
the President of Nicaragua and all orders from him pertaining to the 
Guardia Nacional shall be delivered to the Chief thereof. All other 
civil officials desiring protection or the services of the Guardia Nacional 
will make application to the senior officer of the Guardia Nacional in 
that locality. 

IX. 

An adequate amount as provided in Article I of this Agreement 
shall be appropriated annually to defray the expenses for pay, allow- 
ances, equipment, uniforms, transportation, administration and other 
current expenses of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua. Allotments 
for the various needs of the Guardia Nacional shall be made from this 
sum by the Chief of the Guardia Nacional. 

211 



X. 

Reports of expenditures shall be made by the Chief of the Guardia 
Nacional as directed by the President of Nicaragua and audited in 
accordance with the law. 

Savings effected under any title may be expended under any other 
title upon written approval of the Chief of the Guardia Nacional. 

XI. 

The laws necessary to make effective the above provisions shall be 
submitted to the legislative body of Nicaragua. 

XII. 

In consideration of the foregoing, the Government of the United 
States in virtue of authority conferred on the President by the Act of 
Congress approved May 19, 1926, entitled "An Act to authorize the 
President to detail officers and enlisted men of the United States Army, 
Navy and Marine Corps to assist the Governments of the Latin-Ameri- 
can Republics in military and naval matters" undertakes to detail offi- 
cers and enlisted men of the United States Navy and Marine Corps to 
assist the Government of Nicaragua in the organizing and training of a 
constabulary as herein provided. 

All American officers serving with the Guardia Nacional de Nicara- 
gua shall be appointed from personnel of the United States Navy and 
Marine Corps by the President of Nicaragua upon nomination of the 
President of the United States. They will be replaced by Nicaraguans 
when the latter have successfully completed the course of instructions 
provided by the Chief of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua and have 
shown by their conduct and examination that they are fit for command. 

Officers and enlisted men of the United States Navy and Marine 
Corps serving with the Guardia Nacional will not be tried by Nicara- 
guan civil courts or courts-martial but will be subject to trial by courts- 
martial under the laws of the United States for the Government of the 
Navy. 

In witness whereof, the undersigned have hereunto signed their 
names and affixed their seals in duplicate, in the city of Managua, 
this twenty-second day of December, 1927. 

(Seal of the Legation of the 

United States of America, (Signed) DANA G. MUNRO. 

Managua, Nicaragua.) 

(Seal of the Ministry of 

Foreign Affairs of Nicaragua, (Signed) CARLOS CUADRA PASOS. 

Managua.) 



212 



NAVY DEPARTMENT 
Washington 

December 9, 1927. 

From: The Secretary of the Navy. 

To: The Commander, Special Service Squadron. 

Subject: Instructions for forces in Nicaragua. 

1 . The following principles will govern in the relations between 
the Second Brigade, U. S. Marines, and the Nicaraguan National Guard. 

(a) Basis Principles. The Second Brigade constitutes the 
force of the United States, responsible to the President of the United 
States. The National Guard constitutes the force of Nicaragua, respon- 
sible to the President of Nicaragua. These two forces should operate 
independently of each other, except in an emergency requiring joint 
action. 

(b) Command. The command of the Second Brigade will 
rest in the Brigade Commander, responsible to the Commander, Special 
Service Squadron, to the Navy Department and to the Major General 
Commandant. The command of the National Guard will rest in the 
commanding officer thereof, responsible to the President of Nicaragua. 
In the absence of the brigade commander, the senior officer of the bri- 
gade will succeed him, and a similar succession will apply to the National 
Guard. 

(c) Discipline. The discipline of the Second Brigade will be 
administered by the Brigade Commander, in accordance with the law 
and regulations. The discipline of the National Guard will be admin- 
istered by the Commanding Of^cer thereof solely in so far as the native 
personnel is concerned. In the case of members of the naval service 
attached to the Nicaraguan National Guard Detachment, discipline 
will be administered by the Commanding Officer thereof within the 
limits of his legal powers; i.e., in ordering summary courts-martial, 
deck courts, and the awarding of punishments. In cases where such 
naval service personnel require trial by general courts-martial, the 
individuals will be transferred to the Second Brigade with appropriate 
report and recommendation in each case. The senior officer present 
will act as immediate superior in command on summary courts-martial 
ordered either by the brigade commander or by the commanding officer 
of the Nicaraguan National Guard Detachment. The records of pro- 
ceedings of all courts will be forwarded direct as prescribed by regula- 
tions. 

(d) Organization, Supply, Administration and Training. 

These activities will be conducted independently by the commanders 
of the Second Brigade and the National Guard. There should be full 
cooperation and assistance between these two organizations. 

(e) Correspondence. Correspondence will be conducted di- 
rect by each commander through the proper channels without reference 
to each other. Matters pertaining to combined operations, however, 

213 



will be conducted through the senior officer present. Each commander 
will keep the other informed of matters which have a bearing on com- 
bined operations. 

(f) Police and other civil functions. The Second Brigade 
should refrain from all police and other civil duties except where neces- 
sary to preserve peace and public order. As rapidly as conditions per- 
mit, the brigade should withdraw from these duties, being relieved by 
the National Guard. 

When so relieved, units of the brigade should constitute a reserve 
force only, available in cases of emergency to which the National Guard 
is not equal. 

(g) Senior Officer Present. The senior officer present will be 
the officer of the naval service present in the line of command, accord- 
ing to United States commission. His functions as such, in the coordina- 
tion of the Second Brigade and of the National Guard will be restricted 
to combined operations, the necessity for which he will be the judge. 

(h) Combined Operations. In case of disorder to which the 
National Guard is unequal, the senior officer present is responsible for 
the measures taken for the reestablishment of tranquility, and will 
direct the action to be taken by the Second Brigade and by the National 
Guard for combined operations for that purpose. Such combined 
operations should continue only so long as the military necessity exists. 
The supervision of elections is considered as a combined operation. 

(i) Military Operations. Combined operations will be under 
the direction of the commanding officer of the brigade subject to the 
command of the senior officer present. When forces of the Second 
Brigade and of the National Guard are acting together, the senior 
officer in line of command, according to United States commission, 
whether of the brigade or of the guard, will command the combined 
force. 



/s/ CURTIS D. WILBUR. 



CERTIFIED A TRUE COPY; 



/s/ L. B. Freen, 2nd, 

L. B. Green, 2nd, Lieut-Commander, U.S.N., 

Flag Secretary to, 

Commander Special Service Squadron. 

Al/Ef49(995) G-r 



214 



COMMANDER, 
U. S. SPECIAL SERVICE SQUADRON, 
U.S.S. ROCHESTER, Flagship. 

Balboa, Canal Zone, 
28 April, 1928. 

From: Commander, Special Service Squadron. 

To: Commanding Officer, National Guard of Nicaragua. 

Subject: Instructions for forces in Nicaragua. 

Reference: Comsperon letter Al/Ef49(618) of 23 December, 1927. 

1 . By direction of the Secretary of the Navy, the last sentence 
of sub-paragraph "h", paragraph 1, of the inclosure in reference (a) 
above, Which reads as follows : "The supervision of elections is considered 
as a combined operation", should be eliminated 

/s/ D. F. SELLERS. 

Managua, 21 February, 1928. 

General Elias R. Beadle, 

Sr. Jefe Director de la Guardia Nacional.- 

Presente.- 

I am addressing you to inform you that I have decided that 
the Guardia Nacional, under your worthy direction, take over the 
Police Service of this Capital, from and including the 1st March, 1928, 
replacing the Republican Police, which is actually performing such duty. 

I also wish to advise very earnestly that the members of the 
Guardia assigned to perform the Police duties be selected from among 
the most able and capable for this kind of duty, being in addition most 
trustworthy. 

For the above mentioned reasons, it is necessary that the 
men selected have clean records and no vices, that they may render 
the guarantees to which the people are entitled, and perform their 
duty in the most correct and efficient manner. 

Yours very truly, 

/s/ ADOLFO DIAZ, 
PRESIDENT. 



215 



Presidency and 
Comandancy of the Republic, 

Managua, Nicaragua. June 10, 1928. 

Sr. Jefe Director de la Guardia Nacional, 
City.- 

In accordance with the provisions of the agreement between 
the United States and the Republic of Nicaragua relative to the 
organization of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua signed the twenty- 
second day of December, 1927, by Carlos Cuadra Pasos, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of Nicaragua, and by Dana G. Munro representing the 
United States, and as funds are available you are authorized to increase 
the enlisted strength of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua to two 
thousand men and the strength of officers, including the medical 
personnel to take over the prophylactic service of the Republic, to two 
hundred and forty-six divided among the various ranks as follows- 

1 Brigadier-General, 

7 Colonels, 
10 Majors, 
31 Captains, 
86 First Lieutenants, 
91 Second Lieutenants, 
20 Cadets. 

Very truly yours, 

/s/ ADOLFO DIAZ, 
PRESIDENT. 



216 



HEADQUARTERS GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA 
MANAGUA, NICARAGUA 

1 July, 1932. 



STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION TABLE BASED ON 267 OFFICERS AND 

2150 ENLISTED MEN (exclusive of student Cadets in the Military Academy). 

STATIONS: LINE MEDICAL TOTAL 

OFFICERS: ENL: OFFICERS: ENL: OFFICERS: ENL: 



9 



GEN. HDQTRS. 


13 


6 


MEDICAL DEPT. 






PAY DEPARTMENT 


6 




QM DEPARTMENT 


13 


25 


DEPT. MANAGUA-CARAZO 




MANAGUA 


4 


30 


RADIO CLASS 




13 


LOS BRASILES 




1 


S.F. DEL CORNICERO 




1 


MAIEARE 




1 


SABANA GRANDE 




1 


LA UNION 


1 


11 


SAN RAFAEL 




1 


TICUANTEPE 




1 


EL CARMEN 




1 


SAN MARCOS 




1 


JINOTEPE 


1 


3 


DIRIAMBA 




1 


SANTA TERESA 




1 


TIPITAPA 




1 


POLICE CO MANAGUA 


5 


59 


PRESIDENTIAL GUARD 


3 


59 


BAND 


1 


30 


MILITARY ACADEMY 


10 


4 


DEPT. CHONTALES. 






JUIGALPA 


4 


39 


SANTO DOMINGO 


2 


17 


LA LIBERTAD 


1 


16 


BOACO 


2 


17 


CAMOAPA 




2 


SAN JOSE 




2 


SAN LORENCO 




2 


TEUSTEPE 




2 


SAN CARLOS 




3 


EL MORITO 




2 


SAN MIGUELITO 




2 


ACOYAPA 




4 


SANTO TOMAS 




2 


SAN PEDRO 




2 


COMALAPA 




2 


CUAPA 




1 



13 


6 


7 


9 


6 




13 


25 


4 


30 




13 



1 


5 


60 


1 


3 


59 




1 


30 




10 


4 


1 


5 


40 




2 


17 


1 


1 


17 


1 


2 


18 

2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
2 
2 
4 
2 
2 
2 
1 



217 



STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION TABLE BASED ON 267 OFFICERS AND 
2150 ENLISTED MEN (exclusive of student Cadets in the Military Academy). 



STATIONS: OF 


FICEF 


IS:E> 


DEPT. GRANADA 






GRANADA 


5 


35 


S. S. VICTORIA 




1 


DIRIA 




2 


DIRIOMO 




2 


NANDAIME 




2 


MASAYA 


2 


1 


MASATEPE 




4 


NIQUINOHOMO 
DEPT. LEON- 




1 


LEON 


6 


45 


NAGAROriE 


1 


4 


LA PAZ CENTRO 




2 


LA CEIBA 




2 


TELICA 




2 


QUEZALGUAQUE 
EL SAUCE 


1 
3 


5 

19 


ACHUAPA 


2 


15 


VILLA NUEVA 


2 


14 


SOMOTILLO 


2 


18 


SAN FRANCISCO 




16 


PUNTA RIELES (RR Gd) 
DEPT. CHINANDEGA— 


1 


10 


CHINANDEGA 


4 


24 


CORINTO 


1 


7 


CHICHIGALPA 


1 


15 


EL VIEJO 
SAN ANTONIO 


1 


2 
10 


DEPT. RIVAS— 






RIVAS 


3 


20 


POTOSI 




1 


SAN JORGE 

SAN JUAN DEL SUR 

CARDENAS 


1 
1 


1 

2 
8 


NORTHERN AREA- 






AREA HEADQUARTERS 
DEPT NUEVA SEGOVIA- 


7 


8 


OCOTAL 


4 


70 


DIPILTO 


1 


15 


MACUELIZO 


1 


15 


SANTA MARIA 


1 


15 


SOMOTO 


5 


45 


PATASIE 


1 


17 


YALAGUINA 


1 


15 


CONDEGA 


5 


45 



1 1 





1 




2 




2 




2 


2 


2 




4 




1 


7 


47 


1 


4 




2 




2 




2 


1 


5 


4 


20 


2 


15 


2 


14 


2 


19 




16 


1 


10 


4 


25 


1 


7 


1 


15 




2 


1 


10 


3 


21 




1 




1 


1 


2 


1 


8 


9 


13 


4 


70 


1 


15 


1 


16 


1 


16 


5 


46 


1 


17 


1 


15 


5 


46 



218 



STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION TABLE BASED ON 267 OFFICERS AND 
2150 ENLISTED MEN (exclusive of student Cadets in the Military Academy). 



STATIONS : OFFICERS : ENL : 


OFFICERS: ENL: 


OFFICERS: EI 


TOTOGALPA 




15 




1 


15 


PUEBLO NUEVO 




20 


1 1 


3 


21 


DARAILI 




15 




1 


15 


PALACAGUINA 




19 




2 


19 


QUILALI 




40 


1 


3 


41 


SAN JUAN TELPANECA 




23 


1 1 


4 


24 


lELPANECA 




24 


1 


2 


25 


APALI 




45 


1 1 


4 


46 


JICARO 




24 


1 


3 


25 


JALAPA 




20 


1 


2 


21 


SAN FERNANDO 




15 




1 


15 


DEPT. ESTELI— 












ESTELI 




55 


1 2 


6 


57 


LA TRINIDAD 




15 




1 


15 


LIMAY 




41 


1 


3 


42 


CENTRAL AREA- 












AREA HEADQUARTERS 




2 


3 2 


6 


4 


CO. "D"JINOTEGA 




77 


1 


6 


78 


CO. "M"JINOTEGA 




30 


1 


3 


31 


CO. "A" CORINTO FINCA 




42 


1 1 


4 


43 


CO. "A" SAJONIA 




14 




1 


14 


CO. "B" SAN RAFAEL 




37 


1 


4 


37 


CO. "B" YALI 




37 


1 


4 


38 


CO. "B" LA CONCORDIA 




20 




1 


20 


CO. "C" LA FUNDADORA 




20 


1 


1 


21 


CO. "C" LAS CAMELIAS 




15 




1 


15 


CO. "C'ARANJUEZ 




15 




1 


15 


DEPT. MATAGALPA— 












MATAGALPA 




71 


1 1 


10 


72 


SAN P.AMON 




3 






3 


EL CONSUELO 




28 


1 


3 


29 


DARIO 




9 




1 


9 


TERRABONA 




5 






5 


SAN ISIDRO 




27 


1 


2 


28 


SEBACO 




5 






5 


MUY MUY 




30 


1 


3 


31 


MATIGUAS 




13 




1 


13 


LA PINEDA 




7 




1 


7 


ESQUIPULAS 




10 




1 


10 


SAN DIONISIO 




3 






3 


BUENA VISTA 




15 




1 


15 


ALGOVIA 




9 






9 


LAS LAJAS 




9 






9 


NAVARRO 




37 


1 


3 


38 


LA ISLA 




8 




1 


8 


CUATRO ESQUINAS 




12 






12 



219 



STRENGTH A^;D DISTRIBUTION TABLE BASED ON 267 OFFICERS AND 
2150 ENLISTED MEN (exclusive of student Cadets in the Military Academy). 

RECAPITULATION 

LINE MEDICAL TOTAL 

STATIONS : OFFICERS : ENL : OFFICERS : ENL : OFFICERS : ENL : 



LA CUMPLIDA 




5 








5 


EASTERN AREA- 














AREA HEADQUARTERS 


3 


2 


2 


2 


5 


4 


BLUEFIELDS 


5 


43 






5 


43 


EL RAMA 


2 


19 




1 


2 


20 


EL GALLO 


2 


19 




1 


2 


20 


NEPTUNE MINES 


2 


19 




1 


2 


20 


WAUNI 


2 


29 




1 


2 


30 


PRINZAPOLCA 




8 








8 


LA CRUZ 




4 








4 


PUNTA GORDA 




4 








4 


EL BLUFF 




4 








4 


RIO GRANDE BAR 




4 








4 


DEPT. PUERTO CABEZAS: 












PUERTO CABEZAS 


6 


63 


1 


1 


7 


64 


KIPLA FARM 


1 


15 






1 


15 


MOSS FARM 


3 


34 




1 


3 


35 


TOLEDO WYE 




5 








5 


CABO GRACIAS 


1 


19 




1 


1 


20 


G. N. HEADQUARIERS 


13 


6 






13 


6 


MEDICAL DEPARTMENT 




7 


9 


7 


9 


PAY DEPARTMENT 


6 








6 




Q. M DEPARTMENT 


13 


25 






13 


25 


DEPT. MANAGUA 


6 


68 






6 


68 


POLICE COK/IPANY 


5 


59 




1 


5 


60 


PRESIDENTS GUARD 


3 


59 




1 


3 


60 


BAND 


1 


30 






1 


30 


MILITARY ACADEMY 


10 


4 






10 


4 


DEPT. CHONTALES 


9 


115 


1 


3 


10 


118- 


DEPT. GRANADA 


7 


48 


1 


2 


8 


50 


DEPT. LEON 


18 


152 


2 


4 


20 


156 


DEPT. CHINANDEGa 


7 


58 




1 


7 


59 


DEPT. RIVAS 


5 


32 




1 


5 


33 


NORTHERN AREA 


58 


616 


6 


19 


64 


635 


CENTRAL AREA 


53 


615 


6 


12 


59 


627 


EASIERNAREA 


27 


291 


3 


9 


30 


300 


GRAND TOTAL 


241 


2178 


26 


62 


267 


2240 



The authorized strength of the Department of Northern Bluefields includes 50 enlisted, 
funds for whose maintenance are furnished by the Standard Fruit Company for service 
in that department. Chinandega and Leon are incerased 20 each (10 at San Antonio 
Sugar Estates; 10 at Sugar warehouse at Chichigalpa and 20 for Railroad Guard at 
Leon). If at any time the companies concerned withdraw funds for the maintenance 
of these extra men the authorized strength of these departments will be reduced ac- 

220 



cordingly. The Departments of Leon and Chinandega are authorized 150 Auxiliares 
(85 in Dept. of Leon and 65 in Dept of Chinandega) to be distributed as the military 
situation may require. 

Radio Lieutenants, in addition to the officers provided for in this table, are authorized 
at the following places: OCOTAL 6; SANTA MARIA 1; TELPANECA 1; SAN 
JUAN DE TELPANECA 1 ; JALAP A I; APALI 1; MANAGUA 2; JINOTEGA 3; 
CORINTO FINCA 1; MATAGALPA 2; EL CONSUELO 1; CABO GRACIAS 1; 
NEPTUNE MINE 1 ; PUERTO CABEZAS 1 ; WAUNI 1. 



b 



221 



CUARTEL GENERAL DEL DEPARTAMENTO DE , 

GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA NICARAGUA. 

CONTRATO CELEBRADO ENTIRE LA GUARDIA NACIONAL 
DE NICARAGUA Y LA 

MUNICIPALIDAD DE , DEPARTAMENTO DE..... 

REPUBLICA DE NICARAGUA. 



A fin de proveer los fondos necesarios para el mantenimiento de un 
descramento de la Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua que permanencera 

estacionada en , la Municipiladad de 

se compromete a proveer una suma de dinero al Oficial en comando de 

la Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua estacionada en para el 

mantenimiento de. guardias de acarrdo con el programa que 

adelante de describe. 

La Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua se compremete a enlistar guar- 
dias que van estar de servicio en para el desem.peno de las 

funciones de policia municipal en ese lugar. Dichos guardias van a ser 
alistados por un periodo de un ano solo para el servicio de policia 

municipal en y la Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua se 

compromete a no transferir dichos guardias a otros lugares ni dedicarlos 
a otros servicios. 

Es concenido entre ambas partes, La Guardia Nacional de Nicara- 
gua y la Municipiladad de que los gastos del mantenimiento 

del destacamento de la Guardia de que se habla, se proveeran como bajo 

se indica, y que la Nlunicipilidad de proveera los fondos 

para dichos gastos en las candidades y tiempo establecidos en este con- 
trato. La Guardia Nacional pagara y proveera de vestido a los guardias 
que se alisten de conformidad con este contrato de los fondos que se 
reciban de la Municipilidad, a quien ae la rendira una cuenta mensual 
acompanada de sua respectivos comprobantes por los fondos que se 
hay an gastado. 

Vesturio: Un equipo completo que se la dara a cada guardia al 
principar el contrato y cada seis meses, como sigue: 

3 Camisas khaki .$ 3.75 

3 Corbatas de campo .45 Total del equi- 

3 Fajas de cintura .36 po que se le 

1 Insignia para sombrero .14 dara a cada 

2 Pantalones khaki... 3.00 guardia cada 

2 (1 par) sobrebotas khaki .19 seis (6) meses. 

1 Sombrero de campana. 2.19 

1 par Zapatas del pais..._ 1.75 

^11.83 

Total de..... ._ guardias. 

Pago de cada guardia por mes $ 

Total por mes, Guardias. 

222 



Es entenido y convenido entre ambas partes contratantes que los 
Guardias que se alisten bajo los condiciones de este contrato, seran 
incorporados de la Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua conforme el contrato 
ordinario de alistimiento, y que estaran sujetos a las Leyes y Regla- 
mento para el gobierno y disciplina de la Guardia Nacional. 



Guardia Nacional, Alcalde Municipal. 

Comandante Departamental. 



GUARDIA CIVICA DE NICARAGUA, 
CONTRATO DE ENGANCHE. 

Yo, el suscrito nacido 

en ....Departamento de 

por el presente consiento voluntariamente an alistarme como Civico de 

Nicaragua para servicio en por el termino de un ano sin 

recibir de la Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua pago ninguno por los ser- 
vicios prestados, al menos que sea licenciado antes por autoridad com- 
petente y solomnemente juro que guardare fidelidad y adhesion a 
Nicaragua; que la defendere fielmente y honrossamente contra todos 
sus enemigos, cualquera que estos scan y que obederce las ordenes del 
Presidente de la Republica y las de mas Jefes y Oficiales superiores, 
de acuerdo con las leyes y reglamentos para el gobierno de la Guardia 
Nacional de Nicaragua durante el tiempo que yo este en actual servicio 
militar: 



Marca del dedo pulgar derecho Firma del Civico contratado 

del Civico. 

Suscrito y tornado juramente por mi en 

el ..de.... .....de 19 



Comandante del. 



GUARDIA CIVICA DE NICARAGUA (EN FINCAS) 
CONTRATO DE ENGANCHE. 

Yo, el suscrito nacido.,. en 

Departamento de.. ....por el presente consiento voluntaria- 

mente en alistarme como Civico de Nicaragua para servicio en..... 

por el termino de un ano sin recibir de la Guardia Nacional de Nicara- 
gua pago ninguno por los servicios prestados, al menos que sea licenciado 
antes por autoridad competente y solemnemente juro que guardare 
fidelidad y adhesion a Nicaragua; que la defendere fielmente y honoros- 
amente contra todos sus enemigos, cualquiera que estos scan, y que 
obedecere las ordenes del Presidente de la Republica y las de mas Jefes 
y Oficiales superiores, de acuerdo con las leyes y reglamentos para 
el gobierno de la Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua durante el tiempo que 
yo este en actual servicio militar, pero se entiende que para mis ser- 
vicios como guardia civico simpiemente, en el empleo de 

, que cualesqueira procedimientos legaies que puedan 

resultar de mis acciones en tal capacidad caen bajo la jurisdiccion de 
los tribunales comunes. He recibido el rifle descrito abajo y accepto 
la responsabilidad para su seguridad y limpieza: 

Clase Calibre Numero 



Marca del dedo pulgar derecho 

del Civico. Firma del Civico contratado 

Suscrito y tomado juramente por me en el.. 

de de 19 



Comandante del. 



El individuo arriba mencionado es empleado mio, y siempre lo he 
reconocido como un ciudadano fiel y observador de las leyes de la 
Republica de Nicaragua. Estoy de acuerdo en que sea dado de alta 
para prestar servicios como civico de Nicaragua, y prometo no molestar 
ni intervenir en sus servicios como tal, y asumo toda responsabilidad 
acerca de la seguridad del arma arriba mencionada, y devolver dicha 
arms a la Guardia Nacional cuando reciba ordenes a ese respecto del 
Comandante de la Guardia Nacional, Departamento de 



Firma del empressario del Civico 
arriba mencionado. 



Suscrito por mi en el de..... de 19._. 



Comandante, Guardia Nacional, 
Departamento de..._ 



224 



3-CD/fam HEADQUARTERS GUARDIA NACIONAL DE 
NICARAGUA MANAGUA NICARAGUA. 

28 November, 1931. 

LETTER OF INSTRUCTION #4. 

SUBJECT : Creation of the Auxiliary force of the Guardia Nacional 
de Nicaragua. 

1 . His Excellency General Jose Maria Moncada, President 
of the Republic of Nicaragua, has decided to create a force of Auxiliares 
of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, and has directed the Minister 
of Finance to immediately place to the order of the Guardia the sum of 
C^7,200 for the payment and maintenance of this force for the term of 
one month. 

2. 300 Auxiliares shall be enlisted immediately in the man- 
ner indicated below for the period of three months, subject to discharge 
at any time during such period if convenient to the Government. 

3. They will earn a salary of C^ 12.00 a month. Ration 
allowance of C^0.20 a day. Clothing allowance C^0.20 a day during the 
first month and C^0.07 a day thereafter. The following clothing items 
will be furnished initially: 

1 khaki shirt, 1 khaki trousers: pr., 1 shoes, pr. 

The Auxiliares are obligated to use their uniforms while 
on patrol duty in the field. The use of said uniform on other occasions 
is left to their discretion. The officers should encourage Auxiliares to 
keep their civilian clothing. 

4. Enlistments shall be effected as follows: 

Leon 100 men 

Chinandega 1 00 men 

Masaya 50 men 

Carazo. 50 men 

As far as possible, inhabitants of the comarcas (rural 
districts) will be given preference over those of the cities for enlistment 
in this force. The Jefes Politico have been instructed by His Excellency 
the President to recruit and send in to the Guardia inidviduals for 
enlistment under this contract. 

5. It will not be required that an officer make a formal 
medical examination, but the Jefes Politico and the enlisting Guardia 
officer shall take into account the physical condition of each man before 
enlisting him. No funds have been furnished for medical treatment of 
the Auxiliares. They will be entitled to medical treatment only while on 
active patrol duty. The Auxiliares are not entitled to enjoy the benefits 
stipulated in General Order No. 28-1930. 

6. As concerns discipline, all Auxiliares will be subject to 
the Rules and Regulations for the Govemm.ent of the Guardia Nacional. 
The Commanding Officers will give instructions to all Auxiliares in 



225 



matters regarding their duties and behavior as members of the Guardia 
Nacional. All efforts will be made to develop discipline and efficiency 
in them. 

7. Training of Auxiliares will be carried out to insure dis- 

cipline and prepare them for active field operations. It must be held in 
mind that the mission of this force is to cooperate in exterminating 
banditry. 

BY ORDER OF THE JEFE DIRECTOR MAJOR-GENERAL 
C. B. MATTHEWS, G. N. : 

OFFICIAL: C. DAVIS /s/ WALTER G. SHEARD, 

FIRST LIEUT. GN. GN-1. COLONEL, G.N. CHIEF OF STAFF. 



AUXILIAR DE LA GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA. 
CONTRATO DE ALISTAMIENTO. 

Yo. el suscrito _.. nacido en 

Departamento de por el presente contrato consiento 

voluntariamente a alistarme como Auxiliar de la Guardia Nacional 

de Nicaragua, por un periodo de meses con goce de sueldo a 

razon de C^ 12.00 cordobas mensuales, a no ser que sea dado de baja 
por autoridad competente, y solemnemente juro que sere leal y ad- 
hesivo, que defendre a Nicaragua fiel y honorosamente contra todos 
sus enemigos quienesquiera que sean, y que obedecree las ordenes 
del Presidente de la Republica y las que expidan mis Jefes lo mismo 
que las de mis Oficiales superiores, de acuerdo con las leyes y regla- 
mentos para el gobierno de la Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua durante 
el tiempo que permaneza en servicio active militar. Convengo tambien 
en custodiar toda propriedad del Gobierno puesta baja mi custodia. 
En caso de que se me licencio del servicio del Gobierno por cualquier 
razon antes de haber prestado un mes de servicio, convengo devolver 
la ropa que se me ha proveido, o si no me es posible, que su valcr se 
deduzca de mi pago. 



Impresiones digitales del dedo 

gordo derecho del Auxiliar. Firma del Auxiliar alistado. 

Alistado y juramentado por me en , hoy 

de de 19 

;ii"iii;i ;i;""g n' de Nic" 

Oficial Comandante. 



226 



AMEPvICAN PERSONNEL WHO SERVED IN THE GUARDIA 
NACIONAL IN VARIOUS POSITIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY 
AS HEADS OF ADMINISTRATIVE, EXECUTIVE OR COM- 
MAND DEPARTMENTS. 



NAME: 

RHEA, Robert Y 
PIERCE, Harold C 
BEADLE, Elias R 
McDOUGAL, Douglas C 
MATTHEWS, Calvin B 
SMITH, Julian C 



JEFE DIRECTORS 

MCRANK: GN RANK. 

Lt-Colonel : Brig-General 

Major: Major 
Lt-Colonel : Brig-General 
Colonel: Maj -General 
Lt-Colonel: Maj -General 
Major: Colonel 



DATES OF SERVICE : 

12 May to 29 June. 1927 

30 Junto 10 Jul, 1927(Actg). 

11 Jul 1927 to 10 Mar 1929 

11 Mar 1929 to 5 Feb 1931 

6 Feb 1931 to 1 Jan 1933 

16 Aug to 5 Oct 1931(Actg). 





STAFF: 




CHIEFS OF STAFF: 


SAGE, Albert B 
HARRINGTON, Samuel M 
THRASHER, Tom E 
HOYT, Leon W 
VOGEL, Clayton B 
SHEARD, Walter G 


Captain: Major 
Major: Colonel 
Major: Colonel 
Major: Co^one' 
Lt-Cclonel: Colonel 
Major: Colonel 


SALZMAN, Otto 
MATTHEWS, Calvin B 
DENIG, Robert L 
SMITH, Julian C 


Captain: Major 
Lt-Colonel: Colonel 
Major: Colonel 
Major: Brig-General 


GN-l(PERSONNEL AND ADJU 


PARKER, John H 
HOGABOOM. Robert E 


Captain: Major 
2nd-Lieut: Captain 



PULLER, Lewis B 
ALBAN, Harvey B 
DAVIS. Charles 



2nd-Lieut: Captain 

Ist-Lieut: Captain 

Sgt-Major: Captain 



23 May 1927 to 10 July 1927 

11 Jul 1927 to 28 Feb 1929 

1 Mar 1929 to 27 Apr 1929 

28 Apr to 30 Apr 1929 

I May 1929 to 31 May 1930 

1 Jun 1930 to 27 Oct 1930 

& 31 Mar 1931 to 9 May 1932 

9 to 23 Jun 1931 (Actg) 

28 Oct 1930 to 5 Feb 1931 

6 Feb 1931 to 30 Mar 1931 

10 May 1932 to 1 Jan 1933 



11 Jul 1927 to 30 Nov 1928 

1 Dec 1928 to 14 Dec 1928 

6z 26 Feb 1929 to 23 Dec 1929 

15 Dec 1928 to 25 Feb 1929 

24 Dec 1929 to 14 Jul 1930 

15 Jul 1930 to 1 Jan 1933 

(25 Jan 1929 to 14 Jul 1930 

Personnel Officer, G.N.). 



BLEASDALE, Victor F 
BAIN, James M 
HOLMES, Maurice G 
PATCHEN, Fred G 
SHEARD, Walter G 



GN-2 (INTELLIGENCE) 

Captain: Major 
Captain: Major 
Captain: Major 
Captain: Major 
Major: Colonel 



9 Sep 1927 to 7 Apr 1929 

8 Apr to 31 May 1929 

1 Jun to 23 July 1929 

24 Jul to 11 Nov 1929 

12 Nov 1929 to 28 May 1930 

6z 1 Aug 1930 to 24 Oct 1930 

8z 1 Feb 1931 to 30 Mar 1931 



227 



NAME: 



MC RANK: GN RANK. 



DATES OF SERVICE. 



STENT, Howard N 
SALZMAN, Otto 



HUNT, LeRoy P 



Captain: Captain 
Captain: Major 



Major: Colonel 



29 May 1930 to 14Jun 1930 

15 Jun 1930 to 31 Jul 1930 

& 25 Oct 1930 to 31 Jan 1931 

& 31 Mar 1931 to 28 Nov 1931 

29 Nov 1931 to 1 Jan 1933 



GN-3 (OPERATIONS AND TRAINING); 



BLEASDALE, Victor F 
BAIN, James M 
HOLMES, Maurice G 
PATCHEN, Fred G 
SALZMAN, Otto 

STENT, Howard N 
HUNT, LeRoy P 



Captain: Major 

Captain: Major 

Captain: Major 

Captain: Major 

Captain: Major 

Captain: Captain 

Major: Colonel 



1 Feb 1928 to 7 Apr 1929 

8 Apr 1929 to 25 Apr 1929 

26 Apr 1929 to 23 Jul 1929 

24 Jul 1929 to 17 May 1930 

18 May to 26 May 1930 & 

15 Jun 1930 to 28 Nov 1931 

27 May to 14 Jun 1930 

29 Nov 1931 to 1 Jan 1933 



GENERAL STAFF (Cont). 
GN-4 (QUARTERMASTER) 



HAYES, Glenn E 
VOETH, Robert W 
SAVAGE, Eli 
SALZMAN, Otto 
GREGORY, Maurice C 
HUEFE, Edward G 
REA, Leonard E 



Captain: Major 

Major: Colonel 
Captain: Major 
Captain: Major 
Captain: Major 
Captain: Major 
Captain: Major 



23 May to 10 Jul 1927 

11 Jul 1927 to 15 Feb 1928 

16 Feb 1928 to 9 Apr 1930 

10 Apr 1930 to 19 May 1930 

20 May 1930 to 31 May 1931 

1 Jun 1931 to 9 Apr 1932 

10 Apr 1932 to 1 Jan 1933 



HAYES, Glenn E 
VOETH, Robert W 
DYE, Leon L 
LIVINGSTON, William L 
SCHMIDT, Carl S 



PAYMASTERS: 

Captain. Major 
Major: Colonel 
Captain: Major 
Captain: Major 
Captain: Major 



23 May to 10 Jul 1927 

11 Jul to 31 Aug 1927 

1 Sep 1927 to 28 Jun 1930 

29 Jun 1930 to 30 Apr 1932 

1 May 1932 to 1 Jan 1933 



LAW AND PUBLIC RELATIONS OFFICERS: 

PARKER, John H Captain: Major 1 Jun 1928 to 3 1 Jan 1929 



SCOTT, William W 
SHEARD, Walter G 

HUEFE, Edward G 
BALES, William L 
CHEATHAM, Thomas P 



Ist-Lieut: Captain 
Major: Colonel 

Captain: Major 
Ist-Lieut: Captain 
Major: Colonel 



2 May to 1 1 Nov 1929 

12 Nov 1929 to 21 Sep 1930 

& 24 Mar to 14 Apr 1931 

22 Sep 1930 to 23 Mar 1931 

15 Apr 1931 to 31 Jul 1932 

1 Aug 1932 to 1 Jan 1935 



SALZMAN, Otto 
SMITH, James M 



COMMUNICATIONS OFFICERS: 

Captain: Major 15 Jun 1930 to 2 Jun 193 1 

Ist-Lieut: Captain 3 Jun 1931 to 1 Jan 1933 



228 



NAME: 
HELM, Jesse B 

CONKLIN, Frederic L 
HALE, Gordon D 
TURVILLE, Wm. H. H. 



MEDICAL DIRECTORS: 
MC RANK: GN RANK. 



DATES OF SERVICE. 



Commander: Colonel (MC) 8 Oct 1927 to 11 Oct 1929 
(MC, USN) 

Lt-Comdr. : Colonei(MC) 

Commander: Colonel(MC) 

Lt-Comdr: Colonel(MC) 



12 Oct 1929 to 22 Apr 1930 

23 Apr 1930 to 31 Jan 1932 

2 Feb 1932 to 1 Jan 1933 



HOYT, Leon W 
VOGEL, Clayton B 
DENIG, Robert L 
HUNT, LeRoy P 
BUR WELL, Edward L Jr. 
ARNETT, Roscoe 
CHEATHAM, Thomas P 
WATSON, Thomas E 



AREA COMMANDERS 
NORTHERN AREA 

Major: Colonel 

Lt-Colonel: Colonel 

Major: Colonel 

Major: Colonel 

Captain: Captain 

Captain: Captain 

Major: Colonel 

Major: Colonel 



1 Jun to 23 Oct 1929 
24 Oct to 18 Nov 1929 

19 Nov 1929 to 27 Nov 1930 
28 Nov 1930 to 1 Oct 1931 

2 Oct to 14 Oct 1931 
15 Oct to 30 Nov 1931 

1 Dec 1931 to 31 Jul 1932 
1 Aug 1932 to 14 Dec 1932 



LOV/ELL, Roy D 
ERSKINE, Graves B 
WYNN, Charles A 
MATTHEWS, Calvin B 
SMITH, Julian C 
WATSON, Thomas E 
SHEARD, Walter G 



CENTRAL AREA 

Major: Colonel 
Captain: Major 
Major: Colonel 
Lt-Colonel: Colonel 
Major: Colonel 
Major: Colonel 
Major: Colonel 



1 Apr 1929 to 18 Jan 1930 

19 Jan 1930 to 21 Feb 1930 

22 Feb to 13 Jul 1930 

14 Jul to 27 Oct 1930 

28 Oct 1930 to 5 Apr 1932 
6 Apr to 31 Aug 1932 

1 Sep 1932 to 14 Dec 1932 



SAGE, Albert B 
PEARD, Roger W 
MARSTON, John 
WYNN, Charles A 
LEECH, Lloyd L 



AREA COMMANDERS 

EASTERN AREA 

Captain: Major 

Captain: Major 
Major: Colonel 
Major: Colonel 
Major: Colonel 



27 Feb 1928 to 31 Jan 1929 

1 Feb to 6 May 1929 

7 May 1929 to 5 May 1931 

6 May 1931 to 12 Sep 1931 

13 Sep 1931 to 1 Jan 1933 



THRASHER, Tom Ejr 
SPOTTS, George W 
ARNETT, Roscoe 
WYNN, Charles A 

PATCHEN, Fred G 



WESTERN AREA 

Major: Colonel 
Captain: Major 
Captain: Captain 

Major: Colonel 

Captain: Major 
229 



29 Jul 1929 to 3 May 1930 

4 May to 7 Jul 1930 

8 Jul to 13 Jul 1930 

14 Jul to 5 Sep 1930 & 

15 Nov 1930 to 28 Feb 1931 

6 Sep to 14 Nov 1930 



NAME: 

WYNN, Charles A 
SALZMAN, Otto 
CROKA, William B 
HUNT, LeRoy P 
BUR WELL, Edward Ljr 



AREA EXECUTIVE OFFICERS. 
NORTHERN AREA. 

MC RANK: GN RANK. DATES OF SERVICE. 

Capt & Major: Major Sz Colonel 6 Sep 1929 to 21 Feb 1930 
Captain: Major 22 Feb to 9 Apr 1930 

Captain: Major 10 Apr to 31 Aug 1930 

Captain: Major 1 Sep 1930 to 7 May 1931 



Captain: Major 



8 May 1931 to 14 Dec 1932 



CRAIG, Edward A 

ERSKINE, Graves B 

WEBB, James W 

MILLER, Glenn D 

COX, Max 

CHEATHAM, Thomas P Cap & Major: Major 

WHALEY, Louis W 



CENTRAL AREA. 

Captain: Captain 
Captain: Major 
Captain: Major 
Captain: Major 
Captain: Major 



25 Junto 18 Aug 1929 

19 Aug 1929 to 19 Apr 1930 

20 Apr 1930 to 31 Aug 1930 
1 Sep 1930 to 30 Mar 1931 

31 Mar to 3 Sep 1931 
4 Sep to 31 Oct 1931 
Major: Major & Colonel 1 Nov 1931 to 14 Dec 1932 



CRONMILLER, LePage jr 
LINSCOTT, Henry B 

WOOD, John C 
COX. Max 



EASTERN AREA. 

2d-Lieut: Captain 
Captain: Major 

Captain: Major 
Captain: Major 



18Jun 1928 to 18 May 1929 
1 Jun 1929 to 31 Aug 1929 

& 1 Nov 1929 to 11 Jul 1930 
12 Jul 1930 to 18 Mar 1932 
19 Mar 1932 to 1 Jan 1933 



BUR WELL, Edward L jr 
SPOTTS, George W 
SHANNON, Harold D 
PATCHEN, Fred G 

WEBB, James W 



WESTERN AREA. 

Captain: Captain 
Captain: Major 
Captain: Captain 
Captain: Major 

Captain: Major 



1 Aug to 10 Nov 1929 

11 Nov 1929 to 3 May 1930 

4 May to 30 Jun 1930 

25 Aug to 5 Sep 1930 & 

15 Nov to 30 Nov 1930 

6 Sep 1930 to 14 Nov 1930 

& 1 Dec to 31 Dec 1930 



DEPARTMENT COMMANDERS. 
NUEVA SEGOVIA (HQ AT OCOTAL) 



HAYES, Glenn E 
PEARD, Roger W 

BUR WELL, Edward L jr 
YOUNG, Archibald 



Captain: Major 
Captain: Major 

Captain: Captain 
Major: Colonel 



ERSKINE, Graves B Captain: Major 

CLAUSON, Nicholas E Ist-Lieut : Captain 

NOTE: From 1 Jul 1929 the Area Comdr. Northern 
Commander, Nueva Segovia also.) 



1 Aug to 31 Oct 1927 

1 Nov 1927 to 2 Jan 1928 & 

13 Feb to 18 Mar 1928. 

29 Mar to 31 Mar 1928 

3 Jan to 12 Feb 1928 &z 

1 Apr to 27 Jun 1928 

28 Jun to 6 Aug 1928 

7 Aug 1928 to 30 Jun 1929 

Area functioned as Department 



230 



ESTELI. 



NAME: 

PEARD, Roger W 
McDonald, Donald 
CROKA, William B 
ARNETT, Roscoe 

McQueen, John C 
ELMORE, Willett 
CASPAR, Walter S 



MC RANK: GN RANK. 

Captain: Major 
Cy-Sgt: Ist-Lieut 
Captain: Major 
Captain: Captain 

Ist-Lieut: Captain 
Captain: Captain 
Captain: Captain 



DATES OF SERVICE. 

18 Jul to 26 Dec 1928 

27 Dec 1928 to 31 Aug 1930 

1 Sep to 25 Dec 1930 

26 Dec 1930 to 20 Aug 1931 

6z 15 Oct 1931 to 29 Feb 1932 

21 Aug to 14 Oct 1932 

1 Mar to 18 Apr 1932 

19 Apr 1932 to 14 Dec 1932 



PAUL, Albert W 
BAIN, James M 
SHANNON, Harold D 



JINOTEGA 

Ist-Lieut: Captain 
Captain: Major 
Captain: Captain 



17 Apr to 20 May 1928 

21 May 1928 to 6 Dec 1928 

7 Dec 1928to20Jun 1929 



(NOTE : From 2 1 June 1929 the Department came directly under the Area Commander) 



HAYES, Glenn E 
STAFFORD, David A 
MIXSON, James A 



MATAGALPA. 

Captain: Major 
Ist-Lieut: Captain 
Captain: Captain 



20 May 1928 to 14 Mayl929 
15 May 1929 to 28 Nov 1931 
29 Nov 1931 to 14 Dec 1932 



PATCHEN, Fred G 

EPvSKINE, Graves B 
CORBETT, Murl 
MCHENRY, George W 
SNYDER, William K 
HOWARD, Frederick M 



CHONTALES. 

Captain: Major 

Captain: Major 
Captain: Captain 
Ist-Lieut: Captain 
Captain: Captain 
Captain: Cpatain 



18 Jul to 17 Aug 1928 & 

1 Dec 1928 to 13 Jan 1929 

18 Aug to 30 Nov 1928 

14 Jan 1929 to 5 May 1929 

6 May 1929 to 19 Aug 1929 

20 Aug 1929 to 24 Sep 1930 

25 Sep 1930 to 16 Dec 1932 



ACKERMAN, James A 
HOPPER, James G 
NICHOLAS, Henery T 
YORK, Joseph 
LARSON, Emory E 
SCHNEEMAN, Robert E 
FORSYTH, Ralph E 



RIVAS. 

Ist-Lieut: Captain 
Ist-Lieut :_ Captain 
Ist-Lieut: Captain 
Ist-Sgt: Ist-Lieut 
Ist-Lieut: Captain 
Sgt: Ist-Lieut 
Ist-Lieut: Captain 



21 Aug 1928 to 13 Jan 1929 

14 Jan 1929 to 31 Aug 1929 

1 Sep 1929 to 22 Aug 1930 

23 Aug 1930 to 7 Sep 1930 

8 Sep 1930 to 17Jun 1931 
18Jun 1931 to 8 Jul 1931 

9 Jul 1931 to 21 Dec 1932 



BURWELL, Edward L, jr 
KEIMLING, Herbert S 



GRANADA. 

Captain: Captain 
Ist-Lieut: Captain 



22 Aug to 25 Nov 1928 
26 Nov 1928 to 13 Jan 1929 



231 



DEPARTMENT COMMANDERS. 
MASAYA. 



NAME: 

PAUL. Albert W 
DARNALL, Grover C 
HOPPER. James G 



MC RANK: GN RANK. 

Ist-Lieut: Captain 
Ist-Lieut: Captain 
Ist-Lieut: Captain 



DATES OF SERVICE. 



6Jun 1928 to 4 Jul 1928 

5 Jul 1928 to 19 Nov 1928 

20 Nov 1928 to 13 Jan 1929 



GRANADA-MASAYA (Combined 14 Jan, 1929). 



KEIMLING, Herbert S 
ERSKINE, Graves B 
O'NEILL, Stewart B 



Ist-Lieut: Captain 
Captain: Major 
Captain: Major 



14 Jan 1929 to 30 Apr 1929 

1 May to 18 Aug 1929 

19 Aug 1929 to 31 Dec 1932 



HAYES, Glenn E 
ACKERMAN, James 
PUGH, Lloyd R 
SHANNON, Harold D 
ROGERS. William W 



LEON 

Captain: Major 
Ist-Lieut: Captain 
Ist-Lieut: Captain 
Captain: Captain 
Captain: Captain 



PUGH, Lloyd R 


Ist-Lieut: 


Captain 


GRAVES, Avery 


Ist-Sgt: 


Ist-Lieut 


O'NEILL, Stewart B 


Captain : 


Captain 


BURWELL, Edward L jr 


Captain : 


Caotain 


SHANNON, Harold D. 


Captain 


: Captain 


ARN^TT, RosGoe 


Captain: 


Captain 


WEBB, James W 


Captain 


Major 


SYNN, Charles A 


Major: 


Colonel 


WEBB, James W 


Captain : 


Major 


ARNEl 1, Roscoe 


Captain : 


Major 




CHINANDEGA. 


SAGE, Albert B 


Captain : 


Vlajor 


JAMES, Vv'illiam C 


Captain: 


Captain 


YOUNG, Archibald 


Major: 


Colonel 


PUGH, Lloyd R 


Ist-Lieut: 


Captain 


ROGERS, William W 


Captain : 


Captain 


DARNALL, Grover C 


Ist-Lieut : 


Captain 


YANDLE. Marcin V 


Ist-Lieut: 


Captain 


CRAIG, Edward A 


Captain : 


Captain 


HUEFE, Edward G 


Captain : 


Captain 


W1EBB, James W 


Captain : 


Major 


CRAIG, Edward A 


Captain : 


Captain 



21 Nov 1927 to 15 Feb 1928 

16 Feb to 24 Mar 1928 

25 Mar 1928 to 30 Sep 1928 

1 Oct 1928 to 30 Nov 1928 

1 Dec 1928 to 9 Mar 1929 

& 1 May to 31 May 1929 

10 Mai to 30 Apr 1929 

1 May to 30Jun 1929 

1 Jul 1929 to 18 Aug 1929 

19 Aug 1929 to 25 Jun 1930 

26 Jun 1930 to 11 Jul 1930 

12 Jul 1930 to 22 Dec 1930 

23 Dec 1930 to 27 Feb 1931 

28 Feb 1931 to 11 Apr 1931 

12 Apr 1931 to 20 Mar 1932 

21 Mar 1932 to 1 Jan 1933 



4 Aug 1927 to 21 Oct 1927 
22 Oct 1927 to 21 Nov 1927 
22 Nov 1927 to 31 Dec 1927 

1 Jan 1928 to 28 Feb 1928 
1 Mar 1928 to 30 Nov 1928 

1 Dec 1928 to 31 Oct 1929 
1 Nov 1929 to 30 Nov 1929 

1 Dec 1929 to 26 Jul 1930 

27 Jul 1930 to 21 Sep 1930 
22 Sep 1930 to 26 Sep 1930 

27 Sep 1930 to 2 Sep 1931 



232 



MANAGUA. 



SKINNER, Rees 
ELMORE, Willet 
DARNALL, Grover C 
HAYES, Glenn E 
PARKER, John H 
YOUNG, Archiblad 
HOYT, Leon W 
PARKER, John H 
BUR WELL, Edward L jr 



Captain: Captain 
Captain: Captain 
Ist-Lieut: Captain 
Captain: Major 
Captain: Major 
Major: Colonel 
Major: Colonel 
Captain: Major 
Captain: Captain 



3 Sept 1931 to 30 Apr 1932 
1 May 1932 to 1 Jan 1933 

24 May 1927 to 31 May 1927 
1 Jun 1927 to 3 Aug 1927 

4 Aug 1927 to 15 Mar 1928 
16 Mar 1928 to 31 Mar 1928 

1 Apr 1928 to 23 Apr 1928 
24 Apr 1928 to 25 Nov 1928 
26 Nov 1928 to 19 Mar 1929 



BUR WELL, Edward L jr 
PAUL, Albert W 
DARNALL, Grover C 
BUR WELL, Edward L jr 
SHANNON, Harold D 
FRISBIE, Julian N 



CARAZO. 

Captain: Captain 

Ist-Lieut: Captain 

Ist-Lieut: Captain 

Captain: Captain 

Captain: Captain 

Ist-Lieut: Captain 



PAUL, Albert W Ist-Lieut & Captain: Captain 



17 Apr 1928 to 20 May 1928 

21 May 1928 to 31 May 1928 

1 Jun 1928 to 4 Jul 1928 

5 Jul 1928 to 15 Aug 1928 

16 Jul 1928 to 4 Sep 1928 

5 Sep 1928 to 16 Nov 1928 

17 Nov 1928 to 19 Mar 1929 



DEPARTMENT COMMANDERS. 
MANAGUA-CARAZO (Combined 20 Mar 1929) 



BUR WELL, Edward L jr 
BAIN, James M 
ELMORE, Willett 
CARLSON, Evans F 
YORK, Joseph 
MAYNARD, George L 



Captain: Captain 

Captain: Major 

Captain: Captain 

Ist-Lieut: Captain 

Ist-Sgt: Ist-Lieut 

Captain: Captain 



20 Mar 1929 to 31 Jul 1929 

1 Aug 1929 to 31 Jan 1930 

1 Feb 1930 to 4 Dec 1930 

5 Dec 1930 to 30 Apr 1931 

1 May 1931 to 31 May 1931 

1 Jun 1931 to 1 Jan 1933 



CHIEFS OF POLICE, MANAGUA. 



KEIMLING, Herbert S 
FRISBIE, Julian N 
FLEMING, Hamilton M. H. 
CARLSON, Evans F 



Ist-Lieut: Captain 

Ist-Lieut: Captain 

Captain: Captain 

Ist-Lieut: Captain 



1 May 1928 to 16 Nov 1928 
17 Nov 1928 to 20 Mar 1930 
21 Mar 1930 to 21 Dec 1931 

22 Dec 1931 to 1 Jan 1933 



COMMANDANTES, NATIONAL PENITENTIARY, MANAGUA 

GLADDEN, Alton A Captain: Major 1 Nov 1927 to 25 May 1929 

BAIN, James M Captain: Major 26 May 1929 to 31 Oct 1929 

DENHAM, James L Ist-Lieut: Captain 1 Nov 1929 to 31 Mar 1931 

(NOTE: National Penitentiary destroyed by earthquake 31 Mar 1931). 



DIRECTOR, MILITARY ACADEMY, MANAGUA. 



TRUMBLE, Edward J 
CUNNINGHAM, Francis J 
TRUMBLE, Edward J 



Ist-Lieut: Captain 
Ist-Lieut: Captain 
Ist-Lieut: Captain 



1 Apr 1930 to 25 Aug 1931 

26 Aug 1931 to 26 Oct 1931 

27 Oct 1931 to 1 Jan 1933 



233 



CHAPTER III 

EL BERRUGILLO, June 14, 1927. 
Senor 

Jefe Politoco 
OCOTAL 

My dear Sir, 

I have very much the pleasure to participate you in this letter 
while we accept you as the Jefe Political of Ocotal. But we don't accept 
any of the authority that interferes officially in the following places' 
SAN FERNANDO — CIUDAD ANTIJUA — TELPANECA — 
QUILALI — EL JlCARO — MURRA and JALAPA. We are enough 
men to give a guarantee in those places and all the inhabitants are 
Liberalists, and they dont feel like they have a guarantee with the 
Adolf Diaz as a president of Nicaragua. We dont give up our rifles 
even if the Nicaraguan president is substituted by a Liberal man of 
honor. I want you to let these things be known to your government, 
our attitude is, if the Yankees want to disarm us we are billing to kili 
them and those who want to take away our rifles which was obtained 
with honor by us, those rifles we have, they was taken away from the 
Conservatives, if they dont like it, tell them to do what they want to. 

Truly 

A. C. SAND I NO 



THE COWARDLY AND FELONIC YANKS HIDE BEHIND THE 
MASK OF HYPOCRISY SHOWING A WHITE FLAG TO KILL 
FROM THE BACK MY COMPANIONS IN ONE HAND THEY 
HAVE A CRUCIVIX AND IN THE OTHER THE POINARD. 

All the Central American people know already our attitude of 
sane protest against the criminal Yankee invasion and against the 
traitors to my country who like Boy Scouts come as the advance guard 
of the invaders. Therefore I consider it convenient to make known 
to my fellow Latin-Americans the latest happenings ^^"hich have taken 
place in the area that is out of Adolfo Diaz's control; which com- 
prises the following villages: in the Department of Nueve Segovia: 
San Fernando, Ciudad Antigua, Telpaneca, San Juan de Segovia, 
Quilali, Murra, Jalapa and Ciudad Sandino which was called Jicaro 
before. In each of the above villages we had small detachments to m.ain- 
tain public order as well as the organization of our administration based 
in the most sure demiocracy, inasmuch as even to our enemies we give 
all kinds of guarantees to their persons and interests. Besides we 
keep seven mounted patrols, each with 50 men patrolling the above 
mentioned zone; having our war depot in a place called El Remajon 
which has only one entrance, i.e., El Cerro del Chapote. 

234 



On July 11th, last, I received from the so-called chief of the 
damnable Yankee invading expedition in Camp de Ocotal the telegraph 
message which textually says: "General Augusto C. Sandino, Jicaro. 
It is not possible that you should continue unheeding reasonable 
offers and in spite of your insolent replies to my previous overatures 
I am again giving you another chance to surrender. As you Will no 
doubt know we are prepared to attack you in your own position and 
finish once for all your forces and yourself if you insist in maintaining 
your present attitude. Furthermore if you should succeed in fleeing 
to Honduras or any other place there will be a price on your head 
and you will never be able to return in peace to your country, which 
you seem to love so much but as a bandit who would put to flight his 
oWn peaceful countrymen. If you come to Ocotal with all your forces 
and deliver your arms you and your soldiers will be given amnesty. 
I promise you as a represent^itive of a great and powerful nation which 
never v/ins battles treacherously. Thus you would have the possibility 
of living an honest life in your own country and be able to help your 
countrymen now for the future. Otherwise, you will be an exile and 
outlawed like the pigs, hunted everywhere and repudiated by everyone 
while awaiting a shameful death, that of a criminal who deserves to be 
shot from the back by his own followers. Not a single outlaw has pros- 
pered and died satisfied. And as an example twenty-five years ago 
there was one who was in the same position that you are in and who 
saw the light in time. He was Aguinaldo of the Philippine Islands who 
was afterwards a good friend of the United States of America. Finally 
I must inform you that Nicaragua has had its last revolution and that 
soldiers of fortune will no longer have opportunities to use their talents 
in the future. I shall be waiting for you in Ocotal at 8:00 a.m. on July 
14th, 1927. Your resolution will save the lives of many of your fol- 
lowers and your own. Your answer will be yes or no and I hope it will 
be yes. G. D. Hatfield." 

Simply reading such threats makes my blood, as a legitimate son 
of Nicaragua, boil. Nevertheless I restrain all the hatred that was 
awakened in me by the chief of adventurers who are trampling down 
our country's sovreignty and I answered as follows: ''El Rempajon, 
July 12th, 1927. Mr. G. D. Hatfield, Ocotal: I am in receipt of your 
telegram dated the 11th instant and to which I now reply. When I 
joined the Constitutionalists Movement I did it with the firm purpose 
of getting a free country or death, and as we have not got effective 
liberty nor am I dead, I shall continue in my original purpose. Our 
arms will not be thrown down because they represent the enerjetic 
protest of m.y country and that is why your threats have no interest 
for me and it does not make any difference to me whose representative 
you are, and the first one who dares to trespass across the frontier of 
the section that we have allotted to ourselves will have to leave many 
corpses on the battlefield. And if you are ready to do so you are wel- 
come to, so that we may have the honor of wetting our country's soil 
with treacherous and invading blood. Besides, if United States wants 
peace in Nicaragua they must deliver the presidency to a legitimate 
Liberal and then I will lay down my arms peaceably. A. C. Sandino." 

235 



Now as the chief of the felonious adventurers has challenged 
me, and I, as a legitimate son of my race, accepted it with honor, 
and all comments on his threatening message would be welcome, inas- 
much as the Indian blood stood up for mv country's majesty. ' Once 
more I wanted to prove to Wall Street's lackeys and Coolidge's assas- 
sins that to be humble does not mean to be cowardly. And that there- 
fore in Nicaragua there are legitim.ate sons who are proud of being 
Nicaraguans, and in this connection we have proved to the civilized 
world the decision of the pygmies of a portion of Central America. 
Immediately afterwards the threatening telegram was read to the Army 
of the Defenders of the National Honor and every soldier, even the 
humblest showed in his face, signs of deadly hatred for the invaders 
and the traitors to our country. Death to the Yankees shouted my 
soldiers with all their might. Death to the Yankees answered the 
rugged mountains of Nueva Segovia. And my soldiers added, "On to 
Ocotal, On to Ocotal." "General Sandino, your subordinates hereby 
swear to die in defense of the National Freedom before permitting the 
invaders to insult our sovereignity." My answer was: "I am grateful 
comrades, if the Fatherland needs another pint of blood let us offer it 
in a holocaust." 

The pirate, G. D. Hatfield's challenge had to be rataliated for 
with facts that history will gather. And I being the representative 
of the legitimate sons of my country, could not then permit nor will 
I nor my brothers allow, for the country or for the race, such humilia- 
tion. 

In order to shame the pirates and traitors I reviewed my cavalry 
and only sixty men were left fit to fight, as the other cavalries had been 
sent two days before toward the vicinity of Jinotega on expeditions, 
and for this reason and being unable to control the war-like eagerness 
of my men I decided to attack the invaders in their excellent position 
in Ocotal, and we went with the arms of honor to show a dignified 
example, although inferior in number, as in Ocotal there were VyO less 
than 200 armed men between the invaders and the traitors who were 
obstructing our road to freedom. Ocotal was reached at 12:45 on the 
morning of July 16th last and after these minutes had elapsed in pre- 
paring for the battle at one o'clock sharp the first shot was fired at the 
first patrol the enemy had in the place called El Divisadere, which was 
taken by assault. All the other attacks on the rest of the patrols placed 
around the town were simultaneous all of w^hich were either annihilated 
or fled to the center of the town. The combat lasted fifteen hours and 
the Yankees and the servile constabularies were surrounded so closely 
that they were not able to even obtain drinking vv'ater. They were 
obliged by fear to remain within their v/alls, awaiting whatever death 
we w^ished to give them. But our humane hearts laid us open to the 
charge of criticism as to finish them the easiest way was to set fire to 
the two blocks in which the invaders and felons had taken refuge, 
after boasting so loudly about their strength. The families owning 
the houses of the two blocks in question begged me with tears in their 
eyes to consider the poverty in which they would be left, if we set 



236 



their houses on fire, and considering that these supplicants were my 
countrymen, I sacrificed the victory, and thus it was that the bunch 
of pigs were left alive, as I hold the interests of my countrymen above 
my country's glory; this obliged me to order my men to form and leave 
in complete order. Unfortunately we had to mourn the death of six 
of my brave soldiers, amongst whom was the courageous Colonel Rufo 
Antonio Marin, wdiose namic will be immortalized in history. We cap- 
tured from the enem^y ninety mules, saddles, and 32 Springfield rifles 
with their corresponding equipment. 

On the 25th of the same month the Yankees appeared with flags 
of truce in the square of San Fernando and when they were sixteen 
yards away from the barracks, they opened fire against the soldiers 
who were on duty there. As a result one of my soldiers and three of 
the invaders were killed. Immediately I instructed the cavalry operat- 
ing nearest to San Fernando to intervene and hinder the advance of 
the invader while the other cavalries were concentrating at general 
headquarters to organize the Guerillas who would fight the enemy; 
but unfortunately the one commanded by Colonel Porfirio Sanchez, 
exhausted by the long journey, encamped in Capules where they were 
surprised, but as soon as our men recovered from the surprise they 
kept up fighting for two hours \vhich resulted in thirty-two casualties 
among the Yankees; as I must mention that in all my Guerillas there 
are sharpshooters who can contest for the championship at any rifle 
match. If not inform yourself of the five aeroplanes that have been 
rendered useless to the enem.y when they tried to approach our trenches. 
It is true that the advance guard of the invaders is an aeroplane squad- 
ron, but this does not frighten my brave soldiers as the enemy believes, 
but our powerful rifles bring them, down from whatever height they 
may be. Our Guerilla plans are perfectly organized and therefore we 
believe that God wHll give us strength to annihilate the invaders and 
traitors to our country. We possess the entire region of Nueva Segovia 
body and soul, and this insures the effectiveness of the hostilities 
against the enemy. 

The Yankees by their brutal acts spread terror against the people 
inhabiting this zone, for in their criminal expeditions they have vio- 
lated sixteen women amongst whom there were nine virgins. Two of 
these unfortunate victims died later because of their brutal ravishment 
by the barbarians of the North. They have destroyed in towns and 
villages houses and furniture as well as the provisions and cattle and 
cultivated land. What we tell in this report is based on the purest 
truth and told with complete exactness for we could profit by saying 
the contrary and as a proof I must confess that in the battle of Los 
Calpules we lost three of our brave soldiers, two Louis Machine Gun 
Ammunition Drums, five rifles, and four horses. Finally I only need 
to tell all my countrymicn that our brothers in arms have felt the bitter- 
ness on indentifying amongst the enemy dead a lot of our former com^- 
rades who only yesterday shared the same life with us, united by the 
heat of the campfire in defending the same ideals. Today perhaps due 
to bait offered to them, we are forced to murder our own brothers. 
Stop to think that before anything else you are Nicaraguan and that 
your attitude makes you liable to bitter criticism. 

237 



Countrymen: we shall certainly stay in arms while Adolfo Diaz 
stays in the Presidency, as it is well known that this man is the shame 
of our country as well as of the good Nicaraguans, and being firmly 
convinced that no stranger, whatever his power may be, has a right to 
impose conditions that only natives here have a right to determine. 
Mr. Stimson said to Dr. Sacasa's delegates that the maintenance of 
Adolfo Diaz in the Presidency is a matter of honor and prestige to the 
United States. In that connection, I believe as does Dr. Sacasa that a 
great nation acquires honor and prestige by respecting the sovereignty 
of small and weak countries instead of oppressing those who are strug- 
gling for the security of their rights. We fight for honor and not for 
prestige, because if we lose honor we also lose the right to live. 

I am addressing you : traitors, imposters, myrmidons, bribe-takers, 
moyssillos, pamphlet-makers, get on your knees all of you because 1 
am going to invoke the holy name of my unconquered brothers in arms 
who have died defending Nicaragua's liberty: Rufo Antonio Marin 
^nd Carlos Fonseca. 

/s/ A. C. SANDING 



238 



REGULATIONS FOR CIVIL AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES 

OF THE LOCALITY BELONGING TO OUR DEFENSOR ARMY 

OF THE NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY OF NICARAGUA. 



The undersigned General and Supreme Chief of the Defensor 
Army of the National Sovereignty of Nicaragua, in view of the several 
complaints which are presented to these Headquarters from the local 
authorities as well as from the inhabitants of the vicinity of this area, 
decrees : 

All the inhabitants who live in the areas in which our forces are 
operating will recognize as legal authorities of our army, such as civil 
as in the mJlitary line, those who have in their possession the creden- 
tials of these Headquarters, and in Which their duty is determined. 

The Jueces of Canton might be appointed by the Jueces of Mesta 
in the locality in which the Juez de Canton lives, but the Juez of Mesta 
who appoints any Juez de Canton must bear on hand his own creden- 
tials of these Headquarters, or signed by one of our chiefs, expeditionary 
chiefs, etc., of our army. 

The Municipal Mayors, Commanding Officers of the Posts and 
Chiefs of Police, must have their own credentials signed by these Com- 
mands or by any of our Expeditionary Chiefs of our Army. The Al- 
caldes only can be elected by a solemn assembly of out Staff headed 
by this Supreme Authority. 

The appointments for Commanders of Posts, Chiefs of Police and 
Jueces de Mesta issued by our expeditionary Chiefs will be as pro- 
visional ones while the proper appointment signed by this Supreme 
Authority is provided. When by a mistake several persons are per- 
formdng the same duty, in the same locality, will be the legal authority 
that has the order of this Supreme Authority. In case that no one of 
them have any credentials from these Fleadquarters, will be the legal 
authority that who has a previous appointment; besides that all our 
Expeditionary Chiefs are well instructed about this matter. 

This Regulations for the authorities m^ust be read to the inhabi- 
tants of every place by the authorities who receive it. 

Headquarters, Defensor Army of the National Sovereignty of 
Nicaragua, 1 January, 1931. 

Party and Liberty 

/s/ A. C. SANDINO 



239 



El Chipote, Nicaragua, C. A., March 16, 1929. 
General 

PEDRO ALTAMIRANO, 
Wherever he may be. 

Esteemed friend and companion: 

I have had the honor to receive your appreciable communication dated 
the 10th of this month. 

It is very grateful to me to send you and the other companions my 
tender salute. I beg you to salute very specially to Colonel CENTENO 
and for his family goes my best wishes for their happiness, with my 
respects for Mrs. Maria. 

I am very well informed of the news which you sent me in regards to 
the situation of the enemy. 

The enemy is judging now that it is not possible to hide the truth, as 
it is seen in the newspaper which you iiad the kindness to enclose, 
but it does not say all the truth because the buccaneer chief must 
not only have been wounded by the brave column under your command 
but he must have been one of those killed. 

Today I enclose a copy of the triumphs obtained by you and your 
column on the 8th and 19th of February. 

Something like that copy are the ones that I sent to be published by 
the world news and by this time it ought to be known by all the people 
in the world, because I sent them to France also, where we also count 
with good friends of our cause of Liberty. 

I congratulate you and the other companions once more and always our 
country expects from all of us the most energy and abnegation until 
we see her free and sovereign. 

In the same paper that you send me I see that it is being compre- 
hended of the graves prejudices brought to us by the policy of the 
dollar and in a letter sent by me to HOOVER (it is pronounced hoover), 
the yankee president, I let him see of those prejudices which has been 
brought to us by the malignant policy of the governments of the 
United States. In that letter 1 told him (Hoover) that if he continues 
the policy of the other governments, we are disposed to continue fight- 
ing against him as we have been doing up to date. 

As you understand, it is a challenging letter and very energic in which 
I told him that the sam.e as we routed Coolidge will rout all the insolent 
yankee government who are trying to enslave Nicaragua. I am writing 
a letter to all the government of Latin American Countries and also 
one to the United States of North America inviting them to celebrate 
a conference at Bueno Aires, the capital of the Republic of Argentine, 
between representatives of their govemm.ent and me as representative 
of our Army. 

In this conference I will present a project for the opening of the Nicara- 
guan Canal, as you know the pirates are trying to open it themselves 
only, and that is the reason why want to enslave Nicaragua. 
In case of accepting the Conferences, I will say that the Canal be 
opened with money of all Latin America; but if it is granted to the 
Yankees to open it up with their money, the yankees will have to 

240 



promise to respect the liberty and sovereignity of all Latin American 

Countries. 

If the Governments accept the Conference I will have to go to the 

conference and 1 will have to concentrate all our army and give them 

all the instructions of the case. This will probably be within about 

two months, and I will have to call you in to see what instructions I 

shall give you. My departure will not be before I talk to all Chiefs of 

Columns. 

It is understood that if this Conference are not accepted we will have 

to continue fighting the enemy without rest. 

I have the honor to let you know what is going to arrive a strong 

quantity of ammunition, Springfield, Concon and pistol ammunition, 

and also 10 Sub-Thompson machine guns. All this elements Will come 

through Honduras and even if the Government knows it, he is letting 

it come to us. 

Of this shipping I have true information of it, and we expect it at 

any time, but we must always try to fight the enemy in order to have 

them leave the biggest possible quantity of ammunition. 

There are also coming many companions of other Republics. 

General ESTRADA and General IRIAS left with 120 men, a few days 
ago, with instructions to persecute Caldera and I have already had 
news that they have had contacts with the enemy at Teocintal and 
other places, but I have not the official report from them, I am expect- 
ing it at any moment. 

On the side you are operating on, we expect everything from the column 
under your orders. 

General Salgado an Ortez are operating around Pueblo Nuevo and 
Chinandega and in the mountains of EL SAUCE with Hondurian 
Generals who have joined our forces. 

They all have knowledge of the arrival of the elements I have told 
you and at the right opportunity I will call all the Columns in to 
give them plenty ammunition and good rifles. 

As I have told you by former letters that in case you want to see 
me in order to let me know something important, you may do it with 
a light Column leaving the rest of the force under command of Colonel 
CENTENO an at a place where there is something to eat; but this 
will be only when you have something important, otherwise you will 
have to continue the march as we have already agreed. 
You know that you will always find me at the place I told you about 
and you must not have the least preoccupation in regard to my per- 
sonal security. 

I expect that when it is possible for you to send some funds with some 
trustworthy person you will do it because the runners going to Hon- 
duras are leaving with few funds and it is necessary that they go well 
provided with them 

I always expect you will send me the biggest quantity of newspapers. 
I am not sending you any because they are in Murra and this runners 
is going to your place right away. Very soon I shall send you plenty 
newspapers. 

To those who may ask you about the purpose of our Army you must 
tell them that during the time the Yankees stay in Nicaragua we will 
stand ready and as soon as possible that General ESTRADA AND 

241 



GENERAL IRIAS may want to get in tough with your column because 
they are going to Esteli, and I expect you will lend each other coopera- 
tion in your military actions. They have good instruction of what they 
are going to do. 

I always expect your appreciable communications because being in 
frequent communication we will work the best form to combat the 
enemy. 

With my regards for all your family and my tender salute for all the 
companions, I remain yours, brotherly. 

COUNTRY AND LIBERTY. 

A. C. SANDING. 

The reference I mention above, is a political thought of mine, but 
it is not known whether they will accept it or not, but if they do accept 
it we then have given them the most positive blow to. the enemy and 
the yankees will not be able to remain one more day in Nicaragua 
after the celebration of the Conferences mentioned. 

But even if they do not accept them the triumph is completely our. 

A. C. SANDING. 

TRANSLATIONS FRGM NEWSPAPER ARTICLES IN 
NICARAGUAN PAPERS: 

"LA NGTICIA (Managua, Nicaragua). — April 16, 1932. 

MEXICO CITY — 23 April, 1932 — The papers here talk extensively 
of the battle of Apali. The representative of Sandino, Pedro Jose 
Zepeda, in a statement, says that the battle was waged betw^een three 
perfectl>^ trained columns of Guardia and approximately 500 Sandin- 
istas, furthermore the same Zepeda says that a few days ago he sent 
a letter to President Hoover in which he said that Sandino would not 
recognize the results of the November elections that are super- 
vised by Marines, and that he will continue to fight in this 
country as long as the elections of Nicaragua are supervised by 
foreigners. And lastly Sandino is preparing a new offensive for the 
5th of May in memory of the first anniversary of the death of Miguel 
Angel Ortez. 



"LA NOTICA (Managua, Nicaragua) — 12 November, 1932. 

MEXICO CITY — 11 Nov (AP) Cable — Through his representatives 
here Sandino says that in order that he lay down his arms it is nec- 
essary that certain important positions be granted to his defenders 
of Nicaraguan sovereignty, in order that peace in Nicaragua may be 
assured. It is said here that as soon as the North American Marines 
leave, the warrior will try to secure an interview with President Sacasa 
in Managua with the idea of making arrangements and to determine 
whether the evacuation of the Marines has been actually accomplished, 
for he will not tolerate a single Marine even on duty with the Legation, 

242 



for he would still consider this as actual intervention. He also is think- 
ing of first sending his delegates in order to obtain his own safe-conduct 
by means of signatures. Also the warrior wants Dr. Zepeda to be 
named Minister of Nicaragua to Mexico. 

Editor's Note: The latter part of the foregoing telegram appears 
to confirm the fact that Dr. Pedro Jose Zepeda, as has been published 
in Mexican newspapers, is trying to gain personal advantage from the 
Sandinista cause. 



"LA NOTICIA (Managua, Nicaragua) — 21 November, 1932. 

IT IS ASSURED IN COSTA RICA THAT SANDING IS PREPAR- 
ING ANOTHER OFFENSIVE. 

By yesterday's mail we received the notice that the Diario de 
Costa Rica has information that Sandino is preparing a new offensive, 
stronger than the others, and that he will not recognize the govern- 
ment of Dr. Juan Bautista Sacasa. 



NOTE: Dr. Pedro Jose Zepeda, mentioned in the first two 

above articles was well known in Mexico City as the 
representative of Sandino, and gave out many inter- 
views regarding the declared policies of Sandino. 



243 



BULLETIN OF THE DEFENSING ARMY OF THE NICARA- 
GUAN NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY, FOR THE MONTH OF 

JULY 

For th^ Latin-American observers : 

The following combats excelled during the month of July :- 

Our Atlantic Division under the command of the Generals Fran- 
cisco Estrada and Sim.on Gonzales, attacked and captured the banana 
camp "BACARO" property of American Companies at Puerto Cabezas. 
Reinforcements reached the enemy stationed at the named camp but 
our boys repulsed them capuring the trains and gasoline motors; 
the following day a squadron of planes bombarded our column. One 
of the planes was brought down. The bombardment of the planes 
lead the enemy to our forces between which a sanguinary battle took 
place until the fall of night. Enemy casualties were estimated in over 
one hundred. One of our boys who perished in the battle was the 
bearer of a haversack containing documents from General Gonzalez 
which were lost. 

It was reported to us that 26 amphibious planes landed at Puerto 
Cabezas to pick up the American families residing thereat. It is be- 
lieved that the idea had has been well thougt as the luck which awaits 
the Americans there is very ill. (negress) 

On July 14th our forces under the command of Cononel Ruperto 
Hernandez Roblero and of Sergeant Major Francisco Garcia, had a 
sanquinary contact with the enemy at "Los Chotes", Department of 
Jinotega, in which three dogs and traitor lieutenants together with 
nine pirates Yankees lost their lives, Colonel Roblero also lost docu- 
ments in the battle but captured arms and ammunition. 

On July 16th, our forces under Colonel Zacarias Padilla had a 
sanguinary contact at "La Rocia", Department fo Leon. In this con- 
tact ammunition and eatable provisions were captured. Padilla lost a 
purse containing documents pertaining to his duty. 
Lately (Last information) 

General Estrada and General Gonzalez, chiefs of the Atlantic 
Division, report that strong contingents of American troops crossed 
the hondurenan Mosquitia into Nicaraguan Territory and that they 
have their headquarters at a banana camp of the Yankee Companies 
at Trujillo due to which strong combats are expected from the 20th 
of July on. 

NOW THEN (GIST) 

In m.y standing as the Supreme Chief of the Defensing Army of 
the National Sovereignty of Nicaragua, declare before the observers 
of the Continent that our army has and will respect the integrity of 
the Hondurenan territory; that there exist a great fraternity between 
the people of Honduras and our aimy, but if the Hondurenan Govern- 
ment permits the armies of the invader and that of the traitors dogs of 

244 



Nicaragua to cross or camp at their territory in order to protect their 
operations against our army, WE WILL NOT ANSWER FOR THE 
CONSEQUENCES, for which only the Government of Honduras will 
be responsible. Headquarters of the Defensing Army of the National 
Sovereignty of Nicaragua, Segovias, Nic, 3 August, 1932. 

COUNTRY AND LIBERTY 

(A seal) 

Ceasar Agusto Sandino. 



t 






245 



HEADQUARTERS, THIRD BATTALION, GUARDIA NACIONAL 

DE NICARAGUA 

Ocotal, Nicaragua, 

23 July, 1929. 

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM: 

ENTRY OF SANDINO INTO HONDURAS AND HIS TRIP 
TO DANLI. 

1. Permission to enter Honduras with promises of protection 
having been granted him, Sandino left Limon, Nic, 16 Jun 29, ac- 
companied by four men (Quezada was with Sandino) and crossed the 
border near Malacate at a place called La Laguna; Polo Gamero 
(friend and ex-secretary of Sandino) came to meet him at La Laguna 
and guided him to Amastran. 

2. From Amastran he sent a message to Danli telling of his entry 
into Honduras and requesting escort, his message was not replied to 
immediately and fearing that something had gone wrong, he had 
Gamero guide him to Guayambre, where Jose Idiaquez joined him. 

3. 17 Jun 29 he received a reply from his message he had sent to 
Danli telling him that an escort was being sent to meet him at Amas- 
tran; the next morning 18 Jun 1929 without waiting for the escort to 
arrive, he proceeded to Danli and met escort at Chichicaste, the escort 
was commanded by the Director of Police of Tegucigalpa and consisted 
of sixteen selected men, all with good mounts and all armed with Thomp- 
son sub-machine guns; the party arrived Danli at about 4:00 p.m., 18 
Jun 29. Sandino slept at the Commandancia and took all his meals at 
his friend's house Jose Idiaquez. Sandino and escort left Danli for 
Tegucigalpa at 8:00 a.m., 19 Jun 29. 

4. This information was volunteered by Senor Alfonso Moncada 
of Ocotal. 

J. L. Blanchard. 



246 



5 

22.A/ja 

HEADQUARTERS, GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA, 
MANAGUA, NICARAGUA 

My dear Sir: 

I acknowledge, with thanks, your letter of the 5th inst., 

containing certain information of the activities of Sandino. In this 

connection, I am quoting below an extract from the daily operations 

report of the Northern Area of March 3, 1931 ; 

"Information received from two different sources that 
Sandino is in Honduras suffering from old leg wound received 
in Saraguasca and that he may lose leg due to improper care. 
Above information voluntarily given by two old Indian guides 
who pass between Honduras and Nicaragua." 

I am, my dear Sir, 

Very truly yours, 

C. B. MATTHEWS, 
BRIG. GEN. G. N. 
Jefe Director. 

American Minister, 

American Legation, 

Managua, Nicaragua. 



247 



NOTIFICATION TO MR. GUILLERMO HUPER 
OF MATAGALPA. 



The suscribed General and Supreme Chief of the Defense Army 
of the National Sovereignty of Nicaragua in use of the faculties con- 
ferred by the same Army and foundation in the decree number 26 of 
our military institution. 

DECREE 

To order Mr. Guillermo Huper in Matagalpa to deposit in the 
General Treasury of our Army in the quality of forced contribution 
the quantity of ^5,000.00 for the upkeep of the War, that the sams 
Army has established against the drove of North American bandito 
who with their greatness are treading upon our National Territory. 

The proprietor Guillermo Huper Will turn over the contribution 
in reference to any one of the Expeditionary Chiefs of our Army to wit:- 

General Pedro Altamirano. 

General Carlos Salgado. 

General Ismael Peralta. 

General Simon Gonzales. 

General Francisco Estrada. 

General Miguel Angel Ortez y Guillen. 

Colonel Pedro Blandon. 

Colonel Domitilo Ledezma. 

The National Foreign interests that exists in Nicaraguan territory 
will be used for the National Defense of Nicaragua. 

The foreigners that are not satisfied with this disposition should 
evacuate to the terminal distance of our National Territory. 

Natives and foreigners that do not carry out this order will give 
room to proceed according to the laWs of our military institution, the 
day that our Army takes control of the Republic or should fall in our 
power any plaza where resides any of the deliquents. 

Headquarters of the Defense Army of the National Sovereignty 
of Nicaragua. The Segovias, Nicaragua, C. A. July 20, 1930. 

Liberty and Country. 

(Seal) 

A. C. SANDINO. 



248 



I 



Senor Lt. Felix Pedro Herrera, 
Wherever he may be. 

Dear Brother Lt. Herrera: 

I am sending you this note with the brother Transito Rodriguez. 
As soon as you receive it you will leave for "Los Cedros", join brother 
Avelino Rodriguez and together go and collect the contributions they 
promised to have ready in your last trip. 

When you get to the house of the party who already have been 
notified get whatever he has, give him a short period of time to pay the 
balance and make him understand that until he pays the total he wont 
be able to work in his place. With the receipt of the total we will send 
him the corresponding guaranties. You may take all the boys you need 
to help you on this mission. From the money collected leave a part 
for your families and bring the rest to this camp. 

Be on the watch as you may be surprised by the bandits. If you 
meet any body and you are sure that he is our enemy, "lo chalequean" 
(cut his throat) and burn his house. You may show this note to all the 
people you will collect from, so that they see the orders I give you. 

My brotherly regards for all your families who I hope are in good 
health. 

Thanks to God we have nothing new up here. 

Be back as soon as possible. 

PATRIA Y LIBERTAD. 

/s/ Padro Altamirano. 

November 12, 1930. 



Translation of a letter taken from the person of bandit Lieutenant 
Herrera wounded and captured in a contact at Sisle, 29 December, 1930. 



249 



Campo Los Boloanes, 
Nov 3, 1930. 



Senor Don- 



It has been decreed that on this date you will give 
the sum of ^200.00 as a forced contribution and will give it to Don 
Justo Hernandez who has instructions to receive what you bring. 

The contribution which this Ccmmand imposes upon 
you is to help the forces of the Army of the Defender of the National 
Sovereignty of Nicaragua and which is under my command like this; 
as those who live in the Headquarters with the Supreme Jefe. 

If you do not help the cause which we defend, which 
is the obligation of all honorable Nicaraguans to do for the good of 
their party, you will be obliged to abandon your property as you will 
be declared an enemy of the Army, and in this case, you will lose your' 
family and all kinds of guarantees and will be subjected to whatever 
punishment from us that you merit as a traitor to your country. 

If you do not want to be molested by our forces, you 
will pay the required sum, this in order that you may live in peace on 
your properties. All orders which this Headquarters issues which are 
not complied with, obligate me to have them complied with by blood 
and fire in order that the Army will not be a laughing stock. 

Think carefully and well because if you do not feel 
inclined to help us, only God will keep your family from falling into 
my hands and your properties from being left in ashes. Acknowledge. 

Country and Liberty, 

PEDRO ALTAMIRANO, 
Jefe Expeditionario. 



250 



QUOTATION FROM AN ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION IN 

THE CENTRAL AREA OF NICARAGUA, AS EXTRACTED 

FROM REPORT SUBMITTED BY COLONEL JULIAN 

C. SMITH, G.N. (MAJOR, U.S.M.C.) THEN AREA 

COMMANDER, TO THE JEFE DIRECTOR, 

GUARDIA NACIONAL, 4, 1931. 

EXTRACT 

3. BANDIT ACTIVITIES AND PROBABLE PLANS. 

In the San Rafael sector and the Colon Valley bandits are always 
to be found. Their principal leader is Pedro Blandon. The bandits 
move about on the mountain trails in small groups pillaging and 
robbing the poorer inhabitants. The groups unite under Blandon 
for larger expeditions and forays. 

In the vicinity of Jinotega a small band under Villegas and one 
under Sequiera operate constantly. Both of these Jefes have a great 
local influence and keep the inhabitants pretty well terrorized. The 
second in command of each band has been killed in contact with the 
guardia in the last two months and the bands greatly reduced by cas- 
ualties and desertions. 

The main groups operating under the leaders Peralta, Blandon, 
Irias and Sequiera all under the general control of Pedro Altamirano 
have their general headquarters between the Tuma and Coco Rivers 
and make forays into the richer more populous sections of the Northern 
and Central Areas. 

The bandits steal all of their food and clothing from inhabitants 
of the country through which they operate. They obtain funds through 
blackmail and robbery demanding sums from all finca owners, except 
those whose properties are guarded by Marines or Guardia posts and 
those living in the south pay tribute to the bandits. 

While it is not definitely known how many bandits operate in 
this area, groups of from two-hundred and fifty to three-hundred 
and fifty have been encountered and it is believed that Altamirano can 
concentrate three hundred armed men. 

In addition to the operations of small bands previously described 
the bandits have in the past year made four forays in force in this area. 
One in June when some three or four hundred were concentrated at 
Corraguasca; in November when they captured Matiquas; in Decem- 
ber when they crossed the Tuma at Coyolar and moved northwest to 
La Vencedora; and in January when they passed east of Guapatol and 
Muy Muy, circled south of Matagalpa and returned north in small 
groups through the Colon Valley. After each raid the bandit leader 
returned to the section north of the Tuma where their bands apparently 
broke up into small groups awaiting the disposal of the proceeds of the 
raids and the renewal of ammunition supplies. During their incursions 
into this area it is notable that the bandits attacked no marine or guar- 



251 



dia post v/ith the exception of Matiquas where the garrison was known 
to be very weak and isolated. They generally avoided decisive engage- 
ments when attacked, indicating that their intention was to secure loot 
and contributions but not to seek battle with military forces. 

While in each of the above mentioned forays the bandits were 
defeated in one or more engagements with comparatively heavy losses, 
by dispersing and assembling at distant rendezvous, their main groups 
escaped intact and no prominent leader \v'as killed or captured, and 
in each raid some loot was secured, some property damage done and the 
power to destroy isolated haciendas demonstrated, frightening many 
owners into making contributions. 

All information received indicates a shortage of serviceable arms 
and ammunition, though the larger groups are generally equipped with 
Lewis guns and Thompson sub-machine guns. Their method of recruit- 
ing is simply to replace losses. They conserve their automatic weapons 
and salvage the rifles of those who fall in action. As every band re- 
ported, has a number of men in it armed with cutaches, it is safe to say 
that the number of armed bandits will remain in the near future some- 
what at its present strength, and is dependent purely on the number of 
firearms and amount of ammunition available. The killing of a few 
mozos has little effect on the number of their fighting forces. The leaders 
even of the raiding groups keep well to the rear in contacts with the 
guardia. Sandino and Altamirano keep practically clear of the contact 
zone. Hence the likelihood of ending banditry by killing the leaders is 
remote. The mobility of the bandits, their practice of dispersing when 
attacked and assembling at some prearranged rendezvous, and their 
habit of traveling at night over mountain trails, precludes the possibility 
of their destruction by a large military force, which, due to the necessity 
of carrying supplies is limited to the main trails. The only successful 
offensive operations have been by small very mobile patrols capable 
of living off the country and of following the bandits wherever they 
have been able to go. 

As to the furture plans of the bandits it seems safe to assume 
that they will continue their present methods of rendezvousing north 
of the Tuma for operations against the Northern and Central Areas, 
collecting contributions by means of threats, burning an occasional 
hacienda, making occasional forays into the settled districts, ambushing 
patrols and wiping out small detachments of guardia whenever possible 
without committing themselves to the danger of attack by strong 
guardia forces. 



REPORT OF CONTACT WITH BANDIT FORCES NEAR SAN 
JUAN DE TELPANECA, NORTHERN AREA, GUARDIA 
NACIONAL, NICARAGUA, 28 JUNE, 1930. 



"GUARDIA NACIONAL, SAN JUAN DE TELPANECA, 

29 June 1930. 

From : Commanding Officer, San Juan. 
To : The Area Commander. 

Subject Contact with bandits. 

1. The San Juan patrol, on mission assigned in connection 
with operations ordered by radio of 23 June 1930, encountered a 
group of bandits and engaged them in combat at 11:55 a.m., 28 June 
1930. The engagement took place on the trail to San Juan, coordinates 
233 dash 359, near Ojoche. The engagement continued until 12:30 p.m., 
28 June 1930, or about 35 minutes. 

2. Captain R. A. Anderson, G. N., was in command of the 
patrol, a roster of the patrol is attached. It is estimated that the 
bandit group numbered about fifty. The patrol lost one guardia, 
Venabides, Eusebio, No. 2085, killed, no wounded and no missing. 
No bandit dead were found nor were any captured. I saw no bandit 
wounded but believe several of them to have been. 

3. The patrol was armed with one Lewis machine gun, two 
Sub-Thompsons; one Browning Auto rifle, one Springfield Rifle with 
grenade discharger, the rest of the patrol carrying Krag rifles. 

4. The bandits were armed with Krag rifles and Krag carbines, 
a number of dynamite bombs were used. No arms and no supplies were 
captured. A bandit banner, hats with red bands, knives and machetes 
were picked up by the m.embers of the patrol after the engagement, 
also one dynamite bomb. 

5. The bandits were driven from the place they occupied and 
fled down the valley under cover of heavy brush, separating and run- 
ning in ail directions. It was impossible to maintain contact or to pur- 
sue other than by fire. 

6. The Guardia killed, Venabides, Eusebio, No. 2085, was 
struck by three rifle bullets at the beginning of the combat, one pene- 
trating the skull, one the abdomen and one the right leg. The conduct 
of all men concerned was excellent. There were no outstanding examples 
of bravery beyond the call of .duty. 

/s/ R. A. ANDERSON. 



NOTE: The patrol consisted of one officer, one First Sergeant, two 
Corporals and twenty-six Privates of the Guardia Nacional. 

Editor. 

253 



THE FOLLOWING CONTACT REPORT SUBMITTED BY 
LIEUTENANT C. H. CLARK, G. N. (SERGEANT, U.S.M.C.) 
. IS QUOTED FOR THE INFORMATION OF READERS: 

GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA, 
EL SAUCE, NICARAGUA, 
26 February, 1932. 

From: Second Lieutenant C. H. Clark, G. N. 

To : The Director of Operations. 

Subject: Contact report. 

Reference: Telegram #114 Dir Opers El Sauce, 09423 Feb 32. 

1 . In compliance with the above reference I cleared Villa 
Nueva at 06324, Feb 32 with seventeen enlisted men for Limay via 
Achuapa. At a place called Los Pinos I took a man as a guide to 
take me as far as he knew the trail. This being the first time that 
I had been in this area, I had no idea where I was or what the trail 
was like. At Los Encuentros the guide stated that ke knew the trail 
led up to the north, pointing out to me the entrance to the trail, but 
he said he did not know the trail any further. I thought this was 
strange, but as I had not encountered any other men I took this man 
along thinking that if we got lost that he might be able to help us out. 
We followed this trail arriving at a place called Caracol at noon. 
There the old woman, the only person there, told me it was three 
leagues to Achuapa and that there was no information there except 
that the bandits had been in a place called La Cucaracha three days 
before, but she did not know where this place was. I cleared there at 
twelve o'clock. Fifteen hundred yards further on we were ambushed; 
time about twelve five in a place called Posa Honda; contact lasted 
two hours; group estimated at two hundred and fifty; jefes thought 
to have been Colindres, Salgado and Umanzor; bandits employed four 
automatic weapons and were very aggressive; patrol was immediately 
surrounded, bandits closing in until they were only fifty feet from the 
creek banks, throwing bombs down on the patrol. 

2. When my point entered the creek I was eight men back 
from the first man and could not see what kind of a place we were 
entering. My men were some five or ten yards apart so that, when I 
came into the creek bed, the first man was nearly through the ambush 
which was laid in from and down both sides of the creek, the high 
banks making it impossible for my men to see more than twenty feet 
on either side and the big rocks in front, affording perfect hiding and 
protection for the bandits. As I came out into the creek the bandits 
opened fire on me with a Lewis, killing my mule. Immediately the 
cargo mule, being behind, broke loose from the mulero. Returning 
down the trail I called to the men in front to take the left bank my 
idea being to try and hold the bandits off until I could get an idea of 
the position, but the brush being so thick that very little could be seen, 
and the bandits were closing in so that all my attention was given to 

254 



i^ 




holding them off. In the first shots tv/o men were Wounded. I called to 
the Cabo asking if any had been killed and he told me that none had, 
but the bandits found his position and started bombing him and me. 
One bomb knocked me down and one of my men threw water in my 
face and helped me back to cover, and, as I got my bearings again, I 
saw dirt, stones and water fly up in front of the Cabo. Thinking him 
dead I started over to get the Sub-Thompson that he had, but he got 
up wondering around. He could not see, nor hear. I got hold of him, 
guiding him to shelter. Then, thinking it impossible to hold this posi- 
tion, I called the rest of the point back, signalling them to follow me up 
the right bank of the creek. One Guardia helped the wounded man and 
I guided the Cabo. Using his Sub-Thompson we proceeded up the hill 
in the face of what I thought was the main group. There was hand to 
hand fighting until we got to the top of the hill and I had no time to 
check my men. Arriving at the top I left the Cabo and took check of 
the men, finding one short. This being a very good position I left five 
men there with the wounded. The Cabo was nearly all right by that 
time and was left in charge. I took the rest of the men, going down the 
ridge to look for the missing man, and I saw the bandits were confused 
and were running in every direction, I returned to the scene of the 
ambush and followed down the creek, finding two bandits trying to get 
my blanket roll and medicines off the dead mule. These were killed 
and I got my equipment and returned to the crest of the hill. Two more 
of the men with me got wounded in returning. These I bandaged, and 
leaving them, I returned doWn the hill with six men. At this point the 
bandits started to clear out upon my arrival to the creek. Again they 
had all gone. This time I found the other guardia, dead. He was killed 
by the bombs that exploded near the Cabo, but as he was on the other 
side of the rocks, I could not see him during the contact, and as the 
Cabo was dazed, this man was left behind. The bandits had taken his 
rifle, belt and shoes, but otherwise he was not harmed, as is nearly 
always the case. I proceeded up the opposite bank and doWn the creek 
but the bandits had cleared out, so I sent one man up the hill With in- 
structions to send all but three men down, and to bring the wounded. 
After putting another sentry post up on the other side, I started to 
make preparations to evacuate the wounded and the dead man. We 
made stretchers out of poles for two wounded men and the dead man. 
I took four men and returned down the creek about five hundred yards 
looking for the cargo mule, but was unable to find it, so I returned, it 
being three thirty. Then I lost no time in getting started for Achuapa. 

3, The guide had been killed, so we followed the creek north. 

My map showed a creek leading to Achuapa from that area. We carried 
the dead man about two thousand yards, but this proved to be too 
much and we had to leave him, so we marked two trees with a cross 
and hid him back off the trail. We found no people in that area until 
we had gone nearly two leagues. We had to travel very slow and did 
not arrive in Achuapa until ten thirty that night. I redressed the wounds 
of the men and made preparations to clear for El Sauce the next morn- 
ing, dispatching a runner to notify the Director of Operations and to 
request airplane transportation for the wounded men. 

255 



4. At six o'clock the next morning I sent ten civilians out from 
Achuapa to bring in the dead man. There not being sufficient guardia 
to send a patrol and also to clear the wounded men too, and as the men 
were seriously wounded, I cleared with them at nine thirty for El Sauce. 

5. I recommend the entire patrol for citation, and especially 
note and recommend the conduct of Cabo Panfilo Mendez, #3037. After 
being dazed and nearly killed, he fought bravely begging to accompany 
me down the hill. I also want to commend the conduct of Raso Iginio 
Romero #3030, Raso Manuel Gomez, #4579, and Raso Velasquez 
Apolonio #4788. These men while wounded continued to fight without 
any thought of self or of asking for aid, and to the entire trip into El 
Sauce without complaining. In fact the conduct of the entire patrol 
was such that no words can repay them for the way they conducted 
themselves during the contact and throughout the entire patrol. 

6. The following is a list of the men who took part in this 
contact :- 



Cabo Panfilo Mendez 
Raso Meneses Elias 
Raso Justo Castillo 
Raso Arcado Castillo 
Raso Diaz Ramon 
Raso Antonio Diaz 
Raso Higinio Romero 
Raso Humbert© Martinez 
Raso Gonzalez Tomas 
Raso Francisco Savalbarro 
Raso Ignacio Hernandez 



Raso Manuel Gomez 
Raso Vasquez Apolonio 
Raso Jose Maradiaga 
Raso Fermin Arroliga 
Raso Vernardo Paguaga 

GUARDIA CASUALTIES: 

Raso Ignacio Hernandez #4029 — ^Killed. 
Three wounded 

EQUIPMENT LOST: 

Two Krag rifles 

Eighty rounds ammunition 

Two mules 

GN blanket rolls 

One B. A. R. magazine, empty 

BANDIT CASUALTIES: 

Eight known dead 
Many known wounded 



No. 


ARMS EMPLOYED 


2037 — wounded 


Sub-Thompson 


4079 


Rifle (Asst) STMG 


3384 


Rifle Grenadier 


3385 


B. A. R. 


4022 


Rifle-hand grenades 


4020 


Rifle-Asst. B. A. R. 


3030— wounded 


Sub-Thompson 


4115 


Rifle (Asst) STMG 


4245 


Rifle (Asst) STMG 


3304 


Rifle-hand grenades 


4029— killed 


Rifle-hand grenades 


GUARDIA FROM OCOTAL 




4579 — wounded 


Rifle 


4788 — wounded 


Rifle (Asst) Mulero 


4438 


Rifle-Mulero 


3246 


Rifle (Asst) B. A. R. 


3689 


Rifle grenadier 



256 



EQUIPMENT CAPTURED: 

Two Krag rifles 

23 rounds Krag ammunition 

Mess articles 

Two dynamite bombs 

50 yards cloth 

/s/CECIL H. CLARK, 
Patrol Commander. 



I 



267 



El Sauce, Nicaragua, 
27 February, 1932. 

Following is a copy of letter from Captain J. C. McQueen regarding 
Lieutenant Clark's contact which is quoted for general information: 

Achuapa 

Dear Roberts: 

Atwell and I and our patrol arrived at the scene of Clark's contact 
near Caracol at 0832. Within fifteen minutes Hutchcroft and twenty 
enlisted from Limay combined with Martinez and ten enlisted from 
Achuapa arrived. Atwell and I had covered Jocote before arriving at 
Caracol and found all houses deserted, men and women and children 
all gone. We assume the bandits under Umanzor took them so we could 
get no dope from natives. Saw none. 

After a long search we found the body of the dead Guardia, 
Ignaco Hernandez. It had been removed from where Clark reported it 
to the other side of the trail up on a hill well hidden. We buried the 
body and marked the grave. Body was in too bad condition to bring in. 
Also found body of Clark's guide. This was located at scene of contact 
still lying on the trail with a note as follows: 

"Campo de operacio militates de la column expedicionaria No. 8 
del Ejercito defensor de la Soberania Nacional de Nicaragua: 

Feb 25 1932. 

"Esta es la suerte que los espera perros, haste un pine de tierre les 
niegan. 

Patria y Libertad 
Capt. Jose de Parades General y Jefe Exodo. 

Juan Pablo Umanzor." 



We covered the area about the scene of contact and then to trails 
leading out. We found no dead bandits due to the fact that they had 
been carried away. Umanzor and his group returned morning of 
twenty-fifth to do this. Indications point to several wounded besides 
the dead, Clark reported. We found crude stretchers at various points, 
covered with blood. I do not believe any other jefe was present except 
Umanzor, but doubtlessly he had a large group. The place of ambush is 
wicked. A stretch of 150-175 yards along a stream bed with long hills 
on either side and very heavy with brush. No cover for the patrol at all. 
Sketch enclosed. 

We found the mule which was shot under Clark. Bullet passed 
under left eye and the bandit who shot was no more than 1 5 or 20 yards 
from Clark at the time. 



258 



There is no question that Clark and his patrol were in an awful 
place. The group was strung along on the hills on both sides of the 
trail for 150 yards and were at close range. There was no cover for 
patrol. Indications show Clark must have attacked the bandit left 
flank on left of trail which evidently was the strongest part of the ban- 
dit line. Bandits of left side of trail had a better getaway and a closer 
range on patrol. Parts of a bandit bomb were found at east end of 
ambush which apparently killed his guide or lead man of point. 

I hope as do the officers, that I get a chance to see Clark and 
personally congratulate him for his fine work. A glance at the ambush 
position is enough to tell the story of a desperate situation. Only extra- 
ordinary coolness and strong control over his men enabled Clark to 
get out of the mess, and strike the blow he did, which was done in a 
praiseworthy manner. In the position he found himself and patrol the 
astonishing thing is how he emerged without serious losses; heavy fire, 
from both sides and a mean position from which to attack, (up the hill). 

If Clark is there still, we all (Hutchcroft, Martinez, AtWell and I) 
send our heartiest congratulations. 

We will wait here for more dope on location of group. If we get 
none we will come back direct from here, otherwise we will clear on 
information unless you have orders for me to the contrary from the 
Dir. Operations. 

Yours, 

/s/j. c. McQueen 



259 



REPORT — CONTACT AT EMBOCADEROS ON JUNE 15. 
INCIDENT TO DEATHS OF CAPTAIN POWER &z LIEUT 

McGHEE 

HEADQUARTERS, CENTRAL AREA, 
GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA, 
JINOTEGA, NICARAGUA. 
18 June, 1931. 

From: The Area Commander. 

To : The Jefe Director, Guardia Nacional, Managua. 

Subject: Report of contact at Embocaderos on June 15. 

1. The following account of the contact at Embocaderos is 
compiled from the accounts of the following eye-witnesses: 

Raso Luis Garcia Perez #4323 (wounded), 
Raso Pedro Joaquin Maradiaga #2351 (wounded), 
Jose Valdavia (Owner of the house), 

Amador Montenegro (an intelligent reliable citizen, a civico of 
Jinotega, who was a bandit prisoner). 

and Lieut. Robert L. Griffin, G.N., Lieut. William A. Lee, G.N., and 
Lieut. Policarpo Gutierrez, G.N., who inspected the scene of action 
and made oral reports. 

2. The guardia patrol, consisting of Captain Lester E. Power, 
Lieutenant William^ H. McGhee and fifteen enlisted men, cleared 
Corinto Finca on combat patrol at 09515 for Embocaderos, Las Cuchil- 
las and Pena Blanca areas. The patrol reached the house of Jose Val- 
davia at about 2:00 p.m., where it stopped and began to prepare a meal. 
The house was open to the south and partly boarded with one inch 
pine boards on other sides, has a tile roof, lies on ground generally 
sloping from north to south. The house is lower than the surrounding 
country. 

About noon the bandit group captured Amador Montenegro in 
Estrella, about a league to the north. He states that the group num- 
bered two hundred more or less, that he recognized Pedron Altemirano 
and Pedro Irias. Pedron is well dressed and rides a fine big mule, has 
high boots, khaki trousers and woolen khaki shirt, wears several gold 
chains and many gold rings. He carries a Lugar pistol and a forty-five 
revolver. Nothing notable about the dress of Irias. The bandits were 
not in any kind of uniform, some had hardly any clothes at all. They 
had four machine guns, "two big ones and two little ones", all had rifles 
and pouches full of ammunition. At about 2:00 p.m., a big black man 
in the bandit point came to a hill marked "A" (the bandits were not on 
the main trail but moving from Los Cedros toward the house of Victor 
Rodriguez to a place called Escaleros) with a pair of field glasses, saw 
the guardia pack mules crossing a small rise marked "B". The bandits 
halted until they saw the guardia come to the house of Jose Valdavia 

260 




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and unload the mules. They then sent a runner for a group which had 
gone on ahead and made plans to surround the house on three sides. 
Trias took the left wing and told a man he called "Colonel", a small 
white man with heavy drooping mustaches to take the right wing. 
Montenegro was with Irias and during the fight laid in a hollow about 
fifty yards in rear of the bandit line to the 'east of the house and could 
not see any of the fight. About 3 :00 p.m., the fight started, rifles first, 
followed immediately by machine guns and lasted until nearly dark. 
It was so dark when the bandits left that he was enabled to escape. 
The bandits left in two directions, most of them went back toward 
Estrella, the remainder going to the southeast. The latter group carried 
three dead bodies, one of whom was the Colonel who commanded the 
right wing. (The Jefe Politico of Jinotega states that the man was 
Daniel Hernandez, a Colonel with Altamirano, known to be the best 
shot in his army). Another of the dead was "Chino". (This man's name 
is Juan Zelaya). He heard the bandits, carrying the body, say they 
were sorry "Chino" had been killed. 

3 . When the bandits first opened fire the sentry gave the alarm 
and the guardias immediately returned the fire, most of them outside 
of the house. "During the height of the combat" Lieutenant McGhee, 
while firing the Thompson from behind a stone to the north of the house 
"C" on sketch, was hit in the head by a rifle bullet, went into the house, 
sat down on a pile of lumber and died. Captain Power went behind a 
pile of tiles "D" in sketch, firing his pistol, he called for the B.A.R. It 
was handed to him but was jammed; he then called for the grenade 
discharger and was shot in the head as he reached for it; he went into 
the house, laid on the bed and died in about fifteen minutes. He told 
the guardia to continue the fight. 

4. Private Santiago Talavera, #410,0, was mortally wounded 
while firing through a crack from within the house. He was dragged 
to some little bushes marked "E" and left there. Private Perez says 
that he shot from behind a stump and that he saw two dead men in the 
open. Private Maragiaga says two men were together, one of whom 
shot Captain Power at about one hundred meters. He shot this man 
and the other shot him; when he fell his hand fell on the pistol of 
Captain Power and he brought it with him. He afterward killed a 
bandit with it when he was getting away. Perez was wounded in the 
leg by a bomb, also had a slight flesh wound from a rifle bullet and 
could not walk. He lay hidden in the brush until the bandits left and 
was found next morning by a guardia patrol. He heard the bandits 
say that seven bandits were killed. 

5. All accounts agree that the fight staf ted about 3:00 p.m., 
and lasted till nearly dark. 

6. Lieutenant Lee with the first Guardia patrol on the ground 
estimated the bandits at one hundred and fifty men; their line was 
horseshoe shape and covered more than two hundred yards. In search- 
ing the bushes he found a number of blood spots, and on both trails 
that the bandits used in leaving, there were trails of blood. He picked 
up from the bandit line and brought to this office the following cart- 
ridge cases by actual count: 

261 



826 — Cal. 30 Krag and Springfield 

32 — Cal. 45 
5 — Cal. 38 Rifle 
5 — Cal. 38 Special pistol 
5 — Cal. 32 Short pistol 

11 — Cal. 32/20 pistol 

884 — Total. 

From the vicinity of the house on the ground occupied by the 
"guardia he picked up a larger quantity by volume of empty cartridge 
cases but was unable to bring them in due to lack of transportation. 
As the bandits were in thick brush and the cases were hard to find, 
particularly the Cal. 45 cases, it is safe to say the bandits fired 1500 
rounds and hit six guardia in the open at a distance of from fifty to one 
hundred and fifty yards. 

Each guardia who reported in either to Jinotega or to Corinto 
Finca had an empty cartridge belt. Even the wounded stayed to shoot 
their last cartridges. Corporal Rivas, who handled the BAR was 
wounded and unable to carry the weapon, but states that he completely 
disabled it. 

7. The undersigned believes that it is safe to say that the 

bandits lost seven killed, including Colonel Daniel Hernandez, and an 
unknown number of wounded. The guardia losses: 

DEAD 

Captain Lester E. Power, G.N. 
Lieutenant William H. McGhee, G.N. 
Raso Santiago Ralavera, #4100, G.N. 

WOUNDED 

Corporal Daniel Guierrez, #3529, G.N. 
Corporal Isaac Rivas, #2544, G.N. 
Private Pedro Maradiaga, #3251, G.N. 
Private Luis Perez, #4323, G.N. 



PROPERTY CAPTURED BY BANDITS 

1 BAR (Completely disabled) 
12 Magazines, BAR 

1 Drum, Thompson, SMG 

1 Pistol, (Lieut. McGhee' s) 
19 Blankets 

1 Aeroplane panel and code cards 

1 Dispatch case (Captain Power's) 

1 Thompson 



262 



8. Everything indicates that the guardia were attacked by a 
group of from one hundred and fifty to two hundred bandits under 
Altamirano and Irias, (armed with two Lewis guns and two sub-Thomp- 
sons,) who had not been heard of in this neighborhood for nearly six 
months; that the guardia put up a gallant fight against terrific odds, 
and with the utmost loyalty stuck by their officers until it was known 
that they were dead and until their ammunition was exhausted. Too 
high praise cannot be given them for their loyalty and gallantry, es- 
pecially the old guardia who took cover and cooly shot it out with the 
bandits. 

9. Lieutenant Gutierrez deserves the highest praise for his 
loyalty and courage in marching at once by night to the scene of the 
action with a patrol of only twelve men. 

10. Specific recommendations will be made when more exact 

information is available. 

/s/ J. C. SMITH. 



263 



THE FOLLOWING, WITH ACCOMPANYING SKETCH, COVERS 

CAPTAIN McQUEEN'S REPORT OF THE ATTACK ON 

LIMAY, 1 JULY, 1931. 

GUARDIA NACIONAL, DISTRICT OF SAN JUAN DE LIMAY, 

DEPARTMENT OF ESTELI, NICARAGUA. 

4 July, 1931. 

From: The District Commander, Captain John C. McQueen, G.N. 

To : The Department Commander, Department of Esteli. 

Subject: Attack on Limay by Bandits, 1 July, 1931. 

1. During the night of 1 July, 1931, Limay was attacked 
by bandits, Jefe Jose Leon Diaz and a sub-jefe named Juan Castillo 
with combined groups estimated to be about 1'^ men. The first phase 
of the attack began about 9:50 p.m., and ended at 10:00 p.m., the 
second phase of the attack, a short demonstration of about seven 
minutes, began at about 11:00 p.m. At the beginning of the attack 
there were 28 of the 31 guardias in the cuartel, with three still on 
liberty. There was a moon, and although somewhat overcast, the visi- 
bility was fairly good. 

2. The mission of the bandits, evidently, was to hold the 
guardias in the cuartel by their fire, and sack the town. From reliable 
native reports obtained after the fight, the Castillo group arrived at 
the SE edge of the town at about 9:30 p.m., and halted, having come 
via La Flor trail from the south. A small part of this group circled the 
east and north outskirts of town and joined the Diaz group at the NW 
edge of town. Two mounted men of the Castillo group rode through 
the streets to look things over. They found everything quiet and saw 
only two guardias of the night police patrol on the streets whom they 
avoided. At about 9:30 p.m., the Diaz group with some of the Castillo 
group had taken positions in P18 rear of the cuartel (see attached sketch) 
1, 2, 3, 4 62 5. For a few minutes after the attack began fire came 
from these positions only. Also at this time the remainder of the Cas- 
tillo group composed mostly of machete men, had entered various 
patios in the eastern half of the town searching for mules and pack- 
saddles with which to carry away the prospective loot. Many of the 
townspeople were aware of this, but were afraid to leave their houses to 
report the matter. 

3. It is believed that the bandits were not entirely in position 
and not ready for the attack when it began; that it was precipitated 
due to the guardia turning back to the cuartel after having started 
for the outhouse (to relieve himself) near bandit position 2, causing 
suspicion on the part of the bandits there. Fire opened up from this 
point as the guardia neared the cuartel. The electric lights of the town 
were burning. The customary hour for extinguishing lights is 1 1 :00 p.m. 

4. 2nd Lieut. James R. Bell, second in command, and I were 
in the officers' quarters when the firing began. We closed and bolted 
the doors of the quarters and took position in the trenchera in front 

264 



of the quarters preparatory to making a dash for the cuartel. No sooner 
had we occupied this position then machine gun fire from bandit posi- 
tion 3 was directed at the trencher a and up street A in front of the 
officers' quarters, and rifle fire directed at the trenchera from (6). At 
the first lull in the machine gun fire, we ran across the plaza and gained 
the cuartel. 

5. At the cuartel we found all the guardias (with the exception 
of the three on liberty) manning their assigned attack station, fighting 
calmly, and in high spirits. Firing was heavy on the part of both the 
guardia and the bandits. Lieut. Bell was assigned to command the 
firing line in front (plaza side) of the cuartel. Machine gun fire by this 
time had opened up also from (7). In the rear of the cuartel I found the 
heavy Browning out of action due to a jam. The gun was put into action 
and performed perfectly with the exception of occasional misfires due 
to poor ammunition. Bandit fire was silenced from the rear. On the 
plaza side of the cuartel, Lieut. Bell and his men were firing on targets 
(6), (7) and nev/ target (8). Target 7 was silenced and also target 6, and 
rifle grenades were laid on target (8). This group had formed along sides 
and rear of the church. The first three grenades fired failed to explode 
and the group scattered to the east before the fourth grenade burst. 
A patrol consisting of thirteen men under my command left the cuartel 
and covered the vicinity in rear of the church to the edge of the town. 
The patrol then headed south down street B and fired into a group of 
about 10 men at position (9). Apparently they were taken by surprise. 
We heard several cries of "Ay, mamita" as they scattered into the brush 
and disappeared. While on the run they fired a hurried short burst of 
Thompson fire and a few poorly directed rifle shots. The patrol searched 
through this vicinity, found nothing, and thence continued along the 
east and south outskirts of the town, entered the town to see if the 
various stores were secure, searched patios and possible hiding places, 
and then went back to the cuartel to report the town quiet preparatory 
to searching the vicinity in rear of the cuartel. The three guardias who 
had been on liberty had returned to join the others. Several civicos had 
reported and volunteered their services (these names given in last para- 
graph). Two of the guardias who had been on liberty had made an 
attempt to get to the cuartel during the fight, but were driven back by 
bandit fire, one of them receiving a bullet hole through one knee of his 
trousers. 

6. AtlO:55p.m., the bandits again opened fire from the rear 
of the cuartel before the patrol had cleared to search through this 
section. Firing was not severe and of short duration. During the time 
the first patrol had been out, Lieut. Bell had kept the defense positions 
in readiness and fire was returned by the guardia immediately. After 
sweeping this section with machine gun fire the patrol cleared in the 
direction of the bandit firing line and found it abandoned. The cemetery 
and the potrero were thoroughly covered and the patrol continued on 
west to investigate the trails and houses. We learned that the Diaz 
group had entered the potrero from the NW corner before taking posi- 
tions, but had not departed in that direction. It is believed that the 



265 



group scattered and formed later in the night, and headed toward 
Chilamatal. Reliable natives reported that the group sacked Chila- 
matal on July 2nd and headed NW toward the Honduran border; 
that they carried four seriously wounded; that two dead had been 
buried the morning of the 2nd of July near a river at Chilamatal; that 
Diaz believed a large patrol was absent from the garrison at the time 
of his attack. It was reported later also, by natives living on the La 
Flor Trail, that the Castillo group on the morning of July 2nd was 
seen to pass in small bunches of four and five men heading southeast 
in the general direction of Lagartillo. 

7. CASUALTIES: Guardia — 1 (two slight wounds in face). 

Bandits — unknown (believed to be 2 
dead and 1 1 wounded) 

More serious damage could have resulted to the bandits had all 
the rifle grenades been serviceable, as the bandits were within range of 
grenades in most of their positions. 

8. Guardia weapons employed were 1 Heavy Browning Ma- 
chine Gun; 1 Lewis machine gun; 1 Browning Automatic rifle; 1 Thomp- 
son gun; rifle grenades and rifles. The bandits employed 2 Lewis Guns; 
2 Thompson Guns; rifles, pistols, shotguns and dynamite bombs. 

9. The conduct of the guardias was splendid. They quickly 
took their assigned attack stations, pickep up the target and used 
good judgement in the volume and direction of their fire. In the early 
part of the attack there were several recruits not as attentive to orders 
as they might have been, due probably to their eagerness to fight. 
Lieut. Bell handled his men with precision and I felt confident of the 
safety of the cuartel left in his charge when the patrol cleared to protect 
the town. 

Diputado Senor Fernando Morales L., voluntarily accompanied 
the patrol in its search of the vicinity in rear of the cuartel. He went 
with the point and with his whole-hearted cooperation was of great 
assistance to us. 

The following civilians reported at the cuartel at 10:45 p.m., and 
offered their assistance. They also formed part of the patrol covering 
the town during the remainder of the night: 

Senor Marcial Lopez y Lopez, the Alcalde. 
" Arnold Pineda 
" Teodoro Castillon 
" Pastor Prado 
" Adan Vindel 
" Ramon Gonzalez. 

/s/ J. c. McQueen. 



266 



ATTACK ON LIMAY 
1 JULY, 1931 






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FROM GUARDIA NEWS LETTER NO. 32. 
SOMOTO NICARAGUA 21 JANUARY, 1931. 

From: Second Lieutenant F. M. McCorkle, G. N. 

To : The Commanding Officer. 

Subject: Attack on Somoto, report of. 

1. At exactly 2130 on 19 January 1931, Raso Ignaxio Gonzales 
on town patrol, encountered a group of men and receiving no answer 
to his challenge, fired three shots at them and ran for the barracks, 
garrisoned by myself and twenty-four enlisted men and four auxiliares, 
was attacked from all sides by the bandits numbering about two hun- 
dred under Miguel Ortez, Jose Leon Diaz and Julan Pablo Umanzor. 

2. Bandits employed two Browning automatic rifles, two 
Thompson sub-machine guns, eleven rifle grenades, bombs, rifle and 
pistol fire. Bandits also had one additional Thompson Sub-machine 
gun in the center of the town to protect the looters who were also cov- 
ered by a BAR, in the rear of the church. Machine guns and bombs 
were concentrated in the first part of attack on the officers quarters. 
The bandits were apparently aided by someone who was well acquainted 
with Somoto and barracks as bombs and rifle fire were accurately 
directed, rifle fire being directed to parts of building where officers slept. 
Ten bombs fell in the patio and through roof of officers quarters. A 
very heavy fire was maintained in the streets in front of barracks, 
apparently to keep the Guardia in while looting of town was taking 
place. 

3. A patrol of ten men under Sergeant Chaverria was sent 
out about ten minutes after start of the attack to prevent looting of 
the town. The patrol encountered very heavy machine gun and rifle 
fire and after failure of their Thompson sub-machine gun were forced 
to return to the barracks. Stoppage was claered in about 15 minutes 
and the patrol Was again sent out. Looters were driven from the streets 
about thirty minutes later. The store of Senora Maria Lopez, wife of 
Senator Lopez, was broken into and robbed. The bandits then made 
several unsuccessful attempts to set fire to the store and house. The 
manager of Sierke's store, who was armed with a pistol, opened the 
door of the store upon request of the bandits armed with machetes and 
from an investigation of his store a few minutes after the bandits re- 
treated, it was apparent that a comparatively small amount of mer- 
chandise had been molested, a small amount of clothing and liquor 
being the principal articles taken. 

4. Attack lasted until 2330, five unsuccessful assaults being 
made on the barracks, when apparently upon signal of bomb being 
fired about one-half mile from town on the Ocotal road, bandits retired 
in all directions but for the most part toward the north and east. Heard 
one bomb and rifle and machine gun fire about one quarter mile from 
town on the Ocotal road at 2345 lasting only a few minutes. 

5. Bandits were apparently augmented by natives in the vicin- 
ity of Somoto for the purpose of aiding in the looting of the town. 

267 



6. There were no Guardia or civilian casualties. Bandit casual- 
ties unknown. 

7. Conduct of all Guardias and auxiliares was excellent with 
no confusion at start of attack. Stations were promptly manned and 
an effective fire laid down. Orders were obeyed, especially in the con- 
servation of ammunition, the bandits expending more than the Guardia. 
Discipline was very good despite the fact that the machine guns were 
not of much use due to stoppages. Raso Vasquez, Franciso #1973, 
General Court Martial prisoner awaiting transfer to Ocotal, was upon 
repeated requests, released from confinement, armed and allowed to 
take part in the engagement where he conducted himself well. 

/s/ F. M. McCORKLE. 



268 



1st Endorsement. Guardia Nacional 21 Jan 1931. 

Somoto, Nicaragua. 

From: District Commander. 

To : Area Commander, Northern Area. 

1 . A patrol consisting of myself and eight enlisted men cleared 
Palacaguina at 1830, January 19th, and proceeded towards Somoto. 

2. Due to the direction of the wind the firing during the 
attack on Somoto was not heard until arrival at La Cruz Grande 
(170-357) where the telegraph line was found to be cut. When one 
half mile from town a dynamite bomb was fired from a nearby hill. 
The patrol continued towards Somoto and when about a quarter of a 
mile from town the movement of a group, apparently of considerable 
size, was heard on the road ahead and in an adjoining pasture, and 
at practically the same time a shot was fired at the patrol. The patrol 
returned the fire and the bandits after firing a few shots dispersed in all 
directions. From blood trails and cries, it is believed that at least two 
were wounded. The patrol continued on to Somoto and on arrival 
additional patrols were sent out through the town. 

3. At daylight a search was made of the town and outskirts 
and blood trails were found in the streets and nearby trails leading 
from town. Reliable native reports indicate that two dead and five 
wounded bandits were taken out of the town on animals. The following 
articles were found near positions occupied by the bandits in town: 

Two Thompson clips 

Ninety rounds of miscellaneous ammunition 

Two bombs. 

4. It is believed that the regular bandit groups were tempor- 
arily increased by sympathizers from the surrounding districts, many 
armed only with machetes, who joined to participate in the contem- 
plated looting. 

/s/ G. A. WILLIAMS. 



CONTACT REPORT OF LIEUTENANT GRAY, G.N. 
2 FEBRUARY, 1932: 

DEPARTMENT OF SOUTHERN BLUEFIELDS 

GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA 

BLUEFIELDS, NICARAGUA 

4 February, 1932. 

From: 2nd Lieut, Earl T. Gray, District of Neptune Mine. 

To : The Department Commander of Southern Bluefields. 

Subject: Contact report. 

1. Having information that a large group of bandits which 
sacked Tunky on January 28, 1932, were cutting a road to Waspook 
river, I cleared with the following patrol at 1200, 1 Feb 1932: 

Myself in command. 

1 Sergeant; 1 Corporal; 9 Privates. 

2 civilian guides; 2 pack animals. 

Patrol took a northeast direction going through Eden Mines 
and camped in a small house near the Biltigni River, a tributary of 
the Waspook. 2 February cleared at 0600. Here it was necessary 
to cut a trail to intercept the route taken by the bandits column. 
Cut trail until 1100 when distinct trail of the bandits was found. 
This was followed for a short distance where it entered into the Bil- 
tigni river. Here the bandits had followed the river banks, crossing 
where necessary. The Biltigni river is small and rapid. The trail 
indicated a very large number of bandits. About 1200, a clearing was 
entered but which had not been under cultivation for somie time, being 
grown up higher than the head with woods. Here partly constructed 
bandit camps were found but no bandits. We proceeded cautiously 
seeing fresh tracks. The banks of the river were steeper and the two 
guides, six guardias and the mules were left after we cleared the first 
bandit camp, because they could not follow the trail. When I had pro- 
ceeded about a half mile down the river, a bandit approached the river 
bank from the opposite side with a balsa log. (Which were used in con- 
struction of rafts), This was the first man we had seen. He was about 
100 yards -ahead of us. We proceeded now very slowly and quietly. 
The river bank had dense cover which was fortunate. Our presence was 
not discovered. 

2. We opened fire with the Thompson and B.A.R. at about 
20 yards. The surprise of the bandits was complete and our position 
so close that they fled with very little resistance. They returned a 
feeble fire from the camp and some more from the high grounds back 
of it, but in all the firing lasted less than five minutes. The bandits 
used only shotguns and rifles. 

3. There were about 1^ men in the camp when we attacked. 
We crossed the river as soon as fire had ceased. There were five dead. 
The amount of loot taken from Tunky was large and most of it lay 
there in the camp in rubber sacks. This could not be carried as our 
mules were worn out. Most of the articles were in rubber sacks of which 
there were about 100. A rough estimate is given of the content: 

270 



100 trousers; 100 shirts; 50 hats; 50 pair shoes; 25 womens dresses; 
1^ blankets; 20 rain coats; a great quantity of cloth in pieces; a 
great quantity of cooking utensils; 200 lbs beans; 300 lbs rice; 
200 lbs sugar; 300 tins canned goods; 20 pounds coffee; 5 lbs tea. 

The aforementioned articles were either burned or thrown in the 
river. 

The amount of the military articles were: — 

1 Krag rifle ; 3 shotguns ; 4 clips for Lugar pistol ; \ lb powder. 
About 200 rounds assorted ammunition, mostly Krag Combat 1930 
and 1917, which was reissued to the Guardias after the second 
combat. 36 rounds Lugar; 6 rounds brass shotgun — 12 & 16 guage; 
Remington reloaded. 12 rounds 38 special pistol Winchester; 30 
Machetes; 2 pack bulls (killed in contact) Quantity of correspon- 
dence. 
Five bandits were killed (counted) 

4. When we had destroyed everything, I returned and picked 
up the pack animals and guides. The guardias left behind had come 
up on hearing the firing, but too late to take part in the contact. I 
followed the same route back that I had taken down hoping to find 
some bandits at the first camp. The bandits were on a high bank on 
the opposite side of the river, while the Guardia were in the clear. 
The patrol took cover in a banana grove. The bandits opened a heavy 
fire including one Thompson. The fire increased when another Thomp- 
son fired on the patrol from an angle. Firing continued for about 20 
minutes; it was not practical to advance across the river and up the 
bank in the face of the bandits fire. Careful placing of rifle grenades by 
Raso Acdana finally dislodged the bandits. 

5. No examination of the bandits position could be made, 
due to the river and our own shortage of ammunition, as practically 
all the automatic arms and ammunition and all except one grenade 
had been used, along the majority of rifle ammunition. This contact 
took place about 1600, the first one being at 1300. 

6. The weapons of the Guardia were 1 BAR; 1 TSMG; 1 Rifle 
with grenade discharger; 9 Krag Rifles; 1 Pistol, Cal 45 ; 1 Pistol, Cal 38. 

The bandits were armed with 2 TSMG; Rifles, Pistols and shot- 
guns. Guardia expended 150 rounds ammunition Springfield 1906; 
120 Cat 45 ; 600 new Krag Combat. 

It is estimated that the bandits expended a slightly lesser amount. 
1830 — camped on Beltigni River. 3 February, 0530 cleared for, and 
arrived at Neptune Mine 1200. 

7. The conduct of the Guardia as a whole was satisfactory but 
Cabo Elisio Vargas #2130 with the TSMG; Raso Gumercido Alaniz 
#3084 with the BAR and Raso Rodolfo Acdana #2485 with the grenade 
discharger were particularly cool and effective with their weapons. 

/s/ EARL T. GRAY. 



1st Endorsement. 
HEADQUARTERS EASTERN AREA GUARDIA NACIONAL 
Bluefields, Nicaragua DE NICARAGUA. 

18 February 1932. 

From: Area Commander, Eastern Area. 

To : The Jefe Director, Headquarters, Guardia Nacional de 

Nicaragua, Managua, Nicaragua. 

Subject: Contact report Lieut. Gray (R), G.N., 

of February 2, 1932, at BILTIGNI RIVER. 

1 . Forwarded. 

2. From a study of Lieutenant Gray's report and from per- 
sonal conversation with Captain McAfree, who explained satisfactory 
the reason for sending Lieut. Gray, (Radio), G.N. on the patrol, too 
much credit cannot be given for the action of Lieut. Gray in boldly 
attacking first the large main camp of the bandits with only six (6) 
Guardia, completely surprising and routing the bandits, seizing and 
destroying their stolen loot of several raids, capturing a mass of papers 
and killing six and wounding others. 

3. Being rejoined by the remainder of his patrol and having 
completely dispersed the main group, Lieut. Gray promptly turned 
back on the trail, suspecting the presence of a rear guard and was 
ambushed, but fortunately without casualties. After a spirited long 
range fire action the bandits scattered and vanished. 

4. The manner in which Lieut. Gray led and handled his 
small patrol, the boldness of his attack against such a large force, and 
the results attained receive my admiration and his patrol deserves the 
highest commendation. Such conduct on the part of the officers and 
enlisted men of the Guardia Nacional and especially on the part of 
Lieut. Gray, who is not a line officer, and subject to combat and patrol 
duty, cannot fail to leave its imprint on the morale and future of the 
Guardia Nacional. 

5. I recommend that Second Lieutenant Earl T. Gray, (R), 
G.N., be officially commended in official orders for his conduct and 
splendid results. 

/s/ L. L. LEECH. 



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CONTACT REPORTS OF CAPTAIN PULLER) 
EXTRACTS FROM ON NEWS LETTER #120) 

HEADQUARTERS GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA 

JINOTEGA, NICARAGUA 

3 October 1932. 



From 
To 

Via 



Commanding Officer, Company "M" 

The Jefe Director, Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua. 

The Area Commander, Central Area. 



Subject: Report of engagements with bandit groups at: 

(1) RIO AUYABAL (295-375) 1030 26 Sept 1932. 

(2) LINDO LUGARE (291-379) 1 130 26 Sept 1932. 

(3) SAN ANTONIO (362-329) 0370 30 Sept 1932. 

(4) LA CEIBA (249-326) 1300 30 Sept 1932. 

1 . The following officers and men took part in the four engage- 
ments listed above with bandit groups at the time and places shown: 

Captain Lewis B. Puller, G.N. 

1st Lieut. William A. Lee, G.N. 

40 enlisted men. 
NOTE: Raso Alberto Nicaragua ,#1224 was killed in the second 
engagement and Raso Juan A. Altamirano #4998 died on the morning 
of 27 September from a wound received in the second engagement. 

2. On this patrol from 20 September to 1 October, my plans 
approved by the Area Commander, were to locate and destroy large 
permanent camps of the bandit leaders, SAND I NO and ALTAMI- 
RANO, that I believed to be located east of the RIO COCO and be- 
tween the RIO CUA and the RIO WAMBLAN. The company had 
nineteen mules with it and carried thirty days rations. When SAN- 
DINO went north from SARAGUASCA (337-327) in 1930, he estab- 
lished his camp in the MALAGATE MOUNTAIN (367-345), and from 
here he went further north and established his camp on the RIO CUA 
(279-367), later on he moved still further north. I believe that he now 
has three camps, one between the RIO CUA and the KILANDE 
Mountain (285-374), one east of QUILALI (272-279), and the other 
east of POTECA, (276-405). Since returning to Nicaragua last July, 
I have heard rumors of a large open road running north eastward of 
PEN A BLANC A (284-328) and extending from the East Coast of 
Nicaragua to the border of Honduras. During the few days that I 
served as District Commander of CORINTO FINCA during July and 
August, I learned that the bandits were driving cattle northward around 
both ends of PENA BLANCA. I decided to go east from PAVONA 
(379-333) and cut a trail until I ran into the road that I believed to 
exist; within three miles of PAVONA this road was located. It is just 
about the same road that is shown on the map ; from PAVONA, it runs 
eastward through the CHACHAGON PASS (284-331) and then north- 
ward. An open trail from the east joins this road about one days march 
north from the CHACHAGON PASS and another open trail runs 

273 



south westward from CARROBO (301-370). These are more than 
trails, they are almost roads; it is hard to believe that they exist. Hun- 
dreds of head of cattle, pack animals, and men have been using these 
roads. 

3. In planning this patrol, I had hopes that the company 
would be able to get into the territory without being observed by 
the bandits as we did in the PANTASMA VALLEY and the J I CALITA 
mountain in August. From the moment that the company crossed the 
CHACHAGON PASS, we were picked up by two (2) bandit scouts who 
kept just ahead of us for a day and half and then pushed on ahead up the 
road. Twenty-four (24) temporary deserted bandit camps were passed 
all of which had been used in the last three months. From the time 
we were picked up, I knew that we would be ambushed at any moment ; 
it was not practicable for me to employ flankers all the time if I wished 
to get anywhere. My only course was to push ahead and cover as much 
distance as practicable. 

4. (1) RIO AUYABAL (295-375), 1030 26 Sept 1932. 

The company was ambushed by a small group of bandits who em- 
ployed rifle fire only. There were no Guardia casualties. There were no 
known bandit casualties. The bandits fired one volley and fled to the 
north westward. From what Lieutenant Lee told me and what I know, 
I believe this was an effort to get the officers of the company. The 
Guardias did not hesitate a second when the line went forward to the 
bandit position. 

5. (2) LINDO LUG AR (291-379) 1130, 26 Sept 1932. 

The company was ambushed by a large group over, one hundred 
and fifty (150) bandits here, who employed seven (7) or more automatic 
weapons, rifle grenades, hand grenades, between one hundred fifty (150) 
and two hundred (200) dynamite bombs, and a great quantity of rifle 
ammunition. When I say one hundred and fifty bandits and seven 
automatic weapons, it is a conservative statement; the Guardias esti- 
mate is much larger. I know that they employed on (1) Lewis Machine 
Gun, three (3) Browning Automatic Rifles, and from three (3) to six (6) 
Thompson sub-machine guns. After the fight the guardias picked up 
empty cartridge cases by the hats full; a hat and a half of Springfield 
ammunition was also picked up. The noise of their dynamite bombs 
drowned our fire out. Raso Alberto Nicaragua #1224 was killed by a 
burst of automatic fire and was buried a short distance from the scene 
of the engagement (grave concealed). Raso Juan A. Altimirano, #4998, 
was shot through the head, died on the morning of 27 September and 
buried near (295-355), (grave concealed); he never regained concious- 
ness. Lieutenant William A. Lee was shot through the right arm and in 
the head ; he was knocked unconcious and thought to be dead. Raso Fer- 
nando Dorman #3545 was wounded in the head and left-hand by a hand 
grenade or bomb fragments. Raso Felipe Salgado #3465 was wounded 
in the left leg by rifle or machine gun fire. Ten (10) bandits were killed 
and six (6) known wounded; during the fight when a bandit was hit 
you could hear the machete men being called up to drag them off. The 
machete platoons were also being urged to charge the company during 
the entire fight. The bandit casualties were heavier than is being re- 

274 



ported. This group was under an experienced leader and they had 
plenty of fight in them. SAND I NO was somewhere in the vicinity as 
was evidenced by the constant vivas for him; also PEDRON ALTA- 
MIRANO. The bandits took advantage of a natural "V" position which 
was seemingly made to order. This engagement lasted thirty (30) 
minutes. Lieutenant Lee after being unconscious for fifteen or twenty 
minutes, took over the Lewis machine gun and used it with telling effect; 
his six days of marching back to JINOTEGA was no joy ride. In the 
days of the wooden ships he would have been an iron man. The com- 
pany cleared the bandits from their position, went forward to a ridge 
that crossed the road, established outposts, took care of the wounded, 
and buried Raso Nicaragua. Here due to my Wounded, I was forced to 
begin my return to JINOTEGA. The terrain at the scene of this en- 
gagement is broken and covered with heavy forest and brush. 

6. (3) SAN ANTONIO (362-239) 0730, 30 Sept 1932. 

The company was ambushed here by a group of eighty (80) or more 
bandits who employed two (2) automatic weapons, rifles, and many 
dynamite bombs. There was no shortage of bandit rifle ammunition. 
Before the bandits opened a heavy fire, one shot was fired and the com- 
pany at once took advantage of available cover. There were no guardia 
casualties. One bandit was killed and seven or more wounded. Here 
again the machete men were called when a bandit was hit. The com- 
pany went forward and drove the bandits through the woods. The 
bandits split in two main groups ; one went south and the other south- 
west. The spirit of the company was excellent in this contact after 
expecting to be ambushed every foot of the trail for the past five days. 
Again Lieutenant Lee put the Lewis machine gun in action and set a 
splendid example for the company. 

7. (4) LA CEIBA (249-326) 1300, 30 Sept 1932. 

The company was ambushed here by a group of forty (40) or more 
bandits who employed two automatic weapons, rifles, and dynamite 
bombs. The trail here runs along a stream, crosses the stream, and 
enters thick brush and trees on the other side. On the near side of the 
stream is a bluff from twenty to thirty feet in height. The bandit posi- 
tion was along this bluff and to the south of the trail on the other side. 
The bandits opened fire one at a time and most of the company was 
under cover. There were no guardia casualties. Three or more bandits 
were killed or wounded in this engagement. Again the spirit of Lieu- 
tenant Lee and the men was excellent. The bandits were driven from 
their position and scattered in all directions. 

8. I was strongly advised against making this patrol with 
a small number of guardias and was told that SAND I NO could con- 
centrate more than five hundred (500) well armed bandits to employ 
against the company. 

9. Lieutenant Lee has been in twenty (20) some engagements 
against bandits while serving under me and has distinguished himself 
by extraordinary heroism a number of times in the line of his profession; 
I recommend him for the Cruz de Valor. 

/s/ L. B. PULLER 
276 



EXTRACT FROM REPORTS FROM EASTERN AREA REGARD- 
ING OPERATIONS AGAINST BANDITS: 
(DEATH OF BLANDON). 



On April 11, 1931, Captain H. Pefley, G.N., commanding Puerto 
Cabezas, cleared Puerto Cabezas with a small guardia patrol to investi- 
gate a rumor of some trouble at Logtown (approximately 60 miles from 
Puerto Cabezas on the Lumber Company's railroad). Upon arrival at 
Logtown the Guardia patrol was fired at and Captain Pefley was 
killed and one Guardia wounded. The guardia patrol fought off the 
assailants and drove them in the direction of the Coco River. Captain 
Pefley' s body was recovered and taken to Puerto Cabezas. Lieutenant 
Darrah and Puerto Cabezas guardia patrol then cleared in pursuit. 
Another guardia patrol cleared at night to assist. 

On April 12, it was reported that Lieutenant Darrah and his patrol 
were surrounded at Moss Farm, south of Logtown, after all night 
fighting with armed outlaws of unknown number and identity but 
apparently well armed with plentiful supply of ammunition. No guardia 
casualties. The USS ASHVILLE was ordered to proceed to Puerto 
Cabezas. Marine Planes cleared Managua to assist. Captain Wood 
arrived Puerto Cabezas from Bluefields and cleared with Lieutenant 
Simmer (M.C.) and guardia patrol to reinforce Darrah. 

Last report received April 12, indicated Darrah with patrol in 
good condition at Wakinwas interposing himself between Puerto 
Cabezas and Blandon group at Snaki. Definitely known that Blandon 
with l'^ men well armed were present. 

On April 13 planes returned to Puerto Cabezas. Report that 
Captain Wood's patrol was escorted across Snaki bridge and found 
Moss Farm bridge burned. Guardia marched to Cuyutigny where they 
captured supply train from the bandits. Contact lastee 35 minutes. 
Known dead bandits left on field — eight and two wounded. The 
following message was recieved after the contact: 

"Telegram from Bluefields, to Jefe Director, G.N., Managua, 
April 15, 1931: "Following recived from Wood quote my 18413 Apr 
correction scratch out Pedron Altamirano to correct error over long 
distance telephone period the jefe killed at Logtown was in neat com- 
plete uniform puttees black and red neckerchief rather short of stature, 
under middle age black pompadour hair squarely built body armed with 
a forty five and broad bladed sword period I took following papers from 
his person colon typewritten letter dated February twenty one ad- 
dressed to Senor General Blandon entreating and ordering him to report 
to headquarters comma one typewritten quote Credencial de Represen- 
tante personal de esta Jefatura Suprema a favor del hermano Jefe 
Expedicionario de Nuestra Ejercito General Pedro Blandon en jira 
militar a nuestra costa Atlantica unquote dated sixteen march both 
signed A. C. Sandino and his seal and obvious originals period also 
one order with Pedro Blandon' s official signature period Natives in 
vicinity Logtown stated the Jefe killed was Pedro Blandon — 080 1 5 
April 31 WOOD unquote 09015 April 31 MARSTON". 

276 



It is apparent that Pedro Blandon was killed in the contact. 
Lieutenant Benson and patrol returned from Wawaboom-Puerto Ca- 
bezas region and reported no bandit activities. 



The following report concerning operations in the vicinity of NEP- 
TUNE MINE is quoted: 

DEPARTMENT OF SOUTHERN BLUEFIELDS, GUARDIA 
NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA, DISTRICT OF NEPTUNE 

MINES. 
27 May, 1932. 

From: 2nd Lieut. E. T. Gray, G.N., District of Neptune Mine. 

To : The Department Commander, Bluefields, Nicaragua. 

Subject: Detail of activities since 18 May, 1932, to present date. 

1 . On the morning of the 1 8th, received a report that a large 
group of bandits were in the vicinity of WAUNI and SI UNA, It was 
generally assumed in NEPTUNE that the bandits were a long way 
from this District, however finqueros were coming in bringing all 
their possessions but would not give any information regarding location 
or even infer that there were bandits in this area. Their manner was 
very strange and unusual. We dispatched a runner to try and discover 
the disturbance. About ten thirty same morning a native came running 
into NEPTUNE very excited and reported a group of three hundred 
men under PEDRON ALTAMIRANO about one hour and a half 
from NEPTUNE MINES. Also reported another group about one 
hundred and fifty under Jefe PERALTA. Natives stated both groups 
were advancing on our station. Considered immediate offensive action 
impractical as our automatic weapon was with the patrol in TUNKY 
and further believed the reported circumstances necessitated the defense 
of the Mine, primarily, until we could further ascertain just what the 
situation might be. The people living in the mine of course got terribly 
excited and with some difficulty they were quieted and assured of their 
safety. Dispatched a runner to TUNKY patrol notifying them to re- 
turn to the Mine and expect trouble enroute. Also started a runner to 
WAUNI who was captured same day. Formed heavy guard through 
the night. 

2. Morning of 19th, patrol returned from TUNKY with noth- 
ing more than rumors. Sent two men to try and reach WAUNI, and 
attempt to get definite information of the location of the bandits. One 
of these men was captured, the other escaped and returned to NEP- 
TUNE, bringing authentic data on bandits group. Dispatched one 
more man to WAUNI who reached there and reported to Lieut. CUR- 
CEY. Throughout the night a machine gun or automatic weapon was 
fired twice. Up to the morning of the twenty first I still could not get 
any direct location of the bandit forces. In the afternoon of the twenty- 
first I cleared with ten Guardia and five Civicos to ascertain and verify 

277 



reports and to be. able to give CURCEY an accurate point when he 
arrived as I was expecting him then. My destination was due south of 
Neptune in direction of largest group. It was about six miles to this 
place and when we were about half way I ran up to the guide and asked 
how much further to go. He told me and I turned half around to motion 
the patrol on when I glanced through the bush and saw five armed men 
pass slowly by and looking directly at me. For a minute I thought it 
was Lieut. CURCEY'S Civicos. I flanked the patrol through the bush, 
which was very heavy, and found another new well worn trail alongside 
of a very steep hill at right angles to our original one. Patrol gathered 
together on the trail and we ran to catch up with this group, I then 
saw the trail showed evidence of many having passed). The bandits 
opened fire on us at about thirty yards. The growth was so heavy that 
we could not see but only a few of them, however from their position 
and amount of firing I estimate about one hundred fifty, but do not 
believe PEDRON was in this group as was previously reported. Patrol 
was unable to ascertain any bandit casualties if any at all. There were 
no Guardia casualties. We captured three mules and two horses all 
equipped for riding, with saddles. Patrol then cleared for the mine 
and when we were within a half mile we heard heavy rifle and pistol 
shots to our right and left. Then the heavy Browning from our Cuartel 
was fired. I assumed the mine was being attacked so proceeded cau- 
tiously and fast as I could. On arrival, however, I found Lieut. Somar- 
riba, who was manning and holding that position, had fired at a small 
group that were seen creeping along toward the Cuartel. These bandits 
were dispersed. Lieut. Somarriba remained in the Cuartel on the hill to 
hold that position and I took up a station in the lower part of the town 
with ten armed Guardia and Civicos to maintam a guard over the trails 
and ravines. Sergeant Garcia was placed on the other hill overlooking 
Neptune to take care of that point using the BAR there being the most 
effective position for it. Bandits fired on him during the night and he 
routed them with about five minutes fire. My position was not bothered. 

3. Morning of twenty-second, planes came over and bombed 

area South, by Southwest and East. Fortunately they hit a group 
square, which was reported to be PERALTA and group. A woman he 
had captured along v/ith her husband reported that Captain Mulcahy 
and planes killed five including her husband but she escaped and re- 
ported to me, stating that the group had been completely scattered. I 
received other similar statements almost identical from natives who 
had been hiding from the bandits in that vicinity. At this time I had 
Sergeant Garcia and ten men patrol over to the Company Bodega 
to confirm a report of a group in that location. When he arrived the 
building had been partly looted but bombing cleared them out. In the 
afternoon Somarriba cleared with twenty men to the Eden Mine on 
report of a main group passing through there. The main group had 
passed through. It was about four o'clock so he returned to the mine. 
While Somarriba was in that vicinity we heard a very heavy fire for 
about ten minutes, and assumed he was in contact with them, but on 
return found it must have been Gonzalez and group, who had been to 
our north, not recognizing Pedron and opened fire. Throughout the 
night we kept the same positions as stated above. 

278 



4. Activities had quieted during the night and on the twenty- 
third the bandits were reported to be taking the Biltigni trail and leav- 
ing. Believing they could not travel fast with the stolen cattle, I cleared 
with a patrol of twenty Guardia and Civicos leaving from Neptune 
west over a longer trail but which I thought would not take me between 
two big groups and get in front of both of them to the North. I slipped 
my patrol out one by one as secret as possible and formed them a mile 
West of Neptune. We had hardly gone two hundred yards, when they 
opened fire on us in the open trail but thickly wooded on both sides. 
My point, which in this firing position became the right flank was forced 
into hand to hand conflict to get out and gain combat position. PED- 
RON blew a bugle during the contact and at the beginning called out : 
"Now I have you Macho, you and all your dogs", as interpreted by the 
patrol. The contact lasted for an hour and a half and we killed a known 
seventeen bandits. There were no serious Guardia casualties. I was 
dazed for a few minutes by a bomb explodmg close to me and three 
men were slightly cut by machetes. No one shot, some grazed but it 
did not bother them. I tried to get their automatic weapons and mach- 
ine gun and I placed rifle grenades mighty close to them and bugle, but 
they got away. Captured three m.ore riding animals and saddles, little 
correspondence and picked up some of their spent and good ammunition. 
Planes arrived just as I got back to Neptune and the Guartel was again 
firing at a group at rear of the Mine. During my contact the power 
plant was being attacked at Big Falls but Civicos dispersed them from 
that point. Planes again hit the right spot to the west and I am certain 
they created casualties from the mess of torn flesh and blood found in 
that area. Bandits to the South fired on planes with machine gun or 
automatic weapon when planes fired machine guns. The airplanes put 
a decisive end to the bandits contemplated attack on Neptune Mines. 

5. On the twenty-fifth I again cleared with a combined patrol 
of twenty two to meet Curcey at the Star Mine and continue after the 
bandits. About twelve noon a native appeared, who was identified 
and well known in this vicinity, and reported that at ten o'clock a 
group had passed into his place and robbed him of everything. I cleared 
for that district and the house had been torn up. The man's mule and 
some cattle were stolen. Proceeded to the Pis-Pis Bodega, did not 
locate group and returned to Neptune after dark. Lieut. Curcey arrived 
the next afternoon twenty-sixth and reported many large camps en- 
route from Wauni. Lieutenant Curcey cleared this morning, twenty- 
seventh for bandits. Believe he will get them too. 

6. I am very positive that no bandit force can ever enter 
Neptune Mines as long as there is a good armed force here. 

7. Official contact reports being forwarded next mail. 

8. These recent bandit activities were the most unusual and 
perplexing than any I have ever seen in Nicaragua. 

9. Bandit Jefes were as follows: PEDRON ALTAMIRANO, 
PEDRO IRIAS, SIMON GONZALEZ, PERALTA AND COLONEL 
PINEDA. All identified. 

/s/ E. T. GRAY. 

279 



PATROL AND CONTACT REPORT OF 

CAPTAIN A. R. BOURNE, G. N. 

(Guardia News Letter #63) 

HEADQUARTERS, DISTRICT OF NAVARRO, DEPARTMENT 

OF MATAGALPA, GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA, 

MATAGALPA, NICARAGUA. 

17 August 19.31. 

From: The District Commander. 

To : The Department Commander, Department of Matagalpa, 

Matagalpa, Nicaragua. 

Subject: Patrol and contact report. 

1. At 1430 on 7th August, 1931, report was brought to me 

that a large group of bandits had passed through Agua Amarilla at 
1000 same day. No information as to what route they had taken was 
available. I immediately dispatched one Catarino Gutierrez, Captain 
General de Canada, with message to Lieutenant Ragsdale at Cutro 
Esquinas with message as follows: "Move out at once for Tuma with 
your entire command, to head off bandit group, should they try to 
cross river at that point." At 1 500 Lieut. Pulver and myself and twenty 
enlisted then cleared then for Auga Amarilla to find and get on their 
trail. 1700 arrived at Agua Amarilla, hacienda of R. Hawkins, which 
had been burned that morning. Lieut. Lebetter, Lieut. Thompson and 
twenty-five enlisted arrived same time from El Consuelo. 

1730 — Combined Navarro and El Consuelo patrols cleared over 
trail to Tuma. Marched until 2400 when it became necessary to halt 
as we were not making any time and half of the patrol was helplessly 
lost in the darkness. 

8 AUGUST 

0430 — Cleared over same trail arriving at Tuma at about 0600 
where we learned that bandits had not crossed river but had gone 
over trail toward Cuatro Esquinas. Pursuit was continued. We found 
about twenty-five or thirty worn out animals on the trail which they 
had changed for fresh ones as they traveled. 

They were carrying many sick and wounded and seemed to be in a 
terrible hurry. On night of 7th August they had camped at hacienda 
of Leiva, in Tuma Arriba, about one league from Cuatro Esquinas. 
In the morning they had killed a cow and as the column moved past 
each bandit had grabbed a strip of meat from the carcass. They had 
cleared at daybreak in direction of Sajonia until upon arriving at Santa 
Margarita in Coyolor, they learned of our presence and that we were 
gaining, whereupon they turned and marched over a dozen different 
trails, direct to the Tuma river bridges at San Nicolas del Carmen, 
crossing there the same day. They had had a little time to rob, only 
changing animals at each hacienda moving very fast, the main group 
under Altamirano and Irias stopping nowhere. We pushed on until 
arriving at Santa Margarita where it became necessary to halt at 1630 

280 



with half of my patrol hopelessly behind, while several of the men were 
really fainting from hunger and exposure of the night before. Camped 
for the night. 

9 August, 1931. 

0500 cleared over trail in direction of River Tuma, this trail was 
by this time in a terrible state for men affect, due to the passage of 
many animals and three days steady rain. The bandits had resorted 
to many ruses enroute, splitting up, going through cornfields and taking 
short cuts up nearly perpendicular slopes. Upon arriving at hacienda 
within a league of Tuma river bridges it was decided that if we were 
to make any time it would be necessary to whittle out some of the sick, 
lame and lazy that we were nursing along. At this time 1400, Lieut. 
Ragsdale and fourteen enlisted arrived from Cuatro Esquinas. He 
informed me that he had not received my message until 0700, 8th Au- 
gust, and then I knev/ that my runner had failed me. (He should have 
arrived at 1600 or 1630 the same day). Our only hope lay in a swift 
and energetic pursuit. 

Accordingly I formed a strong patrol of the following officers and 
men: 

Captain A. R. Bourne — 1st Lieut. O. C. Ledbetter — 2nd Lt. 
R. A. Thompson and 2nd Lieut. W. F. Pulver, G. N. 
20 enlisted from NAVARRO. 

10 enlisted from Cuatro Esquinas. 

1 1 enlisted from El Consuelo. 

Patrol was armed with four BAR'S, five sub-thompson machine 
guns, and five "Lanza Bombas". 

Cleared at 1445 for San Nicolas del Carmen and arrived at that 
point at 1600, when it was found heavy rains that day had made the 
river extremely high. Bandits had crossed at about 1730, the last of 
them the afternoon before, and slept at La Union on the opposite side. 

10 AUGUST, 1931. 

0500 cleared and crossed river. Passed through La Union and 
Quebrada Honda del Tuma, when at a group of houses, considerable 
activity in the kitchen was noticed, and meat and tortillas for at least 
50 men was found cooking. Being somewhat hungry, all hands turned 
to and obliterated every trace of food. 1500 At moved on in direction 
of Las Cuchillas. About one league further we found their camp freshly 
made and unslept in, shelters for about 50 men were observed. We 
pushed on. 

Upon arrival at Las Cuchillas, about 1800, a group of about 
10 men with red hat bands were observed leaving house of Chaverria, 
Feliciano, over trail for La Pavona and there were signs of more men 
in trail ahead. Point, under command of Lieut. Pulver opened fire at 
once while advanced with main group, taking position on the left. A 
heavy fire was laid down and four men were seen to fall. While firing 
was heard from the brush on the other side of cleared space surrounding 
buildings. Two of the men who fell, got up and dived for the brush and 
firing ceased, the bandits scattered in all directions. The whole thing 

281 



lasted about ten minutes. We then rushed the buildings and entered 
brush on opposite side but contact was impossible to regain, due to 
approaching darkness. We had opened fire and looked like our only 
chance of contact. Looking over the scene we found the following: 

Bandits: 1 known dead 

1 known wounded 

1 civilian, owner of house, by name of Chaverria, 
wounded, died later. Signs of other wounded. 

Guardia: NONE. 

Captured: 1 Rifle, Krag, serviceable. 3 rounds Krag am- 
munition. Combat 1930. 

1 red and black hat band ; 1 red and black neck- 
erchief; 

2 Muletas, containing womens clothing and con- 
siderable cloth. 

Camp was made for the night. 

11 AUGUST, 1931. 

0340 cleared over trail for La Pavona and arrived 0700. This is 
quite a large plain, cleared of trees but covered with underbrush. Many 
trails were found here, all of them showing signs of recent use. Pro- 
ceeding over the one showing use by animals in direction of Mt. Cha- 
chagon, we arrived at halfway point in the ascent of that mountain 
about 1330 where a bandit camp was found. The trail since morning 
had been getting fainter and fainter until at this point it showed that 
only about 15 men had passed over it about three hours before. With 
Lieut. Pulver and 15 of my best men I proceeded up Mt. Chachagon, 
leaving the remainder to make camp. Upon arriving at the summit, a 
thorough reconnoissance was made of same and we saw where this 
group had scattered hitting the brush, singly and in pairs, it was im- 
possible for us to go on. We returned to camp at 1730. 

12 AUGUST, 1931. 

0700 cleared for La Pavona, arrived at 1330, where camp was 
established, a beef killed and the remainder of the day spent in recon- 
noissance of the neighborhood. 

13 AUGUST, 1931. 

0600 cleared for Las Cuchillas over San Antonio trail. Upon 
arrival at scene of contact of two days previous we met Corinto Finca 
patrol. Combined patrols then proceeded over San Antonio trail. 
About one league further on I heard firing 50 yards ahead about 10 
shots, followed by the explosion of a bomb; moving into the brush 
from where we heard the disturbance, we found signs of a group of 
from 5 to 10 bandits who had been hiding there apparently. One of 
them must have gotten the Buck Fever and accidently fired his rifle, 
the rest of them firing a few shots and tossing a bomb at us to cover 
their getaway. Entire patrol searched the woods here a dense jungle. 



for about one half mile, and found one red and black hat band and one 
neckerchief. Cleared and crossed Tuma at La Union (Arriba) where we 
camped for the night. 

14 AUGUST, 1931. 

0700 cleared for Corinto Finca, arriving at 1130. 

15 AUGUST, 1931. 

0800 cleared for Cuatro Esquinas arriving at 1830. 

16 AUGUST, 1931. 

0600 cleared with Lieut. Pulver and 20 enlisted for Navarro, 
arriving at 1100. 

The conduct of all officers and men on this patrol was excellent. 

/s/ A. R. BOURNE, 
Captain, G.N. 



283 



REPORT OF COMBAT MISSION COMPLETED BY 

CAPTAIN WILLIAMS 

AND SOMOTO (NA) PATROL ON OCTOBER 14, 1931: 

Captain Williams and Somoto (NA) patrol returned to Somoto 
from combat mission on October 14. Reports having picked up bandit 
tracks in the morning of October 13th near Zapote Mountain and fol- 
lowed same to a point where newly constructed camp was located and 
destroyed. The bandits were apparently v/arned of approach of the 
patrol and fied, leaving behind various articles of food and clothing. 
Followed tracks to southeast and at 1 :00 p.m. sighted a large group 
across deep ravine fleeing to the south. Followed group — part of 
group, apparently to facilitate escape of main group, formed a firing 
line some two hundred yards long on small hills and opened fire on the 
patrol at range of about three thousand yards as latter approached 
across open valley. Due to long range, fire was not returned by patrol 
until within about four hundred yards when bandits prepared to aban- 
don position. Bandits fled to hills on flanks which were bombed with 
rifle grenades. The patrol pursued the main group firing at small groups 
of stragglers at long range. Darkness overtook the patrol and shortly 
afterwards the bandits split into small groups proceeding across country 
in various directions, but mostly south. The natives claim that the 
group numbered more than one hundred, but, from views of columns 
from considerable distance, the patrol leader believed the number to 
have been approximately eighty, three-fourths armed with rifles or 
revolvers, no machine guns, and carrying a large red flag. The jefes 
were recognized as Santon Benavides, Daniel Rios and Colonel Morales. 
The patrol pursued to point of exhaustion but due to nature of the 
country and rapid flight of the bandits, close contact could not be 
gained with the main group before darkness made possible their escape. 
During more than five hours pursuit the bandits abandoned various 
articles, including bayonets, cutachas, flashlights, food and clothing. 
On the morning of October 14th the patrol was unable to pick up 
definite tracks or information other than vague report that the group 
was thought to be proceeding towards Colorado. No Guardia casualties. 
Bandit casualties unknown. 

(Pursuit of bandits) 
(Distances between firing lines) 



284 



ENCLOSURE : COP Y— bm— 1 79 

From: N A/Tegucigalpa, Honduras. Date: 17 Feb., 1933. 

Source : Newspaper. 

Subject: Nicaragua, Political, (Banditry) 

Translation from "La Noticia", Managua, Nicaragua, under 
date of February 4, 1933. 

"THE CONVENTION OF PEACE WITH AUGUSTO C. SANDINO: 

Salvador Calderon Ramirez, Pedro J. Zepeda, Horacio Porto- 
carrero and Escolastico Lara, Representatives of General Augusto C. 
Sandino; and David Stadthagen and Crisanto Sacasa, representatives 
of the Conservative and Liberal Nationalist parties, respectively, openly 
agreed to the necessity of peace in the Republic, have convened in the 
following harmonious agreement, which tends to cement the sincere 
love inspired by the welfare of Nicaragua and amid those high senti- 
ments of honor to which the undersigned render homage. 

STATEMENT OF SANDINO'S REPRESENTATIVES AND THAT 
OF THE PARTIES: 

1 . The representatives of General Augusto C. Sandino declared, 
before all, that the mission which he and his army undertook was to 
assure the liberty of the Fatherland; and for that reason, at the present 
time they wish to state in the name of the one they represent, his 
absolute lack of personal interest and irrevocable resolution not to 
demand nor accept anything which might restrict the motives and 
movements of his private life. He therefore wants to set down as a 
principle or immobile base that he aspires to neither glory nor material 
benefits. 

In view of the proceeding manifestations of elevated dis-interest 
the representatives of the conservative and liberal nationalist parties 
rendered homage to the noble and patriotic attitude of the referred to 
General Sandino. 

STATEMENT OF SANDINO: 

2. General Augusto C. Sandino, through his delegates and the 
representatives of both parties, stated: that in virtue of the dis-occupa- 
tion of the national territory by the forces of the foreigners, a new era 
of renovation of the fundamentals of our public existance is undoubt- 
edly opened; that, disciplined by a painful experience, he considers it an 
imperative duty to fortify the collective sentiment of automony which 
with unanimous enthusiasm moves all the Nicaraguans. To the end of 
increasing such a noble tendency. Those signing the present pact agree 
to designate as a capital point in their political programs the respect 
of the Constitution and fundamental laws of the Republic, and to main- 
tain by all rational means which are adequate and justified, the resplen- 
dishment in all its abundance of the sovereignty, political independence 
and economy of Nicaragua. 

285 



DEDICATION TO WORK AND ABANDON OF THEIR ARMS: 

3. The delegates of General Sandino and the parties recognize 

the benefits of cementing in a practical manner the peace of all the 
territory of the Republic, by means of the earnest dedication to work 
of all the men now soldiering under the command of General August© 
C. Sandino and the same time the gradual abandon of their arms. To 
secure by a sure means the normalization of the life of these men in the 
activities of work under the guarantees of law and of the constituted 
authorities, the following means have been adopted: 

AMNESTY: 

(a) The Executive power will present to the National Congress 
a project to grant amnesty for political offenses and civil offenses 
committed in the period elapsed from 4 May 1927 until the day of 
today which will be enjoyed by all the individuals of the army of 
General Sandino who within fifteen days of the promulgation of such 
decree deposit their arms and equally so all those who with the direct 
authorization of General Sandino promise to deposit their arms within 
three months, including in the benefits of the amnesty one hundred 
persons of the aforementioned army who may conserve their arms 
temporarily for the vigilance of the zone of free land in which they will 
be permitted to farm and work, all of whom shall have belonged to 
said army. 

(b) To represent the administrative and military authority of 
the government of the Republic in the Departments of the North, 
comprising especially the zone destined to the work of the individuals 
of the army of General Sandino and also to receive their arms by degrees, 
the Executive power will appoint as its delegate Don Sofonias Salva- 
tierra to whom General Sandino will deliver within the twenty days 
from this date, not less than twenty-five percent of the arms of any kind 
which his army possesses. 

THE ZONE WHICH WILL BE ALLOTTED THEM: 

(c) The zone of free land to be destined for the labor and to 
which sub-paragraph (a) of this decree refers, should be located with 
sufficient amplitude in the valley of the Coco (or Segovia) river, or in 
the region agreed to by the Government and General Sandino; this 
zone should be at least two leagues (30 miles) distant from the towns in 
which there is actually a municipal regime. 

GUARD OF ONE HUNDRED SANDINISTAS CHOSEN: 

(d) The chiefs of the guard of one hundred armed men which 
will be permitted to exist, will be appointed by the Government as 
auxiliaries in emergency, choosing them in accordance with the recom- 
mendation of General Sandino from among the more capacitated of 
his army; but if after one year from the promulgation of this decree 
of amnesty it should become convenient, in the judgement of the 
Government, to maintain said guard of one hundred armed men or a 
smaller number, the appointment of the respective chiefs will fall 
directly upon the President of the Republic. 

28e 



PUBLIC WORKS IN THE SEGOVIAS: 

(e) The Government will maintain in all the Republic and 
especially in the Departments of the North, for the minimum period 
of one year, projects for public labor in which they will enjoy pre- 
ferably the individuals of the army of General Sandino who should 
request work, and who submit to the ordinary regime established in 
these works. 

THE HOSTILITIES CONCLUDED: 

4. By the act of signing this agreement all form of hostilities 
will cease between the two parties to this document, i.e., the Consti- 
tutional Governm.ent presided by Dr. Jaun B. Sacasa and the forces of 
General Augusto C. Sandino, for immediate and supreme guarantees of 
lives and properties of the Nicaraguans; and once becoming definitely 
effective this pact on approval by General Sandino and by the accep- 
tance of the President of the Republic, all the followers of General 
Sandino will come under the guarantees of the constituted authorities 
and as a consequence obligated to cooperate in conserving the public 
order. 

5. To facilitate the disarming of the forces of General Sandino 
and to offer a provisional retreat for them the town of San Rafael del 
Norte is designated, General Sandino being responsible for maintaining 
order during the time which the Government judges convenient. 

APPROVAL: 

In good faith of that treated the two parties thereto do sign hereby 
in the city of Managua, on the second day of February of the year 
nineteen hundred and thirty three. 

(Between the lines) For General Sandino: 

S. Claderon R. — Pedro Jose Zepeda — H. Portocarrero — D. 
Stadthagen — Crisanto Sacasa. 

ACCEPTANCE BY SANDINO: 

Approved and ratified in all its parts, 

Managua, National District, 2 February, 1933 — A. C. SANDINO. 

ACCEPTANCE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC: 

Accepted in all its parts. 

Managua, National District, 2 February, 1933 — Juan B. Sacasa. 



287 



A-40 
TPC-hwb. 

HEADQUARTERS, NORTHERN AREA, GUARDIA NATIONAL, 

OCOTAL, NICARAGUA. 

30 May, 1932. 

AREA ORDER NO. 24 — 1932: 

Subject: Designation of Districts and District Combat Patrols. 

1. Hereafter the districts of the Northern Area will be desig- 
nated as follows: 

MILITARY DEPARTMENT OF NUEVA SEGOVIA: 

(a) First District 

Ocotal, (Headquarters). 

Dipilto. 

Macuelizo. 

Santa Maria. 

(b) Second District 

Somoto (Headquarters). 

Totogalpa. 

Yalaguina. 

Pataste. 

(c) Third District 

Condega (Headquarters). 
Pueblo Nuevo. 
Daraili. 
Palacaguina. 

(d) Fourth District 

Quilali (Headquarters). 
San Juan del Telpaneca. 
Telpaneca. 

(e) Fifth District 

Apali (Headquarters). 

Jicaro. 

Jalapa. 

San Fernando. 

(f) Sixth District 

Esteli (Headquarters). 
La Trinidad. 

(g) Seventh District 

San Juan de Limay (Headquarters). 

2. Hereafter the District Combat Patrols will be designated 
as follows: 

(a) First District — First Combat Patrol. 

(b) Second District • — Second Combat Patrol. 

289 



(c) Third District — Third Combat Patrol. 

(d) Fourth District — Fourth Combat Patrol. 

(e) Fifth District — Fifth Combat Patrol. 

(f) Sixth District — Sixth Combat Patrol. 

(g) Seventh District — Seventh Combat Patrol. 

3. The above designations will hereafter be employed in dis- 

patches and official correspondence, 

OFFICIAL: /s/ H. W. BOND, /s/ THOS. P. CHEATHAM. 
Area Adjutant. Major Guardia Nacional, 

Commanding Northern Area. 



290 



HEADQUARTERS CENTRAL AREA 

GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA 

JINOTEGA, NICARAGUA. 

14 May, 1931. 

AREA ORDER) 
NO. 2-1931) 

SUBJECT: ORGANIZATION AND DUTIES OF THE GUARDIA 
NACIONAL IN THE CENTRAL AREA. 

1. ORGANIZATION. 

For tactical, administrative and police purposes the Central 
Area is divided into the following Departments and Districts, each 
under the command of the senior officer stationed therein: 

DEPARTMENT OF JINOTEGA (Commanded by the 
Area Commander) 

District No. 1. JINOTEGA. 

District No. 2. SAN-RAFAEL, YALI, LA CONCORDIA. 

District No. 3. EMBOCADEROS. 

District No. 4. CORINTO FINCA, SAJONIA. 

District No. 5. LAS CAMELIAS, FUNDADORA, ARANJUEZ. 

DEPARTMENT OF MATAGALPA. 

District No. 1. MATAGALPA, SAN RAMON, SAN 
DIONICIO. 

District No. 2. DARIO, TERRABONA. 
District No. 3. MUY MUY, LA PINEDA, ESQUIPULAS, 
MATIGUAS. 

District No. 4. CONSUELO. 

District No. 5. ALGOVIA, BUENA VISTA, LAS LAJAS. 

District No. 6. NAVARRO, LA ISLA, CUATRO ESQUINAS. 

District No. 7. SAN ISIDRO, SEBACO. 

Each Department, District and post will include the adjoining 
and surrounding territory. 

2. DUTIES OF DEPARTMENT, DISTRICT AND POST 

COMMANDERS. 

Department, District and post commanders are responsible for 
discipline, administration, tactical efficiency, protection of lives and 
property and the preservation of law and order within the limits of 
their respective commands. 

Department Commanders will inspect each post in their respec- 
tive departments at least once during each quarter. 

District Commanders will inspect each post in their respective 
districts at least once a month. 

Proper reports will be made of these inspections. 

291 



All District and Post Commanders will operate frequent rural 
police patrols, reconnoiter and become familiar with all roads and trails 
in the vicinity of their respective headquarters, particularly those that 
are to neighboring guardia stations. 

District Commanders, for temporary operations, are authorized 
to combine all or part of the forces in their districts as situation may 
require. 

ORGANIZATION CENTRAL AREA - - 

3. COMBAT PATROL POSTS. 

YALI, SAN RAFAEL, EMBOCADEROS, CORINTO FINCA. 
NAVARRO, CONSUELO, and MUY MUY are designated as combat 
patrol posts, and in addition to the duties specified in paragraph two, 
will be prepared to clear strong combat patrols to any part of the Cen- 
tral Area either for independent action or to participate in combined op- 
erations under the, direction of the Area Commander. 

4. POLICE OF COLON VALLEY. 

The posts of La CONCORDIA and SAN ISIDRO are especially 
charged with the police of the COLON VALLEY and will cooperate 
with each other and with patrols from the Department of Esteli, North- 
em Area, for that purpose. 

5. COMPANY "M". 

Company "M" will operate under orders from the Area Com- 
mander. 

6. AREA RESERVE. 

Company "D" JINOTEGA, and part of the Eighth Company 
stationed at MATAGALPA will constitute the Area reserve. They will 
carry the casualties of their respective Departments, perform municipal 
and rural police duties, furnish administrative patrols and each will be 
prepared to furnish one mounted patrol to quickly reinforce any part 
of the Central Area. 

7. OBJECTIVE. 

The main objective of all guardia forces in the Central Area 
is the suppression of banditry. Armed bandits will be attacked where- 
ever found, relentlessly pursued wherever they may go and no effort 
spared to effect their complete destruction. 

To this end it shall be the duty of all posts and guardia forces 
of the Central Area to act aggressively at all times, to cooperate with 
each other and with the guardia of adjoining areas, to march immedi- 
ately to the assistance of any post or patrol that may be engaging com- 
bat and to keep neighboring posts as well as Department and Area 
Headquarters informed of the military situation. 

/s/ JULIAN C. SMITH, 
Colonel, Guardia Nacional De Nicaragua 
Commanding Central Area. 

Copies to: All posts in Central Area. 
Headquarters, Managua. 
Department of Esteli. 
FILE. 



CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL 

HEADQUARTERS, GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA, 
MANAGUA, NICARAGUA. 

Weekly Summary of Intelligence, Week ending 25 April, 1932. 
Location of Bandit Groups: 

Group estimated at 150, well armed and having at least 2 auto- 
matic weapons, reported to have been under jefes Pedron Altamirano, 
Juan Altamirano and Transito Sequeira, were engaged by Lieut. 
Castillo and San Rafael Patrol at Santa Barbara (113-325) Kenyon 
Map, on 19 April. Group driven from strong position and scattered. 
From later information it is doubted that Pedron Altamirano was with 
this group. 

Group of 100, jefe unknown, reported at El Salto de Dantanli 
(128-242) Kenyon Map, on 20 April. 

Group of 200 well armed, 1 Lewis Machine Gun, 1 BAR, and 2 
TSMG, jefe thought to have been Colindres engaged by Lieutenant 
Covington and Jalapa patrol at Las Puertas (210-390) Nueva Segovia 
Map, at 1130 on 21 April. Four Guardia killed, bandit casualties un- 
known. Bandits driven off and patrol evacuated dead from scene of 
engagement. Lieutenant Johnson continued to pick up trail of bandits 
and Lieutenants Brunton, Covington and Whitehead (MC) returned 
toward Apali with the four Guardia dead. At 1 500 this patrol attacked 
by the same bandit group, the three officers, three guardia were killed, 
and three guardia wounded. Lieutenant Johnson's patrol gained con- 
tact with bandits at 1530 a short distance west of scene of second con- 
tact and drove bandits to west. Guardia lost 1 BAR, three automatic 
pistols, six rifles and one grenade discharger in the first and second 
engagements. 

A group of about 50 including the deserters from Kisalaya, under 
ex-sergeant Sebastian Jimenez, leader of the Kisalaya mutiny, attacked 
Kisalaya at 0300, 21 April. Four bandits including Jimenez were killed, 
Guardia casualties two wounded including Lieutenant Gaitan, com- 
manding the post. 

A group of 30, jefe Conception Chavarria, on Managua-Matagalpa 
road at Chaguitillo (108-214) Kenyon Map, held up and robbed some 
autos, on night of 21 April. 

A group of 25, jefe Marcial Ribera, west of Harmonia (125-223) 
Kenyon Map, demanded contributions from nearby Hacienda, on 20 
April. 

A group, number not reported, jefe Manuel Irias, reported operat- 
ing on Rio Seguia near Chontales border, on 21 April. 

A group of 70, jefe Juan Altamirano at Sacastli (102-234) Kenyon 
Map, in contact with San Rafael patrol at 1 520 on 23 April. Same patrol 
gained contact again with this group at Loma del Naccia at 0950, 24 
April. Captured 12 horses and 12 hand grenades. 

A group of 100, jefes Salgado and Fulgencio Hernandez, attacked 
by Lieutenant Hamas and patrol in main camp east of Cerro Guam- 
buco at 1530, 23 April. Engagement lasted 25 minutes when bandits 
scattered. Guardia patrol remained in bandit camp for the night. 



Bandits attacked at 1800 and again at 0530, 23 April. Bandits used 
automatic weapons and dynamite bombs. Three bandits killed and 
evidence of many wounded. Two rifles, more than 300 rounds of am- 
munition, some supplies and equipment lost by the guard ia in the en- 
gagements of 21 April, and some correspondence captured. One Guardia 
wounded. 

Jose Leon Diaz and 1 50 left Constancia area April 20 to join Pedron 
Altamirano at Las Naranjas. (Central Area). 

GENER.\L INFORMATION 

There has been no appreciable activity of the bandits in the West- 
ern Departments during the past week. Small groups have been re- 
ported from time to time but they have been very wary and seem to 
have confined their activities to spreading false reports, demanding 
contributions and in general keeping this section of the country in a 
state of uncertainty. Propaganda has been active, however, and the 
temper of that section of the country seems to be in a state where most 
anything may happen. 

The severe repulses sustained by the bandits at Kisalaya is be- 
lieved to have effectively discouraged bandit operations on the lower 
Coco River for the present. The Heavy Browning Machine Gun was 
taken from Kisalaya at the time of the mutiny, was recovered by Lieu- 
tenant Gaitan near Prensa. 

Reports have been received from many sources that the bandits 
are planning to launch a widespread offensive in May in commemora- 
tion of the death of Miguel Angel Ortez. Ortez was killed in the attack 
on Palacaguina on the 14th of May, 1931. The reports of the time of 
this offensive vary from the 5th to the 15th of May. In the issue of El 
Excelsior, Mexican newspaper, for Saturday, 23 April, Zepeda, Sandino's 
agent in Mexico City, stated that a big offensive was scheduled for 5 
May. A report from Costa Rico gives it as 6 May. Reports from various 
parts of Nicaragua are 12 to 15 May. Some accounts state that this 
movement is to be general over the whole of Nicaragua, and others 
that it is to be confined to the Segovias. Dr. Sepeda in a recent press 
release that has received wide publicity, states that a supervised election 
in Nicaragua will not be allowed by Sandino and that to that end San- 
dino will increase his activities from now on. He states that if the 
elections are held under American supervision that Sandino will over- 
throw the government elected under this supervision as soon as the 
marines are withdrawn. 

The Alcalde of Jinotega has sent a telegram to the President 
that within his jurisdiction he is unable to get any one to serve as 
jefes de canton, as all are afraid of the bandits, and that the only ones 
who have any security in such appointments are those appointed by 
the bandits themselves. A report has been received that Pedro Irias 
is now acting as Secretary to Pedron. Irias is said to be strong in the 
confidence of Sandino and it is expected that his acting as Pedron's 
secretary will tend to bring Pedron into closer support of Sandino. It 
is also reported that during this month some 60 recruits have been 
secured by Sandino from Nueva Segovia, mainly in the vicinity of 
Quilali. 

294 



It is further reported that Sandino has moved, or is about to move, 
into Chipote again; that he has greatly augmented his forces and that 
as they now have a good supply of arms and ammunition there is much 
enthusiasm among the ranks for the forthcoming offensive in May in 
honor of the first anniversary of the death of Ortez. 

ESTIMATE: 

Since the last estimate was made on the number of automatic 
weapons in the hands of the bandits, reliable information has been 
received that they have secured some new automatic weapons through 
Honduras, part coming from Choluteca and the others from Danli. 
The number of these weapons or the type has not been ascertained. It 
is estimated that at the present time they have not less than twenty 
serviceable automatic weapons, of which at least 6 are BAR's and 10 
Thompson sub-machine guns. 

The activities of the past week are undoubtedly the beginnings 
of more active and aggressive operations on the part of the bandits. 
There may be a short lull for a few days but it cannot be expected to 
last long. It cannot be too strongly repeated that the existing situation 
calls for the utmost vigilance. Particularly in small stations is the need 
for alertness to be impressed. The number of administrative patrols 
should be reduced to a minimum and made as strong as the circum- 
stances will permit. 

/s/ LeROY P. HUNT, 
Colonel. G.N. GN-2-3. 



295 



Translated by: 

1st Lt. Edward J. Trumble, 

U. S. Marine Corps. 

MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC 

Delivered to: 

THE HONORABLE NATIONAL CONGRESS — 1932. 

HONORABLE NATIONAL CONGRESS: 

As always, rendering homage to the Constitution and the Legisla- 
tive Body of the State, I come to give you information of the political 
and administrative activities in Nicaragua during the year of 1932, 
which is rapidly fading and drawing to a close. 

As you well know, this was the year of elections of the Supreme 
Authorities of the Republic. Under the direction of Admiral Wood- 
ward, named as President of the Electoral Mission by President Hoover, 
and with the help of all the officials of the Republic, the elections 
passed tranquil and honest; notwithstanding the permanent and per- 
sistent threat of banditry. The Sacasa-Espinosa ticket has triumphed 
with a majority or more than twenty-two thousand votes, and as 
members of the Legislative Body many citizens now take seats in Con- 
gress at the side of their colleagues of former years. 

The fact is not unknown to you that since 1928 up to the present 
time, true representatives of Nicaraguan public opinion have been 
seated in this august chamber. You may rest assured that, in the his- 
tory of Nicaraguan independence, it is the first presidential term during 
which such a pleasing and patriotic state of affairs is being realized. 

All of us as Nicaraguans know that the friendly government of 
the United States of America has taken an honorable part in this. 
We realize equally well that the armed intervention of that Nation 
came to our land because of the disgrace of our internal wars. It 
would have been for Nicaragua the most transcendental passage of 
her history if this representation of the true and unmistakable wish 
of the people might have been realized under own auspicies and through 
our own efforts. But fate did not desire it thus. By the help of a distant 
hand we had to realize this event which promises to yield such fruitful 
results, if we follow with good faith the pathway to which free elections 
have led us; that is to say, if we continue to respect the wish of the 
people in coming elections. 

Because of the fact that the Nation at last has cancelled the 
international compromise contracted to cure anarchy in Nicaragua, 
the Government of the United States of America had decreed that its 
armed forces are to leave us. In the first days of January we no longer 
shall see Marines in Nicaragua. 

Will they be days of Jubilee, or of profound sorrow? 

Shall we have learned to maintain peace among brothers? 

The answer in all its intensive scope rests with the people of 
Nicaragua, with the Supreme Authorities who take office today, 
and with those who will take office on the first of January 1933; with 
the Guardia Nacional, another American product, charged with insur- 
ing peace in Nicaragua, and with the political parties. 

296 



Other words concerning the Guardia Nacional are not amiss. It 
has been most costly for the country. We must maintain it notwith- 
standing the obligation of devising the necessary economies, strength- 
ening it with education, loyalty, honor and sacred respect for national 
goodwill. You should realize that a similar organization cannot be 
formed in four or five years, and that the habits acquired during youth 
do not change in a decade. They need the patient and undenied help 
of the schools, and the truly cultural, not the impassioned and partisan, 
voice of the press. 

The Guardia Nacional is a noble organization. Its progress de- 
pends on us. Another theme worthy of mention to you includes the 
works completed by my Government. During this month the railroads 
of San Juan del Sur and El Sauce are to be inaugurated, 100 kilometers 
of railway in all, which shows the effort that the Executive Power has 
devoted to public works, to the well-being of all. 

The canal which unites the Escondido River, that is to say, Blue- 
fields with Laguna de Perlas, has not been opened formally because of 
lack of time, but it is completed, and interior commerce has been estab- 
lished between the two cities. 

The highway from El Sauce to Achuapa has been advanced 15 
kilometers, in the direction of Ocotal, with facilities for placing rails 
along its stretch and continuing the railroad to Nueva Segovia one of 
the projects which no doubt will be found in the program of my illus- 
trious successor, Dr. Juan B. Sacasa. 

I have spoken of the other highways in my previous messages. 

We are able to feel the resurrection of the Capital, following its 
destruction by the earthquake. The sale of cement and zinc (galvanized 
iron roofing) at principal and cost has been a great aid to the citizens 
in the construction of many buildings. The Government has been able 
to reconstruct the Presidential Palace, to equip two large wards in the 
General Hospital as a shelter for the needy, and to construct an orphan 
asylum with a capacity for two hundred children, which will be opened 
formally on Christmas Day of this year. 

I am able to say without boasting that although my Government 
has not given freedom from the debt at hand, its new works, in addition 
to those destroyed by the earthquake, are in the plain view of all. 

If ail of us would show our love for our Country in this manner, 
Nicaragua would be one of the richest and most prosperous nations 
in the world. 

Public Instruction, curtailed by the earthquake on March 31, 
1931, in the second year of my Government, is being reestablished 
and is enlightening the minds of the children again. Many beneficient 
laws might be passed in order to increase the education that the 
country needs in its march toward the future. 

Hygiene has been treated with careful attention. The Department 
of Charity and Hygiene is a work of this Administration. The Institute 
of Serums and Vaccines, one of the best in Central America, has been 
built and will be completely equipped before the end of this month. 

It is not easy to visualize the effort that all these works have 
required in the midst of the economic crisis, natural disasters and 
banditry. But it is most certain, with results as testimony, that the 
money of the Nation has been well employed. If some error has been 
committed, it is a proof of the fact that the hand of man is not infallible; 

297 



that we have no more than one element, the human, with which to 
struggle, and that our imperfection is self-evident, since the beginning 
of time. 

I have spoken of banditry, this is a sorrowful disgrace for our 
country. I am overcome with grief and sadness on seeing and knowing 
that at times even representatives of the people regard the existing 
tragedy with admiration, fathers of families who tomorrow will not 
know how to explain to their sons why they profess the practices of 
communism, and not doctrines which will keep them from the road to 
ruin. 

The bandits of the Segovias preach that property is an ill; and 
they have devastated properties, destroyed lives and wiped out the 
wealth of the rich zone of the North. 

No; property is not an ill, but rather a great good and right. It 
encourages life in all parts. Not even the savage who by dint of hard 
labor and patience has constructed a hut, or aggaigned a cave in which 
to live, can look with indifferences upon the arrival of another savage 
who may kill him and make off with the worldly good of his dwelling; 
much less, should the civilized man tolerate the destruction of all that 
he has created by the sweat of his brow. 

Sandinism is less harmful in its practices than in the influence 
which it exerts among the illiterate and even among the educated 
people. The idea spreads because of a worldly blind love for that which 
is contraiy to custom and which lacks the noble instincts of work. 

As I see it, Honorable Members of the National Congress, as the 
United Powers of the Republic we must exert ourselves against that 
gangrene which blinds and exhausts and destroys our brothers of the 
Segovias. 

I conclude by stating that my Government has known how to 
maintain and cultivate friendly relations with our brothers of Central 
America and the other friendly nations. 

This very day, that though unfortunately a civil war is upheaving 
Honduras, my Government is complying with its duties as a good 
neighbor and in accordance with its obligations as agreed upon in the 
Pacts of Washington. 

I have concluded. I beg you to believe that my greatest desire 
today lies m the success of your efforts. 

J. M. MONCADA. 



298 



Managua, 

Nationa District, 

Nicaragua, 

15 December, 1932. 

YOUR EXCELLENCY MR. PRESIDENT ELECT: 

Full of joy, 
because of the far reaching effect which this solemn act has for the 
peace of our Country, the welfare and honor of the Republic and its 
Institutions, and the tranquil and democratic change of Government, 
I return to the people of Nicaragua the power invested in me by the 
popular election of 1928; and in accordance with a constitutional pre- 
cept I place in your hands the insignia of the Presidency, to which you 
have been called by the same popular vote in November 1932, which 
already has crossed the threshold of the past and is entering that of the 
future. 

Satisfied be- 
cause of the work realized and the completion of my duties, happy on 
handing over to you the Republic in a state of peace, the vandalic 
outbraks that still exist can cause no alarm through their contemptible 
smallness, it is my honor to wish you a most prosperous term of Govern- 
ment and to extend my best wishes for the welfare of the Nation, the 
maintenance of its sovereignty and independence, and your personal 
welfare. It is my sincere and ardent desire that your steps as President 
glide along the constitutional pathway and receive the generous ap- 
plause of your fellow-citizens. 

/s/J.M.MONCADA. 



299 



L^isxi- 



EB<2i^: 



THE 
OFFICIAL LIST 

OF 

CONTACTS 

OF THE 

GUARDIA NACIONAL 

DE 

NICARAGUA 



DIVISION OF OPERATIONS 

and 

INTELLIGENCE 
GN-2 - GN-3 



HEADQUARTERS 

GUARDIA NACIONAL 

MANAGUA, NICARAGUA 



The motive which actuated the publication of this Book of Contacts 
was three fold: In the first instance it is intended as a tribute to the 
officers and men of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua who, in some 
instances gave so freely of their lives and who struggled through the 
hardships of combat and the trail, not with complaint but with a 
cheerfulness in keeping with the best traditions of the profession of 
arms; secondly it is intended to be of historical value. We believe that 
in recent years no similar military organization has had such continuous 
fighting and arduous field service and it is fitting that its deeds be re- 
corded. In the last instance the book will be of use from an administra- 
tive standpoint in that the files may be completed. 

The data for the booklet was extracted under the direction of 
Colonel LeRoy P. Hunt, GN ,GN-2, GN-3, from the Operations Files 
of the Guardia Nacional. Errors may be found and omissions may 
occur, but the book represents our best efforts considering available 
time and data. 

The inception of the idea for this booklet originated with Lieu- 
tenant Emil M. Krieger, GN, and the compiling of the data, the print- 
ing, the designing, publishing and distribution thereof are entirely due 
to his efforts. I wish to give him full credit for his initiative and untiring 
work in this connection. 

C. B. MATTHEWS, 
Major General, G.N. 
Jefe Director. 



301 



GN-2, GN-3 SECTION, 
HEADQUARTERS, GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA, 

MANAGUA, NIC. 
5-LPH-ehk-17.0-15.0 

1. The following list of contacts of the Guardia Nacional de 

Nicaragua are quoted from the Official Contact Files of this section: 

#1: 16 JULY 1927 

Contact at OCOTAL, Nicaragua. C.A. (NA) 

The combined Marine — Guardia garrison stationed at Ocotal com- 
manded by Captain G. D. Hatfield, USMC, (Captain G. C. Darnall, 
GN. Commanding Guardia troops) was attacked by a superior number 
of bandits, well-arm.ed with rifles, machine guns and bombs. This was 
the first engagemicnt in which the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua 
participated. The battle lasted for about 14 hours during which time 
the small garrison was in a siege. With the assistance of Marine Corps 
combat planes, the bandits were finally routed. 

Known casualties : USMC: 1 killed. GN: 3 wounded. 

1 wounded. 

Bandits: Estimated 50 killed and wounded. 

#2: 18 AUGUST 1927 

Contact at MURRA, Nicaragua. C.A. ( (NA) 

A combined Marine — Guardia patrol, commanded by Lieutenant T. 
Bruce, GN, operating in the vicinity of Murra, engaged with bandit 
groups twice on the road from Murra to Jicaro and successfully put 
the bandits to flight. The bandits used bombs and rifles in both cases. 

Known casualties: USMC: None. GN: None. 

Bandits: 2 killed and several wounded. 

#3 : 19 SEPTEMBER 1927 

Contact at TELPANECA, Nicaragua, C.A. (NA) 

The combined Marine — Guardia garrison stationed at Telpanica, 
commanded by Lieutenant H. S. Keimling, GN. was attacked by a 
superior force of bandits that were well armed with machine guns, 
rifles and bombs. After four hours of severe fighting the bandits fled. 

Known casualties: USMC: 2 killed. GN: 1 wounded. 

Bandits : 50 killed and several seriously wounded. 

#4: 21 SEPTEMBER 1927 

Contact at TELPANECA, Nicaragua, C.A. (NA) 

No further data on file. 



302 



#5: 9 OCTOBER 1927 

Contact at ZAPOTILLAL, Nicaragua, C.A. (241-373) 

A combined Marine — Guardia patrol, commanded by Lieutenant 
O'Shea, USMC (Captain J. B. O'Neil ON, (MC) commanding Guardia 
troops) engaged with a force of bandits which greatly outnumbered the 
patrol. Bandits employed Machine-guns, rifles and bombs. Contact 
lasted for approximately two and one-half hours. 

Known casualties: USMC: None. GN: 4 killed. 

Bandits: 50 killed and several wounded. 

#6: 26-27 OCTOBER 1927 

Contact at ANTONIO LOPEZ RANCH, near QUILALI, Nicaragua, 
C.A. 

A combined Marine — Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant 
J. C. Chappell, USMC, operating from Quilali, engaged with a superior 
number of bandits. The patrol at once took up a defensive position 
until reinforced by the second combined Marine — Guardia patrol, 
comimanded by Lieutenant M. J. Gould, USMC, (Lieutenant R. E. 
Hogaboom, GN. commanding Guardia troops). With the assistance 
of the Marine Aircraft Squadrons, the bandits were completely routed. 
Bandits were well armed with machine-guns and rifles. 

Known casualties : USMC: None. GN: None. 

Bandits: 20 killed by patrols. 

Casualties inflicted by plane bombing 
unknown. 

#7: 28 OCTOBER 1927 

Contact at ANTONIO LOPEZ RANCH near QUILALI, Nicaragua, 

C.A. 

No further data on file. 

#8: 1 NOVEMBER 1927 

Contact at ESPINO, Nicaragua, C.A., near JICARO. 

The combined Marine — Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant 
C. J. Chappell, USMC, while enroute from Jjcarito to Jicaro, was 
attacked by a bandit force far superior in size. Engagement lasted for 
about thirty-five minutes in which time the patrol succeeded in routing 
the bandits from their ambush position. Later as the patrol neared 
Jicaro, a bandit outpost was discovered and attacked by the patrol. 
Bandits fled after a few minutes of fighting. 

Known casualties: USMC: 1 wounded. GN: 2 killed. 
Bandits : 60 killed and several wounded. 

#9: 1 NOVEMBER 1927 

Contacc at CARBONAL, Nicaragua, C.A. (214-375) 
No further data on file. 

303 



#10 : 10 NOVEMBER 1927 

Contact at SAN JUAN DE TELPANECA, Nicaragua, C.A. 

A combined Marine — Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant 
J. H. Satterfield, GN. discovered a b-andit outpost which was attacked 
and all bandits thereat killed. The main bandit camp was aroused by 
the firing and engaged with the patrol but later fled with several 
wounded. Bandits were well armed with rifles and bombs. 

Known casualties: USMC: None. GN: None. 

Bandits: 5 killed. 

#11 : 21 NOVEMBER 1927 

Contact at SAN FRANCISCO, Nicaragua. N.E. of TELPANECA. 

A combined Marine — Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant 
J. H. Satterfield, GN, encountered a mounted bandit detachment, 
6 miles N.E. of Telpaneca. The patrol attacked and dispersed the 
bandits. 

Known casualties: USMC: None. GN: None. 

Bandits: 3 killed. 

#12 : 25 NOVEMBER 1927 

Contact at LAGUNA COLORADO, Nicaragua, C.A. (195-405) 

A combined Marine — Guardia patrol, commanded by Lieutenant 
H. S. Keimling, GN, operating close to the Honduran Border, was 
attacked by a bandit group. Patrol returned the fire and drove bandits 
across the border. A large quantity of foodstuffs, animals, ammunition 
and arms were captured and destroyed. 

Known casualties: USMC: None. GN: 1 wounded. 

Bandits: 4 killed. 

#13 : 5 DECEMBER 1927 

Contact at SAN PEDRO RANCH, Nicaragua, C.A. (218-378) 

A small combined Marine — Guardia patrol, commanded by Sergeant 
F. C. Smith, USMC, (Cabo Largaespada #157 in command of Guardia), 
was attacked by a bandit force which greatly outnumbered the patrol. 
The engagement lasted one hour and a half. Bandits well armed with 
rifles and bombs. 

Known casualties : USMC: None. GN: 1 killed. 

Bandits: 30 killed. 

#14 : 6 DECEMBER 1927 

Contact at EL PORTERO, Nicaragua, C.A. (215-372) 

A Marine — Guardia patrol, commanded by Lieutenant W. S. Brown, 
USMC, attacked and successfully dispersed a bandit group at El 
Portero, N.E. of Telpaneca. Arms, ammunition and miscellaneous 
articles captured. 

Known casualties : USMC: None. GN: None. 

Bandits: 5 killed. 

304 



#15 : 10 DECEMBER 1927 

Contact at CORRAL FALSO, Nicaragua, C.A. (145-353) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant H. S. Keimling, ON, 
located and attacked a bandit force at Corral Falso, west of Somoto, 
inflicting heavy losses and completely routing the group. Arms, am- 
munition and provisions were captured and destroyed. 

Known casualties : USMC: None. ON: None. 

Bandits: 6 killed. 

3 wounded. 

#16 : 11 DECEMBER 1927 

Contact at COJE, Nicaragua, C.A. (201-365) 

A combined Marine — Guardia patrol, commanded by Lieutenant 
J. H. Satterfield, GN, attacked a bandit camp of about 30 men; suc- 
ceeded in routing them and capturing arms and ammunition. 

Known casualties: USMC: None. GN: None. 

Bandits: 5 killed. 

3 wounded. 

#17: 17 DECEMBER 1927 

Contact at PORTILLO MOUNTAIN, Nicaragua, C.A. (184-378) 

A combined Marine — Guardia patrol, commanded by Captain L. P. 
Crommiller, GN, engaged with and dispersed a bandit group at Portillo 
Mountain, 6 miles west of Mosonte, N.S. 

Known casualties : USMC: None. GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

#18 : 26 DECEMBER 1927 

Contact at SABANA GRANDE near JICARO, Nicaragua, C.A. 

A combined Marine — Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant 
H. Boyle, GN, encountered a bandit group at Sabana Grande, near 
Jicaro; succeeded in killing one and capturing five. The guardia suffered 
no casualties. 

#19: 30 DECEMBER 1927 

Contact at GUANCASTILLO, Nicaragua, C.A. (223-375) 

A Marine — Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant M. Richal, 
USMC, (Lieutenant T. Bruce, GN, commanding Guardia troops) en- 
gaged with and dispersed a bandit group at Guanacastillo, north of 
San Juan. 

Known casualties: USMC: 1 wounded. GN: None. 

Bandits : Unknown. 

305 



#20 : 30 DECEMBER 1927 

Contact at QUILALI, Nicaragua, C.A. 

A combined Marine — Guardia patrol commanded by Captain R 
Livingston, USMC, (Lieutenant J . Hemphill, ON, commanding Guar- 
dia troops), engaged with a bandit force of about 400, well armed and 
equipped. The patrol was successful in driving the bandits from the 
field after having inflicted severe casualties upon the latter. 

Known casualties: USMC: 4 killed. 

22 wounded; including 
Captain Livingston. 

GN: 2 killed; including 

Lieutenant Hemphill. 

Bandits : Unknown. 

#21 : 1 JANUARY 1928 

Contact at LAS CRUCES near QUILALI, Nicaragua, C.A. 

A combined Marine — Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant 
M. Richal, USMC, (Lieutenant T. Bruce, GN, commanding Guardia 
troops) engaged with a superfor force of bandits that were well armed 
and equipped; fighting lasted 1 hour after which the bandits were dis- 
persed. Lieutenant Thomas G. Bruce, commanding the Guardia 
troops, was killed by the first volley of enemy fire. Lieutenant M. 
Richal, USMC, commanding the patrol was seriously wounded shortly 
thereafter. 

Known casualties: USMC: 4 wounded. GN: 1 killed. 

Lieutenant Bruce. 

Bandits: 50 killed. Number of wounded not 
known. 

#22: 7 JANUARY 1928 

Contact at MAL PASO, Nicaragua, C.A. (NS) 

A small guardia patrol commanded by Captain Crommiller, GN, was 
fired on by a bandit group and after a short firefight the bandits fled. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: Unknown. 

#23: 8 JANUARY 1928 

Contact at CUJE, Nicaragua, C.A. (201-365) 

A combined Marine — Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant 
J. H. Satterfield, GN, engaged with and dispersed a bandit group at 
Cuje. A large quantity of provisions and arms were captured and des- 
troyed by the patrol. 

Known casualties : USMC: None. GN: None. 

Bandits: 5 killed. 

306 



#24: 8 JANUARY 1928 

Contact at SOMOTILLO, Nicaragua, C.A. (128-302) 

Two Marines and eight loyal Guardia, commanded by Lieutenant 
P. Payne, GN, were attacked by 30 bandits, among whom were nine 
disloyal guardia that mutinied from the Somotillo garrison. Disorder 
prevailed for about 24 hours after which time the garrison succeeded in 
driving off the attackers and establishing order in the small town. 

Known casualties: USMC: None. GN: None. 

Bandits: 4 killed (including GN Mutineers) 

3 wounded. 

#25: 14 JANUARY 1928 

Contact at SANTA ROSA, Nicaragua, C.A. (214-334) 

A small Guardia patrol, commanded by Lieutenant D. McDonald, 
GN, attacked and dispersed a group of bandits at Santa Rosa. Patrol 
captured arms, ammunition, provisions and bandit papers. 

Known casualties : GN : None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

2 wounded. 

#26: 21 JANUARY 1928 

Contact at PLANO GRANDE, Nicaragua, C.A. (235-367) 

Captain R. W. Peard, USMC, commanding a Marine — Guardia 
patrol, had contact with a bandit group at Piano Grande. (See con- 
tact #27.) 

#27: 21 JANUARY 1928 

Contact at LAS CRUCES, Nicaragua, C.A. (235-367) 

A combined Marine — Guardia patrol, commanded by Captain R. W. 
Peard, USMC, engaged with bandit groups five times enroute from 
San Albino Gold Mine to Buena Vista, via Las Cruces, and return. 
A large quantity of bandit material was captured, including arms and 
ammunition. 

Known casualties : USMC: None. GN: None. 

Bandits: 6 killed. 

4 wounded. 

#28: 21 JANUARY 1928 

Contact at LAS CRUCES MOUNTAIN, Nicaragua. (235-367) 

(See contact #27.) 

#29: 21 JANUARY 1928 

Contact at BUENA VISTA, Nicaragua, C.A. (235-367) 

(See contact #27.) 

307 



#30: 21 JANUARY 1928 

Contact at LA QUEBRADA MOUNTAIN, Nicaragua, C.A. (near 
Jicaro). 

Lieutenant D. McDonald, GN, and 2 enlisted Guardia attacked and 
routed an enemy signal station at La Quebrada Mountain. 

Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded (Lt. McDonald) 

Bandits : Unknown. 

#31: 22 JANUARY 1928 

Contact at LAS CRUCES, Nicaragua, C.A. (235-367) 

(See contact #27.) 

#32: 8 FEBRUARY 1928 

Contact at CALPULES, Nicaraguan, C.A. (132-378) 

Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant O. B. Daudy, GN, had 
contact with a group of bandits at Calpules. No further data on file. 

#33 : 11 FEBRUARY 1928 

Contact at SAN FRANCISCO, Nicaragua, C.A. (?) 

No further data on file. 

#34 : 18 FEBRUARY 1928 

Contact at LAS MANOS, Nicaragua, C.A. (191-409) 

Guardia patrol under command of Lieutenant J. L. Blanchard, GN, 
had contact with a group of bandits at Las Manos. No further data on 
file. 

#35: 20 FEBRUARY 1928 

Contact at SAN JUAN DE TELPANECA, Nicaragua. (225-369) 

A combined Marine — Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant 
Walraven, USMC, (Lieutenant D. McDonald, commanding Guardia 
troops) routed a bandit force from an ambush position and succeeded 
in driving the bandits off in a short time. 

Known casualties : USMC: None. GN: None. 

Bandits: 3 killed. 

5 wounded. 

#36 : 23 FEBRUARY 1928 

Contact at OCOTAL— TELPANECA TRAIL, Nicaragua, C.A. 

Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant D. E. Wells, GN, had con- 
tact with group of armed bandits on Ocotal — Telpaneca Trail. No fur- 
ther data on file. 

308 



#37: 27 FEBRUARY 1928 

Contact at SANTO DOMINGO, Nicaragua, C.A. ( ? ) 

No further data on file. 

#38: 28 FEBRUARY 1928 

Contact at PORTAL, Nicaragua, C.A. (218-367) 

A combined Marine — Guardia patrol, commanded by Lieutenant 
M. E. Smith, GN, engaged with and dispersed a bandit force at Portal. 
Four pack animals, dynamite and bombs were captured. 

Known casualties : USMC: None. GN: None. 

Bandits: 4 killed. 

#39 : 29 FEBRUARY 1928 

Contact at INLALI, Nicaragua, C.A. (152-348) 

A combined Marine — Guardia patrol commanded by Captain L. P. 
Crommiller, GN, engaged with and routed a large bandit force at Inali. 

Known casualties : USMC: None. GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

1 wounded. 

#40: 25 MARCH 1928 

Contact at EL SILENCIO MOUNTAIN, Nicaragua, C.A. (230-363). 

A guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant D. McDonald, GN, 
attacked and dispersed a bandit group on El Silencio Mountain, about 
12 miles west of San Jaun. Leader of the group killed. Three pack 
animals and a quantity of provisions were captured. 

Known casualties : GN : None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

1 wounded. 

#41: 15 APRIL 1928 

Contact at PATIO GRANDE, Nicaragua, C.A. ( ? ) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain L. E. Crommiller had contact 
at Patio Grande. No further information on file. 

#42: 2 MAY 1928 

Contact at SANTA TERESA, Nicaragua, C.A. ( ? ) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Sergeant A. Miranda, GN, had 
contact with a group of bandits at Santa Teresa. No further information 
on file. 



#43: 13 MAY 1928 

Contact at CONGOHOES, Nicaragua, C.A. (238-300) 

A combined Marine — Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant 
S. E. Ridderhoff, USMC, (Lieutenant C. A. Davis, GN, commanding 
Guardia Troops) had contact with a group of bandits in the vicinity of 
Murra. Lieutenant Davis with reconnaissance patrol, operating from 
m.ain patrol, detected bandits in vicinity and drove bandits from their 
position. 

Known casualties: USMC: None. GN: None. 

Bandits: 2 wounded. 

#44: 13 MAY 1928 

Contact at LA FLOR, Nicaragua, C.A. (CA) 

A combined Marine — Guardia patrol, commanded by Captain R. S. 
Hunter, USMC, (Cadet OUie Blackburn, GN, commanding Guardia 
Troops) was attacked by a large bandit group who were lying in am- 
bush. This engagement lasted about 1 hour. Captain Hunter, com- 
manding the column, was seriously wounded and died a few days later. 
Bandits were well armed with machine-guns and rifles. 

Known casualties: USMC: 1 killed. GN: None. 

Captain Hunter. 

Bandits: 4 killed. 

#45: 29 MAY 1928 

Contact at OJO DE AQUA, Nicaragua, C.A. (Carazo). 

A combined Marine — Guardia patrol commanded by Cadet C. L. 
Levonski, GN, engaged with a bandit force twice the size of the patrol 
and after a firefight of about 20 minutes the bandits fled. A large 
quantity of arms, ammunition and supplies were captured. 

Known casualties: USMC: None. GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed 

3 captured. 

#46: 30 MAY 1928 

Contact at SAN DIEGO, Nicaragua, C.A. ( ? ) 

Contact had by Cadet C. L. Levonski, GN. No further information 
on file. 

#47: 26 JULY 1928 

Contact at LA TRINIDAD, Nicaragua, C.A. (215-288) 
Contact had by Lieutenant J. G. Keller, GN. No further data on file. 

#48 : 20 NOVEMBER 1928 

Contact at EL CHIPON, Nicaragua, C.A. (260-380) 
Contact had by Lieutenant C. A. Davis, GN. No further data on file. 

310 



#49: 10 JANUARY 1929 

Contact at GUANACASTILLA, Nicaragua, C.A. (223-375) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant C. A. Davis, GN, was 
ambushed and attacked by a bandit force of about 100 well armed with 
machine guns, rifles and bombs. The patrol was successful in driving 
out the bandits after severe fighting. 

Known casualties : GN: 2 killed. 

4 wounded. 

Bandits: 7 killed. 

#50: 19 FEBRUARY 1929 

Contact at SAN ANTONIO, Nicaragua, C.A. (CA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant R. F. Harris, GN, engaged 
with and dispersed a bandit group after a short firefight of about 20 
minutes. The bandits were well armed with machine guns, rifles and 
bombs. Lt. H. N. Hunter, GN, 2d in command. 

Known casualties: GN: 2 wounded, (including Lieutenant Harris. 

Bandits: Unknown. 

#51 : 9 MARCH 1929 

Contact at SAN ISIDRO, Nicaragua, C.A. (208-283) 

A guardia patrol commanded by Cadet Norman L. Merritt, GN, had 
contact with a group of armed bandits at San Isidro, Department of 
Matagalpa. Bandit casualties unknown. 
Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded. 

Bandits: Unknown. 

#52: 28 APRIL 1929 

Contact at SAN ISIDRO, Nicaragua, C.A. (208-283) 

The Guardia garrison at San Isidro, Department of Matagalpa, was 
attacked by a group of bandits at 7:45 P.M. Due to the constant 
vigilance and quick wittedness of the garrison stationed there, the 
Guardia, under command of a Non-commissioned officer, quickly 
mobilized for action and drove the bandits off without casualties on 
the part of the Guardia. 
Known casulties: GN: None. 

Bandits: Unknown. 

#53: 3 MAY 1929 

Contact at THIJIO MOUNTAIN, Nicaragua, C.A. (NA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant John Hamas had contact 

with a bandit group at Thijio Mountain, Coco Village, N.S. Bandits 

fled after a few minutes of fighting. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 2 wounded. 

311 



#54 : 31 MAY 1929 

Contact at ALGOVIA, Nicaragua, C.A. (270-295) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant D. Ryan, GN, had contact 
with a group of about 150 bandits at the Finca Algovia, Dept. of Mata- 
galpa. Fight lasted about 30 minutes when bandits dispersed. Patrol 
pursued: regained contact and recaptured a large quantity of loot 
taken from the Finca. Patrol also captured rifles, ammunition, bombs 
and dynamite. Horses and mules. 

Known casualties : GN : None. 

Bandits: 5 killed. 

#55: 5 JUNE 1929 

Contact at AGUACATE, Nicaragua, C.A. (21 1-345) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain E. U. Hakala, GN, had 
contact with a group of armed bandits at Aguacate. Fighting lasted 
for about 10 minutes. Patrol captured a rifle, ammunition, bombs and 
machettes. 

#56: 6 JUNE 1929 

Contact at LAS UVAS, Nicaragua, C.A. (CA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain E. U. Hakala, GN, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits at Las Uvas. Fight lasted 
for about thirty minutes when bandits fled in all directions. Patrol 
captured mules, saddles, US hand grenades, and miscellaneous articles. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: Unknown. 

§S7: 4 JULY 1929 

Contact at CUA, Nicaragua, C.A. (CA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant J. L. Neel, GN, Lieu- 
tenant W. H. Williamson, GN, had contact with a group of armed 
bandits at Cua. The bandits were hidding in a corn field when Guardia 
point was fired on. Patrol immediately took up skirmish position and 
swept field with rifle and machine gun fire. Fight lasted for one hour 
and forty minutes when bandits fled. Patrol captured large amount 
of food supplies, arms, ammunition and equipment. 

Known casualties: GN: 2 wounded including Lieutenant 

W. H. Williamson. 

Bandits: 15 killed. 



312 



#58: 13 AUGUST 1929 

Contact at JICARO, Nicaragua, C.A. (229-386) 

At about 1:30 A.M., three groups of bandits attacked the town of 
Jicaro, Nueva Segovia. Captain H. Stent, GN, and two other GN 
officers with the rest of the garrison of 21 men were the sole defenders 
of the town when the attack took place. The alertness of a sentry on 
outpost duty contributed greatly in helping the Guardia prepare for 
the attack. The alarm was sounded and the attacking group were 
swept with rifle and machine gun fire. Guardia pursued the fleeing 
group for several hours but further contact could not be gained. 
Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: Unknown. 

#59: 21 AUGUST 1929 

Contact at LA PITA, Nicaragua, C.A. (CA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant G. Occhionero, GN, had 
a contact with a group of armed bandits at La Pita. Fight lasted 20 
minutes when bandits fled. 
Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 5 killed. 

#60: 22 AUGUST 1929 

Contact at EL NARANJO, Nicaragua, C.A. (88-249) 
Combined Guardia patrols under Lieutenants M. Hardin and T. Farrar 
had contact with a group of armed bandits at El Naranjo, Dept of 
Chinandega. Bandits employed rifles, pistols and machine-guns. Fight 
lasted for about an hour. 
Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: Unknown. 

#61 : 29 AUGUST 1929 

Contact at LA CABULLAS MOUNTAIN, Nicaragua, C.A. (NA) 
A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain E. U. Hakala, GN, had 
contact with a group of armed bandits at La Cabullas Mountain, Dept. 
of Nueva Segovia. Contact lasted for thirty minutes, when bandits 
fled. Patrol followed in pursuit but further contact could not be gained. 
Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: Two killed. 

#62: 29 AUGUST 1929 

Contact at QUEZALGUAQUE, Nicaragua, C.A. (130-244) 
A Guardia patrol under command of First Sergeant Jose Madriz, GN, 
had contact with a group of armed bandits at Quezalguaque, Depart- 
ment of Leon. First Sergeant Madriz was killed by first burst of bandit 
fire. Two bandits were captured. 
Known casualties: GN: 1 killed (Sgt. Madriz). 
Bandits: 2 captured. 

813 



#63: 31 AUGUST 1929 

Contact at MUYUCA, Nicaragua, C.A. (226-391) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant E. D. Villegas, GN, had 
contact with a group of armed bandits at Muyuca, Dept. of Nueva 
Segovia. Bandit positions were rushed and group fled leaving blood 
trails behind. Lieut. P. C. Stanley, GN, 2nd in command. 

Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded (Lieutenant Villegas) 
Bandits: Unknown. 

#64: 12 OCTOBER 1929 

Contact at LA CONCORDIA, Nicaragua, C.A. (230-322) 
The small Guardia Garrison at La Concordia, Dept. of Jinotega, was 
attacked by a group of armed bandits at 8:50 P.M. Guardia swept 
surroundings vicinity of cuartel with machine gun fire and drove the 
bandits back. Bandits put up a weak fight and fled. No casualties on 
either side. 

#65: 13 OCTOBER 1929 

Contact at BABILONLA, Nicaragua, C.A. (CA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant E. Marcos and his patrol 
of 21 men had contact with a group of armed bandits at Babilonia, 
Department of Jinotega. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 2 wounded. 

#66: 16 OCTOBER 1929 

Contact at PASO REAL, Nicaragua, C.A. (249-326) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant F. L. Kurchov, GN, had 
contact with a group of armed bandits at Paso Real. Bandits fled 
leaving blood trails. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits : Unknown. 

#67: 28 OCTOBER 1929 

Contact at SAN GERONIMO, Nicaragua, C.A. (CA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant H. A. Makus, GN, had 
contact with a group of armed bandits at San Geronimo. Patrol cap- 
tured 1 rifle, a quantity of ammunition, cartridge belts and other 
bandit equipment. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: Unknown. 

314 



#68: 31 OCTOBER 1929 

Contact at LAS MERCEDES, Nicaragua, C.A. (228-405) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant W. F. Krebs, GN, had 
contact with a group of armed bandits at Las Mercedes Hacienda. 
Patrol captured one machine-gun, 3 rifles, ammunition, cartridge belts 
and other bandit equipment. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

1 wounded. 

#69 : 2 DECEMBER 1929 

Contact at SANTA ROSA, Nicaragua, C.A. (148-215) 

A Guardia patrol under command of Lieutenant L. C. Meeks, GN, 
had contact with a group of armed bandits at Santa Rosa, Dept. of 
Leon. Patrol captured 1 pistol, 1 rifle, 3 shotguns, machettes and cu- 
tachas. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 2 killed. 

#70: 11 DECEMBER 1929 

Contact at SABANA GRANDE, Nicaragua, C.A. (NA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant R. F. Harris, GN, had 
contact with a group of armed bandits at Sabana Grande. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 3 killed. 

#71 : 16 DECEMBER 1929 : 

Contact at HUERTAS, Nicaragua, C.A. (NA) 

A patrol of six enlisted Guardias had contact with a group of armed 
bandits at Huertas, Nueva Segovia. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

1 captured. 

#72 : 17 DECEMBER 1929 : 

Contact at ASCENCION CASTELLON, Nicaragua, C.A. (CA) 

A patrol of enlisted Guardias had contact with a group of armed bandits 
at Hacienda Ascencion Castellon near Piedra Grande. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 



815 



#73 : 26 DECEMBER 1929 : 

Contact at RIO GRANDE, Nicaragua, C.A. (NA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant M. Alexander, GN, 
had a contact with a group of bandits at Rio Grande, Nueva Segovia. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 3 captured. 

#74: 4 JANUARY 1930: 

Contact at VALLE DE LAS EAPATAS, Nicaragua, C.A. (1 57-257) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant L.C. Meeks, GH, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits at Valle de las Zapatas, Patrol 
captured 1 pistol, cutachas and machetes. 

Known casualties : GN : None. 

Bandits: 5 captured. 

#75: 11 JANUARY 1930: 

Contact at LOS BANOS, Nicaragua, C.A. ( NA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant F.W. Ferguson, GN, 
Lieutenant J.M. Broderick, GN, had contact with a group of armed 
bandits at Los Banos, Nueva Segovia. Patrol captured large amount 
of foodstuffs, stores, arms, ammunition and equipment. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: Unknown. 

#76: 12 JANUARY 1930 

Contact at LAS CRUCES, Nicaragua, C.A. (NA) 
Lieutenant Urig, GN, and Guardia patrol from Quilali had contact 
with a group of armed bandits at Las Cruces. Fight lasted 15 minutes. 
Known casualties : GN: 1 killed. 

3 wounded. 
Bandits: Unknown. 

jl^77'. 14 JANUARY 1930 

Contact at LAS PERALTAS, Nicaragua, C.A. (170-379) 

A Guardia patrol under command of Lieutenant J. Hamas, GN, 
had contact with a group of armed bandits between Las Peraltas and 
Perpchillos, Nueva Segovia. Patrol captured four animals and saddles. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 wounded. 
1 captured. 

315 



#78: 26 JANUARY 1930 

Contact at COLON, Nicaragua. C.A. (230-318) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant G.C. Smith, ON, had 

contact with a group of bandits at Colon. 

Known casualties : ON : None. 

Bandits: 4 captured. 

#79: 26 JANUARY 1930 

Contact at BI JIGUAL, Nicaragua. C.A. (2 1 2-3 "^l) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant H.A. Makus, GN, had 
contact with a group of bandits under Padilla about one half mile from 
Bijigual. 

Known casualties : GN : None. 

Bandits : Unknown. 

#80: 27 JANUARY 1930 

Contact at TRUJILLO, Nicaragua, C.A. (CA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant H.J. Elliott, GN, had 
contact with a group of bandits near Trujillo. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 2 killed. 

3 wounded. 
1 1 captured. 

#81 : 3 FEBRUARY 1930 

Contact at SANTA MARIA, Nicaragua. C.A. (193-403) 

The small garrison of Guardia at Santa Maria, Nueva Segovia, was 
attacked by a group of bandits, shortly after mid-night. Lieutenant 
J.M. Broderick, GN, in command. 

Known casualties : GN : None. 

Bandits : Unknown. 

#82: 9 FEBRUARY 1930 

Contact at QUILALI, Nicaragua. C.A. (246-365^ 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant J. Sabater, GN, had 
contact with a group of armed bandits about 20 miles southwest of 
Quilali. 

Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded. 

Bandits : Unknown. 



317 



#83 : 11 FEBRUARY 1930 

Contact at GUAPINOL, Nicaragua. C.A. (176-285) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant FJ. Cunningham, ON, 
had contact with a group of armed bandits about 3 miles southeast 
of Guapinol. Patrol captured 1 pistol, 12 machettes and various 
articles of Marine Corps property — Guardia property. Three bandit 
camps were destroyed. 

Known casualties: GN: 1 killed. 

2 wounded. 
Bandits: 1 killed. 

#84 : 16 FEBRUARY 1930 

Contact at LA VIRGEN, Nicaragua. C.A. (1 16-272) 

A Guardia patrol ccmmianded by Captain L.B. Puller, GN, and a 
Guardia patrol com.manded by Lieutenant E.J. Rittman, GN, had 
contact with a group of bandits about three miles north of San Antonio 
on the trail to La Virgen. Lt. E. Marcos GN with Captain Puller's 
patrol. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: Unknown. 

#85 : 17 FEBRUARY 1930 

Contact at EMBOCADERO, Nicaragua. C.A. (252-331) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant M.K. Chenoweth, GN, 
had contact with a group of armed bandits about 2 miles northeast of 
Embocaderos. Patrol captured ammunition and miscellaneous articles 
of loot. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 wounded. 

#86 : 18 FEBRUARY 1930 

Contact at LOS CEDROS, Nicaragua. C.A. (CA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant M.K. Chenoweth, GN, 
had contact with a group of armed bandits at Los Cedros, Dept. of 
Jinotega. Patrol captured ammunition and clothing. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: Unknown. 

#87: 4 MARCH 1930 

Contact at TAMARINDO, Nicaragua. C.A. (NA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant J.M. Broderick, GN, and 
Lieutenant Castillo GN, with his patrol had contact at Tamarindo. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 
Bandits: Unknown. 

318 



#88: 14 MARCH 1930 

Contact at YALI, Nicaragua. C.A. (232-336) 

A Guardia patrol had contact with a group of armed bandits about a 
half a mile outside of Yali. Lieutenants F. Anderton and G.M. Manning 
in command. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits : Unknown. 

#89: 20 MARCH 1930 

Contact at MONTECHRISTO, Nicaragua, C.A. (CA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant M.K. Chenoweth, GN, 
had contact with a group of armed bandits about one mile north of 
Monte Christo. Lieutenant W.A. Lee, second in command. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 2 wounded. 

#90: 23 MARCH 1930 

Contact at BUENA VISTA, Nicaragua. C.A. (CA) 

A Guardia Patrol commanded by Lieutenant F. Anderton, GN, had 
contact with a group of armed bandits near Buena Vista, Department 
of Jinotega. Patrol captured animals, saddles, food stores and corres- 
pondence. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

#91 : 23 MARCH 1930 

Contact at BUENA VISTA, Nicaragua. C.A. (CA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant M.K. Chenoweth, GN, 
had contact with a group of armed bandits at Buena Vista, on trail to 
La Rica. Patrol captured 1 rifle, ammunition and bombs. Lieutenant 
W.A. Lee second in command. 

Known casualties : GN : 1 wounded. 
Bandits: 1 killed. 

5 wounded. 

#92: 30 MARCH 1930 

Contact at SANTA RITA, Nicaragua. C.A. (NA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant N. Hussa, GN, had 
contact with a group of bandits north of Santa Rita. 
No known bandit casualties. 
No guardia casualties. 

319 



#93: 31 MARCH 1930 

Contact at COCO RIVER, (?) Nicaragua. C.A. (CA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant N. Hussa, GN, had 
contact with a group of armed bandits north of the Coco River. (?) 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

1 wounded. 

#94: 1 APRIL 1930 

Contact at YALI, Nicaragua. C.A. (232-336) 

A large group of bandits attacked the small guardia garrison at Yali 
at about 2:30 A.M. Bandits were driven off. Lieutenant F. Anderton 
in command. 

Known casualties: GN: 1 killed. 

1 wounded. 
Bandits: 3 killed. 

4 wounded. 

#95: 3 APRIL 1930 

Contact at YALI— CONCORDIA, Nicaragua. C.A. (CA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant Pilcher, GN, had contact 
with a group of armed bandits on the Yali — Concordia Road. Bandits 
were armed with machine-guns and rifles. Lieutenant Montenegro. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

#96: 5 APRIL 1930 

Contact at EL CARMEN, Nicaragua. C.A. (Rivas) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant M.K. Wilson, GN, had 
contact with a group of armed bandits at the Hacienda El Carmen, 
Department of Rivas. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 4 killed. 

3 wounded. 

#97: 16 APRIL 1930 

Contact at SAN FRANCISCO, Nicaragua. C.A. (Chinandega) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant W.J. Christy, GN, had 
contact with a group of bandits near San Francisco. Patrol captured 
1 rifle. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 3 killed. 

2 captured. 

320 



#98: 22 APRIL 1930 

Contact at LAS CRUCES— LAS VUELTAS, Nicaragua. (NA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant E.L. Livermore, GN, 
had contact with a group of armed bandits on the Las Cruces — Las 
Vueltas trail. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

#99: 22 APRIL 1930 

Contact at SAN JUAN DE TELPANECA, Nicaragua. C.A. (225-368) 

The Guardia garrison at San Juan was attacked by a group of armed 
bandits at about 8:10 P.M. Post was commanded by Lieutenant T. 
Stevenson. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits : Unknown. 

#100: 24 APRIL 1930 

Contact at SAN FRANCISCO, Nicaragua. C.A. (Chinandega) 

Major Spotts, GN, and his patrol of one officer and 10 enlisted had 
contact about 5 leagues north of San Francisco at Pico Jicote with a 
group of 60 armed bandits. Lieutenant M. Hardin second in command. 

Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded. 
Bandits: 2 killed. 

#101 : 5 MAY 1930 

Contact at NARANJO, Nicaragua, C. A. (123—305) 

Lieutenant Christy, GN, and his patrol of 9 enlisted and Lieutenant 
McDonald, GN, with his patrol were amibushed about two miles south- 
west of Naranjo by a group of about forty bandits. Patrols again am- 
bushed when returning to station. No casualties. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 2 killed. 

#102: 7 MAY 1930 

Contact at BARRIAL HILL, Nicaragua. C.A. (NA) 

Lieutenant Livermore, GN, and his patrol were ambushed by a group 
of about 100 bandits at Barrial Hill, Nueva Segovia. 

Known casualties: GN: 4 killed. 

2 wounded. 
Bandits : Unknown . 



321 



#103: 8 MAY 1930 

Contact at AMUCAYAN, Nicaragua. C.A. (199-369) 

Lieutenant Bateman, GN, and his patrol had contact with a group of 
armed bandits north of Amucayan along the Coco river. Patrol 
captured 19 animals, 19 saddles, 1 USMC pack saddle, 2 rifles, 1 
pistol, 4 cutting weapons, 2 bombs, 1 1 sticks of dynamite and various 
other articles. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits : Unknown. 

#104: 10 MAY 1930 

Contact at AGUACATE, Nicaragua. C.A. (NA) 

Captain G.A. Williams, GN, Captain J. D. O'Leary, GN, with a patrol 
of 1 5 enlisted had contact with a group of bandits at Aguacate. Patrol 
captured 1 rifle, 1 revolver, 2 dynamite bombs, hat-bands and flags. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 2 killed. 

#105: 13 MAY 1930 

Contact at MIRAFLOR, Nicaragua. C.A. (224-332) 

Lieutenant Smith, GN, and his patrol had contact with a group of 
armed bandits at La Laguna de Vliraflor, Jinotega. Patrol captured 
2 rifles, 1 shotgun, 2 pistols and ammunition. 

Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded. 
Bandits: 6 killed. 

#106: 26 MAY 1930 

Contact at SANTA CRUZ, Nicaragua. C.A. (NA) 

Cabo Molina, #1203 GN, and his patrol of 4 rasos had contact with 
small group of bandits between Santa Cruz and Mount Espinal. 
Wounded Jeremias Blandon and Fidell Selles and captured them. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 2 wounded. 

#107: 29 MAY 1930 

Contact at EL RODEO, Nicaragua. C.A. (274-287) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain G.A. Williams, GN, surprised 
small group of armed bandits near El Rodeo. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

322 



#108: 29 MAY 1930 

Contact at TULA, Nicaragua. C.A. (NA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant G. Castillo, GN, had 
contact on Tule Mountain with a group of about 20 armed bandits. 
Patrol destroyed large house of bandits and various quantities of 
clothing and provisions. Captured 1 cutacha, correspondence, clothing, 
chicha and quantity of provisions. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 3 wounded. 

#109: 1 JUNE 1930 

Contact at ESPERANZA, Nicaragua. C.A. (NA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant G. Castillo, GN, had 
contact with small group of bandits near Esperanza. Captured 1 
pistol, and 3 cutachas. 
Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 2 killed. 

1 wounded. 

#110: 4 JUNE 1930 

Contact at SAN ANTONIO, Nicaragua. C.A. (1 12-245) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain L.B. Puller, GN, ambushed 
small group of bcindits about 1000 yards north of San Antonio. Leader 
of bandits killed. Captured 1 rifle, 154 cartridges, and 1 revolver. 
Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

#111: 5 JUNE 1930 

Contact at RIO GRANDE, Nicaragua. C.A. (205-355) 

Captain R. Pagan, GN, Lieutenant H.A. Makus, GN, 3 enlisted 
USMC, and 14 enlisted GN had contact at Rio Grande with a group 
of 40 or 50 bandits. Patrol captured 3 mules fully equipped, 1 horse, 
blankets and clothing. Miscellaneous articles. Bandit camp destroyed. 
Known casualties : USMC : None. 

GN: None. 

Bandits: Unknown. 

#112: 6 JUNE 1930 

Contact at TAMARINDO, Nicaragua. C.A. (NA) 

Captain R. Pagan, GN, Lieutenant H.A. Makus, GN, 3 enlisted USMC, 
and 14 enlisted GN, had contact with a group of about 100 armed 
bandits in Tamarindo. 
Known casualties: USMC: None. 

GN: None. 

Bandits: Unknown. 

323 



#113: 6 JUNE 1930 

Contact at LOS CEDROS, Nicaragua. C.A. (121-319) 

Captain L.B. Puller, ON, one officer and 35 men had a contact with a 

group of armed bandits at Los Cedros in the Department of Jinotega. 

Seven bandits killed including the Jefe, Marcial Rivera and the segundo 

jefe, Asencion Rodriguez. Patrol captured 1 Kraig Rifle, 1 ConCon 

rifle, 2 hand grenades, 14 dynamite bombs, 1 revolver, 100 foot fuse, 

detonators, 5 sticks dynamite, 56 cartridges Krag, 17 cartridges ConCon 

10 cutachas, 5 saddles, clothing, food and correspondence. Lieutenant 

W.A. Lee, second in command. 

Known casualties : ON: None. 

Bandits: 7 killed. 

#114: 7 JUNE 1930 

Contact at MANCALLAN, Nicaragua. C.A. (NA) 
A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant J.M. Cobb, ON, had 
contact with a group of about 50 armed bandits in Mancallan in the 
Department of Esteli. Captured Candelario Cardoza, jefe of the group. 
Patrol captured 1 rifle, 3 cutachas, 3 bombs, 50 rounds Krag ammuni- 
tion, 9 animals, 8 saddles, 8 bridles, 8 saddle blakets, 10 raincoats, 
4 pairs new shoes, 4 red and black hat-bands, 800 lbs. of beans, 3 sacks 
of rice, 50 lbs. cheese, 93 tortillas and various articles of clothing. 

Known casualties: ON: None. 

Bandits: 5 killed. 

7 wounded. 

#115: 9 JUNE 1930 

Contact at CARADON FINCA, Nicaragua. C.A. (202-179) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant Roberts, GN, had a 

contact with a group of about 20 bandits at Cardon Finca on the San 

Rafael — Sapote trail. Patrol captured 1 pistol, 1 dynamite bomb, 

15 rounds ammunition, 10 blankets, 30 odd pieces of clothing, etc. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits : Unknown. 

#116: 10 JUNE 1930 

Contact at LA VUELTA ROBLES, Nicaragua. C.A. (CA) 
Lieutenant T.R. Stuart, GN, 1 officer and 1 1 enlisted had a contact in 
the northwest end of Valle de la Vuelta Robles with a group of about 
30 armed bandits. Lieutenant Montenegro, second in command. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: Unknown. 

#117: 11 JUNE 1930 

Contact at ARANJUEZ, Nicaragua. C.A. (250-300) 

A Patrol of enlisted Guardia had contact with small group of armed 

bandits in Aranjuez, Department of Matagalpa. The leader of the 

bandits, Silvino Herrera, was killed. One other bandit wounded and 

chased over a 100 foot cliff. Patrol captured 1 pistol and 1 dagger. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 1 wounded. 

324 



#118: 14 JUNE 1930 

Contact at LA TROZA, Nicaragua. C.A. (LEON) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Raso F. Rivera, #3440, GN, had a 
contact with a group of about 25 amed bandits near La Troza. Patrol 
captured 1 rifle, 1 shot-gun and 1 cutacha. 
Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: Unknown. 

#119: 15 JUNE 1930 

Contact at ZAPOTE MOUNTAIN, Nicaragua. C.A. (CA) 

Lieutenant T.R. Stuart, GN, one officer and 1 1 men had a contact 
with a group of 40 armed bandits at Zapote Mountain. Patrol captured 
1 rifle, some dozen pieces of clothing and bedding. Lieutenant Mon- 
tenegro, second in command. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits : Unknown. 

#120: 19 JUNE 1930 

Contact at SAN MARCOS, Nicaragua. C.A. (CA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant M.R. Pilcher, GN, had 
a contact with a group of about 50 armed bandits about two miles 
northeast of San Marcos. Destroyed quantities of salt, coffee and meat. 

Known casualties: GN: 2 wounded. 
Bandits: 5 killed. 

#121 : 19 JUNE 1930 

Contact at YUCCA PUCCA, Nicaragua. C.A. (CA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain E.L. Russell, GN, had a 
contact with about 150 armed bandits on Yucca Pucca Mountain in 
the Department of Jinotega. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: Unknown. 

#122: 24 JUNE 1930 

Contact at LOS JILGUEROS, Nicaragua. C.A. (CA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Cabo M. Guillen, GN, had a contact 
with a small group of bandits in Los Jilgueros. Patrol captured 1 
automatic rifle, 1 native made rifle, 1 shot-gun, 1 pistol, 1 shirt, 3 
cutachas, 1 military cutacha, 1 US canteen ,3 raincoats, 2 pairs trousers 
and 7 hats. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 3 killed. 

1 wounded. 



825 



#123: 28 JUNE 1930 

Contact at OJOCHE, Nicaragua. C.A. (237-360) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain J. P. Schwerin, GN, had a 
short contact with a group of bandits at Ojoche in the Department 
of Nueva Segovia. 

Known casualties: GN: 1 killed. 

2 wounded including Captain Schwerin. 
Bandits: Unknown. 

#124: 28 JUNE 1930 

Contact at CEDRALE, Nicaragua. C.A. (NA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain R.A. Anderson, GN, had 
a contact on the trail to San Juan about midway between Ojoche and 
Cedrales with a group of about 50 armed bandits. Patrol captured a 
bandit flag, hats with red bands, knives and machetes and 1 dynamite 
bomib. 

Known casualties: GN: 1 killed. 

Bandits: Unknown. 

#125: 30 JUNE 1930 

contact at SCMOTO MOUNTAIN, Nicaragua. C.A. (168-345) 

A Guardia Patrol commanded by Lieutenant G. Castillo, GN, had a 
contact with deserter bandits from Salgado's group at Zapote, near 
Somoto Mountain. Patrol captured 1 revolver and ammunition. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

#126: 5 JULY 1930 

Contact at EL RODEO, Nicaragua. C.A. (274-287) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant G.C. Smith, GN, had a 
contact with a group of about T) armed bandits at the finca of Senor 
Rodriguez, near the m.ountain of Moropotente. Patrol captured 
1 bandit, 26 saddle animals, 1 bugle, many blanket rolls, about 200 
rounds of ammunition. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 12 killed. 

12 wounded. 

#127: 8 JULY 1930 

Contact at LA SULTANA, Nicaragua. C.A. (CA) 

Captain R.D. McAfee, GN, 1 officer and 20 enlisted had a contact at 
La Sultana in the Department of Jinotega with a group of about 50 
armed bandits. Patrol captured small quantity of food. Lieutenant 
E.M. Martin, second in command. 

Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded. 

Bandits: Unknown. 

326 



#128: 9 JULY 1930 

Contact at LAS MESAS, Nicaragua. C.A. (NA) 

Lieutenant J. A. Burns, GN, one officer and 19 enlisted had a contact 
with a group of about 25 armed bandits at the bend of the Las Vueltas — 
Suscallon trail about three-fourths of a mile from the Guali River 
near Las Mesas. Patrol captured 3 horses, 1 mule, 3 saddles and 2 
bridles. 

Knov/n casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 



#129: 10 JULY 1930 

Contact at PASMATA, Nicaragua. C.A. (249-340) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain E.F. Carlson had a contact 
with a group of about 40 armed bandits near Pasmata. Patrol captured 
2 horses, 2 saddles, 1 rifle, 2 dynamite bombs, 1 hand grenade, 15 
dynamite sticks, 7 blankets, 5 hats, 2 raincoats, clothing, food 
stuffs and many other miscellaneous articles. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 2 killed. 

7 wounded. 



#130: 15 JULY 1930 

Contact at ZAPOTE, Nicaragua. C.A. (NA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant C.J. Levonski, GN, had 
contact with a group of armed bandits operating in the Zapote area. 
Patrol captured 2 cutting weapons and 1 muzzle loading rifle. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 2 killed. 

1 wounded. 

#131: 22 JULY 1930 

Contact at MANCOTAL, Nicaragua. C.A. (247-332) 

Captain L.B. Puller, GN, three officers and 46 enlisted had a contact 
with a group of bandits at Dominico Mountain, (Mancotal) in the 
Depatrment of Jinotega. Guardia captured 1 rifle, 4 shot-guns, 1 
revolver, 2 cutachas, 3 1 cartridges, 1 horse, 1 mule and a large quantity 
of supplies. 3 officers were: Lieutenants Lee, Ashbrook, and Lill (MC). 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: Unknown. 



327 



#132: 22 JULY 1930 

Contact at SANTA FE, Nicaragua. C.A. (CA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant Gutierrez, GN, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits at the finca of San Miguel of 
Rio Grande in the vicinity of Santa Fe. One bandit captured. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

1 captured. 

#133: 23 JULY 1930 

Contact at SAN FRANCISCO, CHINANDEGA, Nicaragua. C.A. 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Sgt. Arbelles, #447, GN, had a contact 
with a group of bandits about nine miles east of San Francisco. Patrol 
captured 3 horses, 2 raincoats, 1 flash-light, 1 saddle and 1 Guardia hat. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits : Unknown. 

#134: 25 JULY 1930 

Contact at LAS PALMAS, Nicaragua. C.A (NA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant T.M. Stephenson. GN, 
had a contact near Las Palmas in the Department of Nueva Segovia 
with a small group of bandits. Patrol captured 1 shot-gun and some 
powder. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 wounded. 
3 captured. 

#135: 25 JULY 1930 

Contact at GUAPINOL, Nicaragua. C.A. (CA) 

Captain L.B. Puller, GN, three officers and 45 enlisted had a contact 
with small group of bandits at Venado Mountain near Guapinol 
Mountain. Patrol wounded and captured Captain Saber Manzanares, 
a sub-jefe of Sandino. One bandit camp destroyed Other three 
officers were Lieutenants Lee, Ashbrook and Lill (MC). 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 wounded and captured. 

#136: 27 JULY 1930 

Contact at SAN JERONIMO, Nicaragua, C.A. (CA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant Delgadillo, GN, had a 
contact with a small group of bandits at the Hacienda of San Jeronimo 
near Corinto Finca. Patrol captured 7 horses and mules, 7 saddles, 
2 cutachas and a quantity of clothing. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 3 captured. 

328 



#137: 28 JULY 1930 

Contact at LAS CRUCES, Nicaragua. C.A. (NA) 

Captain Kelly, ON, Lieutenant Freeman, ON, one other officer and a 
patrol of 30 enlisted had contact with a group of armed bandits at the 
top of Quale Mountain near Las Cruces. 

Known casualties: ON: 2 wounded. (Lieutenant Freeman was 

fatally wounded in this 
contact and died later.) 
Bandits : Unknown. 

#138: 30 JULY 1930 

Contact at SEBOYAL, Nicaragua. C.A. (CA) 

Captain G.L. Maynard, ON, 2 of^cers and 25 enlisted had a contact 
with small group of bandits at Seboyal. 

Known casualties: ON: None. 

Bandits: 2 killed. 

#139: 5 AUGUST 1930 

Contact at PALO BLANCO, Nicaragua. C.A. (192-371) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant B. Navarrete, ON, had 
a contact with a group of about twenty armed bandits near Palo Blanco. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

1 wounded. 

2 captured. 

#140: 6 AUGUST 1930 

Contact at NANCE DULCE, Nicaragua. C.A. (180-304) 

Lieutenant G.C. Smith, GN, one officer and twenty-five enlisted had a 
contact that lasted two hours with a group of about 45 armed bandits 
at Nance Dulce. Patrol captured 2 rifles, 2 shot-guns, ammunition, 
saddles, bedding and powder. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 12 killed. 

12 wounded. 

#141 : 15 AUGUST 1930 

Contact at LOS CARBONALES, Nicaragua. C.A. (153-389) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant J.M. Cobb, GN, had a 
contact with a group of about 20 armed bandits at Los Carbonales. 
Patrol captured 1 rifle, 1 pistol, 3 cutachas, 3 raincoats and a quantity 
of clothing. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 2 killed. 

4 v/ounded. 

329 



#142: 18 AUGUST 1930 

Contact at VENCEDORA, Nicaragua. C.A. (253-328) 
Lieutenant A. Graves, GN, two officers and twenty-two enlisted and 
1 civilian guide had contact two miles east of Vencedora and three 
miles south of San Antonio, with a group of about 80 armed bandits. 
Other officers were Lieutenants Ashbrook and Lill (MC). 

Known casualties: GN: 1 killed. 

2 wounded. 
Bandits: 3 killed. 

#143: 18 AUGUST 1930 

Contact at VENCEDORA, Nicaragua. C.A. (253-238) 

Captain R.D. McAfee, GN, one officer and twenty one enlisted had a 

contact with a group of 30 armed bandits near Vencedora. Lieutenant 

Delgadillo, second in command. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

#144: 18 AUGUST 1930 

Contact at VALLE DE OCOTAL, Nicaragua. C.A. (LEON) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant L. Meeks, GN, had a 

contact with a bandit group near the Valle de Ocotal. Patrol captured 

one horse. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

#145: 19 AUGUST 1930: 

Contact at MALACATE, Nicaragua, C.A. (CA) 
Captain L. B. Puller, GN, Lieutenant W. L. Lee, GN, Lieutenant 
Barillas, GN, and thirty-four enlisted had a contact with a group of 
about 70 bandits near Malacate in the Department of Jinotega. Patrol 
captured 52 horses and mules, 44 saddles with equipment, 2 rifles, 
10 rounds ammunition, 13 cutachas and machetes, dynamite, clothing, 
shoes, cloth, spurs, cooking utensils, hammocks, foodstuffs, etc. De- 
stroyed about four tons of corn. 
Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 2 killed. 

#146: 20 AUGUST 1930: 

Contact at GUAPINOL, Nicaragua, C.A. (CA) 
Captain G F. Good, GN, Lieutenant J. A. Burns, GN, Lieutenant 
Caceres (n) GN, and 40 enlisted had a contact with a group of bandits 
on the northern side of Guapinol Mountain. Patrol captured 6 rifles, 

3 shotguns, 2 pistols, 248 rounds ammunition, 4 boxes dynamite caps, 

4 cutachas, 1 mule and saddle, clothing valued at ^400.00. 
Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

1 vvounded. 

330 



#147: 28 AUGUST 1930: 

Contact at SAN RAFAEL, Nicaragua, C.A. (CA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain L. E. Power, GN, had a 
contact with a group of about 3 5 armed bandits on the Sabana Grande 
trail that leads into San Rafael. Patrol captured 6 machetes, and four 
food puches. 
Known casualties' GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

#148: 28 AUGUST 1930: 

Contact at RODEO, Nicaragua, C.A. (NA) 

Major L. P. Hunt, GN, Captain W. W. Davies, GN, Lieutenant 
J. M. Broderick, GN, one enlisted Marine and 14 enlisted Guardia 
had a contact with a group fo armed bandits at Rodeo in the Depart- 
ment of Nueva Segovia. Patrol captured 1 1 animals, 1 1 saddles and 
one cutacha. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

2 wounded. 

#149: 29 AUGUST 1930: 

Contact at LAS LOMAS, Nicaragua, C.A. (236-127) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant N. E. McGhee, GN, 
had a contact with a group of 35 bandits near Las Lomas. Patrol 
captured 3 rifles, 1 shot-gun, 10 sticks dynamite, clothing and docu- 
ments. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 captured. 

#150 : 1 SEPTEMBER 1930 : 

Contact at SABANA GRANDE, Nicaragua, C.A. (CA) 

Lieutenant E. J. Rittman, GN, one officer and twenty enlisted Guardias 
had a contact with a group of about 40 armed bandits about half-way 
between La Concordia and Sabana Grande. Lieut. F. C. Hall, 2d in 
command. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: Unknown. 

#151 : 2 SEPTEMBER 1930 : 

Contact at LA CANA, Nicaragua, C.A. (Leon) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant G. Castillo, GN, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits at La Cana. Patrol captured 1 
pistol and two cutachas. 
Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 2 killed. 

331 



#152 : 8 SEPTEMBER 1930 : 

Contact at LA CONCEPCION, iNicaragua, C.A. (219-178) 

A. Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant C. B. Stearns, GN, 
had a contact with a group of bandits at La Concepcion, six miles 
out toward Sebaco on main road. Patrol captured 1 Springfield rifle, 

1 full Lewis drum and other miscellaneous items. 
Known casualties : GN : None. 

Bandits: 2 killed. 

#153 : 8 SEPTEMBER 1930 : 

Contact at LA CONCEPCION, Nicaragua, C.A. (219-178) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant D. McDonald, GN, 
had a contact with a group of bandits at La Concepcion. Patrol cap- 
tured twenty-eight rounds of ammunition. 

Known casualties : GN : None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

#154: 8 SEPTEMBER 1930 

Contact at OLOGALPA, Nicaragua. C.A. (NA) 

Captain W.P. Kelley, GN, two officers and thirty enlisted, had contact 
with a group of bandits in the vicinity of Ologalpa. Patrol captured 
blanket rolls, 6 pistol cartridges, a quantity of bombs and fuse cord. 
House destroyed. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 2 killed. 

1 wounded. 

#155 : 1 1 SEPTEMBER 1930 

Contact at POTREROS, Nicaragua. C.A. (CA) 

Captain L.B. Puller, GN, two officers and 32 enlisted had a contact 
with a group of armed bandits at a camp near Potreros. Patrol captured 

2 rifles, 2 shot-guns, 50 rounds ammunition, 2 horses and 13 cutachas. 
Other officers were Lieutenants A. Graves and W.E. McGhee. GN. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 3 killed. 

#156 : 13 SEPTEMBER 1930 

Contact at BARYAL— BALSAMO, Nicaragua. C.A. (219-373) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant E.L. Livermore, GN, had 
a contact with about 20 bandits in the vicinity of Baryal — Balsamo. 

Known casualties : GN : None. 

Bandits: 1 wounded. 

332 



#157: 13 SEPTEMBER 1930 

Contact at TELPANECA, Nicaragua. C.A. (205-368) 

Lieutenant C.J. Levonski, ON, two enlisted USMC ,and ten enlisted 
Guardias had a contact with a group of armed bandits at camp of Reyes 
Lopez located near Telpaneca. Destroyed camp. 

Known casualties : ON: None. 

Bandits: 3 killed. 

#158 : 19 SEPTEMBER 1930 

Contact at NARANJO, Nicaragua. C.A. (CA) 

Lieutenant A. Graves, GN, one officer and 15 enlisted had a contact 
with a group of armed bandits at El Naranjo. Patrol captured 2 rifles, 

1 pistol, 1 cutacha and 20 rounds of ammunition. Lieutenant W.A. Lee, 
GN, second in command. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 2 killed. 

#159 : 20 SEPTEMBER 1930 

Contact at EL ACHIOTE, Nicaragua. C.A. (324-234) 

Major L.P. Hunt, GN, and his patrol of four officers and forty-five 
enlisted had a contact with a group of armed bandits at El Achiote in 
the Department of Nueva Segovia. Patrol captured 1 shot-gun and 

2 cutachas. Other officers were Major W. Croka, GN, Lieutenants 
G.C. Smith, GN, J.M. Cobb, GN, and H.F.A. Long, (MC) GN. 

Known casualties : GN: 1 guardia slightly wounded. 
Bandits: 1 killed. 

#160: 20 SEPTEMBER 1930 

Contact at NARANJO, Nicaragua. C.A. (CA) 

Lieutenant R. White, GN, his patrol of one officer and ten enlisted had 
a contact with a group of bandits near Naranjo. Patrol captured two 
animals. Lieutenant Pennington, GN, second in command. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

#161 : 1 OCTOBER 1930 

Contact at EL SALTO, Nicaragua. C.A. (229-324) 
A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant W.M. Calvert, GN. had 
contact with a group of armed bandits at El Salto. Patrol captured 
1 rifle, 1 pistol, 2 machetes, 7 rounds of ammunition. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 2 killed. 

333 



#162: 2 OCTOBER 1930 

Contact at BOCA DE CUA, Nicaragua. C.A. (274-369) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain R.G. Hunt, ON, had contact 
with a group of armed bandits at Boca de Cua. 

Known casualties: ON: None. 

Bandits: 10 killed. 

#163: 4 OCTOBER 1930 

Contact at CHIPOTE MOUNTAIN, Nicaragua. C.A. (NA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain W.W. Davies. GN, had 
contact with a group of armed bandits at Chipote Mountain. Patrol 
captured 1 revolver, cutachas and machetes, Sandino flag, fuses and 
detonators. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 wounded. 

#164 : 16 OCTOBER 1930 

Contact at EL CHAGUITE, Nicaragua. C.A. (NA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant D. McDonald, GN, had 
a contact with a group of armed bandits at El Chaguite. 
Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

#165 : 19 OCTOBER 1930 

Contact at SANTULE, Nicaragua. C.A. (NA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant D. McDonald, GN, had 
a contact with a group of armed bandits at Santule. 
Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

#166: 19 OCTOBER 1930 

Contact at SAN VICENTE, Nicaragua. C.A. (NA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant J.M. Cobb, GN, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits at San Vicente. Patrol captured 
2 rifles, ammunition and supplies. 
Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 5 killed. 

#167: 23 OCTOBER 1930 

Contact at CORNET A, Nicaragua. C.A. (231-294) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Sergeant M. Guillen, GN, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits at Corneta. Patrol captured 
4 rifles, 53 rounds of ammunition and 2 cutachas. 
Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 4 killed. 

334 



#168: 26 OCTOBER 1930 

Contact at EL SALTO, Nicaragua. C.A. (NA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain A. Pefley, ON, had contact 
with a group of armed bandits at El Salto. Patrol captured 3 horses 
and bandit supplies. Lieutenant E.L. Livermore, GN, second in com- 
mand. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 2 wounded. 

#169 : 27 OCTOBER 1930 

Contact at SANTA CLARA, Nicaragua. C.A. (NA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant Caceres, GN, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits at Santa Clara. 
Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: Unknown. 

#170: 30 OCTOBER 1930 

Contact at LAS VEGAS, Nicaragua. C.A. (241-340) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant E.L. Livermore, GN, 
had contact with a group of armed bandits at Las Vegas. Patrol 
captured 2 pistols and bomb detonators. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 2 killed. 

2 wounded. 

#171: 31 OCTOBER 1930 

Contact at CIUDAD ANTIGUA, Nicaragua. C.A. (205-378) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Colonel R.L. Denig, GN, had contact 
with a group of armed bandits at Ciudad Antigua, other officers who 
participated in contact were Major L.P. Hunt, GN, Lieutenants 
S.P. Buechlein (MC) GN, and L. Torres, GN, (n). 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 wounded. 

#172 : 3 NOVEMBER 1930 

Contact at PORTAL. Nicaragua. C.A. (218-369) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain H. Pefley, GN, had contact 
with a group of armed bandits at Portal, between Telpaneca and San 
Juan de Telpaneca. Other officers who participated in contact were 
Lieutenants E.L. Livermore, GN, and M. Gomez, GN, (n). 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 
5 wounded. 

335 



#173 : 5 NOVEMBER 1930 

Contact at MATIGUAS, Nicaragua, C.A. (302-286) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Sergeant Bustamante, GN, had 
a contact with a group of armed bandits at Matiguas. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

3 wounded. 

#174 : 10 NOVEMBER 1930 

Contact at GUAPOTAL, Nicaragua. C.A. (289-302) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant R. White, GN, and 
Lieutenant Paul Kerns, GN, had contact with a group of bandits at 
Guapotal. Lieutenant White died from wounds received m contact. 

Known casualties: GN: 2 wounded. 

Bandits : Unknown. 

#175 : 11 NOVEMBER 1930 

Contact at LAS MERCEDES, Nicaragua. C.A. (CA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Sergeant Dias, GN, had contact 
with a group of armed bandits at Las Mercedes. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

#176 : 11 NOVEMBER 1930 

Contact at CLOCOTON, Nicaragua. C.A. (CA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Corporal Oviedo, GN, had contact 
with a group of armed bandits at Clocotan. Patrol captured 1 horse, 
one saddle and pistol. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits : Unknown. 

#177 : 19 NOVEMBER 1930 

Contact at TELICA, Nicaragua. C.A. (133-246) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant W. W. Stevens, GN, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits at Telica. 

Known casualties: GN: 1 killed. 

1 wounded. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

2 wounded. 



336 



#178: 19 NOVEMBER 1930 

Contact at SANTA ISABEL, Nicaragua. C.A. (CA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain L.B. Puller, ON, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits at Santa Isabel. Lieutenant 
W.A. Lee, GN, second in command. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: Unknown. 

#179: 23 NOVEMBER 1930 

Contact at EL GOLFO, Nicaragua. C.A. (234-375) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant Gomez, GN, had a contact 
with a group of armed bandits between El Golfo and Zapotillal. Patrol 
destroyed 3 bandit houses. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

#180 : 23 NOVEMBER 1930 

Contact at EL SAUCE, Nicaragua. C.A. (NA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant P.M. McCorkle, GN, had 
a contact with a group of armed bandits at El Sauce. Patrol captured 
4 bombs, 2 sticks of dynamite, 50 detonators, clothing and miscel- 
laneous articles. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 2 wounded. 

#181 : 25 NOVEMBER 1930 

Contact at LA PAVONA, Nicaragua. C.A. (CA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain L. B. Puller, GN, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits at point halfway between La 
Pavona and Guapotal. Patrol destroyed bandit camp and captured 
bombs, food, clothing and correspondence. Lieutenant W.A. Lee, 
GN, second in command. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 2 killed. 

3 wounded. 

#182 : 27 NOVEMBER 1930 

Contact at QUILALI, Nicaragua, C.A. (NA) 

Lieutenant E.G. Ross, GN, and Guardia patrol had contact with a 
group of armed bandits at Quilali. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits : Unknown. 

837 



#183 : 30 NOVEMBER 1930 

Contact at LA RICA, Nicaragua. C.A. (245-349) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain L.E. Powers, GN, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits at La Rica. Patrol captured 
10 animals, clothing, food, salt and tobacco. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

#184 : 2 DECEMBER 1930 

Contact at SAN JUAN DE TELPANECA, Nicaragua. C.A, (225-369) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant J.H. Coffman, GN, had 
a contact with a group of armed bandits at San Juan del Telpaneca. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits : Unknown, 

#185: 11 DECEMBER 1930 

Contact at SAN LUCAS, Nicaragua. C.A, (Chontales) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Corporal Urbina, GN, had a contact 
with a group of armed bandits at San Lucas. Patrol captured 3 pistols, 
2 cutachas and a cargo of contraband tobacco. 

Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded. 

Bandits: 1 wounded. 

#186 : 12 DECEMBER 1930 

Contact at VENCEDORA, Nicaragua. C.A. (253-328) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant W.A. Lee, GN, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits at Vencedora. Lieutenant 
P. Gale, GN, second in command. 

Known casualties : GN: 1 killed. 

Bandits: 4 killed. 

#187 : 15 DECEMBER 1930 

Contact at SAN ANTONIO, Nicaragua. C.A. (CA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant W.A. Lee, GN, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits at San Antonio, Other officers: 
Lieutenants P. Gale, GN, and T.R. Stuart, GN. 
Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits : Unknown. 

#188: 16 DECEMBER 1930 

Contact at LA CONSTANCIA, Nicaragua. C.A. (265-296) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant J.M. Broderick, GN, 
had contact with a group of armed bandits at La Constancia. 
Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 woanded. 

338 



#189: 20 DECEMBER 1930 

Contact at EMBOCADEROS, Nicaragua. C.A. (252-331) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant W.A. Lee, ON, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits at Embocaderos. Other officers. 
Lieutenants P. Gale, GN, and T.R. Stuart, GN. 
Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: Unknown. 

#190 : 23 DECEMBER 1930 

Contact at SAN JUAN DE TELPANECA, Nicaragua. C.A. (225-368) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant J.M. Broderick, GN, 
had a contact with a group of armed bandits at San Juan de Telpaneca. 
Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

#191 : 28 DECEMBER 1930 

Contact at EL SALTO, Nicaragua. C.A. (NA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant G.C. Smith, GN, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits at El Salto. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: Unknown. 

#192 : 29 DECEMBER 1930 

Contact at SISLE, Nicaragua. C.A. (243-224) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant T.R. Stuart, GN, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits at Sisle. Patrol captured 2 rifles, 
30 rounds of ammunition, 1 bomb, 6 cutachas, food and clothing. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 6 killed. 

5 wounded. 

#193 : 31 DECEMBER 1930 

Contact at QUILALI, Nicaragua. C.A. (243-365) 

The Guardia cuartel at Quilali was attacked by a large bandit group 
on the night of 30 December, 1930. The garrison was commanded by 
Lieutenant J. H. Coffman, GN, and Lieutenant R.H.A. Forsyth, (MC), 
GN, at the time of the attack. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 2 killed. 



#194: 1 JANUARY 1931 

Contact at CERRO DEL BONETE, Nicaragua. C.A. (CA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant B. Navarrete, GN, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits at Cerro del Bonete. Patrol 
captured 5 animals with saddles, 2 rifles, ammunition, raincoats, rifle 
grenade. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 4 killed. 

#195: 1 JANUARY 1931 

Contact at ZAPOTILLAL, Nicaragua. C.A. (241-373) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain W.P. Kelly ,GN, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits at Zapotillal. Patrol destroyed 
one bandit camp. 

Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

#196: 1 JANUARY 1931 

Contact at ZAPOTILLAL #2, Nicaragua. C.A. (241-373) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant J. H. Satterfield, GN, had 
a contact with a group of armed bandits at Zapotillal. Patrol destroyed 
three bandit camps. 
Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: Unknown. 

#197: 2 JANUARY 1931 

Contact at CHAGUITILLO, Nicaragua. C.A. (CA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant W.F. Pulver, GN, had 
a contact with a group of armed bandits at Chaguitillo. Patrol captured 
1 rifle, 1 pistol, 2000 lbs. cheese, 45 rounds of ammunition and 2 mules 
with saddles. 
Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 2 killed. 

#198: 2 JANUARY 1931 

Contact at CHIPOTE, Nicaragua. C.A. (248-379) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant C.L. Levonski, GN, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits at Chipote. 
Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 



840 



#199: 3 JANUARY 1931 

Contact at NARANJO, Nicaragua. C.A. (CA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant O.E. Pennington, GN, 
had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Naranjo. Patrol 
captured 1 cutacha. 
Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: Unknown. 

#200: 4 JANUARY 1931 

Contact at LICOROY, Nicaragua. C.A. (21 1-289) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant D. McDonald, GN, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits at Licoroy. 
Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 3 killed. 

4 wounded. 

#201 : 5 JANUARY 1931 

Contact at LOS CEDROS, Nicaragua. C.A. (121-319- 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain W.C. Bales, GN, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits at Los Cedros. Patrol captured 
1 rifle, 1 1 hats. Lieutenant C. Clark, GN, second in command. 
Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 4 wounded. 

#202: 6 JANUARY 1931 

Contact at SANTANA, Nicaragua. C.A. (NA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain G.A. Williams, GN, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits at Santana. Patrol captured 
1 pistol, 2 cutachas, food and clothing. Bandit camp destroyed. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

#203: 12 JANUARY 1931 

Contact at LOS PLANOS, Nicaragua. C.A. (NA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant J. M. Broderick, GN, had 
a contact with a group of armed bandits at Los Pianos. Bandit camp 
and food destroyed. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 wounded. 

#204 : 12 JANUARY 193 1 

Contact at BALSAMO, Nicaragua. C.A. (NA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant J. M. Broderick, GN, had 
a contact with a group of armed bandits at Balsamo. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

341 



#205: 19 JANUARY 1931 

Contact at PALACAGUINA, Nicatagua. C.A. (200-254) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant H.E. Kipp, GN, had a 
contact with a group of armicd bandits at Palacaguina. 

Known casualties : GN : 1 wounded. 

Bandits: Unknown. 

#206: 19 JANUARY 1931 

Contact at SOMOTO, Nicaragua. C.A. (167-356) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant F.H. McGorkle, GN, had 
a contact with a group of armed bandits at Somoto. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 5 wounded. 

#207 : 19 JANUARY 1931 

Contact at SOMOTO, Nicaragua. C.A. (167-356) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain G.A. Williams, GN, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits at Somoto. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 2 wounded. 

#208 : 23 JANUARY 1931 

Contact at OLOGALPA, Nicaragua. C.A. (NA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant J.H. Satterfield, GN, 
had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Ologalpa. 
Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 4 killed. 

3 v/ounded. 

#209 : 26 JANUARY 1931 

Contact at SANTA ROSA, Nicaragua. C.A. (NA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain G.A. Williams, GN, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits at Santa Rosa. Bandit camp 
destroyed by patrol. 
Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 2 wounded. 

#210 : 26 JANUARY 1931 

Contact at LA GRORIA, Nicaragua. C.A. (166-238) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant Barillas, GN, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits at La Gloria. Bandit camp 
destroyed by patrol. 

Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

342 



#211: 26 JANUARY 1931 

Contact at EL GALLO, EASTERN AREA, Nicaragua. (422-320) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant L. Curcey, GN, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits at El Gallo. 
Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits : Unknown. 

#212: 30 JANUARY 1931 

Contact at LA LAGUNA, Nicaragua. C.A. (CA) 

A Guardia patrol of six enlisted had a contact with a group of armed 
bandits at La Laguna. The patrol captured 2 pistols. 
Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 2 killed. 

#213: 5 FEBRUARY 1931 

Contact at SAN GERONIMO, Nicaragua. C.A. (NA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant C.H. Clark, GN, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits at San Geronimo. 
Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 2 killed. 

10 wounded. 

#214 : 6 FEBRUARY 1931 

Contact at SAN ANTONIO, Nicaragua. C.A. (NA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain GA. Williams, GN, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits at San Antonio. The patrol 
captured 1 saddle and ammunition. 
Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 2 killed. 

#215 : 6 FEBRUARY 1931 

Contact at LA GUAYABA, Nicaragua. C.A. (177-354) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain GA. Williams, GN, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits at La Guayaba. 
Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 3 killed. 

1 wounded. 

#216 : 8 FEBRUARY 1931 

Contact at PIEDRAS DE AMOLAR, Nicaragua. C.A. (132-375) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant J. R. Pattison, GN, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits at Piedras de Amolar. Patrol 
captured 1 rifie and 2 cutachas. 
Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 2 killed. 

343 



#217 : 16 FEBRUARY 1931 

Contact at EL TULE, Nicaragua. C.A. (NA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain G.A. Williams, GN, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits at El Tule. Patrol captured 
1 rifle, and 6 cutachas. 
Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 5 wounded. 

#218 : 20 FEBRUARY 1931 

Contact at LOWER BARYAL, Nicaragua. C.A. (NA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant J.H. Satterfield, GN, 
had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Lower Baryal. 
Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

1 wounded. 

#219 : 20 FEBRUARY 1931 

Contact at PATASTE AND SAVANAS, Nicaragua. C.A. (NA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant F.H. McGorkle, GN, 
had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Pataste. 
Known casualties: GN: 2 wounded. 

Bandits: 11 killed. 

#220 : 24 FEBRUARY 1931 

Contact at SOMOTO MOUNTAIN, Nicaragua. C.A. (168-345) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant F.H. McGorkle, GN, 
had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Somoto Mountain. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits : Unknown. 

#221: 25 FEBRUARY 1931 

Contact at COYOLITO, Nicaragua. C.A. (CA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant M.G. Alexander, GN, 
had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Coyolito. Patrol 

captured 1 pistol and ammunition. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

#222: 1 MARCH 1931 

Contact at DARAILI, Nicaragua. C.A. (216-347) 

A Guardia patrol of five enlisted had a contact with a group of armed 
bandits at Daraili. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 5 killed. 

20 wounded. 

344 



#223: 3 MARCH 1931 

Contact at DUCUELITO, Nicarauga. C.A. (201-348) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant H.E. Kipp, GN, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits at Ducuelito. Patrol captured 

3 rifles, 1 bomb, 1 cutacha, 5 animals and 3 saddles. Also 400 rounds 
of ammunition. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 5 killed. 

10 wounded. 

#224: 3 MARCH 1931 

Contact at DUCUELITO, Nicaragua, C.A. (201-348) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant J. Hamas, GN, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits at Ducuelito. Patrol captured 

4 animals, 2 saddles and 200 pounds of coffee. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 2 wounded. 

#225: 4 MARCH 1931 

Contact at CUSMAJE, Nicaragua, C.A. (203-360) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant J.O. Brauer, GN, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits at Cusmaje. Patrol captured 
2 rifles. 

Known casualties : GN : 1 wounded. 

Bandits : Unknown. 

#226: 8 MARCH 1931 

Contact at PORTILLO, Nicaragua, C.A. (CHONTALES) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant A.W. Kessler, GN, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits at Portillo. 

Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded. 

Bandits: Unknown. 

#227: 8 MARCH 1931 

Contact at LIMON, Nicaragua, C.A. (NA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant J.O. Brauer, GN, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits at Limon. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits : Unknown. 



345 



#228: 21 MARCH 1931 

Contact at LA LUNA, Nicaragua, C.A. (NA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant B. Klein, GN, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits at La Luna. Patrol captured 
1 pistol, 1 bomb, 1 cutacha. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 2 killed. 

1 wounded. 

#229: 22 MARCH 1931 

Contact at RIO NEGRO, Nicaragua, C.A. (305-249) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant E. Matamoros, GN, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits at Rio Negro. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits : Unknown. 

#230: 23 MARCH 1931 

Contact at CHAGUITE GRANDE, Nicaragua, C.A. (NA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant B. Klein, GN, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits at Chaguite Grande. Patrol 
captured 2 bombs and 2 cutachas. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 4 killed. 

#231: 24 MARCH 1931 

Contact at ALTA GRACIA, Nicaragua, C.A. (283-132) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain W.P. Kelley, GN, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits at Alta Gracia. 

Known casualties: GN: 1 killed. 

3 wounded. 
Bandits: Unknown. 

#232: 1 APRIL 1931 

Contact at SAN RAFAEL, Nicaragua, C.A. (CA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by an N.C.O., had contact with a group 

of armed bandits at San Rafael. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits : Unknown. 

#233: 7 APRIL 1931 

Contact at LAS CANAS, Nicaragua, C.A. (NA) 
A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant P.H. McGorkle, GN, had 
a contact with a group of armed bandits at Las Canas. Patrol captured 
a quantity of pistol ammunition. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 2 wounded. 

346 



#234: 9 APRIL 1931 

Contact at CEDERALES, Nicaragua, C.A. (CA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain A.N. Fricke, GN, had a 

contact with a group of armed bandits at Cederales. Patrol captured 

4 horses, 2 mules, 1 bull, 3 dynamite bombs, food, detonators and 

3 machetes. Lieutenant E.J. Rittman, second in command. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits : Unknown. 

#235: 11 APRIL 1931 

Contact at LOGTOWN, Nicaragua, C.A. (491-468) 
A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain H. Pefley, GN, had a contact 
with a group of armed bandits at Logtown. 

Known casualties: GN: Captain Pefley and 1 guardia killed. 
Bandits: Unknown. 

#236: 12 APRIL 1931 

Contact at MOSS FARM, Nicaragua, C.A. (492-463) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant C.R. Darrah, GN, had a 

contact with a group of armed bandits at Moss Farm. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: Unknown. 

#237: 13 APRIL 1931 

Contact at CUYUTIGNY, Nicaragua, C.A. (485-473) 
A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain U.C. Wood, GN, had a 
contact v/ith a group of armed bandits at Cuyutigny. Patrol destroyed 
a bandit supply train. Lieutenant T. Simmer (MC) GN, other officer 
with patrol. 

Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded. 

Bandits: 8 killed. 

2 wounded. 

#238: 14 APRIL 1931 

Contact at AMUCAYAN, Nicaragua, C.A. (199-369) 
A Guardia patrol commanded by Sergeant Altamirano, GN, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits at Amucayan. Patrol captured 
1 rifle, 2 machetes and food. 

Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded. 

Bandits: 4 killed. 

#239: 16 APRIL 1931 

Contact at NEW VANCE TRACT, Nicaragua, C.A. (FA) 
A Guardia patrol comimanded by Lieutenant C.R. Darrah, GN, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits at New Vance Tract. Patrol 
captured various articles of plunder. 

Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded. 

Bandits : Unknown. 

347 



#240: 16 APRIL 1931 

Contact at RIO ABA JO, Nicaragua, C.A. (194-338) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant C. Rodriguez, GN, had 
a contact with a group of armed bandits at Rio Abajo. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits : Unknown. 

#241: 19 APRIL 1931 

Contact at CERRO GRANDE, Nicaragua, C.A. (181-337) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant H.E. Kipp, GN, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits at Cerro Grande. Patrol 
captured 5 machetes, hat bands and food. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

#242: 23 APRIL 1931 

Contact at LECUS RIVER, Nicaragua, C.A. (501-474) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain O.A. Inman, GN, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits at Lecus River. 
Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 4 killed. 

3 wounded. 

#243: 27 APRIL 1931 

Contact at AGUACATE, Nicaragua, C.A. (NA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant D.L. Truesdale, GN, 
had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Aguacate. Patrol 
captured 11 animals and blankets. 
Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 2 killed. 

#244: 28 APRIL 1931 

Contact at LAS CUCHILLAS, Nicaragua, C.A. (255-330) 
A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant D.L. Truesdale, GN, 
had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Las Cuchillas. Patrol 
captured 2 bombs, hats, clothing, flashlights and hat-bands. 
Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

10 wounded. 



348 



#245: 2 MAY 1931 

Contact at LA PINEDA, Nicaragua, C.A. (CA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant S.M. Ragsdale, GN, had a 

contact with a group of armed bandits at La Pineda. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 wounded. 

#246: 10 MAY 1931 

Contact at YALI, Nicaragua, C.A. (232-336) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain A.H. Fricke, GN, had a 

contact with a group of armed bandits at Yali. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 2 wounded. 

#247: 10 MAY 1931 

Contact at CUA RIVER, Nicaragua, C.A. (CA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain L.B. Puller, GN, had a 

contact with a group of armed bandits at Cua River. Patrol captured 

2 rifles, 2 cutachas, and ammunition. Lieutenant W.A. Lee, GN, 

second in command. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 2 killed. 

#248: 13 MAY 1931 

Contact at LAGARTILLO, Nicaragua, C.A. (NA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant M.H. Bell, GN, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits at Lagartillo. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits : Unknown. 

#249: 13 MAY 1931 

Contact at EL SALTO, Nicaragua, C.A. (229-324) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant H.D. Hutchcroft, GN, 
had a contact with a group of armed bandits at El Salto. 

Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded. 

Bandits: 6 killed. 

#250: 13 MAY 1931 

Contact at JOCOTILLO, Nicaragua, C.A. (NA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain J.C. McQueen, GN, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits at Jocotillo. 

Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded. 

Bandits: 3 killed. 

349 



#251: 13 MAY 1931 

Contact at EL PAJARITO, Nicaragua, C.A. (NA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant G.C. Smith, ON, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits at El Pajarito. Patrol captured 
1 pistol, and ammunition. 

Known casualties : ON: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

#252: 15 MAY 1931 

Contact at PALACAGUINA, Nicaragua, C.A. (200-354) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant J.O. Brauer, GN, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits which attacked Palacaguina. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 5 killed. 

#253: 15 MAY 1931 

Contact at PALACAGUINA, Nicaragua, C.A. (200-354) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant H.E. Kipp, GN, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits at Palacaguina. Patrol captured 

1 rifle, 2 bombs, 1 mule and ammunition. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

#254: 16 MAY 1931 

Contact at CUJE MINE, Nicaragua, C.A. (201-365) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant R.A. Trosper, GN, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits at Cuje Mine. Patrol captured 

2 cutachas. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 5 killed. 

#255: 16 MAY 1931 

Contact at CUJE MINE, Nicaragua, C.A. (201-365) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant J.O. Brauer, GN, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits at Cuje Mine. Patrol captured 
1 bomb and miscellaneous bandit articles. Lieutenant H.A. Kipp, 
GN, second in command. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: Unknown. 



350 



#256: 25 MAY 1931 

Contact at LA COLMENA, Nicaragua, C.A. (NA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant J. Hamas, GN, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits at La Colmena. Patrol captured 
1 rifle, and 3 ponchos. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 2 killed. 

8 wounded. 

#257: 9 JUNE 1931 

Contact at LAS CRUCES, Nicaragua, C.A. (239-367) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant E.C. Ross, GN, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits at Las Cruces. 

Known casualties : GN : 3 wounded including Lieutenant Ross. 
Bandits: 1 killed. 

#258: 14 JUNE 1931 

Contact at CUJE, Nicaragua, C.A. (201-365) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant E.L. Livermore, GN, 
had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Cuje. Patrol captured 

1 revolver, cutachas and a quantity of ammunition. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

#259: 15 JUNE 1931 

Contact at EMBOCADEROS, Nicaragua, C.A. (252-331) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain L. Powers, GN, had'a contact 
with a group of armed bandits at Embocaderos. 

Known casualties: GN: 3 killed including Captain Powers and 

Lieutenant McGhee. 
Bandits: 7 killed. 

#260: 29 JUNE 1931 

Contact at TAMARINDO, Nicaragua, C.A. (NA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant E.N. Munoz, GN, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits at Tamarindo. Patrol captured 

2 bombs, 3 cutachas, correspondence, food and clothing. 
Known casualties : GN : None. 

Bandits: 2 killed. 



351 



#261: 1 JULY 1931 

Contact at LIMAY, Nicaragua, C.A. (188-291) 

Captain J.C. McQueen, ON, Lieutenant J.R. Bell, ON, and Guardia 

stationed at Limay, repulsed a bandit attack on the town. 

Known casualties : ON: 1 wounded. 

Bandits: 2 killed. 

1 1 wounded. 

#262: 1 JULY 1931 

Contact at LIMAY, Nicaragua, C.A. (188-291) 
A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant G.C. Smith, GN, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits at Limay. 
Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded. 

Bandits: Unknown. 

#263: 9 JULY 1931 

Contact at GUAYUCALI, Nicaragua, C.A. (215-355) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant C.H. Clark, GN, had 

contact with a group of armed bandits at Guayucali. Patrol captured 

1 revolver and miscellaneous bandit articles. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 3 killed. 

1 wounded. 

#264: 17 JULY 1931 

Contact at KISALAYA, Nicaragua, C.A. (473-503) 
A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain O.A. Inman, GN, Lieutenant 
T.M. Stephenson, GN, Lieutenant J. Montenegro, GN, had a contact 
with a group of armed bandits at Kisalaya. 
Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded. 

Bandits: 3 wounded. 

#265: 19 JULY 1931 

Contact at SANTO DOMINGO, Nicaragua, C.A. (Chontales) 
A Guardia patrol commanded by Corporal Castillo, GN, had a contact 
with a group of armed bandits at Santo Domingo. 
Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 wounded. 

#266: 19 JULY 1931 

Contact at RAMA, Nicaragua, C.A. (449-198) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant F. Rewie, GN, had a 

contact with a group of armed bandits at Rama. 

Known casualties: GN: 1 killed. 

2 wounded. 
Bandits: 2 killed. 

2 wounded. 

352 



#267: 20 JULY 1931 

Contact at REAL DE LA CRUZ, Nicaragua, C.A. (205-272) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant HJ. Elliott, ON, and 
Lieutenant E.H. Schmierer, GN, had a contact with a group of armed 
bandits at Real de la Cruz. Patrol captured 2 animals and 1 rifle. 
Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits : Unknown. 

#268: 20 JULY 1930 

Contact at ZAPISCAN, Nicaragua, C.A. (CA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant H.J. Elliott, GN, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits at Zapiscan. Patrol captured 
2 aparejos and ammunition, 1 rifle, and 2 animals. 
Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded. 

Bandits: 8 wounded. 

#269: 22 JULY 1931 

Contact at SANTA ROSA, Nicaragua, C.A. (NA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant Zavala, GN, had a contact 
with a group of armed bandits at Santa Rosa. Patrol captured 1 pistol. 
Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 wounded. 

#270: 23 JULY 1931 

Contact at LAS CRUCES, Nicaragua, C.A. (Dept. Leon) 

Lieutenants W.W. Stevens and Castillo, GN, with patrol had contact 
with a group of armed bandits at Las Cruces. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 2 wounded. 

#271: 25 JULY 1931 

Contact at PAVONA, Nicaragua, C.A. (CA-) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant W.F. Bryson, GN, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits at Pavona. 
Known casualties : GN: 1 killed. 

Bandits: Unknown. 

#272: 26 JULY 1931 

Contact at SACKLIN, Nicaragua, C.A. (EA) 

Lieutenants C.J. Levonski and T.M. Stevenson, GN, with Guardia 
patrol had contact with a group of armed bandits at Sacklin. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits : Unknown. 



353 



#273: 28 JULY 1931 

Contact at CHAMASTE, Nicaragua, C.A. (341-359) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant D.L. Truesdale, GN, 
had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Chamaste. Patrol 
captured 4 shot-guns, shells, cartridges and miscellaneous articles. 
Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 3 wounded. 

#274: 30 JULY 1931 

Contact at TOTOGALPA, Nicaragua, C.A. (188-368) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant E.L. Livermore, GN, 
had a contact with a group of armed bandits at Totogalpa. Patrol 
captured 25 cow-hides, hat bands and miscellaneous bandit articles. 
Also destroyed bandit camp. 
Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

1 wounded. 

#275: 14 AUGUST 1931 

Contact at LAS CUCHILLAS, Nicaragua, C.A. (255-330) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain A.R. Bourne, GN, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits at Las Cuchillas. The Patrol 
captured 1 rifle, and various articles of clothing. Other officers in 
patrol were Lieutenants O.C. Ledbetter, GN, W.F. Pulver, and R.A. 
Thompson, GN. 
Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

1 wounded. 

#276: 23 AUGUST 1931 

Contat at LA MUTA, Nicaragua, C.A. (192-361) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant R.A. Trosper, GN, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits at La Muta. 
Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 wounded. 

#277: 26 AUGUST 1931 

Contact at BUENA VISTA, Nicaragua, C.A. (NA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant Delgadillo, GN, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits at Buena Vista. Patrol captured 
6 machetes, correspondence and red and black neckerchiefs. 
Known casualties : GN : M None. 

Bandits: 1 wounded. 

2 killed. 

854 



#278: 29 AUGUST 1931 

Contact at CHAMASTE, #2, Nicaragua, C.A. (341-359) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Captain GK. Frisbie, GN, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits at Chamaste. Patrol captured 
1 S&W pistol .38, 3 Lewis Drums, 3 BAR magazines, 1 Krag rifle, 
8 dynamite sticks, 10 yards of fuse, 3 dry bombs, 210 rounds of ammuni- 
tion, 1 bugle, 2 bayonets, 5 haversacks, bandit guard book, bandit 
correspondence, flags, insignia and clothing. Other officers were 
Lieutenant D.L. Truesdale, GN, and Lieutenant Delgadillo, GN. 
Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

2 wounded. 

#279: 3 SEPTEMBER 1931 

Contact at ACOYAPA, Nicaragua, C.A. (240-168) 

A Guardia patrol had a contact with a group of armed bandits at 
Acoyapa. Patrol captured 2 pistols, 1 Krag rifle and 2 shotguns. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 2 killed. 

#280 : 19 SEPTEMBER 1931 

Contact at JICARITO, Nicaragua, C.A. (NA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant R.E. Vogel, GN, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits at Jicarito. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

1 wounded. 

#281 : 22 SEPTEMBER 1931 

Contact at SIERRO BOLSON, Nicaragua, C.A. (NA) 

A Guardia patrol had a contact with a group of armed bandits at 
Sierro Bolson. Patrol captured 2 Krag rifles, 2 shot-guns, 8 cutachas 
and ammunition. Patrol in command of Sgt. Tapia, GN. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits : Unknown. 

#282: 23 SEPTEMBER 1931 

Contact at ASARYAL, Jinotega, Nicaragua, C.A. (CA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant M. A. Cramer, GN, had 
a contact with a group of armed bandits at Asaryal. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits : Unknown. 

355 



#283 : 25 SEPTEMBER 1931 

Contact at LAS NUBES, Nicaragua, C.A. (CA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant S.M. Ragsdale, GN, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits at Las Nubes. Patrol captured 
3 rifles, ammunition, dynamite, 2 cargo mules, 9 flashlights, 12 rain- 
coats, 35 salbeques, 34 hats, 1 guitar, 6 pr shoes, 4 pr putees, 18 blankets, 
9 towels, 1 clock, 20 pr trousers, 24 shirts, 400 cigars and 500 cigarettes, 
medicines, machetes, cutachas, belts, womens apparel, rubber sacks, 
cloth, candles, cartons of matches and innumerable other articles. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 5 killed. 

20 wounded. 

#284: 25 SEPTEMBER 1931 

Contact at SAN LUIS, Nicaragua, C.A. (NA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant J. B. Hancock, GH, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits at San Luis. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: Unknown. 

#285 : 25 SEPTEMBER 1931 

Contact at SAN DIEGO, Nicaragua, C.A. (NA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant J. B. Hancock, GN, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits at San Diego. Partol captured 
1 rifle and miscellaneous bandit articles. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 3 killed. 

#286 : 25 SEPTEMBER 1931 

Contact at SAN LUIS, Nicaragua, C.A. (NA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant R.A. Trosper, GN, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits at San Luis. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 3 wounded. 

#287 : 27 SEPTEMBER 1931 

Contact at SANTO TOMAS, Nicaragua, C.A. (NA) 

A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant L.A. Kalman, GN, had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits at Santo Tomas. Patrol captured 
1 rifle, cutachas. Destroyed a bandit camp. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 wounded. 
2 captured. 

356 



#288: 3 OCTOBER 1931 

Contact at NARANJA, Nicaragua, C.A. 

(158-333)(2dBrig. Spl.) 
Captain G.A. Williams, GN, and Somoto Guardia patrol had contact 
with a bandit group of 40, believed to have been under jefe Juan 
Gregorio Colindres, near Naranja. The bandits employed rifles, 
revolvers and dynamite bombs. Guardia captured 4 rifles, 10 bombs, 
12 dynamite sticks, 132 rounds ammunition, 7 cutachas, 1 rifle grenade 
discharger, rifle grenade carrier, 3 saddles, 2 horses, 12 blankets, 9 
ponchos and large amount of miscellaneous articles of loot. Bandits 
fled in easterly direction. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 2 killed. 

3 wounded. 

#289: 6 OCTOBER 1931 

Contact at MALETA, Nicaragua, C.A. (200-333)(2d Brig. Spl) 

Captain J.O. Brauer, GN, and Palacaguina Guardia patrol had a 
contact with a small group of bandits in Maleta near Limon. Engage- 
ment lasted a very short time. Bandits fled leaving behind miscel- 
laneous articles of clothing including red-black hat bands. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits : Unknown. 

#290 : 9 OCTOBER 1931 

Contact at CERRO DEL MO JON, Nicaragua, C.A. 

(232-322)(2d Brig. Spl.) 
Lieutenant Matamoros, GN, and La Concordia Guardia patrol had a 
contact with a group of armed bandits near Cerro del Mojon. Contact 
lasted about two minutes. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 2 wounded. 

#291 : 12 OCTOBER 1931 

Contact at (NORTH OF STO DOMINGO) 

(180-368) Nueva Segovia Map. 
A Guardia patrol under charge of a Non-commissioned Officer had 
contact with a group of armed bandits north of Sto. Domingo. Jefe 
unknown. The patrol was fired upon and returned the fire killing one. 
Bandit camp destroyed. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

357 



#292 : 12 OCTOBER 1931 

Contact at LA MUTA, Nicaragua, C.A. 

(194-357)(Nueva Segovia Map) 
Lieutenant C.A. Brown, ON, and Yalaguina Guardia patrol had 
contact with a group of armed bandits under Felicito Prado at La Muta. 
Contact took place in very heavy underbrush. The Guardia captured 
cutachas, machetes, blankets, hammock, tobacco, hat bands, clothing, 
rope, other miscellaneous articles and destroyed a bandit camp. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: Unknown. 

#293 : 13 OCTOBER 1931 

Contact at ZAPOTE MOUNTAIN, Nicaragua, C.A. 

(168-347)(Nueva Segovia Map) 
Captain G.A. Williams, GN, and Somoto Guardia patrol returned to 
Somoto on October 14. Reports having picked up bandit tracks in 
the morning of October 13 near Zapote Mountain and followed same 
to point 169-346 (Nueva Segovia Map) where newly constructed camp 
was located and destroyed. The bandits were apparently warned of 
approach of the patrol and fled, leaving behind various articles of food 
and clothing. Followed tracks to southeast and at 1.00 PM sighted 
a large group across deep ravine near point 172-345 (Nueva Segovia 
Map) fleeing to south. Followed group to point 169-343 (Nueva 
Segovia Map) where part of group, apparently to facilitate escape of 
main group, formed a firing line some two hundred yards long on small 
hills, and opened fire on patrol at range of about three thousand yards 
as latter approached across open valley. Due to long range, fire was 
not returned by patrol until within about four hundred yards when 
bandits prepared to abandon position. Bandits fled to hills on flanks 
which were bombed with rifle grenades. The patrol pursued the main 
group towards point 175-341 (Nueva Segovia Map) firing at small 
groups of stragglers at long range. Darkness overtook the patrol 
at the last named location and shortly afcerwards the bandits split 
into small groups proceeding across country in various directions but 
mostly south. The natives claim the group numbered over one hundred, 
but, from views of columns from considerable distance, the patrol 
leader believes the number to have been approximately eighty, three- 
fourths armed with rifles or revolvers, no machine guns, and carrying 
a large red flag. The jefes were recognized as Santos Benavides, Daniel 
Rios and a Colonel Morales. The patrol pursued to point of exhaustion 
but due to nature of the country and rapid flight of the bandits, close 
contact could not be gained with main group before darkness made 
possible their escape. During more than five hours pursuit the bandits 
abandoned various articles, including bayonets, cutachas, flashlights, 
food and clothing. On the morning of October 14th the patrol, was 
unable to pick up definite tracks or inform.ation other than vague report 
that the group was thought to be proceeding towards Colorado (1 79-334) 
(Nueva Segovia Map). 

Known casualties: GN; None. 

Bandits : Unknown. 

358 



#294: 14 OCTOBER 1931 

Contact at BIG FALLS, Nicaragua, C.A. (1 14-309)(Pefely Map) 

Lieutenant C. Rodriguez, GN, Lieutenant J.L. McClung, GN, and 
Guardia patrol from Bluefields (5th Regt. Map 28-KK.4) had contact 
with bandits at Big Falls. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 4 killed. 

7 wounded. 

#295 : 18 OCTOBER 1931 

Contact at LA MUTA, Nicaragua, C.A. 

(192-358)(Nueva Segovia Map) 
Lieutenant G.K. Burt, GN, and Totogalpa (178-354) Guardia patrol 
had contact with a group of armed bandits under a minor jefe, Catalino 
Vargas, in the vicinity of point 192-358 (Nueva Segovia Map) near 
La Muta. The bandits were armed with rifles, shot-guns, pistols and 
cutachas. The Guardia captured several hats with red and black bands. 
Destroyed a bandit camp. Guardia patrol pursued bandits after the 
engagement but were unable to regain contact. 
Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

#296 : 22 OCTOBER 1931 

Contact at LIMON, Nicaragua, C.A. (200-3 53)(2d Brig. Spl.) 

Lieutenant H.E. Kipp, GN, and Palacaguina Guardia patrol located 
and destroyed a small bandit camp near Limon. Camp consisted of 
tv/o shacks occupied by five or six bandits, armed with two shot-guns 
and three pistols, under a minor jefe, Rosendo Munoz. The patrol 
killed one bandit, identified as Quintero Cupertino. Captured 1 
cutacha, 2 machetes, 3 hat bands, 1 flashlight, 1 powder horn, detonators 
for shot-gun shells, 1 bag with medicines, small quantity of rifle and 
pistol ammunition, lead balls for shot-guns, a Juez de Mesta commission 
signed by Ortez and Salgado, also miscellaneous articles such as soap, 
mochillas (knapsacks) and scabbards. No Guardia casualties. 
Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

#297: 23 OCTOBER 1931 

Contact at LAS CRUCES, Nicaragua, C.A. (227-365)(2d Brig. Spl) 

Captain G.K. Frisbie, Lieutenant D.L. Truesdale, GN, and Quilali 

Guardia patrol had contact with a bandit group armed, under jefe 

Roque Vargas near Las Cruces. Group was armed mostly with cutachas 

and pistols. Captured 1 pistol, bandit letter and other miscellaneous 

articles. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 4 killed. 

Wounded several. 

359 



#298 : 24 OCTOBER 193 1 

Contact at LA MUTA, Nicaragua, C.A. 

(194-357)(Nueva Segovia Map) 
Lieutenant C.A. Brown, GN, and Yalaguina Guardia patrol had contact 
with a small group of bandits, jefe unknown, near La Muta. Patrol 
destroyed two small bandit camps. Captured 8 rounds of Krag am- 
munition, 1 cutacha, 1 cartridge belt, 1 raincoat, several blankets and 
articles of clothing including shoes. Also a commission of Felicito 
Prado as Captain, signed by Sandino. 
Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: Unknown. 

#299 : 24 OCTOBER 1931 

Contact at LAIMUS, Nicaragua, C.A. (141-352)(Pefiey Map) 

Lieutenant E.J. Suprenaut, GN, and Kisalaya Guardia patrol had 

contact with a group of armed bandits number estimated at 100 and 

armed with rifles and two sub-Thompson Guns, on the outskirts of 

Laimus. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: Killed several. 

#300 : 27 OCTOBER 1931 

Contact at CUYUTINGNI, Nicaragua, C.A. (1 52-337)(Pefley Map) 
Lieutenant F. Gaitan, GN, and Puerto Cabezas Guardia patrol had 
contact with a group of armed bandits estimated as 50 under jefe 
Chavarria at Cuyutingni. 
Known casualties : GN: 1 killed. 

Bandits: 7 killed. 

#301 : 27 OCTOBER 1931 

Contact at SAULALLA, Nicaragua, C.A. (24.3-B.4 5th Reg. Map) 
Lieutenant T.M. Stephenson, GN, and Kisalaya Guardia patrol had a 
contact at Saulalla with a large armed group of bandits, leader reported 
to be Altamirano. 
Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: Unknown. 

#302: 30 OCTOBER 1931 

Contact at LA QUINTECA, Nicaragua, C.A. 

(43.7-24.8 Mc Donald Map) 
Lieutenant J. M. Stanko, GN, and Condega Guardia patrol had contact 
with a group of armed bandits under Umanzor at La Quinteca. Bandit 
casualties 1 killed and several wounded. Patrol captured 1 pistol 
cal. .38, 1 poncho, red and black hat bands, 5 pair of shoes, 8 horses and 
4 saddles. Dead bandit buried at place of contact. Bandits armed with 
rifies and pistols. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

Several wounded. 

360 



#303: 31 OCTOBER 1931 

Contact at SAN BENITO, Nicaragua, C.A. 

(299-373)(Nueva Segovia Map) 
Lieutenant Delgadillo, GN, Lieutenant Whitford, GN, and San Juan 
de Telpaneca Guardia patrol had contact with an armed group of 
bandits at San Benito, jefe unknown. 
Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 2 killed. 

1 wounded. 

#304: 1 NOVEMBER 1931 

Contact at LATUNA, Nicaragua, C.A. (177-342 2d Brig. Spl.) 

Lieutenant C.A. Brown, GN, and Yalaguina Guardia patrol had contact 
with a group of armed bandits under jefe Felicito Prado, number 
unknown, in vicinity of a point on trail between Palacaguina and 
Yalaguina about one and one half mile north of Latuna at 2:00 AM. 
No Guardia casualties. Captured 1 pistol, 1 shot-gun, 2 cutachas, 
red and black hat bands, 2 hammocks, 3 blankets and large bundle of 
stolen articles. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

Several wounded. 

#305: 2 NOVEMBER 1931 

Contact at SANTA ROSA, Nicaragua, C.A. 

(189-274 2d Brig. Spl.) 
Lieutenant H.D. Hutchcroft, GN, and El Sauce Guardia patrol had 
contact with a group of bandits, estimated as 100, fully clad in khaki 
clothing, under jefes Juan Morales and Jose Leon Diaz and possibly 
Salgado. Contact lasted one half hour. The guardia lost three rifles 
and a small quantity of ammunition. Late reports state that one jefe 
was shot through the stomach and has probably died, another jefe 
has a broken arm from bullet wounds and that several bandits were 
wounded. 

Known casualties : GN: 3 killed. 

Bandits: 5 killed. 

#306: 9 NOVEMBER 1931 

Contact at TRINIDAD, Nicaragua, C.A. (204-286 2d Brig. Spl.) 

Lieutenant Zavala and La Trinidad Guardia patrol had contact with 
a group of armed bandits under Jose Leon Diaz at a point west of 
Trinidad. No results. 

Known casualties :GN: None. 

Bandits : Unknown. 



361 



#307: 11 NOVEMBER 1931 

Contact at CANAS, Nicaragua, C.A. (158-352 2d Brig. Spl.) 

Captain G.A. Williams, ON, and Somoto Guardia patrol had a contact 
with a group of bandits armed, under jefe Segundo Alfaro near Canas. 
Bandits scattered in all directions. Located and destroyed a well 
hidden and well fortified bandit camp with long and rock firing positions 
and two machine gun emplacements covering approaches to camp. 

Known casualties: ON: None. 

Bandits: Unknown. 

#308 : 11 NOVEMBER 1931 

Contact at MILIGROS, Nicaragua, C.A. 

(242-384 Nueva Segovia Map) 
Lieutenant J. Hamas, GN, and Jicaro guardia patrol had contact 
with a group of armed bandits, jefe unknown, near Miligros. Patrol 
captured 2 prisoners, 1 bomb, 3 sticks dynamite and correspondence. 
Destroyed a bandit camp and supplies. 

Known casualties : GN : None. 

Bandits : Unknown. 

#309 : 15 NOVEMBER 1931 

Contact at SAN JUAN DE TELPANECA, Nicaragua, C.A. 

(222-358 2d Brig. Spl.) 
A Group of approximately fifty bandits, jefe unknown, attacked the 
town of San Juan de Telpaneca. The attack lasted fifteen minutes 
when the bandits were driven off. Cuartel was commanded by Lieu- 
tenant E.N. Munoz, Lieutenant P.M. Wysaski, GN, Lieutenant L. 
Witford, GN. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: Unknown. 

#310: 16 NOVEMBER 1931 

Contact at QUILALI, Nicaragua, C.A. (235-358 2d Brig. Spl.) 
A Group of bandits, jefe unknown, and estimated at one hundred 
attacked the town of Quilali. Firing lasted nearly an hour when 
bandits were driven off. Cuartel was commanded by Captain G.K. 
Frisbie, GN, and Lieutenant W.C. Smith, GN. 

Known casualties : GN : None. 

Bandits: Unknown. 



362 



#311 : 20 NOVEMBER 1931 

Contact at OJOCHE, Nicaragua, C.A. (217-351 2d Brig. Spi.) 
Lieutenant Delgadillo, GN, and San Juan de Telpaneca Guardia 
patrol attacked a bandit camp between Ojoche and El Silencio. Patrol 
destroyed camp and captured 2 bombs, 3 sticks of dynamite, 5 de- 
tonators, 10 rounds of ammunition, fuses, red and black hat bands and 
correspondence. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 2 killed. 

2 wounded, 

#312: 22 NOVEMBER 1931 
Contact at CHICHIGALPA, Nicaragua, C.A. 

(113-250 2d Brig. Spl) 
Two groups thought to be under Colindres and Umanzor attacked the 
town of Chichigalpa on the Railroad, on the night of November 22-23. 
Bandit strength unknown but estimated at least 100. Lieutenant 
H.E. Dumas, GN, with four enlisted guardia and 23 volunteer civilians 
had cleared Chinandega via train for Posoltega to investigate report 
of presence of bandits at that point. Upon arrival near R.R. Station 
at Chichigalpa, Dumas was informed of the presence of bandits in the 
town by the two guardia stationed there. Dumas detrained and while 
approaching station his patrol was fired upon. This started a running 
fight which covered a good share of the town and lasted about 30 
minutes. Bandits were finally driven from town after robbing some 
stores and individuals. 13 prisoners were captured. Four rifles were 
missing from the Guardia Cuartel. One Municipal Guardia was 
wounded. 

Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded. 

Bandits: Unknown. 
13 captured. 

#313 : 22 NOVEMBER 1931 

Contact at HATO GRANDE, Nicaragua, C.A. (237-200) 
A Guardia patrol commanded by Lieutenant E.H. Krieger, GN, had 
contact with a group of bandits north of Zambrano near Hato Grande. 
Jefe unknown. Patrol captured 1 pistol, cutachas and ammunition. 
Known casualties : GN: 1 wounded. 

Bandits: 1 wounded. 
4 captured. 

#3 14 : 25 NOVEMBER 193 1 

Contact at MAYOCUNDA, Nicaragua, C.A. (1 50-280 2d Brig. Spl) 
Lieutenant C. Hennrich, GN, and Guardia patrol with civicos had 
contact with a group of armed bandits near Mayocunda, jefe believed 
to be Colindres. Bandits operated from Three sides. Contact lasted 
forty minutes. Jamming of Browning and Thompson guns compelled 
patrol to break off contact. No Guardia casualties. 
Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

363 



#315 : 26 NOVEMBER 1931 

Contact at ESCARBADERO, Nicaragua, C.A. 

(179-357)(Nueva Segovia Map) 
Lieutenant Montenegro, GN, and Totogalpa Guardia patrol had 
contact with a group of armed bandits at Escarb^dero. Jefe believed 
to be Umanzor. 
Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

Wounded several. 

#316: 26 NOVEMBER 1931 

Contact at CICERA, Nicaragua, C.A. (Near Villa Nueva) 

Captain S.B. Griffin, GN, Lieutenant L. Henderson, GN, and Guardia 
patrol of El Sauce were attacked by group of armed bandits estimated 
at 300 at Cicera, near Villa Nueva. Fight lasted one and one half 
hours. Bandits had machine guns and were aggressive. Guardia could 
not pursue the bandits due to shortage of ammunition. 

Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded. 

Bandits: 5 killed. 

Wounded several. 

#317: 28 NOVEMBER 1931 

Contact at SAN PABLO, Nicaragua, C.A. (148-290 2d Brig. Spl.) 

Lieutenant Barillas, GN, and Guardia patrol had contact with a group 
of armed bandits under Colindres at San Pablo. 

Known casualties : GN: 2 wounded. 

Bandits: 8 killed. (Not ) 
20 wounded. (Verified) 

#318: 28 NOVEMBER 1931 

Contact at LAS POZAS, Nicaragua, C.A. (7.3-H.2 5th Regt. Map) 

Lieutenant R.A. Thompson, GN, six enlisted Guardias and Twenty 
civicos had contact with a group of armed bandits at Las Pozas. 
Contact lasted 25 minutes. Four animals captured with saddles, 
1 drum carrier for TSMG, 1 rifle 30-30 and 1 pistol. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 5 killed. 

#319 : 28 NOVEMBER 1931 

Contact at OLOMEGA, Nicaragua, C.A. (132-267 2d Brig. Pit.) 

Lieutenant Lopez, GN, and patrol of Guardias and auxiliaries had 
contact with a group of armed bandits between Olomega and Las 
Grietas. Captured 5 mules. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

364 



#320: 29 NOVEMBER 1931 

Contact at EL CUADRO, Nicaragua, C.A. (154-258 2d Brig, Spl.) 

Lieutenant G.E. Gardner, ON, with 10 Guardias and 53 auxiliaries 
had contact with a group of armed bandits at El Cuadro, near Las 
Zapatas. Bandits estimated at 80. Jefe unknown. 

Known casualties : GN : 2 wounded (auxiliaries) 

Bandits: 3 wounded. 

#321 : 2 DECEMBER 1931 

Contact at EL MO J ADO, Nicaragua, C.A. (near La Rota) 
Lieutenant D. McDonald, GN, and patrol of Guardias and auxiliaries 
had contact with a group of about thirty armed bandits believed to 
be part of Morales' group at El Mojado, five miles northwest of 
La Rota. Group fled to the northwest. 
Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: Several wounded. 

#322 : 5 DECEMBER 193 1 

Contact at REGADILLO, Nicaragua, C.A. 

(915-GG.5 5thRegt. Map) 
Captam G.K. Frisbie, GN, and Guardia patrol had contact with group 
of between 40 and 60 thought to be under Colindres and Morales 
near Regadillo. Bandits were armed and fled, patrol pursued them 
for two leagues and attacked group. Captured one rifle, animals and 
clothing. Further pursuit was impracticable due to darkness. Bandits 
retreated to some point northeast of Limay. 
Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits : Unknown. 

#323 : 6 DECEMBER 1931 

Contact at KISALAYA, Nicaragua, C.A. (Eastern Area) 

Lieutenant T.M. Stephenson, GN, and Kisalaya Guardia patrol had 
contact with a group of armed bandits at one mile south of Kisalaya. 
Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 3 killed. 

#324 : 14 DECEMBER 1931 

Contact at GRECIA MINE, Nicaragua, C.A. (Near Limay) 
Lieutenant Zamora, GN, and Limay patrol of 25 enlisted had contact 
with a group of armed bandits, under jefe Julian Gutierrez at a point 
about half-way between Limay and Grecia Mine. Patrol captured 
1 shot-gun, 2 bombs, 2 cutachas, numerous hat-bands, supplies and 
numerous miscellaneous articles. Bandits were' pursued by patrol and 
also by patrol under Lieutenant Livermore. Further contact, however, 
could not be gained as bandits scattered in all directions. 
Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

3 wounded. 

365 



#325 : 16 DECEMBER 1931 

Contact at TERRO GRANDE, Nicaragua, C.A. 

(193-365 NS Map) 
Lieutenant M. Berueffy, GN, and Totogalpa Guardia patrol had 
contact with bandit group, jefe Cosme Gutierrez near Terrero Grande. 
Patrol captured few rounds of ammunition, 45 caliber and 30 caliber 
Krag. Destroyed camp. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

#326 : 16 DECEMBER 1931 

Contact at LA PODRILLA, Nicaragua, C.A. (222-370 NS Map) 

Lieutenant J. Hamas, GN, and Jicaro Guardia patrol and civicos had 
contact at La Podrilla with a group of armed bandits estimated at 
fifty, jefe unknown. Bandits were armed with one Sub-Thompson 
machine gun, 20 rifles and the balance cutachas. Contact lasted 35 
minutes. Bandits retreated toward point (230-380 NS Map). Patrol 
captured hats, cutachas and miscellaneous articles. 

Known casualties- GN: 1 wounded (civico) 

Bandits: 2 killed. 

Wounded several. 

#327 : 18 DECEMBER 1931 

Contact at SANTA TERESA, Nicaragua, CA. 

(Near La Constancia) 
Lieutenant W.F. Bryson, GN, and San Rafael Guardia patrol had 
contact with a group of armed bandits at Santa Teresa in the Valley 
of La Constancia. Destroyed large camp capable of holding three 
hundred and believed to be main camp of Estrada. Contact was had 
with small garrison guarding camp. Captured pictures, correspondence, 
cutachas and some ammunition. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

#328 : 19 DECEMBER 1931 

Contact at MONTE RICO, Nicaragua, C.A. (245-393 NS Map) 

Lieutenant Delgadillo, GN, and San Juan Guardia patrol and civicos 
(combined San Juan and Apali patrol) had contact with a group of 
armed bandits under Sebastian Montenegro near Monte Rico. Jefe 
Sebastian Montenegro killed. Captured 1 pistol, 4 cutachas, and 
miscellaneous articles including important correspondence. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

Wounded several. 

366 



#329: 20 DECEMBER 1931 

Contact at SAN ALBINO MINE, Nicaragua, C.A. 

(238-384 NS Map) 
Lieutenant J. Hamas, GN, and Jicaro Guardia patrol had contact 
with a group of armed bandits north of San Albino Mine. Bandits 
dispersed into heavy underbrush. Captured one bandit suspect. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: Unknown. 



Captured 1 



#330 : 22 DECEMBER 1931 



Contact at SAN ISIDRO, Nicaragua, C.A. 

(Department of Matagalpa) 

A bandit group estimated at 200 or more, jefes Jorge Altamirano, 
Colonel Sandoval, Colonel Padilla, Colonel Herrera and Major Salinas, 
attacked the Cuartel at San Isidro, Department of Matagalpa at 1630 
from all sides. The Cuartel was defended by Lieutenant H.J. Elliott, 
GN, and seventeen guardias. The fight lasted until 1915, when the 
bandits withdrew to the northward. Bandits were armed with 2 Sub- 
Thompson, 1 BAR or Lewis, rifles, pistols, and dynamite bombs. 
They were well supplied with ammunition. Bandits left in direction 
of San Lorenzo and Colon Valley. Four Guardia patrol in pursuit. 

Known casualties : GN: 2 killed. 

1 wounded. 

Bandits: 5 killed. 

18 wounded. 



#331 : 22 DECEMBER 1931 

Contact at SAN ISIDOR, Nicaragua, C.A. (208-283) 

Lieutenant C.W. Johnson, GN, with La Trinidad Guardia patrol of 
of 1 1 enlisted and 3 civicos had a contact with the group of bandits 
under Jorge Altamirano, which had attacked San Isidro earlier in day, 
about one mile north San Isidro. Fight lasted about 10 minutes. Ban- 
dits scattered in all directions. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: Unknown. 



367 



#332: 26 DECEMBER 1931 

Contact at CHIPOTE, Nicaragua, C.A. (254-378 NS Map) 

Captain G.K. Frisbe, ON, and Guardia patrol of 30 enlisted from 
Quilali ambushed a group of armed bandits at a point three leagues 
east of Quilali. The patrol leader believes the wounded bandit was 
either Pedron Altamirano or Julian Gutierrez. Patrol gained informa- 
tion, confirmed by captured correspondence signed by Sandino dated 
Dec 24, indicating Sandino and Colindres cleared above point at 
daylight Dec 25 in the direction of Jinotega. Same patrol located and 
destroyed six deserted bandit camps which gave evidence of having 
been used by Sandino at various times near Chipon. Captured three 
good animals, small amount of ammunition, correspondence, and a 
seal. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 2 killed. 

1 wounded. 

#333 : 28 DECEMBER 1931 

Contact at CHIPOTE AREA, Nicaragua, C.A. (NA) 

Lieutenants J. Hamas, GN, and Lieutenant E. Munoz, GN, and com- 
bined patrol from Jicaro and San Juan (NA) had two contacts, one on 
Dec 28 and one Dec 29 with outposts of Sandino's main camp northeast 
of Chipote area. Marcelino Castellano was killed and Rafael Alta- 
mirano was wounded, he is a staff officer of Sandino and a relative of 
Pedro Altamirano. Captured watch, panels, bombs, important 
correspondence and many miscellaneous articles. Patrols forced out- 
posts of Sandino's main camp to retreat. Reported Sandino himself 
with well armed bodyguard, fled to the southeast toward Cua Area. 

Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded. 

Bandits: 3 killed. 

Wounded several. 

#334: 30 DECEMBER 1931 

Contact at GUADALUPE, Nicaragua, C.A. (Near Mayocunda) 

Captain E.J. Trumble, GN, and patrol of cadets and Auxiliares from 
Villa Nueva had contact with Juan Morales and his group of armed 
bandits at Guadalupe, eight miles southeast of Mayocunda at 1500 
on December 30. Patrol killed six animals. Six dead bandits counted 
including two colonels. Jefe Juan Morales seriously wounded and 
natives report he died following day. Captured arms, ammunition and 
correspondence. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 6 killed. (estimated 11) 
1 5 wounded (estimated) 



268 



#335: 4 JANUARY 1932 

Contact at GUALI, Nicaragua, C.A. (221-376 NS Map) 
Lieutenant C. Rodriguez, GN, and (NA) Guardia patrol from Jicaro 
had contact at 0930 at Guali, with a group of armed bandits, jefe un- 
known. The fight lasted ten minutes. Reliable agent reported two 
killed and several wounded. Patrol captured detonators, cutachas, 
hats, correspondence and miscellaneous articles. Bandits employed 
one Sub-Thompson Machine Gun, rifles, and revolvers. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 3 known wounded. 

#336: 7 JANUARY 1932 

Contact at PANTASMA VALLEY, Nicaragua, C.A. (CA) 
Captain A.C. Small, GN, and San Rafael (CA) Guardia patrol had 
contact with a group of armed bandits in Pantasma Valley. Exact 
place unknown. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 wounded. 

#337: 9 JANUARY 1932 

Contact at PANTASMA VALLEY, Nicaragua, C.A. (CA) 

Captain A.C. Small, GN, and San Rafael Guardia patrol had contact 

with a group of armed bandits in Pantasma Valley, exact place un- 

unknown. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 3 wounded. 

#338 : 18 JANUARY 1932 : 

Contact at BROWNS CAMP, Nicaragua, C.A. 

(27.6-D.2 6th Reg. Map) 
Lieutenant C.J. Levonski, GN, and Guardia patrol of 20 enlisted from 
Puerto Cabezas had contact with group of 100 bandits, jefe unknown 
at Browns camp. 
Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

#339 : 19 JANUARY 1932 

Contact at AMERICA, Nicaragua, C.A. 

(42.8-25.6 Esteli Map) 
1st Sgt Ayala and Guardia patrol from Condega (NA) had two contacts 
with group of armed bandits estimated at 150 and dressed in khaki 
and wearing Guardia hat cords and insignia, under Salgado Morales 
and Benavides near America. Lieutenant Clark and patrol of 20 
enlisted arrived in time to participate in contact with same group. 
Captured 1 Krag rifle, 1 pistol, dynamite bombs and correspondence. 
Bandits retreated in northwesterly direction from America. 
Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed (jefe) 
8 wounded. 

369 



#340 : 1 FEBRUARY 1932 

Contact at NEPTUNE MINE, Nicaragua, C.A. (EA) 
Civicos of Neptune Mine had contact with a group of bandits in vicinity 
of Neptune Mine. Civicos captured two shot-guns. Group evidently 
under Gonzalez, Rivera and Castro. 
Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded (civico) 

Bandits: 4 killed. 

#341 : 1 FEBRUARY 1932 

Contact at EL CORAL, Nicaragua, C.A. (213-385 NS Map) 
Sergeant Acevedo, GN, and patrol of Guardias from Jicaro (NA) 
had contact with a group of armed bandits, jefe Bemabe Espinales 
at El Coras. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 wounded. 
1 captured. 

#342 : 2 FEBRUARY 1932 

Contact at VICINITY OF NEPTUNE MINE, Nicaragua, C.A. (EA) 
Lieutenant E.T. Grey, GN, and Guardia patrol made contact with an 
armed bandit group in vicinity of Neptune Mine at 1 PM. 
Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: Unknown. 

#343 : 2 FEBRUARY 1932 

Contact at NEPTUNE MINE, Nicaragua, C.A. (CA) 
Lieutenant E.T. Gray, GN, and Guardia patrol had contact with a 
group of armed bandits in the vicinity of Neptune Mine at 3 PM. 
Captured four arms and ammunition. Destroyed large quantity of 
loot. This group evidently under Gonzales, Rivera and Castro. Patrol 
returned to Neptune Mine on 3 February due to lack of ammunition. 
Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 5 killed. 

Wounded unknown. 

#344 : 2 FEBRUARY 1932 

Contact at BLANDON, Nicaragua, C.A. (138-248 Kenyon Map) 
Lieutenants M.A. Cramer, GN, and C.T. Brannon, GN, and Guardia 
patrol of 28 enlisted had two contacts with bandit group of 100 under 
Daniel Hernandez and Juan Martinez. First contact lasted two and 
one half hours from 0600 to 0900 when bandits retired scene of contact 
at Asayran, northeast of Blandon, crossing of Tuma River. Second 
contact at point (138-252) Kenyon Map, with probably same group, 
occurred at 1430 and lasted thirty minutes when bandits withdrew. 
Known casualties : GN: 2 killed. 

2 wounded (Including Lieutenant Bran- 
non who was slightly wounded in face. 
Bandits: 4 dead. 

370 



#345: 4 FEBRUARY 1932 

Contact at EL TULE, Nicaragua, C.A. (CA) 

Captain A.C. Small, GN, and San Rafael (CA) Guardia patrol returned 

Yali, had contact at El Tule with group of armed bandits estimated 

at 25. Jefe unknown. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

1 wounded. 

#346 : 5 FEBRUARY 1932 

Contact at LOS ANGELES, Nicaragua, C.A. (CA) 
Lieutenants M.A. Cramer, GN, and C.T. Brannon, GN, with 30 
enlisted Guardias returned from combat mission. In contact with 
bandit group between Los Angeles and Pavona. Jefe Perfeto Gutirrez. 
group estimated at forty. Contact lasted fifteen minutes. 
Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: Unknown. 

#347: 7 FEBRUARY 1932 

Contact at SANTA ISABELLA, Nicaragua, C.A. 

(140-247 Kenyon Map-) 
Lieutenant O.E. Pennington, GN, and Guardia patrol from Navarro 
had contact with bandit group in vicinity of Blandon, near Santa 
Isabella. Contact lasted 15 minutes. Destroyed four bandit camps 
in immediate vicinity of contact. Captured 1 rifle, several articles of 
clothing and cutachas. Destroyed quantity of food stuffs. 
Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits : Unknown. 

#348: 8 FEBRUARY 1932 

Contact at CARRETERA, Nicaragua, C.A. (CA) 

Lieutenant O.E. Pennington, GN, and Navarro Guardia patrol had 

contact with a group of armed bandits estimated at 40 at Carretera 

at 2 PM. Contat lasted 20 minutes. Jefe unknown. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 2 killed. 

1 wounded. 

#349: 14 FEBRUARY 1932 

Contact at SAN ANTONIO, Nicaragua, C.A. 

(138-257 Kenyon Map) 
Captain J. P. Schwerin, GN, Lieutenant C.F. Brannon, GN, and 
Guardia patrol from Corinto Finca had contact with group of armed 
bandits, jefe unknown, near San Antonio. Fight iasted|25 minutes. 
Bandits dispersed and fled. 
Known casualties: GN: 1 killed. 

Bandits: Wounded several. 



371 



#350 : 19 FEBRUARY 1932 

Contact at OJOCHE, Nicaragua, C.A. (NA) 

Lieutenant D.L. Truesdale, GN, and Northern area patrol had contact 

with group of armed bandits, jefe unknown, in El Silencio Area near 

Ojoche. Fight lasted about five minutes. Captured 1 shot-gun, 1 

cutacha, 2 dynamite bombs and miscellaneous articles. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 4 killed. 

#351 : 22 FEBRUARY 1932 

Contact at OBREGON, Nicaragua, C.A. (Near Chinandega) 
Lieutenant C. Cuadra (MC) and Chinandega patrol of 5 Guardias, 

6 Municipal Police and 5 auxiliaries had contact near Obregon, about 

7 miles south of Chinandega at 1730, with group of about thirty armed 
bandits, jefe unknown. Fight lasted 5 minutes, wJien bandits fled 
in three directions. 1st Sgt Chavarria and another Guardia patrol 
took up the pursuit. 

Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

Several wounded 

#352 : 24 FEBRUARY 1932 

Contact at CARACOL, Nicaragua, C.A. 

(812-H.7 5th Reg. Spl.) 

Lieutenant C.H. Clark, GN, and Guardia patrol from Daraili had 
contact with large bandit group thought to be under Salgado and 
Umanzor, near Caracol, between Villa Nueva and Limay. Fight 
lasted two hours when bandits were dispersed, fleeing in all diretions 
with main group heading northwest. Guardia patrols from El Sauce 
and Limay took up the pursuit. 

Known casualties: GN: 1 killed. 

4 wounded. 
Bandits: 8 killed. 

Wounded several. 

#353: 25 FEBRUARY 1932 

Contact at CRING CRING, Nicaragua, C.A. 

(21.8-BB.6 5th Reg. Spl.) 

Lieutenant E.J. Suprenant, GN, and Guardia patrol from Kisalaya 
(EA) had contact with a group of armed bandits at Cring Cring. 

Known casualties : GN : None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

1 wounded. 
Patrol captured 15 pitpans, 2 shot-guns, ammunition, correspondence, 
equipment and large amount of loot, previously taken by the bandits 
from the Louisana Commissary. 

#354: 28 FEBRUARY 1932 

372 



Contact at NACASCOLO, Nicaragua, C.A. (183-298 2d Brig. Spl.) 

Lieutenants Mendoza and Zavala, both GN, and patrol of 21 enlisted 
Guardias from Esteli (EA) had contact with group of 250 reported 
under Colindres, Salgado and Umanzor at 1100, at Nispero, near 
Nacascolo. Fight lasted one half hour. Bandits used Brownings, 
Thompsons and rifle grenades. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 2 killed. 

Wounded several 



#355: 2 MARCH 1932 

Contact at PENA BLANCA, Nicaragua, C.A. (275-333 2d Brig. Spl) 

Guardia combat patrol from Navarro commanded by Lieutenants O.E. 
Pennington, GN, S.M. Ragsdale, GN, and O.J. Gumaelious, GN, had 
contact with a group of armed bandits at Pena Blanca. Patrol de- 
stroyed bandit camp and quantity of supplies. 

Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

1 wounded. 



#356: 3 MARCH 1931 

Contact at LLANO LARGO, Nicaragua, C.A. 

(218-304 2d Brig. Spl.) 

Guardia combat patrol from La Concordia had contact at Llano Largo 
with a group of armed bandits, jefe believed to be Valdivia. Patrol 
destroyed bandit samp and supplies. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 



#357: 6 MARCH 1932 

Contact at EL JICARAL, Nicaragua, C.A. (184-268 2d Brig. Spl.) 

Lieutenant S.D. Atha, GN, and Guardia patrol had contact with a 
group of armed bandits under Salgado, Socrates Sandino, Estrada 
and Salinas on mountain overlooking El Jicaral. Bandits estimated 
at 200. Fight lasted about two hours when bandits dispersed. Had 
second contact at long range two hours later which lasted fifteen 
minutes. Main group of bandits retreated towards the southwest. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits : Unknown. 



373 



#358: 11 MARCH 1932 

Contact at SAN BENITO, Nicaragua, C.A. (230-372 NS Map) 

Lieutenant D.L. Truesdale, GN, and Quilali Guardia patrol had contact 
at 2000 with bandit group. J efe Filiberto Reyes at San Benito. Guardia 
surrounded bandit camp and attacked. Captured 1 rifle, 1 pistol, 112 
rounds of ammunition, cutachas and quantity of Sandino corres- 
pondence and propaganda pamphlets. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: Skilled. 

Several wounded. 

#359: 12 MARCH 1932 

Contact at RICO MONTANA, Nicaragua, C.A. (2 1 1-405 NS Map) 

Lieutenant Zamora, GN, and Jicaro Guardia patrol had contact with 
a group of armed bandits estimated at fifty under Colindres and Jose 
Leon Diaz at Rico Montana. Fight lasted 10 minutes, when bandits 
scattered across border into Honduras. Many blood trails were found. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: Unknown. 

#360: 13 MARCH 1932 

Contact at VALLE DE LAS ZAPATAS, Nicaragua, C.A. 

(8.0-EE.9 5th Reg.)(Special Map ) 

Lieutenant Lopez, GN, and patrol of Guardias from Department of 
Leon had contact with bandit group under Umanzor at El Chote, 
six leagues northeast of Valle de las Zapatas. Fight lasted 40 minutes 
when bandits were routed and they dispersed in all directions. Blood 
trails were found. Captured 1 rifle, 1 shot-gun, 2 Thompson drums, 
2 magazines, 9 bombs, 5 grenades, 100 rounds of Springfield ammunition, 
1 pair of field glasses, 2 pistols and many other miscellaneous articles. 
It is belief of patrol leader that Umanzor was wounded during the fight. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 4 killed. 

Wounded unknown. 

#361 : 20 MARCH 1932 

Contact at COYOLITO, Nicaragua. C.A. (6.9-GG.9,5 Reg. Spl.) 

Sergeant Samuel Acosta, GN, with a patrol of Guardias and several 
civicos from San Francisco de Guanijiquilapa had contact with a 
group of armed bandits, jefe Teodulo Molina at Coyolito. Captured 
1 shot-gun. Bandits were dispersed in all directions. 

Known casualties : GN: 1 killed. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

374 



#362: 24 MARCH 1932 

Contact at CHILAMATAL, Nicaragua, C.A. (Near Limay) 

Sgt. Palma, GN, and patrol of Guardias from Limay had contact with 
a group of armxd bandits at Chilamatal in the Rio Negro District. 
4 leagues northwest of Limay. Bandits armed With rifles and shot-guns. 
Fight lasted 10 minutes after which bandits fled in all directions. 
Group thought to be part of Julian Gutierrez. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

#363: 25 MARCH 1932 

Contact at EL ROBLE, Nicaragua, C.A. (8.3-G.3 5th Reg. Spl) 

Lieutenant C.A. Brown, GN, and Potaste Guardia patrol and two 
civicos had contact at El Roble with a group of armed bandits under 
Captain Indalecio Ruiz. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 4 killed. (Including jefe Ruiz) 
Wounded several. 

#364: 31 MARCH 1932 

Contact at CHACARAS GRANDE, Nicaragua, C.A. 

(Near Cinco Pinos) 
Lieutenant L.A. Kalman, GN, and Guardia patrol from Somotillo 
had contact with a group of armed bandits estimated at fifty under 
Umanzor at Chacaras Grande, one league northwest of Cinco Pinos. 
Lieutenant Kalman and patrol took up trail and caught bandits. Fight 
lasted 20 minutes when bandits dispersed. Bandits were armed with 
two Sub-Thompsons, 30 rifles and pistols. 
Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: Unknown. 

#365: 1 APRIL 1932 

Contact at LAS NIEVES, Nicaragua, C.A. (Near Pena Blanca) 
Captain R.L. Griffin, GN, and Company "M" had contact with a group 
of armed bandits at Las Nieves, about two leagues North of Pena 
Blanca. Jefe thought to be Tomas Pineda. One Guardia Officer 
slightly wounded. 

Known casualties : GN : 1 wounded (officer) 

Bandits: Unknown. 

#366: 3 APRIL 1932 

Contact at SAN JUAN, Nicaragua, C.A. (NA) 
Enlisted hunting party of 4 men from San Juan had contact with a 
group of armed bandits about one half league out of town. Later 
information states this group to be a band of robbers. 
Known casualties : GN: 1 wounded. 

Bandits: 4 killed. 

375 



#367: 5 APRIL 1932 

Contact at VILLA NUEVA, Nicaragua, C.A. (145-301) 
Bandit group of between 150 and 200 attacked the Guardia Cuartel 
at Villa Nueva, garrisoned, at the time, by Lieutenant Centeno, GN, 
9 enlisted and about 5 civicos. The attack started at 0100 and lasted 
until 0430 when the bandits withdrew to the north. Bandits used 
machine guns, rifles and hand bombs. Bandits were aggressive, and 
some hand to hand fighting occurred. Indications of bandits killed 
and wounded. 

Known casualties : GN : 5 wounded (2 Guardia and 3 civicos) 
Bandits: Unknown. 

#368: 8 APRIL 1932 

Contact at LA CONSTANCIA, Nicaragua, C.A. (CA) 

Captain A.C. Small, GN, Lieutenant G.D. Snyder, GN, and patrol 

of 30 enlisted had contact with a group of approximately 40 armed 

bandits in La Constancia Area. Jefe unknown. Bandits were routed. 

Group apparently part of a bandit outpost. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 2 killed. 

Wounded several. 

#369: 11 APRIL 1932 

Contact at APANAS, Nicaragua, C.A. (CA) 

Lieutenants G.F. Haubensack, GN, and D.R. Downey, GN, with patrol 
of Guardias had contact with a group of armed bandits jefe unknown 
at Apanas, 5 miles north of Jinotega. Bandits scattered in all directions. 
Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits : Unknown. 

#370: 11 APRIL 1932 

Contact at TUMA RIVER, Nicaragua, C.A. 

(357-877 Jinot. Matag. Map) 

Lieutenant O.C. Ledbetter, GN, and Lieutenant O.J. Gumaelious, GN 
with a Guardia patrol had contact with an armed group of bandits 
about 2 leagues east of Rufino Lopez' Crossing, on the Tuma River. 
Large quantity of food supplies captured and destroyed. 
Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

2 wounded. 

#371 : 12 APRIL 1932 

Contact at LAS CRUCES, Nicaragua, C.A. (241-370 2d Brig Spl.) 

Lieutenant D.L. Truesdale, GN, and Guardia patrol had contact with 
a group of armed bandits north of Las Cruces. Large amount of blood 
found at scene of contact. Contact lasted five minutes. 
Known casualties: GN: Civilian Guide killed. 

Bandits: Unknown. 

376 



#372: 15 APRIL 1932 

Contact at SAN JUAN, Nicaragua, C.A. (NA) 
Lieutenant F.O. Beans, GN, and Quilali Guardia patrol had contact 
with a group of armed bandits under Heriberto Reyes about 2 leagues 
from San Juan on the Quilali trail. Contact lasted fifteen minutes. 
Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

#373: 19 APRIL 1932 

Contact at SANTA BARBARA, Nicaragua, C.A. 

(113-235 KenyonMap) 
Lieutenant Castillo, GN, (n) and Guardia patrol from San Rafael 
had contact with a group of armed bandits estimated at 1 50 reported 
under Pedron and Juan Altamirano and Transito Sequeira at Santa 
Barbara. Contact lasted one and one half hours. Bandits were driven 
from a fortified positon on a hill and dispersed in all directions. They 
used two. or more automatic weapons throughout the fight. Captured 
six horses, saddles, and bridles, one pistol and miscellaneous articles. 
Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits : Unknown. 

#374: 21 APRIL 1932 

Contact at LAS PUERTAS, Nicaragua, C.A. (210-390 NS Map) 

Lieutenant L.T. Covington, GN, and Jalapa Guardia patrol of 11 

enlisted had contact near Las Puertas with a group of 200 well armed 

bandits, jefe unknown. Fighting very intense. Bandit casualties 

unknown but indications of many killed and wounded. 

Known casualties : GN: 4 killed. 

Bandits: Unknown. 

#375: 21 APRIL 1932 

Contact at LAS PUERTAS, Nicaragua, C.A. (Near Apali) 
Lieutenant L.C. Brunton, GN, Lieutenant L.T. Covington, GN, and 
Lieutenant F.M. Whitehead, GN, with Apali Guardia patrol and 
remainder of Jalapa patrol had contact with same group as above 
southwest of Las Puertas toward Apali. The fighting again was very 
intense. Indications of many killed and wounded bandits. 
Known casualties : GN: 6 killed (Including Lieutenants Brunton 

(Covington and Whitehead) 
Bandits : Unknown. 

#376: 21 APRIL 1932 

Contact at SAN FERNANDO, Nicaragua, C.A. (NA) 

Lieutenant C.W. Johnson, GN, and Lieutenant Zamora, GN, with 

Apali patrol had the third contact with the same group at 1530 at a 

point short distance west of scene of second contact. Bandits were 

driven to the west toward San Fernando carrying many dead and 

wounded. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits : Unknown. 

377 



#377: 21 APRIL 1932 

Contact at KISALAYA, Nicaragua, C.A. (EA) 
The Guardia deserters from Kisalaya together with about 30 bandits 
attacked the cuartel at Kisalaya at 0300. Bandits and deserters were 
driven off after severe fighting. Ex-Sergeant Sebastian Jimenez, the 
leader of the deserters was found among the dead. Lieutenant F.Gaitan, 
ON, in command. 

Known casualties: GN: 2 wounded (Including Lieutenant Gaitan) 
Bandits: 4 dead. 

#378: 23 APRIL 1932 

Contact at SACASTE, Nicaragua, C.A. (102-235 Kenyon Map) 

Lieutenants G.R. Weeks, GN, and C.L. Ashbrook, GN, and Guardia 
patrol from San Rafael had contact with group of seventy under Juan 
Altamirano at Sacaste. Fight lasted ten minutes. 
Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: Unknown. 

#379: 23 APRIL 1932 

Contact at GUAMBUCO MOUNTAIN, Nicaragua, C.A. 

(10.9-E 8th Reg Map) 
Lieutenants J. Hamas, GN, J. A. Burns, GN, D.H. Wallace, GN, 
and Guiterrez, GN, and combined (NA) Guardia patrol of 40 enlisted 
had contact with Carlos Salgado and Fulgencio Hernandez and group 
of 100, at 1530, at their main camp near Guanbuco Mountain. Bandits 
employed automatic weapons, rifles and bombs. Fighting lasted for 
twenty five minutes when bandits scattered. Patrol captured 1 Krag 
Rifle, 300 rounds Springfield and Krag ammunition, 1 mule saddle, 
provisions of Covington pack train, part of clothes and equipment of 
Lieutenants Covington and Whitehead, 1000 arrobas of corn, 1 beef, 
20 sticks of dynamite, 3 dynamite bombs, bandit correspondence. 
The patrol occupied the camp. At 1800 the bandits attacked the camp 
and attempted to drive Guardia from it with grenades and rifle fire 
Bandits were driven off after ten minutes of fighting. About 0530 on 
the 24th, the bandits again attempted to take the camp and after fifteen 
minutes of fighting were again driven off and scattered in all directions. 
One more rifle and several rounds of ammunition were captured. 
Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded. 

Bandits: 3 killed. 

Wounded several. 

#380: 24 APRIL 1932 

Contact at LOMA DEL NANCIA, Nicaragua, C.A. (Colon Valley) 
Lieutenants G.R. Weeks, GN, and C.L. Ashbrook, GN, and same 
Central Area patrol from San Rafael had second contact with same 
group at 0950 at Loma del Nancia. Fight lasted 1 5 m.inutes. Captured 
12 horses, 12 saddles, 12 handgrenades and Guardia clothing. 
Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: Unknown. 

378 



#381 : 24 APRIL 1932 

Contact at EL HORNO, Nicaragua, C.A. (Dept. of Matagalpa) 

Enlisted patrol of four men from Algovia had contact lasting two 

minutes with Alfredo Rizo and Small bandit group near El Horno at 

1100. Guardia captured two mules, saddles and equipment and two 

civil prisoners who confessed being members of Rizo's group on other 

occasion. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 2 captured. 

#382: 26 APRIL 1932 

Contact at NORTHEAST OF OCOTAL, Nicaragua, C.A. (NA) 
Lieutenants J. Hamas, GN, J. A. Burns, GN, R.E. Voge. GN, F. 
Cadrera, GN, L. Gutierrez, GN, and Guardia patrol of 45 enlisted 
had contact northeast of Ocotal, Nueva Segovia, near the frontier, 
which lasted for three hours, contact began at 4:00 PM 26 April. 
Patrol discovered and attacked what is thought to be main camp of 
Sandino. Sandino thought to be present during the fight, also ex- 
sergeant Garcia and ex-corporal Cornejo who deserted from Quilali. 
Camp consisted of about thirty-five shacks, some of them large. Bandits 
were estimated at two hundred and fifty and formed firing line six 
hundred yards in length, Guardia occupied bandit defensive positions 
which were of logs and rocks about one hundred and fifty yards from 
bandit positions and well prepared, bandits evidently did not have time 
to occupy these positions and retired across ravine over which firing 
line took place. Bandits tried to flank patrol but Lieutenant Vogel 
on right flank with 2 Thompsons and 2 BARs counter-attacked and 
drove them off; bandits scattered in all directions. Bandits employed 
at least 8 automatic weapons, rifles, pistols, rifle grenades and bombs. 
Lieutenants Burns and Guiterrez held left flank. Lieutenant Hamas 
in command. Captured bandit correspondence, 6 rifles, several drums 
of Thompson with ammunition. Upon arrival of Guardia patrol bandits 
had everything packed up, evidently intending to move camp there- 
fore most of their supplies and equipment taken with them in their 
flight. They retreated to westward across border into Honduras. 
Guardia patrol combed all trails north and west but could not regain 
contact. Camp completely destroyed. 
Known casualties : GN : 1 wounded (slightly) 

Bandits: 10 killed (Including Florencia Silva) 
(Chief Judge of Sandino) 
Wounded several. 

#383: 1 MAY 1932 

Contact at LACUYA, Nicaragua, C.A. (215-377) 
Lieutenant J. A. Burns, GN, and Lieutenant Guiterrez, GN, with 
Northern Area patrol of 35 Guardias had contact with group of 60 
bandits under Heriberto Reyes at Lacuya. Fight lasted 25 minutes. 
Bandits used 2 automatic weapons and rifle grenades. They were 
driven from their camp and fled to the south. Contact could not be 
regained. Bandit camp was destroyed. 
Known casualties: GN: 2 wounded (slightly) 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

4 wounded. 

379 



#384: 5 MAY 1932 

Contact at COLON, Nicaragua, C.A. (230-318) 

Lieutenant Castillo, GN, and Guardia patrol of 12 enlisted from La 
Concordia had contact with group of 30 bandits under Juan Altamirano 
and Jesus Valdivia near Colon. Fight lasted 30 minutes. Captured 
1 pistol, small quantity of rifle and pistol ammunition, 3 animals. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

Wounded several. 

#385: 8 MAY 1932 

Contact at MULAGROS, Nicaragua, C.A. (242-386) 

Lieutenants M.M. Mahoney, GN, J. Hamas, GN, Zamora, GN, and 
Aleman, GN, and Northern Area patrol of 36 enlisted had contact 
with bandit group under Sinforoso Gonzalez at Mulagros. Fight lasted 
15 minutes. Bandits scattered in all directions. Camp was destroyed. 
Captured large quantity food supplies and miscellaneous articles. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 4 killed(Including Sebastian Caceres) 
(Chief of Police for Sandino) 
Several wounded. 

#386: 8 MAY 1932 

Contact at PAMALI, Nicaragua, C.A. (252-362) 

Lieutenants V. Mays, GN, and Guiterrez, GN, and Quilali Guardia 
patrol of 20 enlisted had contact with bandit group at 1900 in the 
vicinity of Pamali. Guardia attacked bandit camp. Bandits dispersed 
in all directions unable to pursue due to darkness. Captured large 
quantity of food, small quantity of ammunition and correspondence. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: Several wounded. 

#387: 11 MAY 1932 

Contact at CHAMASTE, Nicaragua, C.A. (239-363) 

Lieutenants V. Hays, GN, and J. Bernheim, GN, and Quilali Guardia 
patrol of 25 enlisted had contact with bandit group at 1700 near 
Chamaste. Captured and destroyed quantity of food, tobacco, clothing, 
bombs and miscellaneous articles. Camps destroyed in both contacts. 
Reports of above contacts received. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

1 wounded. 

380 



#388: 13 MAY 1932 

Contact at BRAMADERO, Nicaragua, C.A. (230-322) 
Lieutenant Castillo, ON, and La Concordia, (CA) Guardia patrol 
had two contacts, one at 0900 and other at 1300, with same group of 
armed bandits, group of 60, jefes thought to be Salgado and Socrates 
Sandino, in the vicinity of Bramadero, 3 leagues southeast of La Con- 
cordia. First fight lasted one hour, second one five minutes. Captured 
17 animals, small amount of ammunition and correspondence. 
Known casualties : ON: None. 

Bandits: Unknown. 

#389: 17 MAY 1932 

Contact at SISIN, Nicaragua, C.A. (EA) 

Lieutenants M.D. Hutchcroft, ON, and F. Gaitan, GN, and Guardia 
patrol of 15 enlisted had contact With bandit group estimated at 50, 
jefe unknown, at Sisin. Captured one disc Thompson, 2 Magazines, 
BAR. Bandit group thought to include Guardia Mutineers from 
Kisalaya. 

Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded (Lt. Hutchcroft who received 

bullet wound in thigh.) 

#390: 17 MAY 1932 

Contact at SANTO DOMINGO, Nicaragua, C.A. (Chontales) 
Lieutenant Tercerim GN, with roving patrol of 8 enlisted made sur- 
prise attack on bandit camp at San Jose, in the mountains north of 
Santo Domingo at 1800. Bandits completely surprised and fled, 
leaving bloody trails indicating dead and wounded bandits. Group 
was about fifteen under Jefe Policarpo Fonseca. Following articles 
were captured: 2 rifles, 2 shot-guns, 2 cutachas, medicines, 15 ani- 
mals, 10 saddles, miscellaneous clothing, flash and carbide lights, 6 
sticks of dynamite, ponchos, raincoats, powder, precussion caps and 
numerous articles of clothing and equipment. 
Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits : Unknown. 

#391 : 18 MAY 1932 

Contact at ACHUAPA, Nicaragua, C.A. (Dept. of Leon) 
Captain G.K. Frisbie, GN, Lieutenants C.G. Hughes, GN, and Lieut- 
enant Chavarria, GN, and combat patrol from Limay had contact 
with a small group of armed bandits east of Achaupa at 1 :00 PM. 
Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

#392: 21 MAY 1932 

Contact at NEPTUNE MINE, Nicaragua, C.A. (EA) 
Lieutenant E.T. Gray, GN, with fifteen combined Guardia and Civico 
patrol had contact with Pedron Altamirano and group of about 150 
at 1430. Contact lasted one hour near Neptune Mine. Captured 
four animals with saddles. Bandits well armed with automatic weapons. 
Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits : Unknown. 

381 



#393: 23 MAY 1932 

Contact at .NEPTUNE MINE, Nicaragua, C.A. (EA) 
Lieutenant E.T. Gray, GN, and combined Guardia and civico patrol 
of 20 men had contact lasting thirty minutes one mile west of Neptune 
Mine with large bandit group under Pedron Altamirano which had 
been threatening Guardia post at that place. Fighting very tense. 
Upon return of patrol to Neptune Mine, cuartel was attacked by another 
group from north but attack repulsed. Planes by bombing dispersed 
bandits and broke up further attack. 
Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 17 killed. 

#394: 26 MAY 1932 

Contact at CHILAMATAL, Nicaragua, C.A. (233-306) 

Lieutenants Navarrete, GN, and Perez, GN, with Matagalpa Guardia 

patrol had contact with bandit group, jefe unknown, at Chilamatal, 

half-league south of Santa Barbara. Bandits dispersed. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

#395: 26 MAY 1932 

Contact at ACHUAPA, Nicaragua, C.A. (Dept. of Leon) 
Lieutenant J. F. Atwell, GN, and Lieutenant Jarquin, GN, and patrol 
of 18 from Achuapa had contact with group estimated ac 50, jefe 
unknown, at 1000, one league south of Achuapa on road to El Sauce. 
Bandits were surprised preparing an ambush. Firing lasted 20 minutes. 
Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 2 wounded. 

#396: 27 MAY 1932 

Contact at DARAILI, Nicaragua, C.A. (224-334) 

Lieutenant Sandino, GN, and patrol of 8 enlisted and 1 civico had 

contact with a group of armed bandits. Jefe Olivas, south of Daraili 

at point above mentioned. Fight lasted half hour when bandits 

scattered in all directions. Guardia captured 1 pistol, small amount 

of ammunition, hat bands, food and other miscellaneous articles. 

Camp destroyed. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 4 killed. 

#397: 27 MAY 1932 

Contact at NEPTUNE MINE, Nicaragua, C.A. (EA) 
Lieutenant L.C. Curcey, GN, and Wauni Guardia patrol of 19 enlisted 
and 6 civicos had contact with rear guard of Pedron Altamirano group 
under Irias at 1640, about four hours west of Neptune Mine on Limon 
trail. Fight lasted 25 minutes. Bandits were driven off leaving con- 
siderable amount of loot including cattle and miscellaneous articles 
behind, major portion of which was returned to the owners. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: Unknown. 

882 



#398: 29 MAY 1932 

Contact at APALILI, Nicaragua, C.A. (245-275) 

Lieutenant Prado, GN, and Matagalpa patrol of 10 enlisted had contact 

with Juan Altamirano and group of 40 at Apalili, vicinity of Rincon 

Largo at 0700. Fight lasted fifteen minutes when bandits dispersed. 

Captured 1 pistol, two riding animals and miscellaneous articles. 

Bandits were armed with two Thompsons. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

Wounded several. 

#399: 29 MAY 1932 

Contact at LA ARMONIA, Nicaragua, C.A. (Dept. of Matagalpa) 

Lieutenant H.J. Elliot, GN, and Fundadora Guardia patrol had contact 
at La Armonia, north of Matagalpa with a group of armed bandits, 
jefe Ramiro Lopez. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: Unknown. 

#400: 2 JUNE 1932 

Contact at ACHUAPA, Nicaragua, C.A. (168-305) 

Lieutenant Sanchez, GN, and Achuapa Guardia patrol had contact 
at 0700 with group of 25 bandits, jefe unknown, on main trail one and 
a half leagues toward El Sauce from Achuapa. Captured one rifle. 
Bandits scattered in all directions. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

Wounded several. 

#401 : 2 JUNE 1932 

Contact at NORTHWEST OF JALAPA, Nicaragua, C.A. (NA) 

Lieutenant S.M. Ragsdale, GN, and Jalapa Guardia patrol of 15 
enlisted had contact with a group of armed bandits of about 40 under 
Quintero, during night. Guardia made a surprise attack on the bandit 
camp. Guardia captured three rifles, two pistols, six BAR. clips, one 
Thompson clip, 211 rounds Springfield ammunition, quantity of 
assorted ammunition, one flag, two horses, two cows, and many miscel- 
laneous articles of loot which had been stolen from the natives in the 
vicinity of Jalapa. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits : Killed unknown. 

Several wounded (including ex-sgt 

Garcia who deserted 
from Quilali.) 

383 



#402: 4 JUNE 1932 

Contact at LA CONCORDIA, Nicaragua, C.A. (230-322) 

Lieutenant Castillo, GN, and La Concordia Guardia patrol of 15 
enlisted had contact at 1000 west of La Concordia with a group of 
armed bandits, jefe unknown. Fighting lasted 20 minutes. Guardia 
captured 1 rifle, 1 pistol, small quantity of ammunition and 6 animals. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

Several wounded. 

#403: 5 JUNE 1932 

Contact at LAS CRUCES, Nicaragua, C.A. (236-365) 

Lieutenants V. Hays, GN, and Guiterrez, GN, with San Juan Guardia 
patrol attacked a bandit camp at Las Cruces. Jefe of group was 
Sixto Acuna, a 1st Lieutenant of Sandino's forces. Captured large 
amount of food and clothing. Camp was destroyed. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 5 killed. 

7 wounded. 

#404: 6 JUNE 1932 

Contact at YALI MOUNTAIN, Nicaragua, C.A. (224-332) 

Lieutenant C.H. Snyder, GN, and Celedon, GN, with Yali patrol 
had two contacts with bandit groups, jefes unknown, on west ri%e of 
Yali mountain. Guardia captured 2 pistols, 1 bomb, cutachas, small 
amount of ammunition and miscellaneous articles. Bandits were 
dispersed. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 3 killed. 

#405: 12 JUNE 1932 

Contact at GUANACASTILLO, Nicaragua, C.A. (223-374) 

Lieutenant M.M. Mahoney, GN, and Cuadra, GN, and Apali Guardia 
patrol had contact with a group of armed bandits under Heriberto 
Reyes and Roque Vargas near Guanacastillo. Bandits were dispersed 
after 10 minutes fight. Patrol pursued for five miles but could not 
regain contact. Destroyed bandit camp and captured 1 rifle, quantity 
of ammunition, dynamite bombs, 8 blanket roils, cutachas and quantity 
of food. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: Unknown. 

384 



#406: 14 JUNE 1932 

Contact at LIMAY, Nicaragua, C.A. (188-3 18) 

Sergeant Chavarria, GN, and Limay Guardia patrol attacked small 
group of armed bandits, thought to be part of Umanzor's group at 
3 leagues west of Limay. 
Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits : Unknown. 

#407: 15 JUNE 1932 

Contact at SAN RAMON, Nicaragua, C.A. (256-289) 

Lieutenant W.D. Martin, GN, and Buena Vista patrol had contact 
with group of armed bandits, jefe Alfredo Rizo northeast of San Ramon. 
Guardia captured 2 rifles, 2 pistols, 2 shot-guns, 5 animals and quantity 
of clothing. Bandits were dispersed. 
Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 3 killed. 

4 wounded. 

#408: 17 JUNE 1932 

Contact at SAMULALI, Nicaragua, C.A. (255-277) 

Sergeant Sevilla, GN, and Guardia patrol from Las Lajas had contact 
with small bandit group near Samulali. Bandits were dispersed. 
Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded. 

Bandits: 2 wounded. 

#409: 20 JUNE 1932 

Contact at CHAGUITE GRANDE, Nicaragua, C.A. 

(Near Jinotega) 

Lieutenant Guiterrez, GN, and Guardia patrol from Jinotega had 
contact with a group of armed bandits, jefe unknown at 0600, in 
Chaguite Grande, two leagues from Jinotega. Guardia captured 1 
revolver, small quantity of ammunition and some clothing. Bandits 
were dispersed. 
Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

Several wounded. 

#410: 23 JUNE 1932 

Contact at CONSUELO, Nicaragua, C.A. (282-308) 

Lieutenant O.J. Gumaelious, GN, Lieutenants Monte, GN, and Uriza, 

GN, and Consuelo Guardia patrol had contact with Pedron Altamirano 

and large bandit group due north of Consuelo near the Tuma River 

in vicinity of point (282-308). Guardia captured 3 rifles, and small 

quantity of bombs and ammunition. Bandits were driven off and 

scattered. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 5 killed. 

385 



#411: 25 JUNE 1932 

Contact at PIEDRA LUNA, Nicaragua, C.A. (280-301) 

Lieutenant Uriza, GN, and Consuelo Guardia patrol had contact with 
a group of armed bandits at Piedra Luna. Bandits finally withdrew 
and headed northward in direction of Maximo Rivas. 

Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

Several wounded. 

#412: 27 JUNE 1932 

Contact at SAN JUAN, Nicaragua, C.A. (232-367) 

Lieutenant J. Hays, GN, and San Juan Guardia patrol attacked bandit 
camp, jefe unknown, east of San Juan in vicinity of point (232-367). 
Guardia captured 1 rifle, 1 shot-gun, 3 dynamite bombs, cutachas and 
some correspondence. Bandits scattered. 

Known casualties: GN: 1 wounded (Lt Hays slight cutacha 

wound in knee.) 
Bandits: 5 killed. 

#413: 27JUN1E1932 

Contact at NORTHEAST OF JICARO, Nicaragua. C.A. (233-393) 

Lieutenant Montenegro, GN, and Jalapa Guardia patrol had contact 
with a group of armed bandits, jefe Sinforoso Gonzalez at northeast 
of Jicaro. Fight lasted only 5 minutes when bandits scattered. Pursuit 
was made but no further contact could be made due to darkness. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: Unknown. 

#414: 28 JUNE 1932 

Contact at QUILALI, Nicaragua, C.A. (246-366) 

Lieutenant Guiterrez, GN, and Quilali patrol attacked bandit camp 
of Ezequiel Zamora Zeledon, secretary to Sandino at point northeast of 
Quilali. Guardia captured 1 pistol, 120 detonators, quantity of dyna- 
mite and much valuable correspondence. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 6 killed, (including jefe Zeledon) 
8 wounded. 

#415: 2 JULY 1932 

Contact at CEBOYAL, Nicaragua, C.A. (230-318) 

Lieutenant C.L. Ashbrook, GN, and Yali patrol had short contact with 
a group of armed bandits, jefe unknown in Ceboyal in vicinity of Colon 
at 1200. Bandits scattered in all directions. Guardia captured 1 
animal with saddle and small amount of miscellaneous articles. 
Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits : Unknown. 

386 



#416: 5 JULY 1932 

Contact at VACARRO FARM, Nicaragua, C.A. (496-362) 

Lieutenant Padilla, GN, and patrol had contact with a group of armed 
bandits under jefe Simon Gonzalez at Vacarro Farm. Mandador cook 
of Vacarro killed and commissary looted. 
Known casualties: GN: 1 killed. 

1 wounded. 
Bandits : Unknown. 

#417: 6 JULY 1932 

Contact at LECUS, Nicaragua, C.A. (501-475) 

Lieutenants R.L. Peterson, GN, O. Kemp, GN, and Munoz, GN, with 
Guardia patrol had contact with group of armed bandits under Simon 
Gonzalez, which had looted Vacarro Farm Commissary previous day 
at one league east of Lecus. Contact lasted 1 hour, a running fight. 
Guardia captured 1 rifle, 1 shot-gun, 1 pistol, 3 rifle grenades and re- 
covered .^200 worth of loot stolen from commissary. Dead bandit 
believed to be a sub-jefe of Gonzalez. Another guardia patrol went in 
pursuit. 
Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 3 killed. 

3 wounded. 

#418: 7 JULY 1932 

Contact at GUANACASTILLO, Nicaragua, C.A. (222-375) 

Lieutenants M.M. Mahoney, GN, Cuadra, GN, and Guiterrez, GN, 
and Jicaro Guardia patrol had contact with Colindres and Reyes 
group estimated between 150 and 200 bandits at 1850, near Guana- 
castillo. Signs of many bandits killed and wounded. Guardia captured 
several rifles, small quantity of am.munition, cutachas, hats and miscel- 
laneous articles. Bandits retreated toward Quilali. Contact lasted 
45 minutes. 
Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: Unknown. 

#419: 14 JULY 1932 

Contact at PAVONA, Nicaragua, C.A. (237-345) 

Lieutenants Sandino, GN, and Lopez, GN, and Northern Area patrol 
were attacked by bandit group estimated from 200 to 280, jefes Salgado 
and Robleto, at 0700 near Pavona. Contact lasted for an hour and a 
half. Fighting was very intense. Guardia finally rushed bandit posi- 
tions and routed them, dispersing them in all directions. Bandits 
employed dynamite bombs, rifle grenades, 4 Thompson sub-machine 
guns and many rifles. Guardia captured three rifles, six animals, 
correspondence and riflie grenades. Dead bandits were all dressed in 
khaki breeches and shirts with canvas and leather leggins. 
Known casualties : GN* 1 wounded. (Lieutenant Lopez) 

Bandits: 12 killed (Including jefe Robleto) 
Several wounded. 

387 



#420: 15 JULY 1932 

Contact at TULAR, Nicaragua, C.A. (203-327) 

Lieutenant J.M. Broderick, GN, and Condega Guardia patrol of 20 
enlisted had contact with large bandit group, jefes Olivas and Padilla 
near Tular. Fight lasted 20 minutes when bandit position was attacked 
and they fled in all directions. Bandits employed automatic weapons, 
rifle grenades, rifles, pistols and dynamite bombs. Guardia captured 
1 rifle, small quantity of ammunition, 25 animals, 15 saddles, corres- 
pondence, clothing and hats. 
Known casualties : GN: 3 wounded. 

Bandits: 2 killed. 

6 wounded. 

#421 : 17 JULY 1932 

Contact at PAN AMERICA, Nicaragua, A.C. (457-322) 
Lieutenant W.J. Stone, GN, and E. Gallo patrol of Guardias had 
contact with a group of 40, jefes Irias and Mairena near Pan America. 
Large amount of loot, previously captured by the bandits from one of 
the stores on the Rio Grande was recovered. 
Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 2 killed. 

#422: 17 JULY 1932 

Contact at LAS SANDILLAS, Nicaragua, C.A. (214-310) 

Lieutenant S.M. Ragsdale, GN, and Jalapa patrol of 26 enlisted had 
contact w^ith bandit group, jefe unknown, near Las Sandillas, at 0330. 
Contact lasted 7 minutes. Guardia captured food, blankets, several 
head of cattle and some clothing. Contact was a surprise attack on the 
bandit camp. Bandits fled across Honduran border. 
Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 2 wounded. 

#423: 18 JULY 1932 

Contact at QUIOTACO, Nicaragua, C.A. (214-411) 
Lieutenant S.M. Ragsdale, GN, and Jalapa patrol of 26 had contact 
with bandit group of 40, jefe believed to be Quintero, near Quiotaco at 
1000. Contact lasted 17 minutes. Contact was a surprise attack on 
bandits lying in an ambush position waiting for Ragsdale's patrol 
Bandits fled across Honduran border. 
Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 3 wounded. 

#424: 22 JULY 1932 

Contact at CACAO, Nicaragua, C.A. (173-288) 

El Sauce patrol had contact with a group of armed bandits, size and 

jefe unknown, at Cacao. Guardia captured 1 rifle, 2 saddles, 5 hats, 

cutachas and food. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

Several v/ounded. 

388 



#425: 25 JULY 1932 

Contact at SANTA CRUZ, Nicaragua, C.A. (201-302) 

Lieutenants C.C. Hughes, GN, T.M. Lynch, GN, Silva, GN, and 
Saravia, GN, and Esteli Guardia patrol had a 1 5 minute contact with 
Perfecto Chavarria and group at 1600 near Santa Cruz. Bandits used 
automatic weapons, bombs and rifles. Guardia captured 2 shot-guns. 
Bandits scattered in all directions. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 2 killed. 

Several wounded. 

#426: 25 JULY 1932 

Contact at DATANLI, Nicaragua, C.A. (248-302) 

Lieutenant Barillas, GN, and Fundadora Guardia patrol had contact 
near Datanli, NW of Fundadora with group of armed bandits, jefe 
unknown. Captured 2 shot-guns. Bandits scattered in all directions. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

#427: 26 JULY 1932 

Contact at LOS ACHOTES, Nicaragua, C.A. (237-345) 

Lieutenants CD. Snyder, GN, and Lieutenant L.S. Wriston, GN, 
and Yali Guardia patrol had contact at 1100 with bandit group under 
Colindres and Umanzor estimated at over 200, near Los Achotes, 
vicinity of Pavona. Fight lasted over half an hour and was very intense. 
Bandits were in entrenched position and employed 6 automatic weapons, 
bombs, rifle grenades, rifles and pistols. Guardia patrol forced to retire 
due to shortage of ammunition. Bandits remained in their position. 

Known casualties : GN: 1 killed. 

3 wounded. 
Bandits: Unknown. 

#428: 28 JULY 1932 

Contact at ALTA GRACIAS, Nicaragua, C.A. (Near 223-359) 

Lieutenant E.L. Livermore, GN, and Telpaneca Guardia patrol had 
two contacts with same group of armed bandits, jefe Enrique Melgara, 
in vicinity of Alta Gracia. Guardia attacked bandit camp and drove 
bandits out, capturing hats, several bombs, cutachas and miscellaneous 
articles. Guardia patrol took up the pursuit and regained contact 
later in the day in another camp. Attacked second camp and put 
bandits to flight in ail directions. Captured 1 shot-gun, 2 guitars 
6 cutachas, 1 bull and large quantity of miscellaneous articles. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 2 killed. 

1 wounded. 

389 



#429: 29 JULY 1932 

Contact at EL HORNO, Nicaragua, C.A. (237-302) 

Lieutenant Guiterrez, GN, and Jinotega Guardia patrol of 9 enlisted 
escorting two officers of the Electoral Mission from Jinotega to Mata- 
galpa were fired on by armed group of bandits with rifles and pistols 
near El Homo. Patrol returned fire. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 wounded. 

#430: 29 JULY 1932 

Contact at LA TRINIDAD, Nicaragua, C.A. (NA) 

Lieutenant C.G. Hughes, GN, and Silva, GN, and Esteli Guardia 
patrol cleared Esteli and had contact with group of armed bandits 
dressed in khaki, size and jefe unknown, on the edge of town on main 
road to La Trinidad at 0130. Patrol chased the bandits and regained 
contact about one mile out of tovv^n. Contacts lasted about fifteen 
minutes. Bandits used automatic weapons, bombs and rifles. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: Unknown. 

#431: 31 JULY 1932 

Contact at CANOAS, Nicaragua, C.A. (234-357) 

Lieutenants J.M. Broderick, GN, and Montenegro, GN,and, Condega 
Guardia patrol had contact with bandit group of 60 to 80 on Coco 
River, near Canoas, at 1000. Bandits were preparing ambush position 
at river crossing when surprised by Guardia patrol. Guardia captured 
1 boat, few dynamite bombs and small amount of ammunition. Guardia 
patrol crossed river and found and destroyed large camp in El Silencio 
area at point 234-362. Patrol then proceeded south and found and 
destroyed another camp at 230-341. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 3 killed. 

1 wounded. 

#432: 31 JULY 1932 

Contact at LOMA AZUL, Nicaragua, C.A. (243-339) 

Captain L.B. Puller, GN, and Corinto Finca Guardia patrol had contact 
with a group of armed bandits, jefe unknown at 1000 north of Loma 
Azul. Guardia captured 1 rifle, 1 shot-gun, three blankets and some 
clothing. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 2 killed. 



390 



#433: 2 AUGUST 1932 

Contact at CAMPAMENTO, Nicaragua, C.A. (185-294) 

Lieutenant Zavala, GN, and Jarquin, GN, and Sanchez, GN, and com- 
bined Leon, El Sauce Guardia patrol had contact with a group of armed 
bandits, jefe unknown at 1400 near Campamento. Patrol attacked 
bandit camp. Camp was destroyed after bandits were dispersed in all 
directions. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: Unknown, 

#434: 2 AUGUST 1932 

Contact at TERRERO GRANDE, Nicaragua, C.A. (NA) 

Lieutenant Delgadillo, GN, and Totogalpa Guardia patrol had contact 
with a group of armed bandits, jefe unknown, at 1000 in vicinity of 
Totogalpa near Terrero Grande. Bandits fled. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits : Unknown 

#435: 2 AUGUST 1932 

Contact at SANTA ROSA, Nicaragua, C.A. (243-382) 

Lieutenants H.E. Kipp, GN, and Gutierrez, GN, with Jicaro Guardia 
patrol had contact with an armed group of bandits under Roque 
Vargas near Santa Rosa about 1600. Bandits fled toward Chipote. 
Guardia captured food, clothing and miscellaneous articles. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits : Unknown. 

#436: 12 AUGUST 1932 

Contact at PANTASMA VALLEY, Nicaragua, C.A. (260-350) 

Captain L.B. Puller, GN, and Company "M" patrol, CA., had contact 
with two bandit groups in Pantasma Valley. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: Several wounded. 

#437: 13 AUGUST 1932 

Contact at PANTASMA VALLEY, Nicaragua, C.A. (260-3 50-) 

Captain L.B. Puller, GN, Lieutenant N.A. Lee, GN, and Company 
"M" patrol CA., attacked bandit camp in Pantasma Valley, vicinity 
of 260-350 at 1340. Captured rifles, ammunition, food, supplies and 
miscellaneous articles and much correspondence. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 2 killed. 

Several wounded. 

391 



#438: 13 AUGUST 1932 

Contact at PANTASMA VALLEY, Nicaragua, C.A. (260-350) 

Captain L.B. Puller, ON, and Lieutenant W.A. Lee, ON, with Company 
"M" patrol CA., attacked second bandit camp of Salgado consisting of 
32 shacks, in Pantasma Valley at 1530 near 260-350. Captured arms, 
ammunition, cattle, food supplies and correspondence. 

Known casualties : ON: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

Several wounded. 

#439: 14 AUGUST 1932 

Contact at LOS PANALES, Nicaragua, C.A. (233-361) 

Captain F.C. Biebush, GN, and Quilali Guardia patrol had contact 
with a group of armed bandits at 0700, near Los Panales, jefe unknown. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

#440: 16 AUGUST 1932 

Contact at PANATASMA VALLEY, Nicaragua, C.A. (260-350) 

Captain L.B. Puller, GN, Lieutenant W.A. Lee, GN, and Company 
"M" patrol CA., had contact with a group of armed bandits in Pantasma 
Valley. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 wounded. 

#441 : 17 AUGUST 1932 

Contact at ANOGODA, Nicaragua, C.A. (221-299) 

Lieutenant B.M. Bunn, GN, and San Isidro Guardia patrol had contact 
with Juan Altamirano group, size unknown, at 1500 near Anogoda. 
Contact lasted forty minutes. Bandits used two automatic weapons. 
Guardia captured quantity of miscellaneous articles. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 2 killed. 

Several wounded. 

#442: 18 AUGUST 1932 

Contact at OSOMORA, Nicaragua, C.A. • (CA) 

Captain O.A. Inman, GN, and Navarro patrol, Central Area, had 
contact with bandit group at Osomora at 0720; later in day while 
crossing the Tuma River had second contact v/ith group of about 40, 
jefe unknown. One civilian Guide wounded. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: Unknown. 

392 



#443: 19 AUGUST 1932 

Contact at SANTO DOMINGO, Nicaragua, C.A. (352-208) 

Enlisted Guardia patrol with Civicos from Santo Tomas and San 
Pedro, Dept. of Chontales, had contact with bandit group which raided 
Pueblo Viejo at point three leagues southeast of Santo Domingo. 
Bandits were scattered. Guardia captured 1 rifle, 1 revolver and 
practically all of loot taken from Pueblo Viejo. 

Known casualties: GN: 1 Civico wounded. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

#444: 19 AUGUST 1932 

Contact at SANTA FE, Nicaragua, C.A. (243-334) 

Captain L.B. Puller, GN, Lieutenant W.A. Lee, GN, and Company 
"M" patrol CA., had contact with bandit group of 80, jefe Juan Alta- 
mirano, 1 league south of Santa Fe at 0900. Bandits scattered in all 
directions after 5 minute fight. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 4 killed. 

#445: 20 AUGUST 1932 

Contact at MURRA, Nicaragua, C.A. (239-397) 

Lieutenant J. Hamas, GN, and Jicaro Guardia patrol of 15 enlisted 
and one civico had contact with group of bandits under Roque Vargas, 
west of Murra. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 4 killed. 

#446: 20 AUGUST 1932 

Contact at SANTO DOMINGO, Nicaragua, C.A. (352-208) 

Lieutenant Tercero, GN, and Chontales Guardia patrol had contact 
with same group with which contact was had on the 19th near same 
locality. Patrol captured 1 horse and small amount of ammunition. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 2 killed. 

#447: 25 AUGUST 1932 

Contact at LAS CRUCES, Nicaragua, C.A. (251-332) 

Captain L.B. Puller, GN, Lieutenant W.A. Lee, GN, and Company 
"M" patrol CA., had contact with group of T^ at Mountain pass at 
251-332 near Las Cruces, jefe unknown. Bandits were defending the 
pass but Guardia patrol forced its way through. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

Several wounded. 

393 



#448: 26 AUGUST 1932 

Contact at LA TRINIDAD, Nicaragua, C.A. (NA) 

Lieutenants M.M. Mahoney, GN, and Silva, GN, with Esteli Guardia 
patrol had contact with group of about 40 armed bandits, jefe Tomas 
Blandon at a point between Esteli and La Trinidad. Contact consisted 
of running fight lasting over two hours when bandits were scattered 
in all directions. Guardia captured correspondence, 6 animals with 
saddles, hats, cutachas and miscellaneous articles. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 3 killed (Including Tomas Blandon) 
Several wounded. 

#449: 27 AUGUST 1932 

Contact at SAJONIA, Nicaragua, C.A. (244-318) 

Lieutenant Policarpo Gutierrez, GN, and Corinto Finca Guardia patrol 
of 15 enlisted had contact with a group of 50 armed bandits between 
Sajonia and the Tuma River at 1500. Fight lasted 30 minutes. 
Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: Unknown. 

#450: 29 AUGUST 1932 

Contact at MANCOTAL, Nicaragua, C.A. (247-332) 

Lieutenant GR. Weeks, GN, and Lieutenant N.M. Grieco, GN, and 
Corinto Finca Guardia patrol of 25 enlisted had contact with bandit 
group, jefe Rosa Irias, near Mancotal. Fight lasted 5 minutes. Bandits 
scattered in all directions. 
Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 4 killed. 

1 wounded. 

#451 : 31 AUGUST 1932 

Contact at CERRO BLANCO, Nicaragua, C.A. (NA) 

Lieutenants V. Hays and J .Montenegro, GN, had contact with a 
group of armed bandits at Cerro Blanco. Fight lasted five minutes. 
Guardia attacked two bandit camps. Large amount of loot captured, 
including foodstuffs. 
Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: Unknown. 

#452 : 2 SEPTEMBER 1932 

Contact at LIMON, Nicaragua, C.A. (20(>-362) 

Lieutenant E.L. Livermore, GN, and Telpaneca Guardia patrol had 
contact with group of 30 near a point south of Limon, jefe Santiago 
Munoz. Bandits were surprised making camp and immediately fled 
in all directions. 
Known casualties : GN : None. 

Bandits: 2 wounded. 

394 



#453: 5 SEPTEMBER 1932 

Contact at NA ANJA, Nicaragua, C.A. (235-318) 

Captain Max D. Smith, ON, Lieutenant Castillo, ON, and San Rafael 
Guardia patrol of 25 enlisted had contact with bandit group, jefe 
Juan Altamirano, in vicinity of Namanja at 0800. Guardia captured 
1 rifle, 1 pistol, small amount of ammunition and quantity of clothing 
and supplies. 
Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 2 killed. 

Several wounded. 

#454 : 7 SEPTEMBER 1932 

Contact at AYOTE MOUNTAIN, Nicaragua, C.A. (180-408) 

Lieutenants F.M. Wysaski, GN, and Monterrey, GN, and Northern 
Area patrol had contact with a group of 100 armed bandits, jefe Colin- 
dres on Ayote Mountain at 0900. Fight lasted half hour. Bandits 
had large fortified camp on mountain. Patrol was unable to dislodge 
bandits from their position. 
Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits : Unknown. 

#455: 8 SEPTEMBER 1932 

Contact at ACHUAPA, Nicaragua, C.A. (178-314) 

Lieutenants G.C. Reid, GN, and Jarquin, GN, with Achuapa patrol 

had contact with bandit group of 40, jefe unknown near Northeast of 

Achuapa. Contact was running fight lasting half hour. Bandits 

scattered in all directions. Guardia captured 1 animal, blankets and 

clothing. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 4 killed. 

#456 : 10 SEPTEMBER 1932 

Contact at GUAPINOL, Nicaragua, C.A. (190-360) 

Lieutenant Delgadillo, GN, and Totogalpa Guardia patrol had contact 
with a group of armed bandits, jefe unknown at Guapinol. Fight lasted 
20 minutes when bandits scattered. 
Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits : Unknowh. 

#457: 11 SEPTEMBER 1932 

Contact at PINO, Nicaragua, C.A. (198-325) 

Lieutenants M.M. Mahoney, GN, Silva, GN, and Esteli Guardia 
patrol had contact with a group of armed bandits, estimated at 80, 
jefe unknown, lasting 40 minutes near Pino. Guardia surprised bandits 
in camp and attacked, scattering them in all directions. Guardia 
captured 3 rifles, 3 shotguns, 20 riding animals, 2 pack animals, 
cutachas, bombs, clothing and miscellaneous articles. 
Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 10 killed. 

Several wounded. 

395 



#458 : 12 SEPTEMBER 1932 

Contact at CENICERO, Nicaragua, C.A. (162-278) 

Lieutenant J.F. Atwell, GN, and Lieutenant Artola, GN, and El 
Sauce Guardia patrol had contact lasting one hour and ten minutes 
with group of armed bandits estimated at 180, jefes reported as 
Umanzor, Morales, Valdivia and Trujillo at 1350 near vicinity of 
Cenicero. Bandits were aggressive and used 4 automatic weapons, 
rifles and hand grenades and rifles. They were well supplied with 
ammunition. After contact bandits withdrew to the northeast. 
Guardia captured 3 animals and miscellaneous articles. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: Unknown. 

#459 : 12 SEPTEMBER 1932 

Contact at PASO REAL, Nicaragua, C.A. (249-325) 

Lieutenants N.M. Grieco, GN, and D.R. Downey, GN, and Corinto 
Finca Guardia patrol of 35 enlisted had contact with a group of armed 
bandits in the vicinity of Paso Real. Owing to darkness patrol was 
unable to take up effective pursuit. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

Several wounded. 

#460 : 13 SEPTEMBER 1932 

Contact at GUASACA, Nicaragua, C.A. (268-317), 

Captain O.A. Inman, GN, and Navarro Guardia patrol had two 
contacts with a group of armed bandits, jefe Tomas Pineda in vicinity 
of Guasaca. First contact Guardia captured 1 pistol, saddle and 
important correspondence. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 2 killed( Including Jefe Tomas Pineda) 
3 wounded. 

#461 : 14 SEPTEMBER 1932 

Contact at SAN RAMON, Nicaragua, C.A. (156-301) 

Lieutenants L.A. Kalman, GN, and Artola, GN, and El Sauce Guardia 
patrol of 15 enlisted and 9 civicos had three contacts between 1030 
and 1 140, lasting over one hour, with bandit group of 200, jefes thought 
to be Salgado and Um^anzor, midway between El Sauce and Villa Nueva, 
near San Ramon. Bandits were very aggressive and attacked Guardia 
on two occasions from three different sides. Bandits were well armed 
and equipped and had good supply of ammunition. They used at 
least four automatic weapons. Bandit attacks repulsed and they were 
forced to withdraw northward. 
Known casualties : GN: 1 wounded. 

Bandits: 8 killed. 

10 wounded. 

396 



#462: 17 SEPTEMBER 1932 

Contact at NARANJA, Nicaragua, C.A. (165-340) 

Lieutenant B.G. Sinkule, GN, and Somoto Guardia patrol of 18 
enlisted had contact with a group of armed bandits of 100 to 150, jefes 
believed to be Colindres, Irias and Blandon at 0400, near Naranja. 
Bandits were driven from their ambush position and took position on 
some nearby hills. At daylight Sinkules' patrol reenforced by Lieu- 
tenants Hammond, GN, and Monterrey, GN, and Condega patrol of 30 
enlisted and one civico attacked bandits in their new position and after 
a sharp fight put them to rout and scattered them to the southeast. 
Guardia captured 28 riding animals with saddles, 2 rifles, "yl rounds 
ammunition 4 BAR Magazines, spare parts for BAR, hats clothing, 
cutachas, haversacks, pair of field glasses, foodstuffs and miscellaneous 
articles. Bandits expended large amount of ammunition. 

Known casualties : GN: 1 killed. 

1 wounded. 
Bandits: 4 killed. 

Several wounded. 

#463 : 22 SEPTEMBER 1932 

Contact at SANTA FE, Nicaragua, C.A. (243-334) 

Lieutenant J. W. Krawie, GN, and San Rafael Guardia patrol. Central 
Area, had contact with a group of armed bandits, jefe unknown, near 
Santa Fe. Fight lasted ten minutes. Guardia captured 6 riding animals 
and two pack mules. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits : Unknown. 

#464 : 26 SEPTEMBER 1932 

Contact at AGUA CARTA, Nicaragua, C.A. (292-377) 

Captain L.B. Puller, GN, Lieutenant W.A. Lee, GN, and Company 
"M" patrol from Jinotega had contact with a group of armed bandits, 
jefe unknown at Agua Carta. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits : Unknown. 

#465 : 26 SEPTEMBER 1932 

Contact at AGUA CARTA, Nicaragua, C.A. (291-379) 

Captain L.B. Puller, GN, Lieutenant W.A. Lee, GN, and Company 
"M" patrol from Jinotega had contact at Agua Carta with a group of 
armed bandits estimated at 150, jefe unknown. Bandits used 7 auto- 
matic weapons, rifles and hand grenades and expended much ammuni- 
tion. Fight lasted over half hour. 

Known casualties: GN: 2 killed. 

3 wounded (Including Lieut. Lee, 

wounded in right arm and head.) 
Bandits: 16 killed. 



#466 : 27 SEPTEMBER 1932 

Contact at ROBLES, Nicaragua, C.A. (245-310) 

Lieutenants N.M. Gireco, GN, and Perez, GN, and Jinotega Guardia 
patrol of 19 enlisted had contact with a group of 40 armed bandits, 
jefe Daniel Hernandez in the vicinity of Robles at 1730. Fight lasted 
twenty minutes. Bandits scattered and contact could not be regained 
due to darkness. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: Unknown. 

#467: 30 SEPTEMBER 1932 

Contact at SAN ANTONIO, Nicaragua, C.A. (262-329) 

Captain L.B. Puller, GN, Lieutenant W.A. Lee, GN, and Company 
"M" patrol from Jinotega had contact with group of 80 armed bandits 
jefe unknown near San Antonio. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 8 killed. 

#468 : 30 SEPTEMBER 1932 

Contact at PASO REAL, Nicaragua, C.A. (249-326) 

Captain L.B. Puller, GN, Lieutenant W.A. Lee, GN, and Company 
"M" patrol from Jinotega had contact with group of 40 bandits, jefe 
unknown at Paso Real. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 3 killed. 

#469: 5 OCTOBER 1932 

Contact at RILLITO, Nicaragua, C.A. (197-358) 

Lieutenant J.M. Stanko, GN, and Palacaguina Guardia patrol of 6 
enlisted had contact with a group of 1 5 bandits who had stolen animals 
from Guardia potrero at 2250, at a point near Rillito. Guardia re- 
captured 1 1 animals, 1 shot-gun and miscellaneous articles. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits : Unknown. 

#470 : 9 OCTOBER 1932 

Contact at LA TRAMPA, Nicaragua, C.A. (257-3 13) 

Lieutenant W.D. Martin, GN, and Navarro Guardia patrol of 25 
enlisted had contact with a group of armed bandits, size and jefe 
unknown, about three leagues from Navarro on trail to Corinto Finca, 
vicinity of La Trampa. Guardia captured 2 rifles and miscellaneous 
articles. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 2 killed. 

398 



#471: 11 OCTOBER 1932 

Contact at MATAGALPA, Nicaragua, C.A. (CA) 

Sergeant Velasquez, GN, and Matagalpa Guardia patrol of four 
enlisted and four auxiliares had contact with an armed group of bandits, 
jefe Alfredo Rizo, near Matagalpa. Bandits were scattered Guardia 
captured 1 revolver and miscellaneous articles. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits : Unknown. 

#472 : 14 OCTOBER 1932 

Contact at TOMATO YA, Nicaragua, C.A. (CA) 

Lieutenant J.W. Krawie, GN, and San Rafael Guardia patrol of 12 
enlisted had contact with a group of bandits jefe Transito Sequeira in 
vicinity of Tomatoya, Dept. of Matagalpa. Bandits dispersed 
in all directions. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits : Unknown. 

#473 : 14 OCTOBER 1932 

Contact at JINOTEGA, Nicaragua, C.A. (CA) 

1st Sgt. Leiva, GN, with Jinotega Guardia patrol of 15 enlisted had 
contact with a group of armed bandits, jefe Ramiro Lopez, on the out- 
skirts of Jinotega. Pursuit hampered by darkness. 
Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits : Unknown. 

#474: 17 OCTOBER 1932 

Contact at TRAPICHON, Nicaragua, C.A. (Dept. of Chinandega) 

Lieutenant H.E. Dumas, GN, and Guardia patrol of seven enlisted 
from San Antonio had contact with a group of armed bandits at 
Trapichon. Guardia captured 1 rifle, 2 shot-guns, 13 animals, clothing 
and miscellaneous articles. 
Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 3 killed. 

1 wounded. 

#475: 19 OCTOBER 1932 

Contact at BELLA VISTA, Nicaragua, C.A. 

(NE of CHICHIGALPA) 
Sergeant Miguel Bolanos, GN, and Chichigalpa Guardia patrol of 10 
other enlisted had contact with a group of 15 armed bandits, jefe 
unknown, near Bella Vista at 1030. Running fight of 20 minutes when 
remainder of group fled into Telica mountains where trail was lose. 
Guardia captured 3 rifles, 1 revolver and 10 horses with saddles. 
Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 3 killed. 

Several wounded. 

399 



#476 : 20 OCTOBER 1932 

Contact at COLON VALLEY, Nicaragua, C.A. (CA) 

Lieutenant Castillo, GN, and San Rafael Guardia patrol of 15 enlisted 
had contact with group of 20, part of Juan Altimarano group, in Colon 
Valley. Guardia captured miscellaneous articles. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: Unknown. 

#477: 25 OCTOBER 1932 

Contact at SOMOTILLO, Nicaragua, C.A. (131-213) 

Lieutenants G.G. Reid, GN, J.F. Atwell, GN, W. Frisch, GN, Sanchez, 
GN, and Artola, GN, with combined El Sauce and Somotillo Guardia 
patrol of 50 had contact with bandit group of 300, jefes Colindres, 
Salgado, Jose Leon Diaz, Peralta and Quintero at 1330 near point north 
of Somotillo. The fight lasted two hours and ten minutes and the ban- 
dits were very aggressive. Guardia captured first bandit position and 
successfully held it against several counter-attacks. Bandits used at 
least five automatic weapons, and many bombs. Guardia captured 
7 horses with saddles, 1 rifle, 2 pistols, bombs, food, clothing and miscel- 
laneous articles. 

Known casualties : GN: 2 wounded (Including Lieut. Sanchez) 

Bandits: 7 killed. 

Several wounded. 

#478 : 25 OCTOBER 1932 

Contact at VALLE DE SAN BENITO, Nicaragua, C.A. 

(Near 114-250) 
Lieutenant Sotomayor, GN, and Chichigalpa Guardia patrol of 20 
enlisted had contact with mounted group of armed bandits, jefe 
unknown, in Valle de San Benito, north of Chichigalpa. Fight lasted 
twenty minutes. Guardia captured 5 horses, 3 horses killed in contact. 
Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: Unknown. 

#479: 28 OCTOBER 1932 

Contact at LA PELONA, Nicaragua, C.A. (128-264) 

Lieutenants Blanco, GN, Sotomayor, GN, and combined Chichigalpa 
Guardia patrol, auxiliares and civicos totalling 38 men had contact 
with well armed bandit group estimated to be at least 200, jefe Umanzor 
at La Pelona. Fighting was very intense and lasted for three hours 
(7 AM to 10 AM) until Guardia ammunition was expended. Guardia 
patrol was ambushed and surrounded during most of fighting. Bandits 
expended tremendous amount of ammunition and it is believed Uman- 
zor's group will be immobilized for some time. 
Known casualties: GN: 9 killed. 

5 wounded. 
Bandits: 12 killed. 

30 wounded. 

400 



#480: 28 OCTOBER 1932 

Contact at JINOTEGA, Nicaragua, C.A. (CA) 
A patrol of 6 auxiliares from Jinotega had contact with bandit group of 
40, jefes Gadea and Herrera at 0930 near El Porvenir, two leagues east 
of Jinotega. Fight lasted 30 minutes. Auxiliares captured 2 pistols 
and miscellaneous articles. Bandits were dispersed and fled. 
Known casualties : ON: 1 killed (Auxiliares) 

1 wounded (Auxiliares) 
Bandits: 3 killed (Including jefe Herrera) 

4 wounded (Including Gadea) 

#481 : 28 OCTOBER 1932 

Contact at PANTASMA, Nicaragua, C.A. (244-332) 

Captain M.D. Smith, GN, and Lieutenants A.E. Buckner, GN, and 
Cuadra, GN, and Central Area Guardia patrol of 29 enlisted had 
contact at Pantasma with group of armed bandits, jefe Filiberto Gomez. 
Guardia captured 8 horses, 9 mules, 8 cattle, 5 saddles and miscel- 
laneous articles. 
Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits : Unknown. 

#482: 29 OCTOBER 1932 

Contact at NARANJO, Nicaragua, C.A. (232-298) 

Lieutenant Montes, GN, and San Isidro Guardia patrol of twelve 
enlisted had contact near Naranjo with a group of armed bandits 
of 18, jefes Marcial Rivera and Gonzalez. 
Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: Unknown. 

#483 : 31 OCTOBER 1932 

Contact at LA TRONCA, Nicaragua, C.A. (280-317) 
Patrol of Guardia Civicos had two five minute contacts with a poorly 
armed bandit group, jefe Perez at La Tronca. Patrol captured food 
supplies and miscellaneous articles. Destroyed bandit camps. 
Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits : Unknown. 

#484: 1 NO\1EMBER 1932 

Contact at LA PLAZUELA, Nicaragua, C.A. (21 1-360) 

Lieutenants J. M. Stanko, GN, and Cuadra, GN, and combined Ocotal 
and Palacaguina patrol of 25 enlisted had contact with large bandit 
group, jefes Salgado, Benavides, Calderon and Chavarria at 1120 
north La Plazuela. Bandits well armed and used automatic weapons 
and bombs but were finally dispersed northward toward Coco River. 
Guardia captured 2 shot-guns, small amount of ammunition, assorted 
clothing, large amount of food supplies and miscellaneous articles. 
Two bandit camps destroyed. 
Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 4 killed. 

Several wounded. 

401 



#485 : 2 NOVEMBER 1932 

Contact at JICARO, Nicaragua, C.A. (NA) 

A large bandit group estimated at 150, jefes reported as Salgado 
Heriberto Reyes, Sinforoso Gonzalez, Roque Vargas, and ex-sgt. Garcia, 
attacked the town of Jicaro at 2100. The bandits attacked with four 
groups simultaneously from all sides. Fighting lasted until 2320 when 
bandits were forced out of town. Jicaro was garrisoned at the time by 
Lieutenant Keller, M.J., GN, one more officer and 26 enlisted with 
ten civicos. Bandits used 3 Thompsons, 1 BAR and large amount of 
dynamite bombs. Reyes, Vargas and Garcia were recognized by people 
of Jicaro. One store looted. 

Known casualties : GN: 1 wounded slightly (Lieut. Bernheim) 

Bandies: 4 killed. 

Several wounded. 

#486 : 2 NOVEMBER 1932 

Contact at LA CONCORDIA, Nicaragua, C.A. (CA) 

A large bandit group estimated at 150, jefe reported to be Padilla, 
attacked the town of La Concordia during night. Fight lasted over 
one hour when bandits were driven from town. Cuartel was garrisoned 
by Lieutenant Gallardo, GN, 12 enlisted and 4 civicos. People of 
town apparently not molested. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: Unknown. 

#487: 3 NOVEMBER 1932 

Contact at EL SALTO, Nicaragua, C.A. (228-324) 

Lieutenant Castillo, GN, and La Concordia Guardia patrol had contact 
with same group that attacked La Concordia the night before, at 1100 
near El Salto. Bandits driven off. Guardia captured some Browning 
STMG magazines. 

Known casualties: GN: 2 wounded. 

Bandits: 2 killed. 

Several wounded. 

#488 : 3 NOVEMBER 1932 

Contact at BIAGUAL, Nicaragua, C.A. (232-344) 

Lieutenants CD. Snyder, GN, and Gutierrez, GN, and Yali Guardia 
patrol of 20 enlisted had contact with a group of armed bandits at Biagual . 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits : Unknown. 

402 



#489: 3 NOVEMBER 1932 

Contact at MOKARIN, Nicaragua, C.A. (Lower Rio Coco) 

Cabo Blandon, GN, and Cabo Gracias patrol of 10 enlisted had contact 
with a group of 60 armed bandits, jefe unknown, at Mokarin, fighting 
lasted 1 hour. Guardia captured several boats, baggage, loot and 
miscellaneous articles. 
Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: Unknown. 

#490: 3 NOVEMBER 1932 

Contact at SAN RAFAEL, Nicaragua, C.A. (CA) 

Bandits fired into town of San Rafael from neighboring hills during 
night. The Guardia answered with automatic fire upon bandit positions 
and drove them therefrom. No damage done to town. Captain 
A.C. Small, GN, in command. * 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits : Unknown. 

#491 : 5 NOVEMBER 1932 

Contact at SANTO DOMINGO, Nicaragua, C.A. (214-371) 

Lieutenant V. Hayes, GN, and Northern Area patrol of 15 enlisted and 
4 civicos had contact with bandit group of 90, jefe unknown, at Santo 
Domingo. Guardia rushed bandit position and drove them southward. 
Took up pursuit and regained contact an hour later when bandits 
were scattered in all directions. Bandits employed two automatic 
weapons, rifles and dynamite bombs and vivaed Sandino and other jefe. 
Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 2 killed. 

4 wounded. 

#492: 6 NOVEMBER 1932 

Contact at CARBONAL, Nicaragua, C.A. (217-372) 

Lieutenant V. Hays, GN, with Northern Area patrol of 14 enlisted and 
4 civicos had contact near Carbonal with bandit group of 35, jefe 
unknown. Bandits were scattered in all directions. Contact could 
not be regained. 
Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits : Unknown. 

#493 : 6 NOVEMBER 1932 

Contact at SAN RAFAEL, Nicaragua, C.A. (CA) 

Bandits fired into town of San Rafael from neighboring hills during 
the night. The Guardia answered with automatic weapons upon bandit 
positions and drove them therefrom. No damage done to town. Cap- 
tain A.C. Small, GN, in command. 
Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: Unknown. 

403 



#494: 6 NOVEMBER 1932 

Contact at YALI, Nicaragua, C.A. (CA) 

Bandit group, jefe unknown, entered the town of Yali about 2100 and 
attacked Guardia Cuartel. After considerable firing, bandits were 
driven out of town by Guardia. No damage done to town. Lieutenant 
C.D. Snyder, GN, in command. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits : Unknown. 

#495: 6 NOVEMBER 1932 

Contact at AMORT, Nicaragua, C.A. (258-304) 

Patrol of Civicos had contact with small bandit group, jefe unknown, 
near Ajnort. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits : Unknown. 

#496: 7 NOVEMBER 1932 

Contact at YAGUATICA, Nicaragua, C.A. (230-304) 

Lieutenant W.A. Lee, GN, and Jinotega Guardia patrol had contact 
with a group of armed bandits, jefe unknown near Yaguatica at 1 120. 
Bandits dispersed. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 wounded. 

#497 : 1 1 NOVEMBER 1932 

Contact at SANTA BARBARA, Nicaragua, C.A. (233-304) 

A patrol of 11 Auxiliares from Jinotega had contact with a bandit 
group of 25, jefe Jose Chavarria near Santa Barbara. Auxiliares cap- 
tured 1 pistol, 4 bombs and miscellaneous articles. 

Known casualties : GN : None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

Several wounded. 

#498 : 13 NOVEMBER 1932 

Contact at POTREROS, Nicaragua, C.A. (189-283) 

Lieutenant B.M. Bunn, GN, and Central Area Guardia patrol had 
contact near Potreros with a bandit group, jefe unknown. 

Known casualties : GN : None. 

Bandits : Unknown. 



404 



#499: 18 NOVEMBER 1932 

Contact at LAS LAJAS, Nicaragua, C.A. (230-276) 

Lieutenant A.E. Buckner, GN, and Combined Guardia and Civico 
patrol from Central Area had contact with a group of armed bandits, 
jefe Perfecto Chavarria, at Las Lajas. Fighting lasted 9 minutes. 
Body of Chavarria identified by several civicos who had known hirri 
for several years. Guardia captured 2 animals, correspondence, 1 
pistol and miscellaneous articles. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed (Jefe Chavarria) 

#500 : 19 NOVEMBER 1932 

Contact at YANKI, Nicaragua, C.A. (224-326) 

Auxiliares patrol of 40 and 2 Guardias from Jinotega had contact with 
bandit group of 30, jefes Gilberto Gonzalez and Transito Sequeira, 
vicinity of Yanki. (Contact lasted 20 minutes. Patrol destroyed bandit 
camp and captured 1 pistol, small amount of ammunition and miscel- 
laneous articles. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: Several wounded. 

#501: 24 NOVEMBER 1932 

Contact at CINCO PINOC, Nicaragua, C.A. (Dept. Chinandega) 

Lieutenant J.Hamas, GN, G, Reid, GN, and Jarquin, GN, with El 
Sauce patrol of 50 had contact with group of bandits near Cinco Pinos. 
Jefe of group believed to be Dr Arturo Vega. Guardia captured corres- 
pondence and miscellaneous articles. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: Skilled. 

#502: 25 NOVEMBER 1932 

Contact at ESTANZUE, Nicaragua, C.A. (197-299) 

Lieutenant Silva, GN, and Esteli Guardia patrol of 20 enlisted had 
contact with bandit group of 25, jefe Filiberto Blandon at Estanzue. 
Fight lasted 10 minutes. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

Several wounded. 

#503: 26 NOVEMBER 1932 

Contact at EL LLANO, Nicaragua, C.A. (218-312) 

Lieutenant R.C. Haralson, GN, and La Concordia Guardia patrol 
had contact with a group of armed bandits at El Llano. Guardia 
captured seven animals. 

Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

405 



#504: 27 NOVEMBER 1932 

Contact at EMBOCADERO, Nicaragua, C.A, (252-332) 

Patrol of 25 Auxiliares, led by Juan Pineda had contact with a bandit 
group of 40, jefe Emilio Blandon, near Embocadero. Fight lasted 
15 minutes. Guardia captured 10 animals and miscellaneous articles of 
loot. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 2 killed. 

#505: 8 DECEMBER 1932 

Contact at PARAISIC, Nicaragua, C.A. (234-304) 

Lieutenant Barnes, GN, and Fundadora Guardia patrol had contact 
with a group of armed bandits under Alberto Gadea in the vicinity 
of Paraiso. Contact lasted 30 minutes when bandits fled. Guardia 
captured 1 rifle, 1 shot-gun, 2 pistols, correspondence and medicines. 

Known casualties : GN : None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 

5 captured. 



#506 : 1 1 DECEMBER 1932 

Contact near MATIGUAS, Nicaragua, C.A. (302-286) 

Sergeant P. Garcia, GN, and Matiguas patrol had contact with group 
of armed bandits near Matiguas. Jefe of group Timote Gonzalez. 

Known casualties : GN : None. 

Bandits: 4 killed. 

2 wounded. 



#507: 20 DECEMBER 1932 

Contact at ZAPOTILLO, Nicaragua. C.A. (240-375) 

Lieutenants Zepada and Umana, GN, with patrol from Quilali attacked 
and destroyed a bandit camp near Zapotillo. 

Known casualties : GN: None. 

Bandits: 1 killed. 



406 



#508 : 26 DECEMBER 1932 

Contact at PUNTA DE RIELES, Nicaragua, C.A. (169-288) 
Captain Puller, Lieutenants Lee, Bunn, Pulver, Hays, Stevens, Snyder, 
Lynch, Buitrago and Quintanilla with Guardia patrol of sixty from 
Managua had contact at Punta de Rieles with armed bandit group of 
250, jefes Umanzor and Santos Benavides. Fighting was intense and 
lasted over one hour. Bandits ambushed the train upon which Captain 
Puller's patrol was proceeding to El Sauce. Bandits were put to route 
and fled in disorder to the west. Guardia captured 63 riding animals 
with saddles, 8 Krag rifles, 1 pistol, 700 rounds of ammunition and 
many miscellaneous articles. Bandits had concentrated in vicinity 
El Sauce in attempt to break up inauguration ceremony of new Leon — 
El Sauce railroad but their plans were frustrated. 
Known casualties: GN: 3 killed. 

3 wounded. 

Several railroad workmen killed and 
several wounded. 
Bandits: 30 killed. 

Many wounded. 

#509 : 26 DECEMBER 1932 

Contact at VALLE ACHIOTE, Nicaragua, C.A. (NS) 
Lieutenants Solis, Ruiz and Fuentes with combined Guardia patrols 
from Telpaneca and San Juan had contact with bandit group, jefe 
unknown, at Valle Achiote. Guardia captured correspondence and 
food supplies. Bandit camp destroyed. 
Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits: 2 killed. 

#510 : 31 DECEMBER 1932 

Contact at CERRO LAS TABLAS, Nicaragua, C.A. 

(NE of Trinidad) 
Lieutenants Silba and Valle, GN, with La Trinidad Guardia patrol 
had contact with a group of armed bandits, jefe Juan Altamirano at 
Cerro Las Tablas. Fighting lasted two hours, until dark. Guardia 
captured 40 animals, ammunition, correspondence and miscellaneous 
articles of loot. 
Known casualties: GN: None. 

Bandits : Unknown. 



407 



RECAPITULATION: 

Number of contacts : 510 

Guardia killed*: T^ 

Guardia wounded*: 122 

Guardia captured*: 
*( Including Marine personnel serving in the Guardia Nacional). 

Bandits killed: 1,115 

Bandits wounded: 526 

Bandits captured: 76 

Rifles captured: 187 

Rifle Grenade Dischargers captured : 1 

Shot-guns captured: 63 

Pistols captured: 107 

Dynamite bombs captured: 127 

Dynamite, (sticks) : 116 

Ammunition, (rounds): 4,096 

Cutachas and machetes: 272 

Animals (horses &z mules): 620 

Bandit camps destroyed: 102 

NOTE: In addition to the above known number of dead and wounded ban- 
dits, many traces of others, either killed or wounded, were found 
at the scene of contact but no estimate of these has been made. In 
addition to the above the Guardia captured various articles of plund- 
er. 



408 



IN 
MEMORIAM 



SECOND LIEUTENANT JOHNNIE F HEMPHILL, 
GUARDIA NAGIONAL DE NICARAGUA 

(FIRST SERGEANT, U. S. MARINE CORPS) 

KILLED IN ACTION 
30 DECEMBER 1927 QUILALI, NICARAGUA 



SECOND LIEUTENANT JAMES 0. YOUNG, 
GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA 
(SERGEANT, U.S. MARINE CORPS) 

KILLED IN LINE OF DUTY 
18 APRIL 1930 JICARO, NICARAGUA 



SECOND LIEUTENANT THOMAS G BRUCE, 
GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA 

(FIRST SERGEANT, U. S. MARINE CORPS) 



KILLED IN ACTION 
JANUARY 1928 SAPOTILLAL, NICARAGUA 



SECOND LIEUTENANT NORMAN G. FREEMAN, 
GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA 
(SERGEANT, U. S MARINE CORPS) 



DIED FROM WOUNDS RECEIVED IN ACTION 
2 AUGUST 1930 JINOTEGA, NICARAGUA 



SECOND LIEUTENANT ROBERT W. LEAKE, 
GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA 
(SERGEANT, U. S. MARINE CORPS) 



ACCIDENTALLY KILLED IN LINE OF DUTY 
30 AUGUST 1929 OCOTAL, NICARAGUA 



FIRST LIEUTENANT RUSSELL WHITE, 
GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA 

(SERGEANT, U. S. MARINE CORPS) 
— • — 
DIED FROM WOUNDS RECEIVED IN ACTION 

10 NOVEMBER 1930 CACAO, NICARAGUA 



FIRST LIEUTENANT LEWIS E. TROGLER, 
GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA 
(CORPORAL, U. S. MARINE CORPS) 

KILLED IN LINE OF DUl i 
6 OCTOBER 1929 TELPANECA, NICARAGUA 



CAPTAIN LEO HEALEY, 

GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA 

(FIRST LIEUTENANT, U.S. MARINE CORPS) 

DIED OF DISEASE INCIDENT TO SERVICE 
17 FEBRUARY 1931 MANAGUA, NICARAGUA 



CAPTAIN EDWARD SELBY, 

GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA 

(FIRST LIEUTENANT, U. S. MARINE CORPS) 

ACCIDENTALLY KILLED IN LINE OF DUTY 
9 MARCH 1930 PASO REAL, NICARAGUA 



MAJOR HUGO F. A. BASKE,(MC) 

GUARDIA NACIONAL OE NICARAGUA 

(LIEUTENANT COMMANDER, (MC) U.S.N.) 

KILLED DURING MANAGUA EARTHQUAKE 
31 MARCH 1931 MANAGUA, NICARAGUA 



CAPTAIN VERYL H. DARTT, 

GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA 

(FIRST LIEUTENANT, U.S. MARINE CORPS) 



KILLED IN LINE OF DUTY 
18 APRIL 1930 JICARO, NICARAGUA 



FIRST LIEUTENANT JAMES F. DICKEY, 
GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA 

(CHIEF QUARTERMASTER CLERK, U. S. 
MARINE C ORPS) 
KILLED DURING MANAGUA EARTHQUAKE 
31 MARCH 1931 MANAGUA, NICARAGUA 



RO 1033 -I 



410 



IN 
MEMORIAM 



SECOND LIEUTENANT WILLIAM H. PIGG, 
GUARDIA NAGIONAL OE NICARAGUA 
(SERGEANT, U.S. MARINE CORPS) 

KILLED IN LINE OF DUTY 
4 APRIL 1931 MANAGUA, NICARAGUA 



FIRST LIEUTENANT CHARLES J. LEVONSKI, 
GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA 
(SERGEANT, U. S. MARINE CORPS) 

KILLED IN LINE OF DUTY 
4 APRIL 1932 KISALAYA, NICARAGUA 



CAPTAIN HARLAN PEFLEY, 

GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA 
(CAPTAIN, U. S. MARINE CORPS) 



KILLED IN ACTION 
II APRIL 1931 LOGTOWN, NICARAGUA 



FIRST LIEUTENANT LAURENCE C. BRUNTON 
GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA 
(SECOND LIEUTENANT, U.S. MARINE CORPS) 

KILLED IN ACTION 
21 APRIL 1932 APALI, NICARAGUA 



CAPTAIN LESTER E.POWER, 

GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA 

(FIRST LIEUTENANT, U.S. MARINE CORPS) 



15 JUNE 1931 



KILLED IN ACTION 

EMBOCADEROS, NICARAGUA 



SECOND LIEUTENANT LAURIN T. COVINGTON 
GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA 
(CORPORAL, U.S. MARINE CORPS) 



KILLED IN ACTION 
21 APRIL 1932 APALI, NICARAGUA 



SECOND LIEUTENANT WILLIAM E. MCGEE, 
GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA 
(SERGEANT, U. S. MARINE CORPS) 



15 JUNE 1931 



KILLED IN ACTION 

EMBOCADEROS, NICARAGUA 



SECOND LIEUTENANT FINIS H. WHITEHEAD, (MC) 
GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA 

(PHARMACIST'S MATE FIRST CLASS, U.S.NJ 

KILLED IN ACTION 
21 APRIL 1932 APALI, NICARAGUA 



SECOND LIEUTENANT LUIS A. RAMIREZ, 
GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA 
(SERGEANT, U. S. MARINE CORPS) 

DROWNED DURING FIELD OPERATIONS 
I JULY 1931 SOMOTILLO. NICARAGUA 



SECOND LIEUTENANT EDWARD H. SCMI«ERER 
GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA 

(GUNNERY SERGEANT, U.S. MARINE CORPS) 
ASSASSINATED BY NATIVE OFFICER, 
LINE OF DUTY 
30 JUNE 1932 SAN ISIDRO, NICARAGUA 



CAPTAIN ALBERT R. BOURNE, 

GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA 

(FIRST LIEUTENANT, U. S. MARINE CORPS) 



DROWNED DURING FIELD OPERATIONS 
19 SEPTEMBER 1931 NAVARRO. NICARAGUA 



PAX 
VOBISCUM 



411 

I 



CHAPTER IV 

HEADQUARTERS CENTRAL AREA 

GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA 

JINOTEGA, NICARAGUA 

26 May, 1931. 

AREA ORDER) 
NO. 3-1931) 

Subject: AUTHORITY AND DUTIES OF GUARDIA NACION- 
AL AS NATIONAL MILITARY AND POLICE FORCE 
IN CENTRAL AREA UNDER MARTIAL LAW. 

1. MISSIONS: 

The primary mission of the Guardia Nacional in the Central 
Area is the suppression of banditry. Its secondary mission is that of a 
National Police Force charged with the enforcement of the Civil laws 
of the country. 

2. MARTIAL LAW: 

Martial law is in effect in the Central Area. It suspends 
the Constitutional civil rights of inhabitants and places in the hands 
of the Guardia all the authority necessary to carry out its missions. 

3. SUPPRESSION OF BANDITRY: 

The operations for the suppression of banditry vary from 
picking up local bad men, murderers, robbers, etc., who operate singly 
or in small groups, to those approximating organized warfare against 
well armed groups of bandits. For these operations the authority 
granted under martial law may be invoked, bandits, bandit suspects 
and anyone giving assistance to bandits may be placed under arrest, 
guides may be impressed, food stuffs and animals may be comman- 
deered, property camps and dwellings in use by bandits may be de- 
stroyed and any measures taken that will injure the cause of the bandits 
and lead to their defeat, or discourage and cause members of bandit 
groups to forsake banditry and return to peaceful occupations. These 
powers should be exercised with great discretion. 

4. TREATMENT OF RURAL INHABITANTS: 
Practically all the rural inhabitants of this area, particularly 

those living near the unsettled sections are subject to bandit attacks 
and depredations, which it is impossible for the Guardia to completely 
prevent. Many of these inhabitants, no matter where their real 
sympathies may lie are compelled, for fear of their lives, to maintain 
a friendly attitude toward the bandits. Every effort will be made to 
assure them of the friendliness of the Guardia toward all peacable 
citizens and to extend such protection as will enable them to carry on 
peaceful occupations without molestation, and to accumulate property 
without fear of robbery. No effort will be spared to demonstrate the 
advantages of law and order and to secure their cooperation. In no 
case will their property be taken without proper compensation and 
even then care must be exercised to see that they are left with sufficient 
quantities of food for their needs, and that their breeding stocks of 
fowls and livestock are not depleted. 

413 



Their houses will in no case be burned or their property 
destroyed because of assistance they may have been compelled to give 
bandits or because of failure to give information to the Guardia. Only 
such private property will be destroyed as is known to belong to bandits 
or to be for their use. 

DUTIES OF GUARDIA NACIONAL IN CENTRAL AREA (Cont). 
AREA ORDER NO. 3-193 1 . 

5. POLICE DUTIES: 

In the performance of its duties as a National Police Force, 
the Guardia will not exercise the arbitrary authority permitted under 
Martial Law. The civil rights of all citizens will be respected and 
preserved. All criminals arrested will be turned over to Civil Courts 
in accordance with the law. 

Guardia will not be used for the ejection of squatters, 
the enforcement of labor contracts, etc., unless such action is lawfully 
directed by the Civil Courts of the country. 

The Guardia will cooperate with civil authorities of Nicara- 
gua and enforce the laws impartially and equitably. 

Every effort will be made to gain the respect, confidence 
and friendship of the peaceful, law abiding inhabitants of the country . 

/s/JULIAN C. SMITH, 

Colonel, Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, 
Commanding, Central Area. 



414 



A-40 
TPC/jab 

HEADQUARTERS, NORTHERN AREA. GUARDIA NACIONAL, 

OCOTAL, NICARAGUA, 

14 June, 1932. 

AREA ORDER NO. 27 — 1932: 

Subject: HOUSE BURNING. 

1. Permanently constructed buildings will not be burned by 

Guardia Patrols. The mere fact that a dwelling house or other per- 
manent building is being or has been temporarily used by a bandit 
patrol or group when passing through a section is not sufficient justifi- 
cation for the burning of the building or buildings. 

2. A distinction must be drawn between a building of per- 
manent construction that may be or may have been used by a bandit 
group when passing through a section and a temporary or permanent 
camp built by the bandits for the purpose of using it as an operating 
base. 

3 . This order does not apply to permanent or temporary bandit 
camps constructed by them; it does apply to the destruction of per- 
manently constructed buildings which may have been temporarily 
used by a bandit group when passing through a section. 

4. In all cases of doubt the buildings will not be destroyed. 

/s/THOS. P. CHEATHAM, 
Major, Guardia Nacional, 
Commanding Northern Area. 

OFFICIAL: 
JOHN A. BURNS, 
Second Lieut. G.N. 

Dist: JD Man; Dept. Esteli; All Stations, N.A.; FILE 



415 



CHAPTER XVra 

LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS 

For application of 1932 Electoral Law 
National Board of Elections 



1 September. 1932. 




1- 

CHAPTER XVIII. 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 




Subject 


Page 


Amnesty 


2 


Arrest 


4 


Auto de Prision 


4 


Bandits 


8 


Complaints 


8 


Domicile 


10 


F"inger Dipping 


12 


Flagrante Delito 


12 


Franking Privileges 


14 


Guardia Nacional 


16 


Judicial Cooperation 


16 


La Gaceta 


18 


Nominations by Third Parties 


18 


Nominations, transmittal of 


26 


Oaths of Office 


26 


Passports & Idenity Documents 


26 


Petitions 


26 


Police 


30 


Political Prisoners 


30 


Public Motor Vehicles 


30 


Railroad Passes 


30 


Road Tax Law 


32 


Security Detachments 


32 


Supplemental Mesa Directorios 


36 


Telegraphs, Telephones and Post Office 


36 


Voting 


38 



417 



Leg. Div. Elec. Mis. ": 
REW/ASP, 8/29/32 

NATIONAL BOARD OF ELECTIONS 
MANAGUA, NICARAGUA. 
1 September, 1932. 

LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS. 

1 . The National Board of Elections, on Thursday, 1 September, 

1932, resolved that, in appropriate cases, the following instructions 
shall be adhered to during the Electoral Period of 1932, extending from 
7 September 1932 to 6 November 1932, both dates inclusive, and for 
such period thereafter as may be necessary in the conduct of a free and 
fair election: 

AMNESTY 

(a) Amnesty Decrees now in effect provide as follows: 
"The President of the Republic, considering that Headquarters, Guardia 
Nacional, has advised the Ministry of Gobernacion that one Catalino 
Olivas, who was a Jefe of a bandit group under the orders of Miguel 
Angel Ortez, voluntarily presented himself to the Guardia Nacional 
garrison in Palacaguina on the 12th of this month together with arms 
which he carried, manifesting a firm desire to abandon banditry and 
devote himself to peaceful and honorable pursuits; and, that under 
such circumstances, it is necessary to take measures to guarantee his 
life and his rights as a citizen. Considering that similar measures 
must be taken with other individuals who have participated in banditry 
and who present themselves to the authorities under the same cir- 
cumstances and, as a stimulus to their decision to reunite with society 
in order to enjoy their rights as citizens. Therefore, in conformity with 
arts. 1 1 1 inc. 7 CN. and 1 13 inc. 1st. of the Regulations of the Executive 
Power: DECREES: 1st. — To grant full amnesty to Sr. Catalino 
Olivas for whatever offense he may have committed during the time he 
was operating with the bandits. 2nd. — The same favor will be extended 
to those individuals who, under the same circumstances, present 
themselves to the constituted authority in whatever place manifesting 
their intention to abandon banditry and dedicate themselves to a life 
of peaceful and honorable work. 3rd — The authorities will keep strict 
watch over Sr. Olivas and others who may avail themselves of the 
pardon conceded in this decree in order to be assured that they are 
faithfully living up to their promises as the Executive can suspend 
said amnesty when proof is furnished that those benefiting by it are 
violating the agreement." (Presidential Decree of 21 August 1931.) 
"The Senate and Chamber of Deputies of the Republic of Nicaragua, 
DECREE: Art. 1. Full and unconditional amnesty for all persons 
who have been suspected or sentenced for political crimes. This Law 
does not apply to persons who have been punished because their 
activities or cooperation with bandits or Sandino have been proven. 
Art. 2. The authorities of the Republic shall proceed to carry out 
this Decree insofar as the application thereof concerns them." (Con- 
gressional Decree, effective from 4 February 1932.) 

418 



"The Senate and Chamber of Deputies of the Republic of Nicaragua 
DECREE: Art. 1. Full and unconditional amnesty is hereby 
granted to all Nicaraguans now under banishment. Art. 2 The 
Government shall provide the funds for repatriation to whoever re- 
quests same, the said funds to be taken from any item available." 
(Congressional Decree, effective from July 20, 1932.) 

(b) In order that a bandit may enjoy the benefits of the 
foregoing Decree of 21 August 193 1, his status must be formally declared 
as within the provisions thereof by competent executive authority, 
after investigation of the facts. 

ARREST. , 

(a) Attention is directed to the following provision of Art. 
181, section 5, of the Penal Code: 

"Public employees who, during the electoral period and in violation of 
law, perpetrate impressment into service, or order the arrest of any 
qualified citizen, except in the case of flagrante delito or when a legal 
order of arrest has been issued for a crime carrying a heavy sentence 
and from which no release under bond may be granted (shall have 
committed an offense against the right of suffrage)." (See "Flagrante 
delito," "Infraganti," "Auto de Prision," and "Voting" herein.) 

(b) For offenses against the Electoral Law, see articles 12, 
7(b), 5(a), 39, 56, 55, 73, 74, and 82(b) of the 1932 Electoral Law. 

(c) For offenses against the right of suffrage see articles 181 
to 187, inclusive, of the Criminal Code. 

AUTO DE PRISION. 

(a) In any case where the right to register and/or vote is 
challenged on account of an alleged outstanding auto de prision, the 
Electoral Directorio, subject to review, shall permit the elector to 
register or vote provisionally and, at the earliest practicable moment, 
shall proceed as follows : 

(1) Check the challenge against the list of names provided 
by the Departmental Board of Elections to determine if the name of 
the applicant elector is in fact listed thereon; 

(2) Communicate with the District Judge having juris- 
diction of the case requesting proof that the elector concerned is in 
fact laboring under an outstanding auto de prision, said proof to 
include a certified copy of the auto de prision issued, and a complete 
statement by the said judge as to why the case has not been disposed 
of in accordance with the Code of Criminal Procedure, Title IX 
thereof, as well as in accordance with the instructions issued by the 
Supreme Court of Justice on 18 August 1932; 

(3) In the event that there has been undue delay in the 
hearing and disposition of the case, the Electoral Directorio to so 
advise the District Judge, affording him an opportunity to either 
conclude or revoke the auto de prision, inviting his attention to article 
611, Code of Criminal Procedure, which reads as follows: 

"All judicial functionaries that intervene in criminal cases and 
retard their proceedings by not executing or causing them to be 
executed in the time established by law without a reasonable 
motive, shall be irremissibly punished by the Superior Tribunals 
as criminals of retardation in the administration of justice." 

419 



(4) In any case where the District Judge unreasonably 
fails to properly dispose of the auto de prision in question, the Elec- 
toral Directorio will make full report of the circumstances to the 
Departmental Board of Elections for further transmittal to the 
Supreme Court of Justice via the National Board of Elections and, 
subject to review, will proceed as follows: 

1 . Every judicial dispensation or declaration that ground 
exists for instituting action which, in the judgement of the Electoral 
Directorio, subject to the review mentioned in articles 20, section 
(b), and 24, section (b), of the 1932 Electoral Law, may be made 
with the malicious purpose of hindering a citizen in the exercise 
of his rights to register or to vote, shall not be considered sufficient 
to deprive him of such rights in accordance with article 20, section 
1, of the Constitution. (See Article 5(d) of the 1932 Electoral 
Law. But in all other cases: 

2. If the auto de prision is more than from 28 to 42 
days old in any case, depending upon the distances of witnesses 
and other evidence from the place of trial (at the rate of one day 
more than 28 for each six leagues), and if the defendant is in no 
ivay responsible for the undue delay, to declare that, for electoral 
purposes and without prejudice to renewal, said auto de prision 
has lapsed due to judicial default, and to allow the elector to register 
and/or vote; 

3. But, if the auto de prision is less than from 28 to 
42 days old in such cases as aforesaid, to make a careful study of 
the circumstances under which it was issued and, if ther is adequate 
proof that said auto was issued for malicious or political reasons 
and without valid legal grounds, to declare said auto to be null 
and void on account of fraud, and allow the elector to register 
and/or vote; and 

4. In any case where the auto de prision is entirely valid 
to sustain the challenge and bar the elector from registering and/or 
voting as appropriate, except that, if the challenge is made at the 
time of registration and the time limit for a valid auto, as hereto- 
fore set forth, will expire before the date of voting, to allow the 
elector to register provisionally, his right to vote to be determined 
at the appropriate time. 

(b) The Supreme Court of Justice has issued instructions 
to the local and district courts to afford the electoral agencies full 
cooperation, and to provide same with such information as may be 
requested by them. 

BANDITS. 

(a) Principals and accessories who are engaged in the criminal 
undertakings of "banditry" have been declared to be outlaws. Those 
against whom valid and outstanding autos de prision are in existence 
are not entitled to vote. (See "Auto de Prision" herein). Neither are 
those who have been declared by competent authority (Suprem.e Court 
or District Court having jurisdiction of the person) to be "notorious 
characters." Those who have been lawfully placed under arrest, or 

420 



who have been confined serving sentence or pending trial, are not 
entitled to personally appear at the polling place to cast their respective 
votes if the exigencies of the situation do not permit of same. (See 
"Voting" and "Security Detachments".) 

(b) In general, bandits are in the same status as other 
criminals charged with'treason, murder, arson, rape, robbery, et cetera. 
(But see "Amnesty" herein). 

COMPLAINTS. 

(a) The procedure of submitting complaints which shall 
be accorded official recognition by the electoral agencies is as follows : 

(1) Initially, any given complaint must be presented to 
the Electoral Directorio having jurisdiction within the Canton 
where the complaint arises and the decision of said Directorio shall 
be final unless an appeal is taken to higher authority in the following 
manner ; 

(2) A complaint, which is appealed from the decision of 
an Electoral Directorio, or concerning which said Directorio did not 
have jurisdiction, may be presented to the Departmental Board of 
Elections through the Departmental Governing Body of the party 
concerned or the highest departmental agency of the organization 
or group concerned, and the decision of said Departmental Board 
shall be final unless appeal is taken to higher authority in the following 
manner ; 

(3) A complaint, which is appealed from the decision of a 
Departmental Board of Elections, or concerning which said Board 
did not have jurisdiction, may be presented to the National Board 
of Elections through the National Governing Body of the party 
concerned or the highest national agency of the organization or 
group concerned, and the decision of said National Board shall be 
final. 

(b) Every effort, consistent with electoral liberty and justice, 
shall be made to discourage frivolous and captious complaints, and 
unwarranted appeals. 

DOMICILE. 

(a) With regard to the provisions of articles 4 and 32(a) 
of the 1932 Electoral Law the following explanation of the synonimous 
terms "domicile" and "legal residence" will serve as a guide in the 
application thereof: 

(1) The domicile of origin of a legitimate child is that of 
its father and continues with its father until the child is of legal age, 
or is lawfully married, or the father dies, after which the child's 
domicile is with its mother terminating as previously indicated. 

(2) The domicile of origin of an illigitimate child is with 
its mother until terminated as set forth above unless said child is 
adopted by its father. 

(3) There are several other variations as the foregoing 
which need not be considered here. 



421 



(4) The domicile of origin having been established by the 
parents of the person concerned cannot be changed except by the 
deliberate act of said person. It begins with the place where his 
parents lived with the intention of staying there permanently. When 
the parent ceases to control the domicile of the individual concerned, 
the latter may change it. To do so, he must actually leave the 
place of former residence and establish his actual residence in a new 
place with the simultaneous intention of permanently abandoning 
the old residence and permanently adopting the new. Hence, there 
must be (a) actual presence in the new place of residence; (b) actual 
intention never to return to the old place of residence; and (c) actual 
intention to permanently remain in the new place of residence. If 
all these coincide, it is said that the person has changed his former 
domicile. If they do not coincide, the old domicile obtains. 

(5) In the cases of nomads, tramps, and itinerant travelers, 
their acts and intentions are so incongruous that it is assumed that 
they have their domicile "where they happen to be at any particular 
time." Having abandoned their domiciles of origin and having no 
fixed idea of where they will permanently settle down, it is impossible 
to attribute any other domicile to them than that where they happen 
to be. But these cases must be distinguished from those where 
employment takes laborers or others temporarily away from their 
homes. Unless there is clear and unmistakable intention to abandon 
the old residence and to take up the new permanently, combined with 
physical presence in the new, there is no change of domicile. 

(6) Under the 1932 Electoral Law, even though such change 
of domicile does occur, the person concerned cannot vote in his 
new domicile unless said change was accomplished at least one month 
prior to the first day of registration, that is, by 18 August 1932. 
Otherwise, the individual concerned must register and vote in his 
former cantonal domicile. But care must be exercised that mere 
presence in the canton one month prior to the first registration day 
is not taken as proving change of domicile. Such is not the case. 
There must always be presence, intention to abandon the old domicile, 
and intention to permanently live in the new place before the latter 
becomes the legal residence or domicile of the person concerned, 
thereby displacing the old legal residence or domicile. This, combined 
with the fact that the change was made at least one month prior 
to the first date of registration, authorizes registration in the new 
cantonal residence. 

FINGER DIPPING. 

(a) As a matter of administrative necessity, and in accordance 
with established precedent in the conduct of free and fair elections in 
Nicaragua, electors who appear at the electoral mesas on the day of 
the elections will be marked for identification during the remainder of 
that day by the use of the stain provided therefor in the following 
manner : 

(1) At the time a ballot is issued to said elector, and before 
he leaves the issuing table to m^ark said ba